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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation shows that and explains why two European Union (EU) Member 
States, namely France and the United Kingdom (UK), differ in the degree of 
internalisation of political conditionality.  
 
The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part assesses the degree of 
internalisation of political conditionality. Following a three-fold measurement 
framework, the thesis examines French and British policies, legal documents and 
behaviour. The analysis of behaviour concentrates on four cases of EU aid sanctions: 
Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. France 
and the UK differ significantly. France has not officially endorsed political 
conditionality, generally does not insert human rights clauses in its developing 
agreements, and is recurrently among the donors which take a soft stance in response 
to recipient governments’ abuses. The UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy 
requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic 
principles, has consistently included human rights clauses in its development 
agreements and often belongs to the group of hardliners in favour of the application 
of aid sanctions. 
 
The second part of the dissertation explains these differences. Given the complexities 
of aid decision-making, the thesis adopts an “analytic eclectic” approach and tests 
four alternative hypotheses derived from realism, international constructivism, 
liberalism and sociological institutionalism. The examination of the cases studies and 
more than 100 interviews with diplomats, aid officials and representatives from non-
governmental organisations show that the higher accountability of aid decision-
makers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) 
have played the most significant role in generating deeper internalisation of political 
conditionality by the UK. While organisational cultures cannot explain the extent of 
internalisation of political conditionality, their differences are helpful to understand 
the characteristics of the cases when political conditionality is applied more 
reluctantly. Evidence is not sufficient to confirm the hypotheses based on material 
interests, Commonwealth influence and aid modalities. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation shows that and explains why France and the United Kingdom (UK) 
differ in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality, that is, the norm by 
which aid donors should make the allocation of development assistance dependent on 
respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments. The 
dissertation concentrates on France and the UK because, notwithstanding their 
similar status in world politics (as big donors, members of the European Union, 
former colonial empires, nuclear powers and permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council), and notwithstanding a formal attempt to coordinate their 
development policies in Africa (sanctioned by a joint declaration in 1998), the two 
countries have starkly different approaches to applying aid sanctions against human 
rights abusers. This situation offers a unique vantage point to explore those factors 
that can explain the different attitude towards political conditionality by influential 
European Union (EU) Member States.1  
 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first section argues against a 
few scholars who have suggested the demise of political conditionality, and shows 
that suspending, redirecting, cutting, and/or withdrawing aid is still widely used as a 
foreign policy tool to respond to political crises in recipient countries. In order to 
prove this claim, the section presents a few cases of recent application of aid 
sanctions, and summarises the findings of the latest quantitative studies on the 
determinants of aid allocation. The second section offers a quick overview of cases 
of variation in the application of political conditionality by OECD donors. The 
purpose is to highlight that, as far as political conditionality is concerned, the 
puzzling question is not whether aid sanctions are still used (or not) as a foreign 
policy tool, but why bilateral donors differ so much in their perspectives on the 
appropriateness of this instrument (and thus often fail to coordinate their responses to 
human rights violations or electoral frauds by recipient governments). The third 
                                                 
1 In addition to common membership in the EU, both France and the UK belong to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). This means that the dissertation offers also potential suggestions with respect to the 
determinants of variation among OECD donors (provided that the confounding effects of EU 
membership are given adequate consideration).  
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section clarifies that the thesis focuses on the empirical aspects of political 
conditionality, and does not take any side in the normative debate regarding the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of aid sanctions. If the thesis shows that either 
France or the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than the 
other donor, this does not necessarily mean that its foreign policy is more ethical than 
that of the other country. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the thesis 
structure. 
 
1.1. Current relevance of political conditionality 
 
A few researchers recently expressed their doubts about the present and future 
significance of political conditionality.2 Richard Youngs offered the latest and most 
vocal analysis. In a 2010 working paper entitled The end of democratic 
conditionality: Good Riddance? the author argued that 
 
in practice, democratic conditionality has not been deployed in a significant or 
consistent fashion. In recent years, its use has almost disappeared from Western 
foreign policies. As the international context has become more turbulent and 
uncertain, Western governments have reverted to attaching a high priority to 
deepening political engagement with autocratic regimes. Western governments’ 
use of sanctions as a means of prompting democratic reform is now extremely 
sparing. The rewards and incentives they offer for democratic reform remain 
partial and unevenly distributed. Democratic conditionality has been superseded 
and undermined by other types of conditionalities attached to more immediate, 
short-term security goals.3 
 
The fact that rewards and incentives offered by OECD donors remain partial and 
unevenly distributed cannot be questioned. Yet, there is strong evidence that political 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Yolanda Sadie, “Aid and Political Conditionalities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” South 
African Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2002): 57–68; Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and 
Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research 17, 
no. 2 (2005): 179–98. Yolanda Sadie looked at the eight largest aid recipients in the period from 1995 
and 1998 (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana and Kenya) and 
noted that there is only one electoral democracy (Uganda was classified as a non-oppositional 
authoritarian regime). Stephen Brown argued that Western donors are not using negative 
conditionality to push for democratic change in African countries. 
3 Richard Youngs, The End of Democratic Conditionality: Good Riddance?, Working Paper (Madrid: 
Spain: FRIDE, September 2010), 1. 
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conditionality has not been superseded as a foreign policy tool, and that Western 
governments’ use of sanctions as a means of promoting democratic reform (and, 
more generally, respect for human rights) is not sparing. 
 
At the policy level, the commitment to link aid to human rights improvements is still 
forceful. In 2007, Gunilla Carlson, the then Swedish Minister for Development 
Cooperation, regretted that, in previous administrations, “the implementation of both 
negative and positive conditionality has been weak”, and stated that “if democratic 
development is to take place, we must dare to implement the tools we have at hand”. 
While the need to recognize the diversity of democratic practices at country level is 
acknowledged, “firmness on principles is still necessary. Sweden should be and will 
be a voice for democratic principles and practices, and will play this role in 
multilateral forums as well as in bilateral development cooperation”.4 In April 2014, 
Jim Murphy delivered his first speech as British Shadow Secretary of State for 
International Development.5 He committed to create a new Human Rights unit within 
the Department for International Development (DFID), headed by a senior official, 
and to tougher aid conditions based on human rights performance. In a passage 
which is worth quoting, Murphy clarified his thoughts:  
 
Labour is looking at new tough rules for the granting of UK aid. Under these 
plans governments in receipt of direct UK aid would face an annual audit. As 
well as firm rules on transparency and corruption, we would monitor respect for 
human rights. A new unit at the heart of DFID would assess states against 
internationally agreed standards. Governments that fail to meet those standards 
– that break international law or breach the United Nations (UN) Charter or 
globally agreed covenants for example – and show no sign of progression 
would face consequences. Labour is developing a system of graduated 
withdrawal through which transgressors would see direct support reduced and 
                                                 
4 Gunilla Carlsson, Supporting Democracy: Highlighting the Political Dimension of International 
Development Cooperation, Opening address by the Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation, 
Challenges to Democracy Building (Stockholm: International IDEA, May 28, 2007). 
5 Katy Wright, “What Would DFID Look like under Labour?,” Oxfam Policy & Practice, April 9, 
2014, http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2014/04/what-would-DFID-look-like-under-labour. 
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eventually suspended if respect for human rights is not reinstalled. And in 
extreme cases we would of course reserve the right to act immediately.6  
 
The situation is not different at the European level. Following the publication of a 
Green Paper which stimulated over 100 responses and a heated debate, in October 
2011 the European Commission adopted a new Communication titled The Future 
Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries. The basic idea is that “EU 
budget support is not a blank cheque, nor is it provided to every country”.7 Rather, 
“commitment to the fundamental values of human rights, democracy and rule of law 
is essential for the establishment of any partnership and cooperation between the EU 
and third countries”.8 This commitment is important both at the stage of eligibility of 
budget support and in case of deterioration of the political situation. On the one hand, 
the Communication states that “eligibility criteria have to be met before and during 
the programme and conditions need to be fulfilled before payments are made”.9 On 
the other hand, “in cases where the partner country’s commitment to fundamental 
values shows a significant deteriorating trend an adequate and coordinated response 
strategy at EU and Member States level needs to be defined and implemented. 
Unless there is a clear cut-situation where EU financial interests and reputation need 
to be protected, in which case general budget support can be suspended immediately, 
the response to deterioration should be progressive and proportionate”.10  
 
On 14 May 2012, the Council of the European Union unanimously endorsed the 
proposals contained in the Communication. The Council expressly argued that “the 
commitment and record of partner countries to democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law is one of the key determinants of EU development cooperation”. As a 
consequence, “general budget support – in the form of Good Governance and 
Development Contracts – shall only be provided when and where it is assessed that 
there is trust that it will contribute to effective development impact and will be spent 
in accordance with shared objectives and values, in particular human rights, 
                                                 
6 Jim Murphy, DFID under Labour – Development and Power – Jim Murphy Speech at the ONE 
Campaign (London: Speech at the ONE Campaign, April 8, 2014), 
http://www.jimmurphymp.com/news-room/Speeches/news.aspx?p=1041548. 
7 European Commission, The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries, 
COM(2011) 638 final (October 13, 2011), 2. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
16 
 
democracy and the rule of law”. Where governance has severely deteriorated, “the 
EU should reassess its budget support cooperation with the partner country, in 
parallel to an assessment of its overall development cooperation, within existing 
procedures and decision-making processes”.11 Importantly, these developments took 
place notwithstanding Youngs’ argument that, while the EU includes a human rights 
and democracy clause in all its international agreements that explicitly provides for 
punitive measures, “many European diplomats would now like to see the clause 
removed; they argue that it has no impact, merely complicates security and economic 
objectives, and persists simply as a sop to the European Parliament”.12 
 
The most up-to-date statistical analyses on aid allocation seem to confirm that these 
statements of policy are not just cheap talk but that, at least since the end of the Cold 
War, human rights considerations have actually informed aid decision-making by 
bilateral donors. Neumayer obtained “some indication that respect for human rights 
plays a role in the bilateral allocation of aid. Countries with higher respect for 
political/civil rights receive statistically significantly more aid”. This is not totally 
true as regards respect for personal integrity rights: “countries with a higher level of 
respect do not receive more aid”. However, “countries that improve their respect for 
personal integrity rights over time do”.13 Bandyopadhyay and Wall analyzed data 
from 1995, 2000 and 2003 and found that aid “generally responded positively to … 
civil and political rights”.14 Wright and Winters highlighted the differences between 
pre- and post-Cold War periods. According to the authors, “the aid reward for 
increased contestation is increasing over the sample period, to the 5%–10% range by 
the mid-1990s. Donors’ response to increases in contestation appears to be slightly 
negative for the 20 years preceding 1990 and strongly negative in the 1960s – 
suggesting that donors actually punished recipient countries for increased 
contestation during this decade. Overall, though, the reward for improved 
                                                 
11 Council of the European Union, The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries 
(Brussels, May 14, 2012), Para. 7-8. 
12 Youngs, The End of Democratic Conditionality: Good Riddance?, 4. 
13 Eric Neumayer, “Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral and 
Multilateral Aid Flows,” Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2003): 526–527. 
14 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall, “The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” in Theory and Practice of Foreign Aid, ed. Hamid Beladi and E. Kwan Choi (Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, 2006), 401. 
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contestation appears to be increasing over time”.15 Nielsen specifically focused on 
aid sanctions, and offered the most advanced analysis of donors’ responses to 
democratic irregularities and human rights abuses. His findings indicate that foreign 
aid donors do impose aid sanctions, “but that they do so selectively. Countries that 
violate human rights are typically sanctioned under three circumstances: When the 
violating countries do not have close political ties to aid donors, when rights 
violations have negative consequences for donors, and when violations are widely 
publicized to donors”.16 
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that political conditionality is far from being 
abandoned by OECD donors and international organisation. In July 2011, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) – a United States (US) development 
agency formally based on the principle of ex post rewards for proven achievements – 
suspended $350 million allocated to Malawi after deadly anti-government protests 
and the arrests of opposition and human rights leaders.17 The MCC Board expressed 
“very serious concerns about the economic and political situation in Malawi, and 
emphasized the need for the Government of Malawi to respect the rights of its 
citizens and civil society organisations to assemble and speak freely”.18 In March 
2012, a group of renegade Malian looted the presidential palace and eventually 
overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The day 
after the coup, European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs speedily declared the 
temporary suspension of European development operations in the country. 
According to Piebalgs, “Mali has achieved steady development progress in recent 
years which can only be preserved in a stable and democratic environment”.19  
 
Even in cases of donor resistance to apply aid sanctions, calls for the application of 
political conditionality have become a recurrent feature of political debates. Even 
                                                 
15 Joseph Wright and Matthew S. Winters, “The Politics of Effective Aid,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 13, no. 2 (2010): 64. 
16 Richard A. Nielsen, “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive 
States,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 791. 
17 Faith Karimi, “U.S. Restores $350 Million Aid Package to Malawi,” CNN, June 23, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/23/world/africa/malawi-us-aid/index.html. 
18 “Press Release: MCC Board Approves Zambia Compact, Suspends Compact with Malawi,” 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, March 23, 2012, 
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-032312-Boardrelease. 
19 “EU Suspends Development Operations in Mali,” Reuters, March 23, 2012, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSBRE82M0HS20120323. 
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though Rwanda is often praised as one of the most successful development stories on 
the African continent,20 the authoritarian grip of Kagame’s power is worryingly 
worsening.21 Since 2009, the Economist has strongly supported the application of 
sanctions to respond to the human rights abuses of the Rwandan government. The 
influential magazine recognizes that “withdrawing aid would be a blunt tool and, at 
any rate in the short run, would hamper the battle against poverty. But in the longer 
run, material development will suffer if authoritarian habits turn into tyranny. Those 
in the West who rightly praise Mr Kagame for his achievements in development 
must also loudly lambast him for his loathsome and needless tendency to 
intolerance”.22 The magazine continues by arguing that 
 
the Rwandan government’s human-rights record is so bad that donors should 
start withdrawing aid ... The American and British governments have sent 
warning signals to Mr Kagame by suspending or delaying aid disbursements, so 
far only in symbolic amounts. Other Western governments have done the same. 
They should be more drastic. A big chunk of aid goes directly to supporting the 
budget rather than to specific projects. It should be withheld until Mr Kagame 
proves a real willingness to rein in his proxies abroad and give his opponents at 
home more space. ... There is a risk that he will ignore such complaints; and if 
aid is withdrawn, some of Rwanda's poorest will get hurt. But that is for him to 
decide. Western donors must not allow themselves to be blackmailed by him.23 
 
The recent revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests in the Arab World 
offered a similar picture. According to Jan Vanheukelom, “there can be little doubt 
that the Arab Spring has pushed human rights and political governance higher on the 
policy agenda in the EU and elsewhere. This has resulted in tougher talk about 
political conditionality in the aid component of the EU’s foreign relations”.24 For 
instance, in November 2012 the EU together with its 28 Member States promised 
                                                 
20 Fareed Zakaria, “Africa’s Biggest Success Story,” CNN, July 17, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/. 
21 David Smith, “Paul Kagame’s Rwanda: African Success Story or Authoritarian State?,” The 
Guardian, October 10, 2012, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/10/paul-
kagame-rwanda-success-authoritarian. 
22 “Efficiency versus Freedom; Rwanda and Other Aid Darlings,” The Economist, August 7, 2010. 
23 “A Painful Dilemma; Rwanda,” The Economist, August 4, 2012. 
24 Jan Vanheukelom, Political Conditionality in the EU’s Development Cooperation – Pointers for a 
Broader Debate, GREAT Insights (Brussels: ECDPM, April 2012), 11, http://ecdpm.org/great-
insights/trade-and-human-rights/political-conditionality-eus-dev-cooperation-broader-debate/. 
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Egypt a total of €5bn in grants and loans for a series of initiatives and projects on 
condition that democratic reform was implemented. In August 2013, the Financial 
Times reported that, as international concern mounted about recurrent crackdowns on 
Islamist protesters, the EU “urgently reviewed” relations with Egypt and “considered 
suspending aid to the country”. An EU official explicitly commented: “the current 
situation is not making it possible for Egyptian authorities to fulfil many of those 
conditions so they cannot get the money that was put at their potential disposal in 
November”.25 Even though the EU eventually disbursed the money,26 Denmark 
suspended two projects amounting to around 4 million Euros. Christian Friis Bach, 
the development aid Minister, said that the decision was a response to “the bloody 
events and the very regrettable turn the development of democracy has taken” and 
clarified that the two projects were “in direct collaboration with the Egyptian 
government and public institutions”.27 Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for 
Development, recently commented that, “given the lessons learnt from recent events 
in North Africa and the Middle East, human rights, democracy and good governance 
trends will be given greater weight”.28 
 
Interest in political conditionality is higher on the agenda also outside of policy-
making circles. The most recent results from the Eurobarometer surveys show that 
European citizens are strongly in favour of political conditionality. At the beginning 
of 2011, Europeans were asked whether development aid should be offered with 
conditions attached in a specific area. A large majority of 84% believe that the EU 
should require developing countries to follow certain rules regarding democracy, 
                                                 
25 James Fontanella-Khan, Abeer Allam, and James Politi, “EU Considers Suspension of €5bn in Aid 
to Egypt,” Financial Times, August 18, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d7381334-07f8-11e3-badc-
00144feabdc0.html. 
26 Mark Tran, “EU Denounces Egypt Violence but Will Maintain Aid Programmes,” The Guardian, 
August 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/21/eu-egypt-violence-
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/16/germany-egypt-aid_n_3767552.html. 
28 Andris Piebalgs, “Preface,” in The European Union and Global Development: An “Enlightened 
Superpower” in the Making?, ed. Stefan Gänzle and Sven Grimm (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), xi. 
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human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.29 A 
renewed attention to political conditionality can also be detected in the academic 
community. A Special Issue on “Political Conditionality” is scheduled to be 
published in World Development at the beginning of 2015.30 
 
The starting point of this dissertation is that political conditionality still is a topical 
issue in world politics. The OECD and the World Bank recently published a review 
of donor approaches, experiences and challenges in integrating human rights into aid 
programmes. One of the conclusions is that “most bilateral agencies have explicit 
political conditionality policies”.31 This result is consistent with the view that, even 
though in donor terminology ‘conditionality’ is often avoided and replaced by a 
‘dialogue’, “policy dialogue is just another donor conditionality”.32  
 
Some researchers have even suggested that the use of conditionality is increasing. 
According to Rachel Hayman, what seem to be emerging are “more signs that donors 
are willing to pull back from unconditional budget support where political 
governance seems to be going in the ‘wrong’ direction, or are putting in place 
stronger mechanisms for scrutinising democratic practice”.33 Jonathan Glennie 
agrees that “the use of aid to pressure recipient governments to respect human rights 
appears to be on the increase. Whereas once donors sent aid to the most despotic of 
regimes to secure strategic national interests, now they appear to want to use their aid 
power to stand up for the rights of citizens in other countries”.34 
 
  
                                                 
29 Eurobarometer, Making a Difference in the World: Europeans and the Future of Development Aid, 
November 2011, 28. 
30 Sebastian Dellepiane, Jörg Faust, and Nadia Molenaers, “Political Conditionality and Development 
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Bank Publications, 2013), 45. 
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21 
 
1.2. Existing variation in the internalisation of political conditionality 
 
The fact that political conditionality is still considered to be an appropriate tool of 
foreign policy does not mean that all donors consistently apply the norm. Numerous 
are the frauds and abuses that go unpunished; numerous are also the cases in which 
donors do not offer a coordinated response. For instance, in 2008 the Netherlands 
and Sweden cut budget support to the Rwandan government, but other donors did 
not.35 In Kenya, many donors are reluctant to provide budget support, even though 
the European Commission does.36 
 
In some circumstances, a different reaction by donors can be explained by the 
contextual factors of the case at stake. As mentioned above, Nielsen found that the 
adoption of aid sanctions is more likely for donors that have no close political ties to 
recalcitrant recipient governments and that suffer from negative “externalities” 
caused by human rights violations. This is understandable, and much of the variation 
among donors is usually explained in these terms. For instance, in 1999 Portugal 
resisted the application of aid sanctions against Guinea-Bissau because of the strong 
links with its former colony.37 In 1991, the Japanese government distanced itself 
from other bilateral donors and decided not to impose negative measures against 
Indonesia because of regional strategic interests.38 
 
But what if variation among donors could not be explained exclusively through the 
specificities of their bilateral relations with the recipient government, but can be 
considered also the consequence of differences in the importance assigned to human 
rights and/or in the perception of the value of aid sanctions? In other words, what if 
some donors actually consider political conditionality more appropriate than other 
donors? This would imply a variation in the “internalisation” of the norm. All other 
things being equal (including colonial legacy, economic interests, strategic 
                                                 
35 Eugenia Zorbas, “Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox,” in 
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, eds. Scott Straus and Lars 
Waldorf (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 113. 
36 Hayman, “Budget Support and Democracy,” 684. 
37 Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 332. 
38 Mark Robinson, “Will Political Conditionality Work?,” IDS Bulletin 24, no. 1 (1993): 61. 
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significance, etc.), some donors would be more willing than others to apply aid 
sanctions in response to human rights violations, coups d’état and electoral frauds. 
 
The issue of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights offers a good 
example of variation in the internalisation of political conditionality. In November 
2007, the Netherlands was the first among the major donors of development 
assistance to state that it would lobby developing countries to legalize homosexuality 
and fight discrimination.39 Since then, numerous donors (including Germany, the US 
and the UK) expressed their support to the idea of using aid as a tool to press African 
government not to criminalize homosexuality.40 For instance, in October 2011 David 
Cameron, the UK Prime Minster, affirmed: “We are not just talking about it. We are 
also saying that British aid should have more strings attached. This is an issue where 
we are pushing for movement, we are prepared to put some money behind what we 
believe”.41  
 
Notwithstanding a discernible trend, a few donors have not embraced the idea. Japan, 
France and Italy never released any statement in support of LGBT rights 
conditionality. The consequences are evident if one looks at specific cases. In 
February 2014, three European countries (the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark) 
announced the withdrawal of millions of dollars in direct support to Uganda’s 
government (but will continue supporting nongovernmental groups).42 Sweden 
suspended part of its aid cooperation in March,43 while the U.S. followed suit in 
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June.44 Other donors showed unwillingness to use aid as a weapon to induce policy 
changes. The Japanese ambassador to Uganda, Junzo Fujita, said his government will 
not abandon Ugandans even as some donor countries threaten to withdraw aid. 
According to the ambassador, what matters is helping people in need, not the 
legislation: “This issue (anti-gay law) and aid are different. In my own view, people 
are affected and they need safe water. We cannot close our eyes because of that issue 
(anti-gay legislation)”.45 An advisor to the French Minister of Development 
Cooperation took a similar stance and diplomatically affirmed that France was “not 
necessarily in favour of temporary suspension of aid”.46 
 
The issue of LGBT rights is only one example of variation in the internalisation of 
more general political conditionality among donors agencies. Hints suggesting the 
existence of this variation are diffuse. Among academic works using qualitative 
approaches, Uvin examined the application of political conditionality by the US, 
Japan, the European Commission and France until mid-1992. The conclusion of his 
research was that, compared to other donors, “the French policy change in favour of 
political conditionality is much more modest”.47 Stokke edited a volume on specific 
instances of political conditionality by Norway, the UK, Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland between 1992 and 1994. He stressed that “the 
objectives associated with [political] conditionality and the strategy to attain these 
objectives vary from one donor country to another”;48 as a matter of fact, “donor 
countries have not been identical in their approach”.49 Crawford scrutinized the 
behaviour of the UK, the US, Sweden and the EC/EU in 29 cases of political 
conditionality during the first half of the 1990s. He found large inconsistencies: “31 
per cent [of the cases] are characterised by … significant difference in donor 
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practices, where punitive measures taken by at least one of the donors contrast with 
the lack of action taken by others”.50 More recently, Barratt compared the 
incorporation of human rights by the aid agencies of the UK, Australia and Canada 
from the 1970s to the first decade of the new millennium. Her research 
“demonstrates variation in the extent to which democratic donors maintain a 
commitment to human rights in making aid decisions”.51 Nadia Molenaers focused 
on donors’ policies regarding budget support and political conditionality. The results 
of her research indicate that “large differences exist between donors where budget 
support policies and practices are concerned. These differences are grounded in 
fundamentally different visions and expectations regarding budget support and give 
rise to very different interpretations on what the role of donors is in the field when 
leveraging reform”.52 
 
Academic works using quantitative methods confirm these findings. Svensson 
answered the question whether between 1970 and 1995 certain donors (among 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the 
US) were more prone to reward democratic countries. He concluded that “there are 
large differences across donors with respect to the allocation of foreign aid”.53 
Alesina and Dollar assessed aid determinants for the US, the UK, France, Japan, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Austria, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway in the period from 1970 to 1994. They proved that “democracy 
is an area in which there are clear differences among major donors”;54 in fact, 
“certain donors … respond more to the ‘correct’ incentives, namely … good 
institutions of the receiving countries … Other countries … give to former colonies 
tied by political alliances, without much regard to other factors, including poverty 
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levels or choice of politico-economic regimes”.55 Zanger analysed whether foreign 
aid from Germany, France, the UK and the EC/EU rewarded good governance in 
developing countries between 1980 and 1995. She concluded that “more democratic 
countries received more aid only from Germany during the period 1986 to 1990. 
Countries that moved towards democracy benefited from more aid only from the UK 
between 1991 and 1995. Human rights violations had no effect on either France or 
the EC/EU. Both Germany and the UK showed rather mixed results in their aid 
allocation in respect to repression in the recipient countries”.56 Neumayer studied the 
bilateral aid allocation by all 21 countries that form the OECD DAC from 1985 to 
1997. He found that “as concerns human rights, there is no consistent pattern across 
donors”; in fact, “respect for civil/political rights and respect for personal integrity 
rights exert a positive influence on the pattern of aid giving of only few donors”.57 
Berthélemy provided an overall empirical assessment of the motivations of foreign 
aid granted by Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark, New 
Zealand, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Japan, Finland, USA, UK, France, Italy and 
Australia in the period between 1980 and 2000. He found “a lot of heterogeneity in 
donor behaviour”. On average, “donors target recipients with better governance 
indicators, such as democracy or absence of violent conflicts … in spite of the 
egoism of their policies, bilateral donors also implement some sort of selectivity 
rules based on recipient needs and merits”. However, “there are significant 
differences of parameters among donors, for virtually all donors”. As far as 
democracy is concerned, for instance, “Austria behaves … differently from other 
[altruistic] donors … the Austrian aid is the only one to be significantly and 
negatively correlated with democracy”.58 Carey investigated the aid decisions of the 
European Commission, Germany, France, and the UK from 1978 to 2003. 
Controlling for various donor interests and recipient needs, “the results show that, 
despite donors’ emphasis on human rights in official documents, the human rights 
situation in developing countries does not consistently shape European aid 
commitments”. She concluded that “levels of human rights violations do not 
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influence the decision of European donors on whether or not to give aid to a country 
– apart from the UK, which gave more aid to the most repressive countries”. 
Moreover, there “was a general trend in the findings: when deciding how to allocate 
aid, Germany paid more attention to the human rights situation in developing 
countries than the other donors analyzed in this study”.59 
 
Variation among EU member states is acknowledged not only by academics but also 
by European institutions. In the occasion of the public consultation on the future of 
EU budget support held in 2011, the European Commission highlighted that “when 
underlying principles [of human rights, good governance and rule of law] deteriorate, 
some donors suspend disbursements, while others continue”. Indeed, European 
donors disagree with respect to the most appropriate forum for dialogue on political 
governance: “some have advocated using all possible avenues, including budget 
support dialogue processes … Others have favoured a more political forum, separate 
from but informing and informed by budget support dialogue processes”.60  
 
EU member states confirmed this view as well. The Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AECID) stressed that “in the past there have been 
differences between states, and between states and the European Commission, that 
have resulted in mixed messages being sent”.61 Germany emphasised that “at present, 
the Commission and the Member States occasionally disagree as to whether the 
underlying principles [of human rights respect] are met, which is often hard for our 
partners to understand”.62 Sweden agrees that “the Commission and the Member 
States sometimes come to diverging conclusions regarding the suitability of budget 
support in specific countries”.63  
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The consultation itself represented a blatant manifestation of large differences. The 
objective of the consultation was to collect views and evidence that would improve 
the provision of budget support. The Commission welcomed contributions from all 
EU Member States on the most critical topics, including political conditionality. At 
issue was whether budget support should be explicitly conditional on a country’s 
respect of the principles of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law or 
not. As the Commission acknowledged, “experience has shown that political 
sensitivities are likely to be more intense in the case of budget support, mainly in the 
context of general budget support (GBS), since it is widely seen as providing an 
endorsement of the partner country’s overall policy stance”.64 The questions put 
forward by the Commission included: should budget support programmes make 
more use of political governance conditionality? How can donors meaningfully 
respond to any deterioration in the underlying principles while protecting the 
development benefits and predictability of budget support?  
 
The result of the consultation was that EU member states were patently divided into 
three distinct groups. First, there were the strong supporters of political 
conditionality. The Netherlands made it clear that “budget support will not be 
provided where there is evidence of corruption or human rights violations, or 
insufficient evidence of good governance”. The Dutch government “believes that 
memorandums of understanding (MoU) on budget support between donors and the 
recipient government should include clear underlying principles. These must reflect 
the principles that serve as the basis for the budget support relationship, in particular 
principles on anticorruption, human rights and good governance”.65 Germany agreed 
that budget support should be granted “only to a few select countries” and “on the 
basis of minimum standards, which must include governance criteria”. Germany 
“regards it as absolutely essential that the (general) budget support provided by the 
EU Commission be tied to fulfilment of the underlying principles (in most cases 
peace and security, the rule of law, human rights, a focus on poverty reduction, 
efforts to tackle corruption, reform of public financial management/administrative 
reform, macroeconomic stability). That makes it very important to assess whether 
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these principles are being observed before granting budget support for the first time. 
They constitute the eligibility criteria. It is then equally important to continually 
monitor observance of these principles during the course of budget support 
programmes”.66 Ireland was on the same line: “Where GBS is being provided it must 
be strongly linked to standards and performance on progressing the Underlying 
Principles of rule of law, human rights, democracy and good governance. 
Commitments to the Underlying Principles should be included in transparent and 
unambiguous MoU between partners”.67  
 
Second, there were those countries whose position on the issue was not well-defined. 
Italy, for instance, emphasised that it “believes that the action of the EU should be 
inspired at all stages by those principles which are the fundament of the dialogue 
with partner Countries”. However, Italy also warned that “we should pay attention 
not to overcharge this tool with an excessive political emphasis, thus creating new 
conditionalities”. In ambiguous terms, Italy concluded that “the Underlying 
Principles of human rights, protection of religious minorities, democracy, rule of law 
and good governance – which are, for instance, present in the budget support MoU 
with Mozambique – could be included in all budget support MoUs, provided that 
they are not used as political conditionality leverage” 68. Spain maintained a similar 
position. It affirmed that when it comes to designing budget support operations, “it is 
important to set out a number of underlying principles regarding respect for human 
rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and governance [...] Therefore, we 
believe that these principles should be contained in the MoU as principles that inform 
the entire programme”. Nevertheless, these principles “should not be automatically 
transferred to the Performance Assessment Frameworks” and “must be previously 
agreed with the partner government, in accordance with its cultural and socio-
political context and specific historical perspective”.69  
 
Third, there were the staunch critics of political conditionality. Portugal affirmed that 
it “does not support the use of budget support as a means to increase leverage or 
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political control, or as a means to micro-manage policies and politics. This 
instrument is a financing tool for development and not a tool for political pressure”. 
According to Portugal, “this does not mean granting budget support a blank check 
but it should also not imply a whole new layer of human rights conditionality. 
Conditionality associated to GBS should be exclusively related to good use of budget 
support, which is why financial management analysis is so important, and the 
underlying principles identified in the MoU shall not be transformed into “Terms of 
Reference” for political dialogue”.70 
 
This cursory sample of academic findings, policy statements and anecdotes proves 
that OECD donors and EU Member States, have internalized political conditionality 
with different strengths: some donors deem political conditionality as the appropriate 
behaviour in development assistance, others do not. The consequence is that for 
some donors the threshold to apply political conditionality is higher than for others, 
and that some donors apply political conditionality more consistently than others. 
The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the existence of this variation between 
France and the UK, and then explain it. 
 
1.3. Internalisation of political conditionality, not ethical foreign policy 
 
The argument of this dissertation is that the UK has internalized political 
conditionality to a larger extent than France. There are several reasons why this does 
not necessarily mean that British foreign policy is more ethical than the French one, 
or that British decision-makers care more about human rights than their French 
counterparts.  
 
First, democracy and human rights can be promoted through aid sanctions, but also 
in numerous other ways. Remaining in the field of development cooperation, most 
Western donors directly support local civil society organisations.71 Beyond 
development cooperation, Luard proposed the following list of types of action which 
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a government can take to influence the domestic behaviour of other states. In 
ascending order of urgency:  
 confidential representations to the government concerned;  
 joint representations made with other governments;  
 public statements of concern in parliament or elsewhere;  
 support for calls in such bodies as the United Nations Human Rights Council;  
 direct initiation of such action in international bodies;  
 cancellation or postponement of ministerial visits;  
 restraints on cultural and sporting contracts;  
 embargoes on arms sales;  
 reduction in aid programmes;  
 withdrawal of an ambassador;  
 a cessation of all aid;  
 the breaking of diplomatic relations;  
 trading sanction.72  
 
Even though France does not use political conditionality as consistently as the UK, it 
might promote human rights through other actions, such as diplomatic demarches or 
trade agreements.73 Vice versa, even though the UK is more willing to apply aid 
sanctions than France, it might undermine the efficacy of its efforts through 
contrasting policies in other areas. For instance, British policy-makers have often 
been blamed because of sizeable arms exports to repressive regimes.74 If a 
comprehensive analysis of French and British foreign policies is outside the scope of 
this dissertation, it is nonetheless important to remember that policy coherence is 
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widely acknowledged as one of the main problems behind the lack of effective 
integration of human rights into the foreign policy of many donors.75  
 
The second reason why internalisation of political conditionality does not amount to 
ethical foreign policy is that there is no general consensus on the appropriateness 
and/or effectiveness of aid sanctions in promoting respect for human rights and 
democratic principles by recipient governments under all circumstances (and this is 
where variation steps in: some countries believe in the norm while others do not). 
The arguments in favour of conditionality are numerous. In response to those who 
argue to shift from suspension and cuts to earmarking assistance to specific sectors, 
for instance, supporters of political conditionality recall the problems associated with 
aid fungibility.76 The Economist offers a lucid description of the issue: 
 
Aid-givers often finance specific projects, such as irrigation and the building of 
schools. Since the schools are usually built and the ditches dug, donors are 
satisfied that their money has served its intended purpose. But has it? Probably 
not. Most evidence suggests that aid money is fungible – that is, that it goes into 
the pot of public funds and is spent on whatever the recipient wants to spend it 
on. If donors earmark money for education, it may cause the recipient 
government to spend more on education, or it may make available for 
something else the money that it would otherwise have spent on education. If 
the government is benign, the alternative may be agriculture or tax cuts. If the 
government is crooked, donors’ funds may be spent on shopping trips to 
London for the president's wife or fighter planes to strafe unpopular 
minorities.77 
 
Aid fungibility entails that, even if political conditionality is not effective in 
triggering policy changes, at least it saves donors from complicity with abuses.78 
 
                                                 
75 David P. Forsythe, ed., Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2000); Richard Falk, “Human Rights,” Foreign Policy, no. 141 (April 2004): 18–28. 
76 Tarhan Feyzioglu, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu, “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of 
Foreign Aid,” The World Bank Economic Review 12, no. 1 (1998): 29–58; H. Pack and J. R. Pack, 
“Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993, 258–
65. 
77 “Helping the Third World: How to Make Aid Work,” The Economist, June 26, 1999. 
78 Vanheukelom, Political Conditionality in the EU’s Development Cooperation – Pointers for a 
Broader Debate, 11. 
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The latest trends in the selection of aid modalities offer additional weight in favour 
of political conditionality. Since the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
donors have been strongly encouraged to abide by the principle of country ownership 
and disburse funds through recipient governments’ public financial systems.79 The 
expansion of general budget support, that is, un-earmarked contributions to the 
recipient government’s budget, is the most evident sign of this new tendency.80 The 
weakness of this approach is that “it risks strengthening the state without reforming 
it, perpetuating political elites and their rent-seeking bureaucracies, and 
marginalizing those elements in society with the greatest energy and motivation to 
effect positive transformation”.81 In other words, aid dependence can intervene in the 
democratic balance of power and “tip it toward the executive branch”.82 For instance, 
past research showed that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid 
allocation process in favour of co-partisan and co-ethnic voters, and that this bias has 
increased incumbent vote share.83  
 
If donors want to maintain government-to-government funding, political 
conditionality can mitigate the risk mentioned above by promoting higher 
transparency and encouraging public participation. This is important because 
alternative strategies have little leverage. For instance, support to civil society can be 
constructive. However, “it is clear that the potential of a human rights-based 
                                                 
79 On the relationship between the Paris Declaration and human rights, see Marta Foresti, David 
Booth, and Tammie O’Neil, Aid Effectiveness and Human Rights: Strengthening the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration (London: ODI, 2006), 
http://www.redenderechos.org/webdav/publico/Aid%20effectiveness%20and%20human%20rights.pd
f. 
80 Stefan Koeberle, Zoran Stavreski, and Jan Walliser, Budget Support as More Effective Aid?: Recent 
Experiences and Emerging Lessons (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2006). 
81 Tom Porteous, “British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour,” 
International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 293. 
82 Deborah Bräutigam, Aid Dependence and Governance (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 2000), 32. See also Amanda A. Licht, “Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid 
on Leader Survival,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 1 (2010): 67; Joseph Wright, “How 
Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political 
Science 53, no. 3 (2009): 553. 
83 Ryan S. Jablonski, “How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid 
Distribution,” World Politics 66, no. 2 (2014): 293–330. A qualitative description of this process is 
offered by Human Rights Watch. According to this organisation, the Ethiopian government of Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi reportedly withheld the distribution of foreign aid, including agricultural 
supplies and food aid, from families that failed to vote for his party. Human Rights Watch, 
Development without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, October 2010. 
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approach is limited where the overarching political context is authoritarian or 
autocratic and rule of law is absent”.84  
 
Even though these arguments are powerful, they do not prove that political 
conditionality is always the appropriate response to human rights violations, coups 
d’état and electoral fraud. Critics recall that political conditionality is often 
ineffective.85 Tertius Zongo, Former Prime Minister and Former Minister of Finance 
of Burkina Faso, recently warned donors that they “cannot buy reform with money. 
The recipients will pretend they have changed. But genuine change is a bottom up 
process. We must ensure that the European institutions understand that a suitcase of 
money will not build democracy”.86 Stephen Brown confirms that 
 
political conditionality, as currently applied, can be evaded. Many African 
governments quickly learned how to make the minimum necessary reforms to 
retain their levels of aid: allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; 
permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups 
to function, but not effectively; and consenting that elections be held, but not 
replace the ruling party.87  
 
Political conditionality can even produce unintended side-effects. Sanctions 
sometimes provoke a hardening of attitude by the recipient government, or a “rally 
behind the flag” dynamic within the recipient country.88 
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Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993), xii. For a specific example, see the case of 
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4 (1996): 46–65. 
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An additional argument against political conditionality is that disengagement is not 
always helpful.89 Through the application of aid sanctions, donors lose (at least part 
of) their leverage over the recipient government.90 On the contrary, maintaining aid 
programs “may provide a means, however marginal, of influencing the situation 
through the many direct contacts with result: once it is cut off, all chance of influence 
is lost and the direct contacts with the population are destroyed”.91 Commentators 
suggest that this “doesn’t mean donors should not seek to influence events for the 
better, using the tools they have available. While pulling out may appear safer in 
terms of risk management, staying involved may be the best way to make a change 
for the better”.92 The underlying idea is  
 
to attempt to influence the situation directly through cooperation relations with 
the regime, and where feasible also through ensuing contacts with local people. 
Through mere presence, continued interest and active involvement in 
developing activities, a donor may build up trust and acquire a position as 
legitimate and accepted partner in a development, human rights and/or 
democracy dialogue.93 
 
The application of political conditionality has also been accused of neo-colonialism. 
According to John Jean Barya, “conditionalities are unrelated to any desire by 
Western donors to promote democracy in Africa, but rather should be viewed as part 
of a broader scheme to promote a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold 
War”.94 The neo-colonial claim is based on the argument that power imbalances 
between donor and recipient governments have not fundamentally changed. A 
statement signed by over 50 African organisations working on sexual health, 
women’s rights and gender issues – including ActionAid Liberia, Women Working 
with Women (Kenya), Coalition Against Homophobia in Ghana, Engender (South 
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Africa), and House of Rainbow Fellowship (Nigeria) – argued against aid sanctions 
in response to anti-gay legislation because they “are by their nature coercive and 
reinforce the disproportionate power dynamics between donor countries and 
recipients”.95 Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, regularly lambasts the donors’ 
attitude in the following terms: “What is this blackmail about? Aid? .. They give you 
aid so that forever you glorify them and depend on them. And they keep using it as a 
tool of control and management”.96   
 
These are only some of the arguments offered by the critics of political 
conditionality. Aid sanctions, in particular when linked to budget support operations, 
can also undermine the predictability of aid flows and the efforts at improved donor 
harmonization around country systems and priorities. This can impact on the 
effectiveness of aid in contributing to positive development outcomes.97 Moreover, 
there is a high risk that suspending or cutting aid actually double-punishes the poor 
population, without affecting those responsible for the abuses.98 This is the reason 
why the European Parliament recommended that before any such measures are 
imposed a proper assessment of their negative consequences should be undertaken by 
way of a human rights impact assessment.99  
 
In sum, aid conditionality represents only one aspect of the general foreign policy of 
France and the UK, and these countries can adopt contrasting behaviour in other 
areas. In addition, there is no simple answer to the question whether political 
conditionality is an appropriate and effective tool of foreign policy or not. 
Assessments should be conducted on a country by country basis.100 This means that, 
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even though this dissertation shows that the UK is more willing than France to apply 
aid sanctions, the author does not praise or blame any EU Member State for its 
policy decisions, and does not take any position in the normative debate on good 
versus bad sanctions. The assessment of ethical or unethical foreign policies is 
outside the boundaries of this research. 
 
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The second chapter clarifies the 
object of analysis, and proves the academic relevance and originality of the thesis. 
The third chapter justifies the selection of France and the United Kingdom as case 
studies and defends the methodological decision to adopt a three-fold measurement 
framework: in order to assess internalisation of political conditionality, the 
dissertation looks at policy agendas, legal documents and state behaviour. The fourth 
chapter shows that the laws, international agreements and policies regulating French 
and British development cooperation place a significantly different emphasis on the 
principles of political conditionality. France avoids any reference to political 
conditionality in both policy documents and international agreements. The UK 
strongly supports the idea of conditioning aid to respect for human rights by recipient 
governments and has included a human rights clause in the great majority of its 
cooperation agreements with developing countries. The fifth chapter extracts the 
findings on the two countries from previous quantitative studies on aid allocation and 
qualitative studies on aid sanctions, and offers a detailed comparison of the responses 
of the two donors to a small number of instances of human rights violations in 
recipient countries. The chapter shows that France is often the most opposed to the 
application of political conditionality, while the UK frequently takes the lead in the 
imposition of aid sanctions, together with like-minded Nordic donors. The sixth 
chapter defends the endorsement of “analytic eclecticism” and introduces four 
alternative hypotheses derived from realism, international constructivism, liberalism 
and sociological institutionalism. The seventh chapter shows that the higher 
accountability of aid decision-makers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in 
particular Nordic countries) are the most important factors which generated deeper 
internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. The eight chapter concludes the 
dissertation by summarising its main findings, discussing its most important 
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contributions to the academic literature, and offering a few suggestions in terms of 
potential avenues for future research. 
 
A final caveat is in order before proceeding further. The objective of the dissertation 
is not to demonstrate that the UK has consistently applied political conditionality. No 
EU Member State or OECD donor can claim this record. Rather, the thesis aims to 
show that it is possible to detect important differences between those donors who 
believe that political conditionality is appropriate under certain circumstances and 
those donors who tend to avoid the application of aid sanctions altogether. In sum, 
the thesis is interested in variation between countries, not adherence to or divergence 
from an ideal situation of perfect compliance with the norm of political 
conditionality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPLAINING WHAT? 
THE ACADEMIC RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY  
 
This chapter has three objectives:  
 to clarify the object of analysis of the dissertation,  
 to explain why it addresses a fascinating puzzle, and 
 to show its academic relevance and originality.  
The first two sections offer a working definition of foreign aid and political 
conditionality respectively. The aim is to make the topic of the dissertation as clear 
as possible. The third section lists a number of reasons why similarity, and not 
variation, should be expected in terms of internalisation of political conditionality by 
France and the UK (as well as EU Member States more in general).101 This list of 
reasons is what makes variation between the two donors a puzzle and research aimed 
at explaining it worth conducting. The fourth section makes the “academic case” for 
the thesis. It shows that this puzzle has not been explained yet by the academic 
literature on foreign aid and human rights; rather, it represents one of its major gaps. 
In addition, it suggests that the solution of this puzzle can contribute to the 
advancement of the literatures on Europeanisation and norm internalisation. 
 
2.1. Foreign aid 
 
This thesis focuses on the internalisation of political conditionality in bilateral 
foreign aid. The standard definition of bilateral foreign aid (also referred to as 
bilateral development assistance or bilateral development cooperation) is provided by 
the OECD DAC, an international forum where donor governments come together to 
coordinate their activities in development assistance. According to the DAC, bilateral 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those “grants or loans to ... 
developing countries ... which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with 
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at 
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Chapter 3. 
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concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). 
In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid”.102 
 
Four elements of bilateral ODA – the focus of this dissertation – can be stressed here 
for the sake of clarity. First, ODA is a form of concessional financing. This 
dissertation does not deal with international loans at market terms, or with the 
activity of export credit agencies. Second, ODA is provided by official state 
agencies. This dissertation does not deal with private aid, that is, the concessional 
transfer of resources by non-government organisations, religious groups, charities, 
foundations or private companies. Third, ODA has the objective of the social and 
economic development of the recipient country. This dissertation does not deal with 
military assistance (which involves the transfer of resources with the objective to 
assist an ally in its defence or in maintaining control over its own territory) or 
humanitarian assistance (which involves the transfer of resources in response to 
humanitarian crises and whose primary objective is to save lives and alleviate 
suffering, not to address structural socioeconomic factors which hamper 
development).103 Fourth, this dissertation focuses on bilateral ODA, which is directly 
delivered from donor agencies to recipient countries. This dissertation does not deal 
with multilateral ODA, when donor countries channel their development assistance 
through international financial institutions (such as the World Bank), United Nations 
agencies (such as the United Nations Development Programme), or regional 
organisations (such as the European Union).104 
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2.2. Political conditionality 
 
2.2.1. Aid conditionality as a norm 
 
In plain English, a ‘condition’ is “something demanded or required as a prerequisite 
to the granting or performance of something else”, and ‘conditionality’ is “the state 
of being subject to one or more conditions being met” (emphasis added).105 While it 
is possible to conceptualize aid conditionality as the situation in which the allocation 
or disbursement of foreign aid is subject to one or more conditions being met by the 
recipient state, this dissertation takes a step further and follows other scholars 
claiming that aid conditionality, in particular political conditionality, is not only a 
“state of being”, but also a “norm”.106  
 
In International Relations (IR), a norm is usually defined as a “standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”.107 The defining attributes of a 
norm are therefore three: moral character (norms include a prescriptive quality of 
“oughtness” and “appropriateness”), behavioural focus (norms call for specific forms 
of action) and social origin (norms are the result of inter-subjective evaluation).108 
Political conditionality presents all these characteristics: donors should condition aid 
to promote social values such as human rights. James Fearon argues that norms take 
the generic form “Good people do (or do not do) X in situations A, B, C . . .”.109 
Political conditionality takes the specific form “Good donors avoid government-to-
government aid when the recipient government violates human rights”. More 
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generally, “good donors make the allocation of development assistance dependent on 
respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments”.  
 
Being a norm, political conditionality is neither an institution nor a practice. Political 
conditionality is not an “institution” because, as defined by March and Olsen, an 
institution is “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate 
behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations”.110 Political 
conditionality lacks the aggregated character of institutions (“collection of …”). It is 
a single standard of appropriate behaviour, not a structured and interrelated group of 
behavioural rules.111 Political conditionality is not a practice because, as clarified by 
Pouliot, a practice “is learned from experience and can hardly be expressed apart 
from practice. It is ‘thoughtless’ – what popular parlance calls commonsense, 
experience, intuition, knack, skill, or practical mastery”.112 Political conditionality is 
never implemented without intentionality. The application of sanctions is always 
preceded by (often) heated debates between donors and recipient governments, 
closed sessions among ambassadors, calls by civil society organisations, ministerial 
statements of condemnation, etc. Even in the case of the US after a coup d’état, when 
the suspension of aid is automatic given the provisions contained in Section 7008 of 
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, the local ambassador and the Department of State always discuss whether a 
waiver may be appropriate or not.113 
 
A potential factor against the categorization of political conditionality as a norm is 
the observation that donors often violate it. For instance, donors almost never take 
negative measures when abuses are committed by strategically important 
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recipients.114 Against this argument, IR scholars have already suggested that norm 
violation cannot be equated with norm inexistence. According to McFaul,  
 
norm can long exist, perhaps even indefinitely, while being violated. In 
international affairs, antislavery norms enjoyed widespread recognition 
hundreds of years before the practice of slavery finally ended. Likewise, norms 
on self-determination and decolonization garnered international legitimacy well 
before the last great empire collapsed.115 
 
The fact that norms continue to exist even when they are violated represents a 
necessary precondition for the puzzle addressed by this dissertation. Why do some 
actors ignore certain norms more than others? Specifically, why do some donors 
refuse to comply with political conditionality more than others? 
 
2.2.2. Aid conditionality as a foreign policy tool  
 
As Stokke reminds us, aid conditionality “is not an aim in itself, but an instrument by 
which other objectives are pursued”.116 Scholars agree that the principal objective of 
aid conditionality is to influence the behaviour of the recipient government. For 
instance, aid conditionality can be used to induce the receiving party to undertake 
actions that it would not otherwise have taken or refrain from actions that it would 
otherwise have undertaken.117 Aid conditionality can also be used in view of other 
objectives, such as to avoid complicity with the concerned recipient country, punish 
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it, or deter similar behaviour of other recipient governments. In recent times, 
particularly in situations of economic and financial crisis, conditionality is 
increasingly seen as a way to ensure the value for money of aid programmes and 
justify them before the general public.118 
 
Aid conditionality is widely used a foreign policy tool because of the attractiveness 
of foreign assistance in the eyes of the recipient government.119 Foreign aid is desired 
by recipient states for both material (financial) and social (reputational) reasons.120 
On the one hand, foreign aid is the main source of external finance in an average 
low-income country.121 Between 1975 and 1995 foreign aid financed on average 
53.8% percent of central government expenditures in the fifty most aid-dependent 
countries.122 On the other hand, foreign aid “is a potent political symbol and signal. 
As a voluntary transfer, it suggests approbation by the donor of the recipient”.123 And 
international standing is particularly important for recipient countries both in 
international markets and in domestic political circles.124 For instance, Bartels 
confirms that aid recipients “frequently seek (or purport to seek) the legitimacy ... 
that can be conferred by such engagement”. In fact, EU action against Zimbabwe has 
failed, due to President Mugabe’s complete lack of interest in any rapprochement 
with the EU”.125 
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Those who highlight that aid conditionality is based on an asymmetric power 
relationship between the donor and the recipient make an important point with regard 
to the functioning of this foreign policy tool. However, they miss the full picture. It is 
true: the donor has something that the recipient wants (economic and political 
support) and the recipient is willing to fulfil certain conditions in order to receive it. 
However, the recipient too has something that the donor wants (the fulfilment of 
certain conditions) and the donor is willing to disburse aid in order to obtain it. For 
aid conditionality to exist, the desire by the recipient state alone is not enough. The 
basis of aid conditionality is that there is both something desired by the recipient 
state (foreign aid) and something desired by the donor (the fulfilment of certain 
conditions). Successful aid conditionality is the reciprocal satisfaction of these 
desires. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel are clear on this point: any 
conditionality relationship, in order for it to exist and to develop, must be perceived 
by all actors involved as a mutually advantageous arrangement. The costs-and-
benefits structure must be aligned to the interests of both the donor and the 
recipient.126 
 
2.2.3. The complexities of aid conditionality and the focus on negative measures 
 
This dissertation focuses on a specific aspect of aid conditionality: the adoption of 
negative measures (such as the suspension of aid delivery). Yet, it is important to 
acknowledge that aid conditionality is much more than this. First of all, aid 
conditionality can be negative, but also positive.127 In negative conditionality, 
recipient countries are penalized when they do not meet certain conditions (when 
they do not adopt “good” policies, or when they adopt “bad” policies).128 The 
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Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 4, no. 2 (2005): 125–46. 
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suspension, reduction or withdrawal of aid is used as a stick, as a sanction. Under a 
strategy of “reinforcement by punishment”, the donor state punishes the recipient 
state if conditions are not met, and avoid punishing it otherwise. The donor state 
“intervene[s] coercively … to change the cost–benefit assessment of the target 
government by inflicting extra costs”.129 In positive conditionality, recipient 
countries are rewarded when they meet certain conditions (for instance, when they 
adopt “good” policies).130 The allocation of aid (or more aid) is used as a carrot, as 
an inducement. Under a strategy of “reinforcement by reward”, the donor state 
distributes the rewards if the target government complies with its conditions, and 
“withholds the reward if the target government fails to comply with its 
conditions”.131 
  
Second, conditions can be imposed on recipient governments as a prerequisite for 
keeping up aid after an agreement has already been concluded, but also as a 
prerequisite for entering into an aid agreement in the first place.132 In contractual 
conditionality, conditions are attached to the continuation of aid disbursements under 
an agreement already into force. The most typical example of contractual 
conditionality is the presence of a specific clause in the body of an international 
agreement: the clause provides the legal ground for one party to suspend or terminate 
the agreement. A human rights clause would therefore provide the legal ground for 
the donor to suspend disbursements in case of political repression. In selective or 
allocative conditionality, it is the selection of the countries to which to allocate 
foreign aid which is subject to certain conditions. These conditions or criteria are 
usually found in documents which bear the hallmark of soft law, and are meant to be 
fulfilled before an agreement is concluded – this usually renders these conditions 
more political than legal.133 
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As can be seen, aid conditionality is a more complex phenomenon than the 
“essentially punitive strategy” which is often referred to when speaking about 
development assistance.134 Burnell is therefore right to highlight that: 
 
the exercise of political conditionality itself offers various steps, some of them 
taken in private: offers and payment of rewards, threats to withhold, to suspend 
or to cut off aid, and action implementing the same. Conditionality can mean 
more than just the enforcement of sanctions, an act of last resort which in the 
past has been associated with gross abuses of human rights. Conditionality can 
infuse the regular decision-making process over aid allocations, whereby a 
country’s inflow is maintained, increased or reduced from previous years, and 
its annual request is acceded to by donors, or met wholly or only in part. 
Instances of punitive conditionality have attracted most attention, but positive 
conditionality is probably a more widespread feature of the landscape.135  
 
Why then does this thesis concentrate on the negative aspect of conditionality? First, 
because the decision to suspend, cut or withdraw aid is never an easy decision. 
Donor agencies have strong organisational incentives to disburse money whatever 
occurs in the recipient government.136 In addition, aid sanctions are not likely to be 
effective if implemented by one donor alone. According to Crawford, “unilateral 
action to suspend aid is unlikely ever to be effective even by a major donor”.137 This 
means that sanctions represent the most unlikely case of variation in terms of 
political conditionality. In the case of political crises, donor officials always have 
extensive discussions on how to proceed, and tend to coordinate as much as possible 
in order to be able to fully justify their decision and increase the leverage of their 
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actions.138 The case of aid rewards is different because the competitiveness of the aid 
environment can actually incentivize the independent decision by a single donor to 
increase aid and thus improve the relationship with the recipient government. 
Second, sanctions are the most visible instrument to promote democracy and human 
rights in recipient countries through development cooperation. They therefore seem 
to represent the most interesting aspect in terms of generalization to other human 
rights foreign policy tools.  
 
2.2.4. Different purposes of aid conditionality and the focus on human rights and 
democracy 
 
According to Morgenthau, “a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or 
military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armoury of the 
nation”.139 As with most foreign policy tools – diplomatic talks can be used to 
prepare for war but also to adopt environmental treaties; military force can be used to 
occupy a weaker country but also to support a liberal opposition against an 
authoritarian government – aid conditionality can be used for different purposes. 
Indeed, scholars acknowledge that while “there have always been strings attached to 
development assistance… these have been of different kinds”.140 In general, aid 
conditionality has served three different purposes. 
 
A first kind of conditionality aims at influencing the foreign policy of the recipient 
state. The purpose of conditionality is to establish a relationship of gratitude with 
recipient states and to exploit this relationship in international politics.141 
Historically, donor countries have tried to use the leverage of aid conditionality in 
both security and commercial relations. On the security side, until 1989 aid 
conditions have been intimately related to the Cold War: recipient countries were 
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expected to side with the donor country in the East-West struggle.142 On the 
commercial side, aid conditions have often been used to gain advantage in the 
international competition over raw materials: recipient countries are expected to 
concede raw materials at preferential conditions to their donor counterparts.143 As a 
recent example of this foreign-policy oriented conditionality, the U.S. administration 
threatened to cut all military aid to those countries which would have ratified the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court but which were unwilling to sign bilateral 
impunity agreements with the United States.144 
  
A second kind of conditionality aims at influencing the domestic economic 
behaviour and/or the domestic economic structure of the recipient state. The purpose 
of this type of conditionality is to protect the international system against weaknesses 
in recipient countries and/or to improve aid effectiveness. The major proponents of 
this type of conditionality have been the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.145  
 
A third kind of conditionality aims at influencing the domestic political behaviour 
and/or the domestic political structure of the recipient state. As Doornbos puts it, the 
goal of this kind of conditionality is “to establish a grip on recipient developing 
countries’ handling of policy processes”, and “on the basic manner in which 
government and its constituent political processes . . . would be structured”.146 The 
final purpose of this form of conditionality can be two-fold: to safeguard the rights 
and freedoms of the individuals under the sovereign hand of recipient countries, and 
to improve aid effectiveness. This kind of conditionality has mainly concentrated on 
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three different indicators: personal integrity rights (right to life, prohibition of torture, 
etc.), civil and political rights (right of assembly, political pluralism, fair and free 
elections, etc.), and an accountable and efficient public administration (transparency, 
the absence of corruption, low military expenditure, etc.).147  
 
This dissertation focuses on this last kind of conditionality, and concentrates 
exclusively on personal integrity rights (for instance, right to life, prohibition of 
torture, etc.), and civil and political rights (for instance, non-discrimination, freedom 
of the press, right to vote, etc.). Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this type of 
conditionality as “political conditionality”.  
 
2.2.5. Political conditionality: conflating human rights and democracy? 
 
The decision to combine abuses of personal integrity rights with violations of civil 
and political rights (including gross violations of basic democratic principles) is in 
line with past academic literature.148 This equivalence is important for the 
dissertation to build upon past findings, as well as to contribute effectively to a 
thriving research programme.  
 
Mixing human rights with democracy is also consistent with existing State practice. 
For instance, the “human rights clause” included in EU cooperation agreements with 
development countries covers three essential elements: human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law. As highlighted by Youngs, EU Member States and EU 
institutions rarely clarify which elements of the clause warrant intervention under the 
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specific circumstances of each case: European donors strongly resist the idea of 
separating democracy from human rights.149 In a similar way, the Friends of 
Zimbabwe – the grouping of the country’s major aid donors – has never 
distinguished between the promotion of human rights and the push for free and fair 
election. For instance, the donors repeatedly declared that they “collectively stand 
ready to broaden, deepen and harmonise [their] engagement and support as the 
country moves further down the path of democracy and respect for human rights”.150 
Gomes Porto confirms that the objective of the donors was to “pressure Robert 
Mugabe’s regime to negotiate with the Movement for Democratic Change, to respect 
human rights and fundamental liberties, to repeal draconian legislation and, finally, 
to implement transparent and free and fair elections”.151 
 
Most interviewees have also confirmed that, notwithstanding the fact that coups 
d’état tend to lead to aid sanctions more recurrently than gross human rights abuses, 
the attitude of EU Member States does not change if one looks at abuses of personal 
integrity rights or violations of civil and political rights.152 The consequence is that 
the two types of cases can be included in the same set. 
 
2.3. Why is variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality a 
puzzle? 
 
There are numerous reasons to expect convergence rather than variation in the degree 
of internalisation of political conditionality by OECD donors since the end of the 
Cold War. All of these reasons are particularly strong for European donors. This 
explains the principled stance adopted by the European Union as a whole, and 
justifies the decision to concentrate this dissertation on EU Member States. 
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2.3.1. The recognition of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the promotion of 
human rights 
 
The first reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political 
conditionality by OECD donors is that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the promotion 
of human rights came to be seen as both an effective and an appropriate behaviour in 
international relations. This should have led all Western donors – both habitual 
human rights advocates and traditional laggards – to more actively promote human 
rights, and thus adopt political conditionality.  
 
Changing beliefs on the effectiveness of human rights promotion were a consequence 
of the climate of hope and euphoria evoked by the perspectives of democratisation of 
Eastern Europe, the rapid advancement of the Latin American continent towards the 
rule of law, and the disappearance of the apartheid regime in South Africa. As a 
matter of fact, Eastern Europe, Latina America and South Africa had been the most 
prominent targets of human rights campaigns during the 1980s.153 Changing beliefs 
on the appropriateness of human rights promotion were mainly due to the 
endorsement of a pro-human rights re-orientation by regional organisations with 
representation of Southern governments, such as the Commonwealth, the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU).154 Horng effectively summarises that this was a period “characterised by 
major political change and a rapidly shifting world scene leading to the emergence of 
more governments committed to democracy and auguring well in some ways for the 
development of human rights”.155 Burnell recalls that “increasingly the view [was] 
being expressed that the international community is entitled to insist on all states 
fulfilling certain basic responsibilities in regard to their own citizens”.156 The 
promotion of human rights was eventually recognised as a paramount goal of the 
world community by all United Nations Member States: “the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and 
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international levels should be universal … the international community should 
support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world” (as included in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993).  
 
This new consensus should have had some impact on donors’ policies and behaviour 
because during the Cold War many OECD countries voluntarily ignored human 
rights as they represented a highly politicised issue. The aim of this strategy was to 
depart from the domineering practices of the superpowers: the promotion of human 
rights was perceived as only reflecting the military opposition between the West and 
the East (civil and political rights on the one side, economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other side), and ideological and strategic considerations were perceived 
to override more genuine human rights concerns.157 In contrast, “with the decline of 
East-West conflict, donors feel increasingly justified in promoting democracy and 
pluralism in their own right without being accused of neo-colonialism”.158 As 
Kevlihan confirms, “with Cold War rivalry removed from the equation, Western 
governments felt freer to pursue basic political concerns vis-à-vis governments of the 
South”.159 
 
2.3.2. From development as a prerequisite of human rights respect to respect for 
human rights as a prerequisite for economic development and aid effectiveness 
 
The second reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of 
political conditionality by OCED donors is that, after the failures of many 
development programmes in the 1980s a consensus developed within the foreign aid 
community on the causal belief that respect for human rights is a precondition for 
good economic performances by recipient countries, and thus enhances the 
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effectiveness of mainstream development programmes.160 This evolution should have 
led all Western states to adopt political conditionality and promote human rights, if 
not for their own sake, in pursuit of their development goals: donors eager to ensure 
the maximum impact of their aid programmes should target it towards countries with 
good track records on human rights or push laggards to adopt reformist agendas. 
 
Scholars agree that one of the most important factors behind the diffusion of political 
conditionality was that respect for human rights was seen as a means to the end of 
economic development and liberalisation.161 Furuoka recalls that “there has been a 
growing awareness that foreign aid works less effectively in the recipient countries 
where political regimes suppress human rights and democracy”.162 As Wiseman 
commented, “the reasoning behind political conditionality was partly economic in 
that it was argued that economic failure … was in some measure due to the absence 
of democracy and political accountability and that without political change the 
imposition of economic conditionality … would not produce the desired economic 
results”.163  
 
This reasoning ran against the prevailing opinions that development and prosperity 
are preconditions for the respect of human rights, rather than vice versa,164 and that 
the successful implementation of economic adjustment requires the firm hand of 
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authoritarian rule.165 This new thinking initially emanated from the World Bank. In 
the context of the poor results of structural adjustment programmes, the Bank 
concluded that its economic policies were correct but not being implemented 
properly. Attention was drawn to the weaknesses of political institutions caused by 
the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable governments.166 Indeed, already in 
1989 the World Bank “suspended disbursements of its structural adjustment loan to 
strike-torn Benin, informing the government that it could not continue its 
disbursements until it had ‘the consent of its people’ to continue its reform 
programmes”.167 This approach was later confirmed by the OECD. In 1996, the 
OECD DAC identified a set of qualitative foundations that are deemed to be essential 
for achieving developmental goals, including “capacity development for effective, 
democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect 
for the rule of law”.168 
 
2.3.3. The end of the Cold War and the power readjustments in the international 
arena  
 
The third reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political 
conditionality by OECD donors is that the power readjustment that took place in the 
international arena after the collapse of the communist bloc both freed Western 
donors to pursue other goals than security maximisation and made them more 
powerful vis-à-vis recipient countries. OECD donors should have similarly adopted 
political conditionality because its application became less costly as well as more 
effective.  
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First, the use of aid resources for geo-strategic purposes became less prominent.169 
During the Cold War aid was primarily driven by security motives.170 Furuoka 
recalls that “during the Cold War era, Western aid donors often overlooked human 
rights abuses by repressive governments in aid-recipient countries, provided those 
governments were pro-Western”.171 With the end of the rivalry between the West and 
the East “the uses of aid need no longer be shaped by geo-political considerations 
and compromises. Stereotypically, it is no longer necessary or possible to support 
nasty authoritarian regimes on the grounds that they are the only feasible alternative 
to local Communists and/or Soviet, Cuban or Chinese influence.”.172 Accordingly, all 
Western states have fewer reasons not to consistently adopt political conditionality. 
Second, “the appearance of the formerly communist East European countries on the 
list of recipient countries of OECD development assistance … ha[d] greatly 
increased the competition for available aid resources, strengthening the temptation 
for donor country policy-makers to attempt to dictate their ideological terms to 
recipients”.173 The competition for limited aid resources increased also because of 
worsening economic conditions in developing countries,174 and because of the abrupt 
disappearance of Soviet aid for many countries in the developing world. Moyo 
recalls that “the Soviet Union had, on average, disbursed US$300 million a year to 
Africa ... but after the break-up of the union this amount would almost certainly have 
fallen considerably. Donors could now pick and choose, when, why and to whom 
they doled out aid – if at all”.175 
 
  
                                                 
169 Joan M. Nelson, “Good Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid,” in Development 
Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries, ed. Paul Mosley (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), 309; Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political 
Reform, 14–15, 64; Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign 
Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 
50, no. 2 (1998): 322; Stokke, “Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art,” 9; 
Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” Economics & Politics 11, no. 3 (1999): 293; Uvin, 
“‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do,’” 63; Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 44–46; Biagiotti, “Discours Allemands et 
Conditionnalité Démocratique,” 19. 
170 See Keith Griffin, “Foreign Aid after the Cold War,” Development and Change 22, no. 4 (1991): 
645–85. 
171 Furuoka, “Political conditionality and Aid Allocation,” 126; see also Moyo, Dead Aid, 23. 
172 Moore, “Introduction,” 1; Moyo, Dead Aid, 24. 
173 Uvin, “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do,’” 64. 
174 Marantis, “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development,” 8. 
175 Moyo, Dead Aid, 24. 
56 
 
2.3.4. The financial problems of donor states 
 
The fourth reason to expect convergence rather than variation in the adoption of 
political conditionality by OECD donors is that, since the beginning of the 1990s, all 
Western governments have recurrently faced a feeble economic situation and, as a 
consequence, strong domestic criticisms of spending large sums of aid on overseas 
development programmes. OECD countries should have similarly adopted political 
conditionality because this policy could easily be used either as a fake justification to 
withdraw foreign aid to less important recipients or as a legitimate end to protect 
development aid from excessive cuts. The two arguments are opposite in their 
motives; yet, they are concurring in their result: the adoption of behaviour consistent 
with the norm.  
 
The 1990s experienced an evident donor fatigue with respect to foreign aid. The net 
ODA disbursements as a share of donor GNP fell from 0.38 per cent in 1982 to 0.22 
per cent in 1997.176 Many scholars suggest that the new situation provided a rationale 
for cutting aid: the official justification was political conditionality, the real motives 
were budget problems.177 According to Tomaševski, “political conditionality 
coincides with decreased aid flows. Donors’ commitment to the promotion of human 
rights is thus suspect. Human rights appear to many as no more than a convenient 
excuse for decreasing aid: convenient because of the high degree of public support 
for whatever is labelled ‘human rights’. If at the same time money is actually saved, 
then such a policy is even more convenient”.178 Lancaster agrees that political 
considerations “were less compelling than in the past. Thus, aid was vulnerable to 
being cut in times of economic recession and budgetary stringency”.179 For instance, 
“in the United States, the end of the Cold War rationale caused a search for other, 
compelling purposes for foreign aid”.180 
 
Others support the opposite idea that the emphasis on human rights served to avoid 
more severe budget cuts. Human rights are principles unanimously agreed as 
                                                 
176 Ibid., 25. 
177 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform, 65. 
178 Katharina Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1993), xiii–xiv. 
179 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 45–46. 
180 Ibid., 241, note 23. 
57 
 
desirable in the foreign policy of Western countries.181 Kevlihan argues that “some 
donor governments may have felt pressured to adopt democracy and human rights as 
their new rationales for assistance in the absence of a cold war threat in order to 
justify continued large scale assistance to developing countries”.182 Carey agrees that 
“making aid conditional on respect for basic human rights helps donors justify the 
expense of aid to their taxpayers, as financing repressive regimes is unlikely to find 
support among voters in their own countries”.183  
 
Both explanations can have some truth in them. The important thing is that, either 
way, budget constraints should have triggered political conditionality. 
 
2.3.5. The expectation of automatic convergence 
 
The fifth reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political 
conditionality by OECD donors is that this policy should automatically lean toward 
an equilibrium among donor states. The reason is simple. The effectiveness of 
political conditionality is heavily dependent on consistency among donors – the fact 
that all donors are united in punishing the repressive regime and rewarding its 
positive changes: if new donors step in when old donors withdraw aid out of human 
rights concerns, conditionality evidently loses any leverage on the recipient 
government. A report by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) made this point 
clear back in 1992: “a lack of consensus among donors over the appropriate 
conditions to apply may allow recipient governments to play donors off against one 
another, by complying with the least onerous conditions in order to resist pressures 
for more fundamental political changes”.184 
 
This being the case, supporters of political conditionality cannot go alone in its 
application: without the support of other donors their efforts are ineffective. This 
means that, after a trial period, donor countries should have settled on a conception 
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of political conditionality applicable by all of them. The impossibility for supporters 
of political conditionality to apply it more than recalcitrant donors should have 
levelled the adoption of the norm to similar standards.  
 
2.3.6. Political conditionality: an emerging international norm 
 
The combination of this list of reasons explains the rapid diffusion of political 
conditionality after the end of the Cold War. In 1993, Tomaševski acknowledged that 
“the previous practice of cutting off aid from countries whose governments violate 
human rights is today becoming institutionalised”.185 In the same year, Moore 
commented that “all major aid donors have begun to insist that ‘good government’ is 
important”,186 Gibbon wrote that political conditionality represented the core of the 
“new international aid regime”,187 and Robinson dubbed political conditionality the 
“new policy agenda”.188 According to Crawford, “similar policies were declared in 
rapid succession by almost all major bilateral aid donors from 1990 onwards, with a 
remarkable consensus in both the ends and means pronounced in the policy 
statements”.189 The consequence is that, among the tools of human rights foreign 
policy, “foreign aid has probably been the most significant instrument in the 
1990s”.190 Arts confirms that “during the 1990s, the practice of linking development 
cooperation, human rights and democracy gained an enormous impetus”,191 and that 
many countries “stepped up their records of applying punitive measures”.192  
 
A clear example of the social pressure created by the diffusion of political 
conditionality is offered by Kevlihan. He concludes his analysis of Irish development 
policy by saying that  
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considering Irish government policy towards first and second generation 
conditionality together, one can perceive a drift towards international norms, or 
perhaps more specifically, the agenda of the most developed states. It would 
appear that conformity with this agenda without any apparent independent 
policy is what is meant by becoming a ‘player’. In both cases, Irish policy has 
moved from a position of pragmatism to one of conformity.193  
 
This situation is still true today. Writing about political conditionality, Carey 
recognises that “international norms and conventions legitimize and even encourage 
such donor behaviour”.194  
 
2.3.7. The particular strength of these reasons with respect to EU Member States 
 
If the reasons listed above lead one to expect that OECD donors have converged 
towards a similar internalisation of political conditionality, this expectation is even 
stronger with respect to European countries. All of the reasons listed above are 
particularly strong for EU Member States. 
 
The lack of a proper human rights policy by the EC and its Member States in the 
1970s is usually explained as a direct consequence of Cold War politics, neutrality 
being used by European donors to distinguish the Community from other 
superpowers.195 Yet, the first international agreement ever to endorse the idea that 
respect for human rights represents the cornerstone of the concept of development 
was the 1989 Fourth Lomé Convention, a trade and aid agreement between the 
European Community (EC) and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:  
 
Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main 
protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and 
promotion of all human rights. Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived 
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in accordance with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is 
recognized as a basic factor of real development and where cooperation is 
conceived as a contribution to the promotion of these rights. In this context 
development policy and cooperation are closely linked with the respect for and 
enjoyment of fundamental human rights.  
 
In 1991, the European Council also endorsed the causal belief that respect for human 
rights is a pre-condition of development. It declared that “democracy, pluralism, 
respect for human rights, institutions working within a constitutional framework, and 
responsible governments appointed following periodic, fair elections, as well as the 
recognition of the legitimate importance of the individual in a society, are essential 
prerequisites of sustained social and economic development”.196 
 
The financial problems deriving from the poor economic situation were particularly 
acute for EU Member States that had to comply with the parameters and budget 
constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.197 According to Tarp, aid cuts during 
the 1990s were a direct consequence of the fact that, “among European countries, the 
decision to meet the Maastricht’s treaty’s criteria for entering the Euro-currency 
arrangement required substantial shrinking in budget deficits in the years leading up 
to January 1999”.198  
 
The potential for coordination is nowhere higher than among EU Member States. In 
addition to repeated calls for stronger vertical coherence in general development 
policies,199 European institutions specifically supported the belief that effective 
human rights promotion requires uniform behaviour by all donors. In the 1995 
“Communication on the European Union and the external dimension of human rights 
policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond”, the Commission acknowledged that 
“to improve the quality and impact of the Unions actions in this field, it is essential 
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to: … promote exchanges of information with the Member States to ensure that the 
action taken by the Union as a whole is consistent”.200 In 2010, the Commission 
emphasised that “EU budget support should be provided in a way that improves 
coordination both within and beyond the EU, and enhances the coherence and 
credibility of the EU”.201 As a recent study for the European Parliament puts it, 
“donor harmonisation is key … to achieve maximum impact. All donors should share 
the same understanding of underlying principles and democracy and use a common 
approach vis-à-vis the partner government. In many countries, however, some donors 
cut their budget support operation while others maintained [it] ... This leads to a 
situation in which governments in partner countries face different and sometimes 
contradictory requirements from different donors which shows a lack of 
harmonisation”.202 
 
2.3.8. Deep internalisation of political conditionality by the EU 
 
Against this background, it is no surprise that, in comparison with other Western 
donors, the EU has become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of political 
conditionality. Since the end of the Cold War, all European bodies issued statements 
in support of linking aid to respect for human rights.203 Just to offer one concrete 
example, in October 2011 the European Commission adopted its latest 
comprehensive policy document on European aid: a Communication titled 
“Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change”. The 
Commission stressed “the enhanced importance of human rights, democracy and 
good governance trends in determining the mix of instruments and aid modalities at 
country level” [emphasis added]. The consequence is that “the mix and level of aid 
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will depend on the country’s situation, including its ability to conduct reforms … EU 
general budget support should be linked to the governance situation and political 
dialogue with the partner country, in coordination with the Member States”. In 
particular, “should a country loosen its commitment to human rights and democracy, 
the EU should strengthen its cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities 
and use forms of aid that provide the poor with the support they need. At the same 
time, the EU should maintain dialogue with governments and non-state actors. In 
some cases, stricter conditionality will be warranted”.204  
 
The Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the Communication: “European citizens must 
be shown, now more than ever, that EU development cooperation … helps advance 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance”.205 As such, the 
Council confirmed that “relations between the EU and its Member States and partner 
countries are based on and will promote shared values of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law” and that “support to partners will be adapted to their … 
commitment and progress with regard to human rights, democracy, the rule of law 
and good governance”.206 
 
Deep internalisation of political conditionality by the EU offers two additional 
reasons why EU Member States should share a similar position on the issue. The first 
one is the “upload” channel. The existing EU policy on political conditionality could 
not exist without express support from all EU Member States. Hence, they should 
agree on how much, and what kind of, political conditionality is appropriate in 
foreign aid. To offer one example, the Fourth Lomé Convention, which revised the 
legal framework for trade and development cooperation between the EC and ACP 
countries in 1989, was the first development agreement ever to incorporate a human 
rights clause which legally permits the suspension of development cooperation in 
case of grave abuses. By 1995 the human rights clause became a standard for any 
development agreement with third countries, and the European Parliament could 
proudly announce that “the European Union has now evolved the most highly 
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developed form of human rights policy in third country agreements that exists, to be 
compared only with developments which have taken place in the U.S. since the 
adoption of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1966”.207 This evolution would not have 
been possible without the support by EU Member States: all development 
agreements are signed by the European Commission (on behalf of the EU) and by all 
EU Member States.  
 
There is more. Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has applied 
political conditionality vis-à-vis a large number of third countries: to name a few, 
Belarus, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, 
Zimbabwe. Almost none of these measure would have been possible without the 
support by all EU Member States. In the great majority of these cases, decisions were 
taken by unanimity in the Council of the European Union (which comprises all EU 
Member States).  
 
The second reason why EU Member States should share a similar position on 
political conditionality is the “download” channel. EU Member States should share a 
similar view on political conditionality because of equalling social pressure by EU 
institutions. Social pressure and resulting uniform behaviour within the EU is the 
object of enquiry of a still-growing strand of research named “Europeanisation”. This 
literature stresses the increasing adaptation of the national state systems, politics and 
policies of EU Member States to EU theory and practice.208 Europeanisation studies 
have already showed (limited but existing) adaptation processes in many areas, 
including, but not confined to, foreign policy at large, refugee policies and 
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immigration policies.209 There is no reason why foreign aid should be an 
exception.210  
 
Why then do we experience variation among EU Member States? This dissertation 
suggests how to solve this puzzle.  
 
2.4. Advancing academic research on aid sanctions, Europeanisation and norm 
internalisation 
 
2.4.1 International Relations literature on aid and human rights 
 
The academic literature of International Relations has addressed three important 
questions with respect to political conditionality. From a normative point of view, is 
it a legitimate and appropriate tool of foreign policy?211 From a policy perspective, is 
it efficacious in bringing change within recipient countries?212 From an empirical 
standpoint, do states actually practice political conditionality as they claim? This 
dissertation builds upon the strand of research which addressed the last question.  
 
Researchers have used both qualitative and quantitative methods to assess whether 
the human rights performance of recipient states determines the allocation of foreign 
aid by donor states. Signalling the absence of any human rights concern by donor 
states, or at least the lack of attention towards the issue from the wider aid 
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community, until the 1990s there was no qualitative research on political 
conditionality. The path-breaking work was a 1995 volume, edited by Stokke, on the 
adoption of political conditionality by a wide range of donors, including Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Norway.213 Since then, several scholars 
have provided in-depth historical accounts of the application (and non-application) of 
political conditionality in specific historical circumstances. Thomas Carothers 
concentrated on US democracy assistance,214 Crawford focused on the EC/EU, 
Sweden, the UK and the US,215 Barratt gave attention to Australia, Canada and the 
UK.216  
 
In a similar vein, until the 1990s most of the quantitative studies on the determinants 
of aid allocation ignored any potential influence of the human rights performance of 
recipient countries, testing only for the economic needs of the recipients and the 
strategic and economic interests of the donors.217 The pioneering study on the 
relationship between foreign aid and human rights is an article by Schoultz, who was 
the first to operationalise the level of violations of fundamental human rights by 
governments receiving foreign aid.218 Schoultz concentrated on US foreign aid in 
Latin America, and, after him, for more than a decade scholars who studied the 
impact of human respect as a determinant of aid allocation focused only on US 
foreign aid.219 It is only very recently that, along with a few works that concentrated 
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on aggregate bilateral aid flows,220 the scope of analysis has expanded to 
simultaneously compare different individual donors and control for the human rights 
performance by recipient countries. The section of the introductory chapter which 
offered preliminary evidence of the existence of variation among Western donor 
states is based on this strand of research.221  
 
This literature offers invaluable insights with respect to the relevance of political 
conditionality in foreign aid. In particular, it shows that donors, and EU Member 
States in particular, differ in their approach towards political conditionality. What is 
missing from the picture is a related but different question: why have donor states 
internalized political conditionality to different extents? While variation is 
established, no effort is made to explain it.222  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to follow the path signalled by the only 
exception,223 and make a step further in the study of human rights and foreign aid 
and to say why, not only that, states have differently adopted political conditionality. 
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The purpose is to explain, rather than only document, the variation in political 
conditionality. This is an important purpose. As Lancaster puts it, “if we are to 
understand the controversies over foreign aid, if we are to assess fairly aid’s past 
impact and ensure its future effectiveness, if we are to comprehend this important 
innovation in relations between state, we need to understand … how and why aid’s 
purposes have differed from country to country, and why and how they have changed 
over time”.224 
 
Addressing this question is important not only for scholars working on foreign aid 
and human rights but also for scholars working on human rights at large, who are 
challenged by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink to pay more attention to “the causal 
mechanisms and processes by which … [human rights] ideas spread”.225 As a matter 
of fact, in the literature on human rights little attention has been dedicated to 
theoretically-informed empirical studies on the processes by which states come to 
adopt the promotion of human rights as a desirable goal of foreign policy. IR has 
occasionally dealt with human rights and foreign policy, mainly producing historical 
accounts of instances when human rights were, or were not, actually promoted.226 
The result of these exercises has been the acknowledgment that past and present 
international relations provide extensive evidence of variation in the importance of 
the promotion of human rights in the foreign policy of specific states. On the one 
side, there is variation over time: in a given state, the importance of human rights 
promotion is different in different periods. For instance, Sikkink argues that “before 
1973 human rights were rarely explicitly considered in the United States’ foreign 
policy calculus; after 1976, legislation and executive policy led to the explicit 
inclusion of human rights criteria in foreign policy decision making”.227 On the other 
side, there is variation among states: at a given time, the importance of human rights 
promotion is different in different states. For instance, Sikkink writes that “human 
                                                 
224 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 2. 
225 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 4. 
226 See Rein Müllerson, Human Rights Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 1997); Peter R. Baehr and 
Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
227 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
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rights ideas entered foreign policy debates in the United States and Europe at the 
same time … Nevertheless, the European and American approaches to human rights 
policy differ considerably”.228 However, little has been written on why variation 
exists.  
 
Past research on the influence of human rights NGOs on foreign policy is one limited 
exception.229 Another important exception is Forsythe’s Human Rights and 
Comparative Foreign Policy.230 The book is unique in utilizing a common 
framework of analysis for the examination of a wide range of states’ foreign policies, 
and Forsythe was adamant that 
 
one of the more important questions in contemporary international relations is 
the extent to which various states make the creation and consolidation of liberal 
democracy one of their salient foreign policy goals. By liberal democracy we 
refer to a polity manifesting free and fair elections for national office, on the 
basis of almost universal suffrage, with the winners actually governing the 
country; accompanied by the rule of law and constitutionalism (government 
limited by law); with protection of those civil and political rights that 
reasonably protect against the tyranny of the majority.231 
 
                                                 
228 Ibid., 139. 
229 Ann Marie Clark, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on International 
Society,” Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 507–25; Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
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(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), 16. 
231 Forsythe, “Introduction,” 11. Forsythe goes even further and explicitly endorses the objective of 
this dissertation: “it is important to continue to make a comparative analysis of the extent to which 
states seek to protect human rights through foreign assistance”. Ibid. 14. 
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 However, as Donnelly argues in its last chapter, the volume offers nothing more 
than “preliminary conclusions about the state of human rights in post-Cold War 
foreign policy”.232 
 
The result is that, as Schmitz and Sikkink concluded in their 2002 review of the 
academic contribution on human rights and international relations, “the degree to 
which human rights issues have influenced foreign policy decisions” is one of the 
“pressing issues [which] still need more systematic scholarly attention”.233 
Unfortunately, this gap still exists. Suffice it here to mention that the new (2012) 
edition of Schmitz and Sikkink’s review does not mention any comparative work on 
foreign policy and human rights, and its section on human rights foreign policy only 
addresses the following questions: “Do human rights considerations affect foreign 
policy decisions?” and “Can foreign policy instruments improve human rights 
conditions abroad?”.234 Nothing is said about when human rights considerations 
affect foreign policy decisions, and why they do so with different degrees in different 
countries.235 This dissertation aims at filling this gap by explaining the variation in 
the degree to which political conditionality has influenced foreign aid decisions in 
two EU Member States, France and the UK.236 
 
2.4.2.  International Relations research on Europeanisation and norm internalisation 
 
The solution to this puzzle can also contribute to the academic literature on 
Europeanisation and norm internalisation. The complementarity between these two 
strands of research have been confirmed by Börzel and Risse. According to the two 
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authors, “Europeanisation research can be regarded as a special instance of policy 
and institutional diffusion”.237 
 
To start with, it is important to highlight that this thesis is a not a Europeanisation 
study per se. Without opening the Pandora’s box of what Europeanisation is and 
what it is not,238 researchers interested in Europeanisation processes generally focus 
on “the impact of the EU on its Member States”.239 In this dissertation, the European 
endorsement of political conditionality is taken as a useful starting point in the 
process of selecting hard cases of variation in the degree of internalisation of the 
norm (as described above, it is more puzzling to discover divergence among EU 
Member States than among OECD donors). However, the thesis compares France 
and the UK one against the other. It does not systematically explore the mechanisms 
and processes through which European institutions and other EU Member States may 
have influenced the evolution of French and British development programmes.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis will contribute to the infant literature on the Europeanisation 
of Member States’ development programmes. This strand of research is still very 
limited: its foundations are sketched in only two book chapters.240 Moreover, its 
findings are not encouraging. Researchers have concentrated the few existing 
empirical studies on the accession of new Member States in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the Europeanisation of their development programmes has unanimously 
been described as “shallow”.241 Anecdotes from other works confirm the 
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unwillingness of EU Member States to change their aid priorities. For example, even 
though Alonso reported that EU membership prompted the movement of Spain from 
being an aid recipient in 1979 to ranking the 11th largest donor in 2003,242 Escribano 
and Lorca emphasized a persistent focus on Latin American countries 
notwithstanding significant pressure to deliver more aid to poorer African 
countries.243 
 
The lack of interest in the Europeanisation of aid programmes and the poor record of 
past findings are surprising because numerous scholars have studied similar fields 
where EU coordination is based on soft law instruments, such as foreign policy,244 
and discovered significant EU impacts. In their review of Europeanisation research 
on foreign policy, Hill and Wong commented that “all national foreign policies have 
been meaningfully Europeanized to some degree, or in some particular form”.245 
How to explain this resistance to Europeanize development policies? EU aid even 
presents a larger budget than EU foreign policy, and recent works have pointed at the 
limited but discernible role played by the European Commission in coordinating 
Member States’ development practices.246  
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Europeanisation scholars have suggested a few key mediating factors that explain 
variation in the degree of domestic change adjusting to EU pressure.247 From a 
rational choice perspective, Europeanisation is facilitated by the absence of multiple 
veto players and the existence of mediating formal institutions. On the basis of 
sociological insights, Europeanisation is assisted by normative resonance with 
domestic understandings, strong norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented 
decision-making cultures.  
 
This thesis is the first ever comparative study which directly tests the significance of 
some of these factors, such as the presence of multiple veto points and the normative 
fit with organisational cultures, in obstructing internalisation of an aid norm like 
political conditionality.248 Moreover, the thesis is the first study ever to discuss the 
Europeanisation of political conditionality, thus expanding the reach of existing 
research beyond the most traditional aspects of aid quantity, geographical focus, tied 
aid, use of budget support and reduction of number of countries. 
 
Importantly, the contribution of this dissertation to the Europeanisation literature is 
significant, but not comprehensive. Europeanisation researchers have focused on 
different types of “variables” influenced by the EU (policies, polities and politics),249 
different types of mechanisms producing domestic impacts (positive integration, 
liberalization and facilitated coordination),250 and different types of interactions both 
with European institutions and between EU Member States (downloading, cross-
                                                 
247 Tanja A. Börzel, “Europeanization: How the EU Interacts with Its Member States,” in The Member 
States of the European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 53. 
248 Even the most advanced paper so far on the Europeanisation of development policies 
acknowledges that it “focuses on similarities between the four states rather than offer a comprehensive 
comparative study”: Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, “Reluctant Donors?,” 2. 
249 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” in The 
Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Maria Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 60. 
250 This categorization was first introduced in Simon J. Bulmer and Claudio M. Radaelli, The 
Europeanisation of National Policy?, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation (Belfast: Queens 
University, 2004), 13, http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/queens/p0042.html. Similarly, Knill and Lenschow 
proposed three ideal-typical modes of EU governance, namely, governance by compliance, 
governance by competition, and governance by communication and information exchange in 
transnational networks: Christoph Knill and Andrea Lenschow, “Compliance, Competition and 
Communication: Different Approaches of European Governance and Their Impact on National 
Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 3 (2005): 586. 
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loading and uploading).251 Given its comparative focus on a specific norm in an area 
of shared competence, this dissertation mainly contributes to past literature dealing 
with EU impact on (1) policies, thanks to (2) facilitated coordination, through (3) 
cross-loading and down-loading. In terms of the dynamics leading to change at the 
domestic level, the dissertation covers both constructivist processes (such as 
persuasion and imitation) and rational choice expectations (such as ex post 
rationalization of strategic interests).252 
 
Similar processes can also be found in the IR literature on norm internalisation. IR 
scholars define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a 
given identity”.253 This dissertation treats political conditionality as a norm, and thus 
takes it as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for donor states” with the following 
form: a donor state should make the allocation of foreign aid dependent on the 
human rights performance of recipient countries.254  
 
The idea that norms matter in foreign policy and foreign aid is nothing new. Indeed, 
it is at least twenty years that constructivist scholars have demonstrated that both 
domestic and international norms influence state behaviour.255 Nonetheless, many 
have warned that explaining state behaviour by the use of norms as independent 
variables is a problematic enterprise. On the one side, the existence of a norm does 
not necessarily entail the adoption of the behaviour covered by the norm. In fact, 
“norms are counterfactually valid. No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a 
norm. Not even many such occurrences necessarily do”.256 On the other side, foreign 
policy decisions are often taken against the background of numerous overlapping 
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norms. If this is the case, “one can almost always identify, post hoc, a norm to 
explain a given behaviour”.257 Both these considerations reveal that, at present, the 
most relevant issue in the constructivist approach is no more whether norms exist and 
whether norms sometimes matter, but when specific norms matter. 
 
In IR it is now considered to be normal that states differ in the internalisation of 
international norms: as Gurowitz puts it, “international norms and standards do not 
diffuse automatically or consistently across states”.258 Political conditionality is no 
exception in this respect: some EU Member States have internalized political 
conditionality to a larger extent than others (for instance, they apply conditionality 
when a lower threshold of human rights violations is reached, or notwithstanding a 
higher level of bilateral relationship). In the IR literature on norms there are now 
numerous terms to refer to this variable, including strength,259 degree of 
acceptance,260 and internalisation.261 
 
The literature on internalisation (and its related terms) has primarily focused on 
explaining state behaviour, with domestic salience of a norm being used as an 
independent variable. For instance, Klotz documented changing attitudes toward 
South African racial separateness in the United States, Britain, and Zimbabwe and 
explained the differences in the behaviour of these states on the basis of the ultimate 
domestic salience of the norm against apartheid.262 However, domestic salience has 
rarely been studied as a dependent variable. For instance, Gurowitz laments that the 
majority of scholars interested in the influence of transnational norms did “not 
examine … how … diffusion varies across time and place”.263  
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The constructivist literature on norm diffusion has suggested a factor that can 
influence the domestic salience (or non-salience) of new international norms: 
complementarity with the pre-existing normative framework. Checkel refers to 
“cultural match” to describe “a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an 
international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the 
legal system – constitutions, judicial codes, laws – and bureaucratic agencies – 
organisational ethos and administrative agencies”. He argues that norm diffusion is 
“more rapid when … a systemic norm … resonates with historically constructed 
domestic norms”.264 In contrast, when the international norms do not mirror domestic 
values, the literature provides a theory of rejection.265  
 
This insight is interesting. However, as argued by Cortell and Davies, “the conditions 
under which [norms] come to infuse domestic understandings [need to be] more 
systematically specified”.266 The step identified by the authors to overcome these 
shortcomings “is empirical research focusing on how specific … norms have and 
have not become salient in several national contexts”.267 This dissertation aims to 
make this step, and focuses on the extent to which political conditionality has been 
internalized by two EU Member States. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter clarified the object of analysis of the dissertation, and showed its 
academic relevance and originality. The first two sections offered a working 
definition of the basic concepts of foreign aid and political conditionality. The central 
points are that: 
 foreign aid is bilateral ODA as defined by the OECD DAC; 
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 the dissertation predominantly focuses on negative conditionality (punishing 
bad behaviour), even though it is recognised that political conditionality 
includes positive action (rewarding positive behaviour); 
 political conditionality addresses both human rights abuses and violations of 
basic democratic principles. 
 
The third section argued that there are numerous reasons to expect convergence 
rather than variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by OECD donors 
since the end of the Cold War, including the recognition of the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of human rights promotion in foreign policy, the causal belief that 
respect for human rights is a precondition for lasting development and effective 
poverty reduction, the end of the Cold War and related power readjustments in the 
international arena, the financial problems of donors’ economies and the automatic 
coordination that should derive from reiterated application of any type of 
conditionality. As these reasons are particularly strong for European donors, it is no 
surprise that numerous researchers showed that the European Union quickly became 
one of the firmest supporters (in comparison with other donors) of political 
conditionality. This justified the decision to concentrate this thesis on EU Member 
States. 
 
The fourth section introduced the academic literatures on aid sanctions, 
Europeanisation and norm internalisation, and showed that the dissertation addresses 
an existing gap at the crossroads of these strands of research. Past works on aid 
sanctions have showed but not explained variation among Western donors, 
Europeanisation scholars have produced limited research on EU Member States’ 
development policies, and constructivist researchers have called for new studies on 
the factors that facilitate or hinder domestic internalisation of international norms. 
 
This chapter has left a few methodological issues unresolved: 
 Select the case studies. Why France and the UK? 
 Create a standard of measurement. What does it mean that two countries 
differ in the internalisation of political conditionality? How can the 
internalisation of political conditionality be compared? 
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 Produce alternative hypotheses. Why do France and the UK show different 
approaches to political conditionality? What can explain this variation? 
 
The next chapter answers the first two questions. The last one will be dealt with in 
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES:  
CASE SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT STRATEGY 
 
This dissertation aims to explain variation in the degree of internalisation of the norm 
of political conditionality across two EU member states, France and the UK. The first 
section of this chapter defends the selection of France and the UK as case studies. 
Notwithstanding numerous similarities, the two donors offer a different approach 
towards political conditionality. This makes them a perfect fit for a comparison under 
a most similar systems design.  
 
As the internalisation of the norm of political conditionality is the dependent variable 
of this dissertation, a fundamental methodological question is: how to measure the 
degree of norm internalisation? The second part of the chapter defends the adoption 
of a three-fold measurement framework. First, the thesis looks at states’ policy 
agendas. Inclusion of the norm in ministerial statements and strategy papers is 
probably the most superficial form of internalisation, as it can easily represent a 
rhetorical move and not be a signal of credible commitment. However, it is a 
necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for a norm to be internalized. The 
reliability of the results of the analysis of policy agendas is confirmed by assessing 
the importance of political conditionality in states’ legal documents and behaviour. 
Legal documents encompass the laws regulating foreign aid and the bilateral 
development agreements concluded with third countries. Is human rights among the 
legal purposes of foreign aid? Are human rights clauses included in bilateral 
development agreements? The evaluation of states’ behaviour includes the collection 
and consolidation of 15 years of quantitative analysis of the application of political 
conditionality across the whole spectrum of recipient countries, as well as a closer 
examination of four cases of application of the norm by the EU. 
 
3.1. The selection of case studies: France and the UK 
 
This dissertation aims to explain why today, notwithstanding the impressive 
diffusion of the norm of political conditionality after the end of the Cold War, EU 
member states show different attitudes towards the idea of sanctioning repressive 
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regimes using aid suspensions and cuts. As Price observes, “a complete account of 
international norm change and resistance would require inter alia the empirical 
investigation of the domestic politics and culture of all states, as per the 
comparativist-inspired critique”.268 This is a demanding requirement. Only 
collaborative exercises can combine the depth of qualitative analysis with the breadth 
of cross-country comparison.269 
 
The high number of European countries and the two-fold objective of estimation and 
explanation preclude from taking into consideration the development programmes of 
all EU member states and all instance of political conditionality. As Tomasevski 
effectively puts it, “the actual purpose of aid and its impact cannot be assessed for all 
aid by all donors”.270 A selection of case studies is thus necessary.  
 
The Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill’s Method of Difference) suggests 
comparing donors that differ in the dependent variable (that is, the level of 
internalisation of political conditionality) and are as similar as possible on other 
factors. The assumption behind this strategy is that this would make it easier to find 
those elements that can explain the high/low level of internalisation of the norm that 
aid should be conditioned on respect for human rights by recipient governments.271 
For instance, Michalski justified the decision to compare the Europeanisation of 
Denmark’s and Sweden’s foreign policies towards China “because of the similarities 
in their general foreign policy orientation. … At the same time, Denmark and 
Sweden display important differences in terms of security policy and general attitude 
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to the EU”.272 In addition to this methodological requirement, it would be interesting 
to focus on countries that play a meaningful role in the donor community. The size 
and importance of the aid programme is therefore taken into consideration too. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s – when the norm of political conditionality stated 
diffusing and the EC quickly became one of its strongest supporters – the 
Community was composed of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
the UK. As can be seen in Table 1, in the last twenty years the five major European 
donors have been, in order, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Italy. 
 
Table 1. Total Official Development Assistance between 1989 and 2010 
 
France $128,725.45 
Germany $121,769.10 
UK $86,304.39 
Netherlands $55,791.71 
Italy $48,573.98 
Spain $29,341.55 
Denmark $29,027.42 
Belgium $19,200.36 
Portugal $5,535.28 
Ireland $5,171.71 
Greece $2,924.59 
Luxembourg $2,089.78 
 
Source: DAC Statistics (OECD.Stat), at www.oecd.org. 
Note: The table is calculated at current prices (USD millions). Greece has no available 
data between 1989 and 1995.  
 
These five donors can be divided on the basis of their approach to political 
conditionality.  France seems to be the staunchest opponent of political conditionality 
(among the minor donors, Portugal mirrors its strong stance against political 
conditionality). Paris was against including any reference to human rights in the 
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Lomé Convention.273 Uvin concluded his brief analysis of political conditionalities 
and major donors by stating that “the French policy towards political conditionality 
is much more modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent 
support for the prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic 
or human rights record”.274 Alesina and Dollar found that France is the major donor 
that pays less attention to the democracy of the receiving country.275 In the recent 
consultation held by the European Commission on the future of budget support, the 
French government affirmed that “budget support cannot be conceived as an 
instrument to promote values and policy objectives, except if you want to divert the 
purpose”, that is, “to support the national strategies to fight against poverty, 
elaborated by partner countries”.276 The French intervention continued that “it does 
not comply with our commitments with respect to aid effectiveness to reserve aid a 
special treatment … Budget support cannot be a political tool except if you want to 
jeopardise its primary purpose”.277  
 
On the opposite side, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK seems to be supportive 
of political conditionality. London was in favour of including some reference to 
human rights in the Lomé Convention.278 Alesina and Dollar found that, in 
comparison with other countries, it has one of the strongest positive responses to 
democratic institutions.279 Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French 
and British aid from the end of the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was 
“a radical shift with the introduction of political conditionality”. While the shift has 
gradually been watered down in both countries, this happened more in France, and 
“to a lesser extent” in the UK.280 
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The UK is preferred over the other donors because of its similarity with France. The 
two countries are middle-ranking powers with roughly similar military and economic 
might.281 Both France and the UK  are former colonial empires and permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council. They each have nuclear 
capabilities and high-level representation on the Executive Boards of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The two countries have also equal 
voting powers in the European Union and similar influence over the Paris Club, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Development 
Fund and the European Investment Bank. EU development cooperation can actually 
be considered to be equally driven by the two countries. The first cooperation 
agreement with development countries, the Yaoundé Convention, was evidently 
tailored on the interests of France and its former colonies. The new version of the 
Yaoundé Convention, the Lomé Convention, was expressly introduced in order to 
include the former UK colonies within the European preferential system. 
 
In addition, at least since the end of the 1990s, the UK dedicated a dramatic increase 
of resources  to  parts  of  sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s share of country aid rose 
from 40 per cent to 55 per cent (compared to some 33 per cent in 1990).282 As sub-
Saharan Africa has always constituted the privileged territory of French development 
cooperation, comparison of the two countries should be easier in the last ten years. 
Not only. Variation between the two countries can be considered even more puzzling 
than that among other EU Member States because in 1998 the Heads of State and 
Government of the two countries met in Saint-Malo and agreed on a declaration 
putting an end to Anglo-French rivalry in Africa.283 This initiative “established the 
basis for ... harmonizing policies and the overall approach” towards the continent,284 
and led to initiatives like cooperation between Heads of Mission in individual 
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countries, secondments between ministries and informal dialogue within European 
fora (including the Africa Working Group and the then General Affairs and External 
Relations Council, that is, where political conditionality is discussed).285 As Africa 
represents, by far, the most recurrent target of European aid sanctions, Saint-Malo 
should have led to enhanced understanding between the two sides of the Channel. 
 
Lastly, both countries consider themselves the source of inspiration of human rights 
promotion (while the liberal tradition of human rights can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution, the egalitarian one is usually derived from 
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period) and offer the opportunity to access 
relevant information in the form of official policy statements, aid statistics and 
interviews with responsible officials. 
 
3.2. Assessing norm internalisation: a three-fold measurement 
 
Marie Gibert argues that the decision to apply aid sanctions against a recipient 
government is a “mixture” of different factors, including “the general attitude of the 
donor to human rights conditionality (we know, for example, that the Nordic 
European countries are generally more in favour of a harsh stance on democratic and 
human rights conditionality) and the importance of the links between the two 
countries (for instance, former colonial power will be more eager to maintain links 
and defend former colonies)”.286 This thesis focuses on the first of these two factors. 
Following Koh, we name this general attitude “internalisation”, and define it as the 
situation “when political élites accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter 
of government policy”.287 
 
Koh’s definition is a good starting point. However, it offers little help for those who 
are interested in detecting variation in internalisation. How to assess élite acceptance 
of an international norm? As far as political conditionality is concerned, it is no 
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mystery that almost no donor applies aid sanctions against strategically important 
recipients. But what about second-order recipients? Some donors might be more 
willing than others to apply sanctions in this case. This would be the manifestation of 
a higher level of internalisation of the norm of political conditionality: for some 
donors sanctions are more appropriate than for others. 
 
As Brysk notes, assessing the internalisation of any type of norm regarding human 
rights promotion is a difficult exercise: “how would we qualify a country as a ‘global 
Good Samaritan’? Some countries claim more than they produce, or label self-
seeking behaviour as humanitarian, in order to gain international reputation. 
Conversely, principled promoters often under-assess their own efforts, discounting 
modest gains relative to unfulfilled aspirations”.288 This is generally true for any 
norm. As highlighted by Johnston, “the validity and reliability of measures for 
accessing the preferences of actors are problematic since the only way to observe is 
to look at some phenomenon external to their cognition (e.g., a speech act, a gesture, 
a decision that might itself be strategic)”.289 
 
Existing IR literature is not particularly helpful in overcoming these challenges. In 
fact, in the discipline, norms and interests have been assumed, rather than empirically 
evaluated, for a long time, alleging measurement difficulties as the main reasons for 
this.290 The literature on norm salience is of little guidance too. As Cortell and Davis 
argued, “scholars repeatedly conclude that domestic salience is crucial to many cases 
of states compliance with international norms, but they rarely provide definitions or 
operational measures for the concept and, instead, merely assert that the norm in 
question was salient”.291  
 
                                                 
288 Allison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 19–20. See also Stéphane Bolle, “La Conditionnalité Démocratique Dans La 
Politique Africaine de La France,” Afrilex, no. 2 (2001): 22. 
289 Alastair Ian Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International 
Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 492. 
290 Jeffrey Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” in Strategic Choice and 
International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton University Press, 1999), 39–
76. 
291 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International 
Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 67. 
85 
 
If we accept the definition of a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity”,292 norm salience (when applied to states) arguably has 
three fundamental indicators. First, the policy agenda. Since a norm is a standard of 
appropriate behaviour, and appropriateness is communicatively shared, a salient 
norm is referred to by the state to justify its behaviour. Second, legal documents. 
Since a norms is a standard of appropriate behaviour, and states standardise their 
behaviour through legal texts, a salient norm is included in laws and international 
agreements. Third, state behaviour. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate 
behaviour, a salient norm is acted upon by the state. 
 
Constructivist scholars are not the only researchers who adopted a similar three-
pronged measurement framework to assess the salience of other domestic norms.293 
Academics investigating the internalisation of EU norms by European states (a 
particular form of Europeanisation) have equally highlighted the importance of 
looking at the three levels of discourses, institutions and practices in order to 
recognise all possible reactions to Europeanisation such as absorption, 
accommodation of existing policies, or even their rejection.294 Ondřej Horký is 
adamant in stating that 
 
it is vital to recognize how deeply (or superficially) the norms are adopted. It 
matters indeed if a country only pledges to follow EU norms in its outward-
oriented discourse, if it takes over the rules and integrates them in the domestic 
norms, or if it implements them in practice. In consequence, three levels of 
implementation can be differentiated:  
 Discursive level: the actors refer to EU norms in their discourses;  
 Institutional level: EU norms are institutionalised domestically by the 
member state;  
 Behavioural level: the actors act in compliance with EU norms.295 
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3.3. Policy agenda 
 
Cortell and Davis argue that, although public discourse is often used as a measure of 
a norm’s domestic strength, “a focus on the state’s policy agenda provides a better 
measure”. There are two reasons why. First, a focus on public discourse raises “a 
number of difficult methodological questions, including what types of statements 
matter, how many statements are sufficient, and which domestic actors’ statements 
matter”. The state’s policy agenda is more easily operationalized in terms of 
government officials’ statements. Second, “it is the political elite who make the 
concrete decisions on how to interpret a norm in a given context, a focus on policy 
agenda provides a better indication of the norm’s ‘meaning’ in a particular political 
context than would the analysis of the broader societal discourse or policy choice 
more generally”.296 
  
The salience of political conditionality in the policy agenda of EU member states can 
be measured by examining public statements at ministerial level as well as policy 
documents from development agencies, such as white papers, strategic plans, 
programmatic guidelines, etc. For instance, at the end of 1991 Germany introduced 
new aid policy guidelines in which it listed five criteria for granting development aid: 
respect for human rights, popular participation in the development process, 
guaranteeing certainty in law, a ‘market-friendly’ approach to economic 
development, and the recipient government's own commitment to poverty 
alleviation, protecting the environment, and curbing population growth. Reduced 
military expenditure is also taken into account in assessing government commitment 
to poverty alleviation since additional resources may be released for this purpose as a 
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result. These criteria have been adopted with the explicit aim of facilitating the 
implementation of a poverty-oriented development strategy and now guide decisions 
on country aid allocations.297 
 
In 2002 Danish Finance Minister Thor Pedersen announced cuts in a draft aid budget 
submitted to the Parliament which stated that Denmark wanted to be more efficient 
in the way it assisted the developing world and did not want to prop up dictators: 
“The government will pursue an assistance policy with a higher degree of 
consistency. Systematic, constant violations of human rights and democratic rules 
will no longer be accepted. Therefore, development cooperation with Zimbabwe, 
Malawi ... and their status as programme countries will cease”. In a review published 
on the foreign ministry’s website, the Danish government added that it “wishes to 
break with the habitual thinking of years which dictates that if only assistance 
increases everything will be good”.298 
 
Arguably, there are three levels of discursive salience. Salience is high when “the 
norm’s objectives, prescriptions and proscriptions [are] largely uncontested and 
routinely invoked to justify policy choices”.299 In the case of political conditionality, 
ministerial speeches and policy documents would habitually refer to respect for 
human rights as a pre-condition for aid allocation and disbursement. Salience is 
moderate when “elites continue to debate the merits of the norm and raise 
reservations and arguments limiting its applicability across a range of issue areas”.300 
This can be the case when the promotion of human rights is a prominent goal of 
foreign policy but doubts are raised about the effectiveness or appropriateness of 
political conditionality as a tool to achieve this objective. Political conditionality can 
be considered counterproductive: cutting off development aid to poor countries 
might only worsen the situation, inevitably punishing the population “for the sins of 
their rulers”.301 A donor state may also deem it more effective to strengthen its 
economic and political links with repressive regimes, thus engendering a process of 
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internal change.302 The dilemma is between strategies of “asphyxiation” (blocking 
economic flows inhibits or halts bad behaviour) or strategies of “oxygen” (economic 
activity leads to positive political consequences).303 Many also make the point that, 
should one state suspend its aid, “its place would quickly be taken by another and it 
would have achieved nothing but damage to itself”.304 Finally, the salience of 
political conditionality is low when non-compliance is explicitly justified on the basis 
of the inappropriateness of human rights promotion. Moral relativists consider 
political conditionality an act of imperialism: donors claim to enlighten recipient 
countries but actually foster their own interests.305 Nationalists argue that national 
social contracts come before any obligation to some supposed universal community 
of right-bearing individuals: citizens’ interests should trump moral concerns towards 
foreigner peoples.306 
 
Official statements, in both bilateral and multilateral settings, will be analyzed to 
assess which of these arguments is most recurrent in French and British aid circles. A 
similar exercised was conducted by Koh with respect to the general promotion of 
human rights in the U.S. in the 1990s. He concluded that “the broader goal of the 
Clinton-Albright doctrine was to assert that promotion of democracy and human 
rights is always in our national interest. The goal of American foreign policy is thus 
to fuse power and principle, by promoting the globalization of freedom as the 
antidote to other global problems”.307 In fact, the Clinton administration refused to 
base its actions in Kosovo solely on humanitarian grounds: “Ending this tragedy is a 
moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest”.308 
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3.4. Legal documents 
 
The legal salience of political conditionality will be measured by looking at both the 
laws and the international agreements governing the aid regime.  
 
First of all, development agencies are not completely free in the selection of recipient 
countries or of aid delivery methods. Rather, they must abide by the laws that 
authorise and regulate development cooperation projects. The importance of the legal 
basis of development assistance should not be underestimated. In November 1994, 
after an application for judicial review brought by the World Development 
Movement (R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), the British High Court held 
that the then-Foreign Secretary had acted ultra vires (outside of his power and 
therefore illegally) by allocating £234 million towards the funding of the Pergau 
Dam, on the grounds that it was not of economic or humanitarian benefit to the 
Malaysian people. The inclusion of respect for human rights among the objectives of 
development assistance would have meant availability of judicial review in case of 
aid to dictators or repressive regimes. 
 
As a consequence, a measurement of the institutional salience of political 
conditionality would first search for permissive (and/or even mandatory) statutory 
provisions linking foreign aid to respect for human rights. One of the most cited 
examples of law linking foreign aid to human rights is section 116 of the US Foreign 
Assistance Act. The first paragraph of the section reads:  
 
No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country 
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or de-grading 
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the 
disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those 
persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of 
person.309 
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To offer another example, Section 7008 of the US Department of State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act reads: 
 
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III 
through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any 
assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of 
government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or, after the date of 
enactment of this Act, a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a 
decisive role. 
 
Soft-law regulations and guidelines are also important in this respect. The Japanese 
government, for instance, expressed its commitment to impose political 
conditionality by introducing new aid guidelines. In 1992, the government issued the 
“ODA Charter”. The fourth principle of the “ODA Charter” instructs that “Full 
attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of 
a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human 
rights and freedoms in the recipient countries”.310  
 
Second, development agreements with recipient countries offer the opportunity to 
define reciprocal obligations and thus establish the pre-requisites for the 
implementation of development projects. Do donors clarify that respect for human 
rights is a fundamental condition to avoid suspension or cancellation of aid 
programmes? The importance of clarifying reciprocal obligations in international 
agreements cannot be underestimated. In 1977, Uganda was a party to the Lomé 
Convention, the agreement between the EC and 71 ACP countries which entitled the 
latter to trade and aid benefits. Under the leadership of President Idi Amin Dada, 
Ugandan armed forces violently repressed popular protests against the regime. The 
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EC found itself in an uncomfortable position: EC funds were evidently benefiting a 
government involved in atrocious human rights violations; yet, bound by the 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Community had no way of 
suspending the granted privileges. More recently, Trevor Wilson, former Australian 
Ambassador to Myanmar, argued that “in reality, it might be quite difficult legally 
for a donor agency to stop an assistance programme because of some such “political” 
problem when this problem had not been previously specified (in writing) to the 
program’s implementing organisation”.311 
 
As an example, the standard format for programme support agreements signed by the 
Government of Denmark clearly affirms that “respect for human rights, democratic 
principles, including free and fair elections, the rule of law, independence of the 
judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes ... constitute essential elements” 
of the instrument, and that in case of “violation of the essential elements ... the 
Government of Denmark reserves the right to suspend with immediate effect further 
disbursements to the implementing partners”.312 
 
3.5. State behaviour  
 
The history of political conditionality is full of examples of divergence between 
words and deeds. For instance, Arase strongly criticized the Japanese government 
because of the absence of changes in Japanese foreign aid allocation after the 
adoption of the “ODA Charter” in 1992.313 Rix concurred that Japan still gave 
priority to some of its strategic aid recipients, such as Indonesia and Myanmar. 
Human rights had not become a central element of the Japanese government’s 
decision-making process on aid allocation.314 Okuizumi summarises the point in the 
following terms: “despite its policy of linking its economic aid to the human rights 
practices of aid receiving countries, as articulated in the ODA Charter, the Japanese 
government in practice has not, thus far, fully implemented the Charter vis-à-vis all 
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countries which receive Japanese aid”.315 Nuscheler and Warkentin agree that “in 
respect to basic human rights, the application of the charter was inconsequential”.316 
 
A fundamental indicator to comprehensively assess the adoption of the norm of 
political conditionality by donor states is thus state behaviour. As Barratt succinctly 
puts it, “the preferences of policy-makers are revealed by the choices governments 
make about resource allocation”.317 Carey reiterates the point by emphasising that 
“major European donors emphasize the importance of human rights for the allocation 
of their development aid in various reports, official statements, and policy 
documents. But declaring human rights as a guiding principle for aid allocation is not 
sufficient for the promotion of such rights. Development aid as a tool to promote 
human rights works only if political conditionality is applied rigorously and 
consistently across countries and regions”.318 These arguments proceed from the 
assumption that governmental budgetary commitments represent the translation of 
“financial resources into human purposes” in any aspect of public policy, including 
aid policy. The scrutiny of spending behaviour thus provides a basis to evaluate the 
translation of espoused policy objectives into practice”.319 
 
3.5.1. The problems of quantitative analyses 
 
Many scholars have used econometric techniques to investigate whether the human 
rights performance of potential recipient governments affects the decision by OECD 
donors on (a) who their recipient governments should be and (b) how much aid these 
governments should receive.320 While the findings of this strand of research offer a 
useful starting point to assess the application of political conditionality, Lancaster 
has a point when she asserts that  
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Quantitative exercises that produce correlations between the value of aid flows 
to particular countries […and particular characteristics of these countries] can 
be quite misleading considered by themselves and in the absence of context … 
Thus the prolonged disputes on measurement and methodology in econometric 
studies of aid-giving, as the primary approach to understanding aid’s purposes, 
can often prove sterile.321  
 
Lancaster does not elaborate on this point, but four weaknesses of statistical studies 
can be highlighted here.322  
 
Weakness 1: Annual figures 
 
Quantitative studies are based on figures that are reported to the OECD on an annual 
basis. This inevitably leads to overlook relevant information. For instance, what if a 
recipient government harshly represses the opposition in February, development 
grants are reduced or cancelled in April, the situation improves in September, and 
disbursements are restored in December? OECD figures could not be but silent with 
respect to this aid sanction.  
 
Weakness 2: Suspensions versus cuts 
 
Political conditionality usually entails the mere suspension of aid. This means that 
development assistance is neither cut or cancelled, but only “frozen” (as the 
journalistic jargon goes). The predominance of aid suspensions, together with the 
lack of proficient reporting by bilateral aid agencies, means that numerous cases of 
aid sanctions cannot be detected through the OECD dataset. Nielsen confirms that 
“[a]id donors can both suspend ongoing disbursements and cut off future funding, 
but virtually all prior scholarship has focused solely on cuts to future funding 
because they are easier to observe ... This is because the OECD has collected detailed 
                                                 
321 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 17. 
322 The arguments offered here are about statistical analysis of aid sanctions, not statistical analysis of 
“selectivity”. Donors can respond to human rights abuses by recipient governments in two ways. In 
the short term, they usually suspend aid and condition its resumption on improvement on the situation. 
In the long term, they can cut the amount of aid given to a country. Most of the problems of 
quantitative studies are related to their inability to detect short-term suspensions. For a complementary 
argument, see Bolle, “La Conditionnalité Démocratique Dans La Politique Africaine de La France,” 8. 
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information on aid commitments since the 1970s but has not, until recently, asked 
donors to provide adequate information on how much aid is actually disbursed”.323  
 
This issue is particularly problematic because all aid agencies share a strong 
incentive to spend the funds allocated to a country, and thus suspensions are highly 
preferred in comparison with cuts or withdrawals. A confidential report on DfID 
sanctions in Africa offers numerous examples of this ‘pressure to spend’, including 
the efforts made by some country offices to disburse delayed funds within the 
original disbursement quarter or financial year as in June 2004 in Rwanda or leaving 
the possibility of general budget support to be disbursed in Uganda’s financial year 
in 2004. The result is that some delays or political negotiations are made 
administratively ‘invisible’, though partners’ budget cycles and trust might 
nonetheless have been affected. 
 
Weakness 3: Different aid modalities 
 
Previous studies have concentrated on total bilateral aid flows, implicitly assuming 
that all types of aid should be similarly object to suspensions and cuts. However, this 
does not take into adequate consideration the interrelationship (and mutual 
interference) with two others ways in which aid can be used to advance respect for 
human rights: (1) earmarking and (2) support to civil society.  
 
In public finance, earmarking is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating 
specific revenues to the financing of specific public services. Human rights 
earmarking works as follows. Foreign aid is still given directly to recipient 
government. However, and in contrast with budget support, it is collected in separate 
budgets, to be spent in specific sectors or programmes. As such, through earmarking, 
donors bypass the normal procedure where tax revenue and foreign aid are pooled 
into a common, general fund before money is allocated across separate spending 
programmes. Donors tie foreign aid directly to its expected expenditure programme. 
Earmarked funds are alternatively referred to as “special funds,” “segregated 
accounts,” “segregated budgets,” or “dedicated revenues.” Through earmarking, 
                                                 
323 Richard A. Nielsen, “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive 
States,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 793. 
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donors attempt to “segregate” human rights resources in separate pots: aid for 
HIV/AIDS is supposed to be kept separate from that for environment, and 
environment funds from that for girl’s education, for example. The ultimate purpose 
in doing so is to influence a government’s spending choices in favour of those 
programs and services deemed important by donors. 
  
Direct support to human rights civil society organisations (CSOs) is another way in 
which aid can be used to advance respect for human rights. Direct support to CSOs 
voluntarily ignores the institutions (and budgets) of recipient governments and 
directly sustains human rights organisations and human rights projects within 
recipient countries. Aid can be channelled through private organisations whose 
purpose is the promotion of human rights (for instance, non-governmental 
organisations which work to eradicate child labour or female genital mutilation). Aid 
can also be given to commercial private actors whose programmes have positive 
human rights side-effects (for instance, the construction of schools). The U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends more than $700 
million annually on programmes dedicated to support civil and political rights 
abroad, including election support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and 
political parties, and fostering the growth and power of civil society organizations 
such as labour unions and women’s and human rights groups.324 The OECD DAC 
calls it “human rights projects”,325 Uvin names it “positive support”,326 others dub it 
micro-conditionality, or democracy assistance. I call it direct support to human rights 
CSOs. 
 
The existence of different aid modalities creates significant validity problems for 
quantitative studies whose dependent variable is total aid flows. Earmarking and civil 
society support affect the modalities of disbursement (aid is earmarked for specific 
purposes or channelled through specific private organisations) but may not influence 
either the amount of aid or the selection of recipient countries. Actually, countries 
whose governments are bad human rights performers may even be allocated more aid 
                                                 
324 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment, 1999). 
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(earmarked or channelled through human rights organisations) because support for 
human rights is needed more.327 Indeed, the large majority of donors try not to 
suspend or cut those aid programmes and projects that directly benefit the 
population. Rather, they modify only those money flows which end up directly into 
the hands of the recipient government. Thus, in addition, to humanitarian aid, aid 
programmes targeted at social sectors and channelled through NGOs are often left in 
place as well. This might include health and education programmes, food security, 
programmes in support of civil society, human rights and democracy, and rural 
development projects.328  
 
This aspect cannot but affect statistical results because donors are increasingly using 
different modalities of aid delivery. According to OECD figures, in 2008 donors 
delegated over 30% of their aid for implementation through non-state development 
actors, including NGOs, multilateral agencies and public-private partnerships. In 
addition, the selection of aid modalities is endogenous to the quality of recipient 
governments’ institutions. Bermeo showed that the type of aid donors distribute 
varies depending on whether or not the recipient country is relatively well-governed. 
Well-governed countries are more likely to receive development aid (e.g., for 
economic infrastructure), whereas poorly governed countries are more likely to get 
only emergency relief aid.329 Dietrich concluded that, all else equal, in poorly 
governed recipient countries donors bypass recipient governments and deliver more 
aid through non-state actors. In recipient countries with higher governance quality, 
                                                 
327 Again, DfID exemplifies this situation: “If a partner government is not committed to the three 
partnership commitments, we do not use conditions to try to impose these commitments. Instead, we 
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328 See, for instance, the position taken by DfID in its strategy paper on conditionality: “This policy 
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donors engage the government and give more aid through the government-to-
government channel.330 
 
By ignoring the distinction between different aid modalities, past quantitative studies 
inevitably offer a distorted picture of political conditionality. What if, after human 
rights abuses, a donor decides to change aid modality and deliver a large part of its 
aid through human rights NGOs? According to OECD data, the donor would not be 
applying conditionality. Yet, such country would in fact be doing so. A related point 
is that donors that channel most of their aid through NGOs have been penalised by 
past analyses. Direct assistance to local NGOs is a specific feature of Scandinavian 
donors, as well as of the US.331 In contrast, France does not offer democracy 
assistance, but focuses instead on more apolitical governance aid to strengthen state 
institutions.332  
  
As highlighted by Barratt, when donors decide to “switch from less to more 
restrictive forms of aid, for instance, when human rights situations turn sour or 
governments fail to make adequate progress in meeting the needs of their citizens … 
this is something that is rather tricky to capture in aggregate analyses of the kind 
conducted here”.333 For instance, after Malawian judges dealing with corruption 
cases were fired in November 2001, the UK partly converted general budget support 
into humanitarian assistance to deal with the food crisis in 2002.334 This means that, 
in official data, aid is still classified as directed to Malawi. Yet, it is channelled 
through civil society organizations and never seen by government leaders. 
 
After an increasing number of calls for more research on different types of aid,335 
researchers have started to disaggregate aid data in different ways, such as technical 
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versus non-technical assistance,336 budget support versus project aid,337 as well as by 
sector,338 or by general orientation (Economic aid, Social aid, and Human rights and 
Democracy aid).339 Yet, these studies make use of OECD data on aid commitments, 
instead of disbursements, and the use of commitments obviously does not reflect the 
actual amount of aid released in case of aid sanctions.340 As recognized by the 
OECD, available figures on disbursements by sector are highly unreliable: “the 
analysis on CRS disbursements … is not recommended for flows before 2002, 
because the annual coverage is below 60%”.341 According to The Economist, the 
share of aid which is recorded accurately “has risen from 42% in 2005 to 48% in 
2007 (i.e., only 48% of aid is properly accounted for)”. The magazine recognizes that 
this is  “an improvement, but still a far cry from the target, which is 85% 
accuracy”.342 Those researchers who have attempted to overcome these problems by 
creating their own datasets recognize the limitations of their work: 
 
Many of the sources do not go into a great deal of detail on the specifics of the 
event and indeed, it is not unlikely that there may be a number of suspensions 
that we have not encoded because our search has not yet been exhaustive 
enough. Another important caveat related to the completeness and 
representativeness of our dataset is that since we only have been able to capture 
the actions of those donors that have publicly reported on their budget support 
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suspensions, our results might be biased towards the more transparent 
donors.343 
 
Weakness 4: Threats versus cuts 
 
Mere threats to suspend, cut or cancel foreign aid are occasionally sufficient to 
obtain policy concessions by recipient governments. In these cases, aid figures would 
remain unchanged although development financing is in fact conditioned on the 
respect of human rights. Any quantitative analysis that relies on this data is 
necessarily blind to this type of political conditionality. Only qualitative analysis can 
effectively study this process. This is particularly problematic because the most 
recurrent type of aid sanctions is the suspension of future aid, as opposed to the 
suspension of ongoing programmes.344  
 
3.5.2. A qualitative research design 
 
The issues highlighted above are not the only ones affecting the validity of statistical 
analysis. For example, much has been written about the flaws of existing measures of 
government respect for human rights.345 Taken in the round, these weaknesses point 
in favour of the adoption of a qualitative research strategy. This is particularly true 
also in the light of the important insights that a qualitative analysis can provide into 
how norms shape both ‘events’ (donors may offer different reasons to suspend aid, 
such as human rights abuses or macro-economic imbalances) and ‘non-events’ (only 
some donors may justify the non-application of the norm, thus implicitly 
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acknowledging its salience).346 Kratochwil and Ruggie convincingly argued a long 
time ago that norms serve as reasons for action, rather than causes, and that any 
explanation that seeks to invoke norms must do more than point to the existence of 
norms on the one hand, and of norm-consistent behaviour on the other.347 Discourse 
can provide insights into how norms shape ‘non-events’ (paths not taken).348 The 
invocation of a norm by relevant actors, for instance, is an important indicator in 
itself, even if not followed by consistent behaviour. 
 
The advantages of a qualitative analysis of political conditionality are also defended 
by Crawford. In analysing the role of human rights in foreign aid,  
 
there is considerable reliance on quantitative material, especially in the 
investigation of political aid programmes. While it is maintained that this 
provides valuable indicators of the overall orientation and scope of donor 
programmes, it is acknowledged that there are limitations to analyses based 
only on quantitative data, especially given the complexity of objectives and the 
variety of political scenarios in recipient countries. Ideally, the investigation 
into the contribution of external agencies would be supplemented by the 
qualitative analysis that detailed country case-studies can provide (Crawford 
2001, 8).  
 
Indeed, qualitative analysis is needed to detect small but important variation in donor 
behaviour. Portela distinguishes different types of restrictive measures, in descending 
order of severity: 
 full suspension (except humanitarian); 
 suspension of programme aid or balance-of-payments support; 
 suspension of new projects (including technical cooperation); 
 redirection towards civil society; 
 overall reduction of aid allocation; 
 refusal to inform how much money will be delivered;  
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International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 87. 
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 consultations, political statements and threats to take restrictive action.349 
A more sophisticated analysis of donors’ responses carried out by DfID consultants 
considered the decision not to increase aid at key moments as an alternative to the 
use of cuts/delays/suspension.350  
 
Having accounted for all the above arguments in favour and against the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to assess political conditionality, this thesis 
will build on the findings of past quantitative studies, but will test their validity 
through an in-depth exploration of case studies. The focus will be on the negative 
aspect of conditionality, because coordination is more likely in these circumstances, 
and thus variation is more puzzling. According to a diplomat with extensive work 
experience in African countries, “suspension of aid is a very extreme measure and it 
is not adopted lightly as a method of putting pressure on the government. Usually, 
there has been months and months of deadlock between the government and the 
donors before suspension of aid is used as a final straw. These situations can be very 
sensitive and the donors generally speaking want to be cautious and act as a group 
rather than on their own”.351 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter justified two fundamental methodological decisions. First, the selection 
of France and the UK as case studies. Among European donors, France and the UK 
are two strikingly similar large donors, middle-ranking powers, nuclear-weapon 
states, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, former colonial 
empires, EU Member States and human rights ‘homelands’. Notwithstanding this 
resemblance (and a formal attempt to coordinate their policies towards Africa), the 
two countries seem to present a different approach towards political conditionality. 
This offers a unique vantage point to apply Mill’s method of difference and discover 
those factors that can explain variation in the internalisation of political 
conditionality by EU Member States. 
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Second, the chapter clarified the choice to assess the level of internalisation of 
political conditionality by looking at three different factors: policies, legal documents 
(laws and international agreements) and state behaviour. The flaws of quantitative 
data on political conditionality led to the adoption of a qualitative research design, 
centred on the analysis of a few case studies of negative sanctions.  
 
A three-fold measurement of the salience of political conditionality may be 
considered an excessive complication. Why should one not concentrate on legal 
basis, discourse, or behaviour alone? The answer is that each of the three indicators 
is imperfect if taken on its own. As far as discourse is concerned, it is true that 
political rhetoric provides a starting point for evaluating norm salience. Rhetorical 
norm affirmation provides early evidence of the acknowledgment of an emergent 
international norm. However, state discourse can easily be accused to be uncorrelated 
with actions. Political leaders “can cynically manipulate rhetorical norm affirmation 
to deflect political pressure and avoid concrete action”. As such, “the combination of 
behaviour and rhetoric provides greater evidence to evaluate the domestic salience of 
the emergent norm”.352 This is particularly true for aid conditionality. For instance, in 
his attempt to prove that conditions are often rhetorical moves and do not translate 
into practical actions, Svensson found “no link between a country’s reform effort, or 
fulfilment of conditionality, and the disbursement rate” of aid funds.353  
 
With respect to the analysis of behaviour, there is one main reason why this alone 
would be a deficient strategy. Johnston observed that behaviour can be consistent 
with a norm even without any influence from the norm itself. He created the idiom 
“pro-norm behaviour” to indicate “action that is consistent with the norm in question, 
whether done because the norm has been internalized or because some kind of 
consequentialist calculation makes it useful to follow”.354 The point made by 
Johnston clarifies that aid to a repressive government may be suspended not just 
because of sincere human rights concerns. In this case, an analysis of discourse is 
necessary to understand the real value of donor actions. Checkel justifies the analysis 
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of discourse in the following terms: “to minimize reliance on correlational 
arguments, I consider not only the observable degree of compliance among agents 
but also the motives and attitudes that lead actors to abide by normative 
prescriptions”.355  
 
Like any coding, the exercise of measuring the level of internalisation of political 
conditionality is partly interpretive. Yet, the methodology proposed here improves on 
many studies that offer no way to evaluate norm strength at all (assuming rather than 
assessing the importance of certain norms) or are based on partial analyses limited to 
discourse or behaviour alone. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLICIES, LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
This dissertation addresses two different questions: have France and the UK 
internalised political conditionality to different degrees? If so, why? This chapter 
offers a positive answer to the first question. Specifically, it shows that the laws, 
international agreements and policies regulating French and British development 
cooperation place significantly different emphasis on the principle that government-
to-government development assistance should be conditioned on respect for human 
rights. The chapter is divided into two main sections, the first one focuses on France, 
the second one on the UK. Special attention is dedicated to the policies on general 
budget support, given the high fiduciary and political risks attached to this 
instrument.356 The conclusion presents the results of the analysis in a comparative 
fashion.  
 
For the sake of concision, the chapter presents only a small sample of the most 
representative legal documents, strategy papers and international agreements of the 
two development actors. It is worth emphasizing that this selection is the result of the 
analysis of more than 90 documents, including laws, ministerial declarations, 
strategy papers, policy documents, and different types of international agreements. 
 
4.1. France 
 
4.1.1. Legal basis 
 
The legal basis of French development cooperation lies in a plethora of stratified, 
inter-linked and intricate texts (laws, regulations, ordinances, edicts and inter-
ministerial decrees).357 The result is chaotic, and final evidence is difficult to obtain. 
Nevertheless, none of these documents seem to include any reference to the 
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promotion of human rights as an objective of development cooperation, or to respect 
for human rights as a pre-condition for aid disbursement.  
 
As a matter of fact, most of the legal documents regulating French development 
assistance focus on its process, not on its content. Thus, the new Institutional Act on 
Financial Legislation, which came into effect in 2006, gave Parliament greater 
control over the budget, including development assistance: each year, during budget 
discussions, the Foreign Affairs and Finance, Economy and Planning Committees 
submit detailed and substantiated reports on the provisions of the Budget Act relating 
to ODA, and hold in-depth discussions and hear the ministers concerned.358 Yet, the 
Act does not provide any guidance on what the objectives of French development 
cooperation should be, and on what basis aid programmes should be evaluated.  
 
The 2007 Act on the External Action of Local Authorities presents a similar 
situation. Article L1115-1 states that “local governments and their associations may, 
in compliance with international commitments of France, enter into agreements with 
foreign local authorities to carry out actions of cooperation or development 
assistance”. However, the Act does not specify what the objectives of these 
agreements should be. Actually, it leaves the question open to contextual 
negotiations: “these agreements specify the purpose of the proposed actions and the 
estimated amount of financial commitments”.359 
 
4.1.2. Policy documents and ministerial statements 
 
After the end of the Cold War, France initially supported the principles of political 
conditionality in development assistance. On 20 June 1990, French President 
François Mitterrand concluded the Franco-African Summit at La Baule by saying 
that French aid would be “lukewarm” towards countries that did not strive to create 
institutions based on free elections, multiparty systems, the removal of censorship 
and an independent judiciary. The consequence would be a reduction in French aid to 
“regimes which would behave in an authoritarian fashion, without accepting any 
evolution towards democracy”, and that “France will bind all its contributions to the 
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efforts that will be made to move towards more freedom”.360 This linkage was 
reasserted in what came to be called the ‘Balladur doctrine’, by the name of the then 
French Prime Minister. The doctrine was formulated in an article published by Le 
Monde on 23 September 1993 and sought to reserve aid for countries that were 
correctly governed, democratic and at peace with themselves.361  
 
These openings were significant. However, they should not be overestimated. At a 
press conference organised on the day after the discourse in La Baule, Mitterand 
clarified that “each country should set the terms and pace of its own reform”.362 In 
1992, Jacques Pelletier, the French Cooperation minister who had strongly supported 
democratisation, left office, apparently because of disagreements with the policy of 
the Elysée.363 Xavier Renou, a French political science researcher and human rights 
activists, reports that 
 
at the 1992 Franco-African Summit, French Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy 
privately explained that amongst potentially conflicting goals of promoting 
democracy, ensuring development and maintaining security, the last-mentioned 
ranked first. Development should be pursued second, and only then could 
democratisation be tackled.364 
 
In 1993, this concept was reiterated by Roland Daums. The then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated that “economic reform should have priority over democratization” and 
that “the pace of democratisation should not be forced”.365 
 
In 1998, the reform of French aid system seemed to suggest the triumph of the new 
course over the old practices. The outline document issued in February stated that 
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“co-operating means working together in a free but demanding dialogue. In many 
cases this will mean abandoning the idea of assistance in order to forge a genuine 
partnership based on priorities expressed in terms of sustainable development and the 
promotion of human rights and democracy”.366 However, the analysis of successive 
strategy papers shows that the changes were neither profound nor durable. Actually, 
in the new millennium political conditionality has lost almost any appeal within 
French development policy circles.  
 
A 2006 strategy paper titled “Governance strategy for French Development 
Assistance” represents the most compelling evidence in this respect. The document 
was approved by the Inter-ministerial Committee on International Cooperation and 
Development (CICID), the body in charge of signalling the direction of French aid. 
The CICID concedes that “governance has been at the heart of development for 
almost fifteen years now”, that the agenda has shifted “to a broader understanding of 
the term ... it is now recognized that not only the content of the policies themselves 
are important but also the way policies are drafted and implemented, notably with the 
participation of the stakeholders”, and that “this shift can be seen among bilateral 
donors, and at the level of the European Union”.367 Nevertheless (and 
notwithstanding explicit reference to the policies of the EU), according to French 
policy-makers ownership should take precedence over governance, and 
conditionality is expressly ruled out. Indicators “were originally simple tools for 
ranking countries and conditionality. [On the contrary, t]hey should primarily be 
thought of as a method for observing and evaluating ongoing processes in a given 
society. They constitute a helpful basis and a necessary signal for the reforms that are 
required for development assistance. They should also be used to evaluate France’s 
assistance system whenever possible”.368  
 
The argument behind the French approach is that “a “turnkey” democratic 
development model becomes contradictory if it means that local choices are pre-
empted. This means that “the quality of cooperation should not be measured so much 
by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through 
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conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with 
specific experience and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies”.369 
The policy for the future is the following:  
 
governance is an element used in aid allocation decision-making, but without being an 
automatic conditionality instrument. Measuring governance outcomes would not so 
much determine the level of assistance as it would clarify the types of instruments to be 
used in cooperation policies, thereby making it possible to identify the policies and tools 
that are best suited to any given situation. In this respect, the methodology that France 
has developed takes into consideration the following criteria: income level, governance 
quality, France’s political priorities and the fragility of the country in question. The 
results constitute a decision-making support for channelling aid and defining the 
relevant procedures.
370
 
 
The result is a strong preference for direct support to rule of law initiatives and civil 
society organisations over conditionality.371 
 
This position was confirmed by subsequent policy documents. In 2008, the cross-
cutting policy document attached to the financial report on development assistance 
stated that, in the 55 countries in France’s priority solidarity zone, “the key aims of 
French development policy are to foster growth, reduce poverty and give easier 
access to global public goods, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals to 2015”.372 No reference to human rights can be found. 
 
Interestingly, human right conditionality is not considered appropriate even for 
budget support operations. French budget support is dispensed on the basis of two 
documents: a “Doctrine for the use of comprehensive budgetary aid in foreign 
States” adopted in February 2007, and a strategy of operational implementation laid 
down by the French Development Agency in March 2007. The doctrine for the use of 
budget support is based on principles of predictability, results-oriented management 
and alignment. Three eligibility conditions has to be satisfied for the planning and 
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disbursement of budget support: a sound and sustainable macroeconomic policy, a 
growth and poverty-reduction strategy in line with the Millennium Development 
Goals, and a favourable assessment of the public financial management system.373 
No human rights requirement is included.  
 
In 2011 the French government adopted its first long-term policy document, titled 
Development cooperation: A French Vision. The document stresses that France 
“must move from a development assistance policy, which implies an asymmetrical 
donor-beneficiary relationship, over to a policy of cooperation with developing 
countries”.374 This implies that, notwithstanding the fact that development 
cooperation cannot sidestep governance issues,  
 
the role of cooperation action depends primarily therefore on the country-specific 
context and cannot be reduced to a one-size-fits-all model. The effectiveness of 
cooperation actions demands a partnership approach adapted to the context, based on 
equality between partners, a common analysis of needs and reciprocal contractual 
commitments … Cooperation policy … should not use an unequal balance of power to 
impose a particular form of governance on its partners.
375
 
 
This point is reiterated with additional strength:  
 
France sets governance as a priority for its cooperation, while respecting its partners’ 
sovereignty. France makes the promotion of individual rights, the rule of law and 
governance a core strand of its cooperation policy and considers them to be part and 
parcel of the political dialogue on the formulation and implementation of development 
strategies. This priority is grounded on the fact that governance is a critical dimension 
of the political fate of societies and their economic emergence. However, support for 
good governance comes up against the limits, encountered by any outside party, of non- 
interference in the political and social balance of a sovereign country.
376
  
 
The French position on political conditionality is well exemplified also by an episode 
which occurred at the beginning of Sarkozy’s presidency. In 2007, as part of its 
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“ouverture au centre et à gauche”, Sarkozy nominated Jean-Marie Bockel as 
Secretary of State for Cooperation and La Francophonie. Bockel, considered a 
reformist, was the leader of a new centre-left political party, Modern Left (Gauche 
Moderne). 
 
In January 2008, Bockel released an interview to Le Monde in which he pledged to 
sign the “death certificate of the Françafrique”, that is the “cronyish network of 
politicians and businessmen in France and Africa, which has defined relations 
between France and many of its French-speaking former colonies in the past, and 
whose mutually supportive nature resists all attempts to change it”.377 In particular, 
Bockel affirmed that “one of the main obstacles to development is bad governance” 
and that his response would have been to “review our conditionalities … it means to 
condition our aid to good governance”.378  
 
The interview to Le Monde was the consequence of a speech that Bockel delivered 
the day before in a traditional ceremony inaugurating the year at the Ministry of 
Cooperation. In this speech, Bockel expressed his ideas with greater clarity. Good 
governance should be intended in a large sense: “democracy, human rights, fight 
against corruption and business environment”. The aim is “a demanding friendship, 
and without complacency, exactly because it is a sincere friendship, a friendship 
directed to a people and not only to its leaders”. Again, the norm of conditionality is 
explicitly supported: “I suggest going beyond the ‘positive’ incentives and consider, 
where appropriate, real conditionality for granting our aid”.379   
 
The Economist, surprised by the strong words of the Secretary of State, dedicated a 
specific article to the French policy change. The magazine summarized Bockel’s 
thinking in the following terms: “French aid to Africa would be conditional on good 
governance, be monitored more rigorously, and cut off if African leaders were up to 
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no good. In other words, in line with best-practice policy on development aid in the 
West”.380 Professor Martial K. Frindéthié offered a similar interpretation: 
 
Bockel was convinced that France’s distribution of aid in the Third World 
should be subordinated to democratic principles both in France and in the aid-
recipient countries. Traditionally, this had not been the case, and the fact that 
over the decades, some French officials ha personalized their relationships with 
some African dictators, whom the propped up with tax payers’ money, reflected 
a crisis of morality in French political life.381  
 
The “syndicate” of African Heads of States immediately organized itself: Omar 
Bongo (President of Gabon), Denis Sassou Nguesso (President of Congo) and Paul 
Biya (President of Cameroun) called the French President and claimed the head of 
the Secretary of State.382 In March 2008, Bockel was reassigned as Secretary of State 
for Veterans Affairs in what was sold as a technical reshuffling. The political motive 
of the change was later confirmed by Bockel himself,383 by Robert Bourgi (who 
acted as intermediary between the African Presidents and the French political 
establishment), 384 by another minister, questioned anonymously by Agence France-
Presse, as well as by other sources at the Quai d’Orsay. They evoked “pressures, 
particularly from Omar Bongo, to let Bockel leave the Quai d’Orsay”.385  
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The new Secretary of State for Cooperation and La Francophonie, Alain Joyandet, 
soon clarified the position of the French government: 
 
It is not about reversing the demands of France in terms of good governance 
and democracy ... it is useless, if we want to achieve results, to declaim, ridicule 
or finger specific governments or individuals. It is necessary to accompany the 
changes, to respect the Heads of State and, if problems are there, treat them with 
diplomacy.386 
 
The point was reiterated a few years later. France speaks “to regimes that are not 
perfect democracies, because our diplomacy is intended to be universal. This is a 
diplomacy of ‘positive influence’: we want to talk with everyone to bring them to our 
values. The more we talk with these countries, the greater the possibilities of 
advancing these values”.387 
 
Constructivist scholars suggest that identities and norms “appear unconscious, when 
they have become deeply internalized”. However, they “surface when they are 
contested by external change or internal challengers”.388 The case of Bockel offers 
strong evidence that the any call in favour of political conditionality unsettle 
contrasting identities and norms with deep roots in French policy-circles. 
 
4.1.3. International agreements 
 
France has concluded three types of development agreements with recipient 
countries: Partnership Framework Documents, Debt Reduction and Development 
Contracts and general cooperation or friendship treaties. 
 
General cooperation or friendship treaties 
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Sometimes France includes provisions on foreign aid in general cooperation or 
friendship treaties. Numerous agreements concentrate on cultural cooperation. While 
some of these texts refer to development cooperation projects (with special focus on 
the diffusion of the French language), they never touch on human rights or 
democracy. For instance, on 19 April 2004 France and Libya signed an Agreement 
on Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The document encourages the 
development of the French Cultural Institute in Tripoli and the conclusion of 
scholarship programmes for Libyan students who want to study in France. However, 
human rights and democracy do not feature in the document.389 
 
Other treaties are dedicated to specific issues or projects. On 10 January 2009, 
France and Burkina Faso concluded an Agreement on the Joint Management of 
Migration Flows and Common Development. The document covers projects on 
student scholarships, policy cooperation and financial help. Most of the projects are 
funded by French development assistance. Human rights are only touched upon in 
the preamble, through a brief reference to the fundamental rights of migrant 
workers.390 On 21 February 2008, the French Development Agency (Agence 
française de développement, AFD) and Lebanon signed a Line of Credit Agreement. 
Disbursement of the money was divided in separate tranches, each of which was 
subordinated to a set of conditions. The conditions included, inter alia, the 
submission to Parliament of the 2007 annual budget law, the privatization of mobile 
telecommunications and the structural reform of Electricité du Liban, the state-
owned company responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electrical energy in Lebanon. No condition was dedicated to human rights or 
democratic issues.   
 
The absence of any reference to human rights in these agreements can be justified 
because of their sectoral or project-specific focus. However, France does not insert 
human rights clauses even in more generic treaties. The latest Friendship and 
Cooperation Treaty between France and a developing country was signed on 27 
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January 2012 with Afghanistan. The treaty covers cooperation in many areas, 
including development assistance. The objective of the treaty is to develop “a 
balanced partnership that contributes to the independence, security and economic and 
social development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” and France commits, 
inter alia, to “strengthen its cooperation in the sectors of agriculture, education, 
health, archaeology and cultural exchanges” (Article 1). Afghan authorities will 
facilitate the activities of AFD (Article 11).  
 
Human rights are only mentioned in the preamble of the treaty: the Parties conclude 
the agreement “reaffirming their commitment to the principles of national 
sovereignty, democracy, human rights and equality between men and women 
enrolled in their Constitution”.391 In addition to the marginal place of the reference to 
human rights, this is weakened by the inclusion of the concept of national 
sovereignty. Democratic governance and rule of law are considered, but only as a 
field to be supported, not as conditions of the agreement. Article 8 is titled 
“Democratic Governance and the Rule of Law” and states that “the French Party 
supports the strengthening of the rule of law and the effectiveness of institutions of 
the Republic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan … Particular attention is dedicated to 
the protection of women and their access to justice”.392 The lack of any political 
conditionality is confirmed by the scant termination clause included in Article 13, on 
“Final Dispositions”, which states that “Any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
execution of this Treaty shall be settled between the Parties through diplomatic 
channels. This treaty may be terminated in writing by either of Parties with three 
months’ notice through diplomatic channels”.393  
 
The treaty includes an Annex specifically dedicated to development cooperation, 
titled “Cooperation Programme for period 2012-2016”. The Programme never 
mentions human rights. Section 3.5 is dedicated to detailed analysis of the projects 
on democratic governance and rule of law. Most of these projects are dedicated to the 
formation of administrative cadres and judges. 
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Partnership Framework Documents 
 
As part of the long process of reform of French development assistance, in July 2004 
the CICID decided to create a pluri-annual framework instrument – the Partnership 
Framework Document (Document Cadre de Partenariat, DCP) – for French 
assistance in countries included in the Priority Solidarity Zone (Zone de solidarité 
prioritaire, ZSP). DCPs are signed by both parties for a five-year term, set out the 
priorities for French aid in the partner country and are drafted in accordance with the 
partner country’s development strategy, enhancing ownership and predictability. 
 
DCPs never include anything similar to a human rights clause, linking financial 
disbursement or programme continuation to respect for human rights or adherence to 
democratic principles. When reference to human rights can be found, this is for 
projects related to the enhancement of the rule of law. For instance, in 2005 France 
and Cameroon signed a DCP with “the objective to identify the priority intervention 
areas and modalities of Franco-Cameroon cooperation over the next five years 
(2006-2010)”. The document, which was explicitly “based on the Strategic 
Framework for the Fight against Poverty adopted by Cameroon in 2003” and was 
“consistent with the new directions in French aid decided by the CICID in 2004 and 
2005”, does not mention any condition, prerequisite or qualification for the initiation 
or continuation of development cooperation.394 Human rights or democracy are 
mentioned only three times. First, “in consultation with other partners, specifically 
multilateral organisations, French cooperation proposes to contribute to the 
improvement of public governance, in those areas where it can offer specific 
expertise and strengths (financial governance, administrative reform, 
decentralization, justice and security, human rights)”.395 Second, in the field of policy 
and security, two government-to-government projects will be accompanied by 
“human rights actions ... channelled through specialized Cameroonian and French 
NGOs, in consultation with other partners”. Third, France will support the Pluri-
actors Concerted Programme (Programme Concerté Pluri-acteurs, PCPA), “an 
innovative program designed to increase the involvement of non-state actors in the 
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democratic debate, the monitoring of public policies and the implementation of 
development projects”.396 
 
Other DCPs follow the approach taken by France and Cameroon. The DCP signed 
with Ethiopia in 2006 does not mention conditions but includes a section (4.2.1.1) 
titled “Support to the judiciary and law reforms”, under which France commits to 
“contribute to the following activities to strengthening of democracy, the private 
sector and access to justice ... Good governance, human rights: to support the training 
institute for judges and prosecutors”. Even the DCP signed with Benin in 2006, 
where France commits to continue the budget support programme initiated in 2005, 
does not declare common values or list a set of prerequisites.  
 
Contrats de désendettement et de développement 
 
Debt Reduction and Development Contracts (Contrats de désendettement et de 
développement, C2Ds) are France’s bilateral instrument for reducing debt incurred as 
part of development assistance. They are signed and implemented after the 
completion point of the multilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative and are added to the debt cancellations granted through the Paris Club. 
C2Ds use grants to refinance aid debts: the countries continue to service their debt, 
but as soon as a repayment is made, France hands the same sum back to the country 
for use in poverty reduction programmes that have been selected through mutual 
agreement between France and the partner country.  
 
Since 2000, many countries have signed C2Ds with France. A short list of the first 
ones include Mozambique (2001 and 2004), Uganda (2002), Bolivia (2003), 
Tanzania (2003), Mauritania (2003 and 2006), Ghana (2004), Madagascar (2005), 
Nicaragua (2005) and Cameroon (2006). None of these contracts, as well as none of 
the Presentation Reports that informs the National Assembly of the conclusion of the 
agreements, ever mention the presence of political conditionality. This is true 
notwithstanding the fact that many C2Ds set up significant budget support 
programmes.397 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually impose some 
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conditions to the conclusion of C2Ds. The contract can be signed only “when public 
financial management is reliable, and when poverty reduction strategies are 
appropriate and credible, the appropriations can take the form of global budget 
assistance to support poverty reduction strategies or harmonized financing for sector 
programmes”.398 Human rights are patently out of the picture. 
 
4.1.4. Conclusions on French policies and legal documents 
 
France does not support the idea that allocation and disbursement of development 
assistance should depend on respect for human rights and democratic principles by 
recipient governments. Notwithstanding initial endorsement of the norm, France has 
reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct support to rule of 
law programmes) to conditionality. This policy stance is confirmed by two additional 
elements: the laws that regulate French development cooperation do not include any 
reference to human rights, and French development agreements with recipient 
government generally do not contain human rights clauses. 
 
4.2. United Kingdom 
 
4.2.1. Legal basis 
 
The legal basis of British development assistance is the International Development 
Act 2002, which replaced the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980. 
Neither of the two acts contains any reference to human rights. The first article of the 
2002 Act, which sets down the objectives of British development assistance, reads as 
follows: 
 
(1) The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance 
if he is satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction 
in poverty. 
(2) In this Act “development assistance” means assistance provided for the purpose 
of— 
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(a) furthering sustainable development in one or more countries outside the United 
Kingdom, or 
  (b) improving the welfare of the population of one or more such countries. 
 
The Secretary of State can thus provide assistance to foreign countries only if two 
conditions are concurrently satisfied: (1) assistance furthers their sustainable 
development or improve the welfare of their population; and (2) it is likely to 
contribute to a reduction in poverty. No human rights requirement is mentioned. 
 
4.2.2. Policy documents and ministerial statements 
 
The UK was the first European country to speak in favour of political conditionality 
after the end of the Cold War. On 6 June 1990, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, affirmed that “countries which 
tend towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human 
rights, market principles, should be encouraged. Governments which persist with 
repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful and discredited economic systems 
should not expect us to support their folly with scarce aid resources which could be 
used better elsewhere”.399  
 
Since then, British governments of whatever colour have consistently argued in 
favour of the application of human rights selectivity and/or conditionality in 
government-to-government cooperation. In 1997, the newly-elected Labour 
government created the Department of International Development (DFID), 
separating the management of development assistance from the handling of foreign 
affairs. In the same year, the first DFID white paper called for the establishment of a 
new type of partnership with recipient countries, a partnership which “moves beyond 
the old conditionalities of development assistance and will require political 
commitment to poverty elimination on both sides”.400 The idea is to shift from donor-
imposed conditions (contractual conditionality) to mutually-agreed commitments 
(selective/allocative conditionality). In this respect, partner government are expected, 
inter alia, to “pursue policies which promote responsive and accountable 
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government, recognising that governments have obligations to all their people [and] 
promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.401 
 
On 2 March 2005, DFID, Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office jointly adopted a document titled Partnerships for poverty 
reduction: rethinking conditionality, which “sets out the circumstances in which [the 
UK] will consider modifying or withdrawing existing aid commitments”.402 The UK 
government affirms that “an effective aid partnership should be based on a shared 
commitment to three objectives: 
1. reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals; 
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; and 
3. strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk 
of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption”.403 
Notwithstanding the reiteration of the importance of an approach based on selectivity 
rather than conditionality (as selectivity assures policy ownership by partner 
countries), DFID, the FCO and the Treasury agree that “the UK will consider 
reducing or interrupting aid if: 
 countries veer significantly away from agreed poverty reduction objectives or 
outcomes or the agreed objectives of a particular aid commitment (e.g. 
through an unjustifiable rise in military spending, or a substantial deviation 
from the agreed poverty reduction programme); or 
 countries are in significant violation of human rights or other international 
obligations; or 
 there is a significant breakdown in partner government financial management 
and accountability, leading to the risk of funds being misused through weak 
administration or corruption”.404 
 
According to the policy document, one of the reasons why political conditions have 
been ineffective in the past is that donors have “failed to fulfil their part of the 
bargain. Aid has been withdrawn in response to domestic financial pressures in donor 
countries or external political events, with limited notice or consultation. There are 
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also frequent examples of donors continuing to provide assistance even when 
countries have not kept to their agreement” (DFID 2005, 6). The UK will seek to 
make aid more “predictable and transparent by being clear in advance about the 
process of decision-making on conditions, the conditions themselves, and the process 
for deciding to reduce or interrupt aid”.405 
 
Since 2005, this conditionality policy has been reaffirmed numerous times, such as 
by the Labour government in the 2006 White Paper Eliminating world poverty: 
making governance work for the poor,406 and by the Coalition government in the 
2014 Guidance note: The Partnership Principles.407 In 2008, DfID also released a 
strategy document specifically dedicated to budget support, titled Poverty Reduction 
Budget Support: A DFID Policy Paper. DFID argues that the provision of poverty 
reduction budget support (PRBS) will require two stages of analysis. First, the UK 
will use PRBS and encourage other donors also to use budget support, when it 
assesses that governments are sincerely committed to the three objectives already 
suggested in the 2005 paper on conditionality, that is:  
 reducing poverty; 
 upholding human rights and international obligations;  
 improving public financial management, promoting good governance and 
transparency and fighting corruption. 
Second, the UK will need to determine the most effective way of delivering its aid to 
support the government – this might be through PRBS or through other aid 
instruments.408 To decide whether PRBS is appropriate or not, the UK will assess 
four elements: the government’s strategy, budget and capacity, fiduciary risk, 
political risk, the expected benefits of PRBS. The political risk assessment is 
expressly centred on human rights. The commitment by DFID reads as follows: 
 
We will assess political risks, drawing on the assessment of the government’s 
commitment to human rights, to promoting good governance, and to fighting 
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408 DfID, Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID Policy Paper (London, 2008), 11. 
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corruption. We will assess the impact that any of these risks might have on the 
aid relationship and on the budget support programme in particular.409 
 
Importantly, this policy has been confirmed by the new Coalition government too. In 
July 2011, DFID published a Technical Note on Implementing DFID’s strengthened 
approach to budget support, which affirms that, in considering whether to give 
budget support or not, it will continue to assess governments against the three 
commitments mentioned above. In addition, it “will place more emphasis on 
domestic accountability by making partner country commitment to strengthening 
domestic accountability a specific commitment, separating it out from the other 
commitments, so the commitments will be to: 
1. poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals; 
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; 
3. improving public financial management, promoting good governance and 
transparency and fighting corruption; and 
4. strengthening domestic accountability”.410 
  
4.2.3. International agreements 
 
International agreements between the UK and developing countries can take different 
forms: multi-donor Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), Joint Assistance 
Strategies, overarching bilateral partnership arrangements, individual aid agreements 
(DFID MoU with partner governments required when giving governments Financial 
Aid or Technical Cooperation) and even joint minutes of aid talks. At least since the 
adoption of the 2005 paper on policy paper on conditionality, the UK has inserted 
reference to the existence of a shared commitment to respect human rights in almost 
every of these international documents.  
 
Development Partnership Arrangements (DPAs) set out the annual volume of aid that 
DFID expects to allocate to a partner country over a ten-year period, supporting 
medium-term planning and signalling a certain degree of trust. So far, the UK limited 
its use of ten-year DPAs to nine countries, among which Afghanistan (2005), 
                                                 
409 Ibid., 13. 
410 DfID, Implementing DFID’s Strengthened Approach to Budget Support: Technical Note (London, 
2011), 1. 
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Vietnam (2006), Zambia (2006), Yemen (2007) and Uganda (2007). All DPAs 
includes an article titled “Basis of the Partnership”, which reads as follows:  
 
Our development partnership in [Country X] is based on commitment to the 
following three objectives:  
i. Reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in [Country X];  
ii. Respecting human rights and other relevant international obligations;  
iii. Strengthening financial management and accountability and reducing the 
risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption. 
 
Bilateral MoU with developing countries do not include a standard human rights 
clause as DPAs do. However, they very often contain reference to the existence of a 
shared commitment to respect human rights. For instance, in 2006 the Governments 
of the UK and Rwanda jointly committed themselves to, inter alia, “the promotion 
and protection of the full range of human rights of all Rwandans, especially the poor, 
including through the promotion and observance of relevant international agreements 
to which our countries are signatories” (Article 6). These commitments form the 
basis for the high-level dialogue between the two Government throughout the year, 
and progress against the commitments “will be reviewed annually by the two 
Governments and by a team of independent consultants, using as a framework the 
agreed annual indicators of progress” Article 7). In case of alleged human rights 
violations, Article 8 and 9 regulate the potential termination of the agreement in 
further details: 
 
Should either Government believe that the other has taken or plans to take 
action incompatible with a commitment within the MoU, then the parties will 
meet to formally record the concern, draw attention to the potential implications 
of a failure to honour a commitment, and discuss what remedial action might be 
taken. 
If after substantive discussions either party continues to have significant 
concerns, then the UK’s programme of assistance to the Government of 
Rwanda may be reconfigured or, in extreme circumstances, terminated. 
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4.2.4. Conclusions on British policies and legal documents 
 
The UK presents a firm stance in favour of political conditionality. Even though 
human rights promotion is not an objective of British development assistance under 
the International Development Act 2002, the UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy 
requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic 
principles, and consistently include human rights clauses in development agreements 
with recipient countries. 
 
4.3. Conclusion: policy and institutional variation 
 
This chapter showed that France and the UK differ significantly in their approach to 
political conditionality. France opposes the idea that allocation and disbursement of 
development assistance should depend on the human rights practices of recipient 
governments. The laws that regulate French development cooperation do not include 
any reference to human rights and development agreements with recipient 
government do not contain any human rights clause. In addition, notwithstanding 
initial (and partial) endorsement of the norm (immediately after the end of the Cold 
War), France has reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct 
support to rule of law programmes) to conditionality.  
 
In comparison with the French attitude, the UK is a stronger supporter of the norm. It 
is true that the International Development Act 2002 does not include human rights 
promotion among the objectives of British development assistance. However, British 
policy-makers have repeatedly stated their support to political conditionality and 
consistently include human rights clauses in development agreements with recipient 
countries.  
 
This finding is in line with the scant comments on political conditionality offered by 
researchers on British aid and African policies. Cumming agrees that Blair 
“introduced a policy of political conditionality whereby British aid [was] linked to 
political reforms by African governments”.411 Porteous identiﬁes four key elements 
                                                 
411 Gordon Cumming, “UK African Policy in the Post Cold War Era: From Realpolitik to 
Moralpolitik?,” Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Politics 42, no. 1 (2004): 110. 
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of the UK’s Africa policies. The first one is the idea of ‘enhanced partnership’ with 
African governments committed to good governance, conflict prevention and poverty 
reduction 412. Zoe Marriage argues that the official rhetoric under New Labour had it 
that DFID exemplified the “moral aspect of the UK government, claiming a 
relationship of partnership between the UK and developing countries based on a 
common concern for poverty reduction and respect for human rights”.413 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that France and the UK vary significantly with respect 
to the internalisation of political conditionality in their policies, laws and 
international agreements. The next chapter assesses whether this finding can be 
further validated by the existence of similar differences in the behaviour of the two 
donors. 
  
                                                 
412 Tom Porteous, Britain in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2008), 12. 
413 Zoe Marriage, “Defining Morality: DfID and the Great Lakes,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 3 
(2006): 489. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF AID SANCTIONS 
 
The previous chapter assessed the discursive and legal elements of the internalisation 
of political conditionality by France and the UK. This chapter concentrates on the 
behavioural component. The analysis builds upon the findings of past qualitative and 
quantitative studies, and expands existing research by comparing the two donors’ 
responses to four instances of human rights violations in recipient countries. The 
chapter shows that France is often the most opposed to the application of political 
conditionality, while the UK frequently takes the lead in the imposition of aid 
sanctions, together with like-minded Nordic donors. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section offers a collection of anecdotal 
evidence on French and British behaviour from past qualitative research. In addition, 
it presents the findings of previous quantitative studies on aid allocation by the two 
countries. These results offer a good starting point to assess the internalisation of 
political conditionality by different donors. However, as explained in Chapter 3, they 
also present serious weaknesses and cannot therefore be considered the last word on 
the subject. The second section presents the universe of cases of EU aid sanctions 
and defends the selection of four case studies: Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua 
and Zimbabwe. The third section contrasts French and British responses to the 
human rights abuses occurring in these countries, both in their bilateral policies and 
in their attempts to influence EU decisions.414 The analysis compares France and the 
UK, where possible, with each other, and, where this is not possible, with the 
behaviour of other donors. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the 
chapter. 
 
It is important to stress from the outset that, notwithstanding the selection of “hard” 
and “least-likely” cases, there is no way to demonstrate that the following qualitative 
                                                 
414 As highlighted by Forsythe, both aspects are important. In today’s interconnected world, “it is 
frequently not possible fully to separate multilateral from bilateral foreign policy ... Nevertheless, 
states do pursue some foreign policy objectives largely on a bilateral basis, even if at some point these 
national initiatives may become entangled in multilateral developments or take place against the 
background of multilateral standards and organizations”: David P. Forsythe, “Introduction,” in Human 
Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. David P. Forsythe (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 2000), 10. 
126 
 
analysis has any external validity beyond the case studies that are included in the 
chapter.415 Each recipient country is different from the others, as is each donor-
recipient relationship. Nevertheless, this problem should not worry the reader too 
much. The external validity of the case studies will be inferred from the results of 
past statistical works (which takes into account all potential aid recipients, in the 
whole 20-year period since the end of the Cold War). The objective is to show that, 
notwithstanding their weaknesses, the findings of past quantitative studies are not the 
result of measurement errors, missing data or limitations in the operationalization of 
relevant concepts. Rather, they are confirmed by the in-depth analysis of a limited 
number of case studies. 
 
5.1. Past research 
 
5.1.1. Qualitative studies 
 
Past qualitative research suggests that France is less willing than the UK to apply 
political conditionality. Uvin, for instance, found that, in comparison with other 
major donors, “the French policy towards political conditionality is much more 
modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent support for 
the prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic or human 
rights record.416 Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French and British 
aid from the end of the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was “a radical 
shift with the introduction of political conditionality”. While the shift has gradually 
been watered down in both countries, this happened more in France, and “to a lesser 
extent” in the UK.417  
 
Numerous case studies confirm these findings. During the negotiation for the Lomé 
III Convention, France expressly stated its opposition to the inclusion of references 
to human rights in the main text of the agreement.418 Emmanuel uses the behaviour 
                                                 
415 External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized to other situations. 
416 Peter Uvin, “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality,” The European 
Journal of Development Research 5, no. 1 (1993): 66. 
417 Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New 
Millennium (Ashgate, 2001), 340. 
418 Menno Kamminga, “Human Rights and the Lomé Conventions,” Netherlands Quarterly for 
Human Rights, 1989, 30. 
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of France in Cameroon as a flagship example of what he called donor-patrons, that 
is, critical aid providers that refuse to exercise their leverage and force the recipient 
to undergo political change.419 Ebolo confirms that, in the wake of the 1992 
Cameroonian presidential elections, which were denounced by the opposition and the 
international community, including the EU, France in fact increased aid to the 
government.420 In 1996, only two months after the military coup which took place in 
Niger on 27 January, France broke the ranks of the EU by unilaterally resuming its 
bilateral aid co-operation. In addition, in defiance of the unanimous international 
rejection of the results of the July election, “France announced that … Paris would 
continue its bilateral aid to Niger. … The French unilateral step was strongly 
criticized by other EU partners such as Germany and Denmark. The Danes among 
others stood firm on the principles of democracy in European development co-
operation and they further argued that if the EU accepted the military takeover in 
Niger and if the European countries resumed their aid, this would be the wrong 
signal to convey to other African countries and potential dictators”.421 In 1999-2000, 
when Britain and the US pushed for the imposition of sanctions – which included an 
aid component – on the regime of warlord-turned president Charles Taylor in 
Liberia, France argued against such measures.422 Brown and Raddatz reports that, 
after the crisis that followed the 2007 Kenyan elections, “divisions among donors 
were … an impediment to influence. … Some donors, including the UK but not 
France, had shifted much of their assistance to the non-governmental organisation 
sector as a means of keeping the aid flowing without directly supporting a 
government that they did not trust”.423 
 
  
                                                 
419 Nikolas Emmanuel, “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political 
Conditionality,” Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 856–77. 
420 Martin Dieudonné Ebolo, “L’implication Des Puissances Occidentales Dans Les Processus de 
Démocratisation En Afrique: Analyse Des Actions Américaine et Française Au Cameroun (1989–
1997),” Polis/R.C.S.P./C.P.S.R. 6, no. 2 (1998): 21–48. 
421 Gorm Rye Olsen, “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How 
Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?,” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 358. 
422 Jakkie Cilliers, “Still...France versus the Rest in Africa?,” African Security Review 10, no. 3 
(2001): 124; Comfort Ero, “A Critical Assessment of Britain’s Africa Policy,” Conflict, Security & 
Development 1, no. 2 (2001): 65. 
423 Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, “Dire Consequences or Empty Threats? Western Pressure 
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5.1.2. Quantitative studies 
 
Since the 1970s, there has been protracted academic debate as to whether donor 
countries use aid allocation strategies to reward or punish the human rights 
performance of potential recipient governments.424 The large majority of the studies 
on the topic have concentrated on US aid allocation,425 with a few researchers 
looking at other donors individually, such as France, the UK and the Netherlands,426 
or at aggregate bilateral levels.427  
 
Comparative analyses of aid allocation by different donors have long excluded good 
governance factors, including respect for human rights.428 By answering the question 
whether between 1970 and 1995 certain donors (among which Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US) have been 
more prone to reward democratic countries, Svensson was the first researcher to offer 
a comparison of the impact of human rights (in particular, political rights) on aid 
allocation from a significant number of OECD countries.429 With this move, he 
started a thread of research that has used econometric techniques to investigate 
whether the human rights performance of potential recipient governments have 
influenced the decisions of bilateral donors, including France and the United 
                                                 
424 The precursor of this literature is considered to be Robert D. McKinlay and Richard Little, “A 
Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation,” World Politics 20, no. 2 (1977): 58–86. 
425 David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, “Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of 
US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries,” American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 3 
(1985): 539–63; David Carleton and Michael Stohl, “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric 
and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan,” Human Rights Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1985): 205–29; 
Steven C. Poe and James Meernik, “US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis,” Journal of 
Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995): 399; James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe, “Testing 
Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War,” The Journal of Politics 60, 
no. 1 (1998): 63–85; Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, “United States Human Rights Policy and 
Foreign Assistance,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 185–98. 
426 Robert D. McKinlay and Richard Little, “The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of 
the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964–70,” Development and Change 9, no. 3 (1978): 459–
78; M. Breuning, “Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 
235–54; Bethany Barratt, “Aiding or Abetting: British Foreign Aid Decisions and Recipient Country 
Human Rights,” in Understanding Human Rights Violations, ed. Sabine C. Carey and Steven C. Poe, 
Ashgate (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2004), 112–34. 
427 See, for instance, William N. Trumbull and Howard J. Wall, “Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria 
with Panel Data,” The Economic Journal 104, no. 425 (1994): 876–82. 
428 See, for instance, Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, “Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries,” World Development 12, no. 9 (1984): 879–900; Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and 
Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and 
Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323. 
429 Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” Economics & Politics 11, no. 3 (1999): 275–97. 
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Kingdom, on (a) who their recipient governments should be and (b) how much aid 
these governments should receive.430  
 
Table 2 offers a comprehensive overview of their findings with respect to political 
conditionality/selectivity.  
                                                 
430 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63; Sabine C. Zanger, “Good Governance and European Aid: 
The Impact of Political Conditionality,” European Union Politics 1, no. 3 (2000): 293–317; Eric 
Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 
Donor Countries,” Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 3 (2003): 650–66; Jean-Claude Berthélemy, 
“Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors 
Behave the Same?,” Review of Development Economics 10, no. 2 (2006): 179–94; Sabine C. Carey, 
“European Aid: Human Rights Versus Bureaucratic Inertia?,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 4 
(2007): 447–64; Anke Hoeffler and Verity Outram, “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What Determines 
the Allocation of Aid?,” Review of Development Economics 15, no. 2 (2011): 237–50. 
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Table 2. Findings of past quantitative studies on determinants of aid allocation by France and the United Kingdom 
 
Article Scope Relevant variable(s) France United Kingdom 
Jakob Svensson, “Aid, 
Growth and Democracy,” 
Economics & Politics 11, no. 
3 (1999): 275–97. 
Sample restricted to the 
1990s 
Democracy “[T]he relationship between 
aid flows and democracy is 
… significantly negative for 
France” 
“Only bilateral aid from 
Sweden and the UK … are 
positively and significantly 
correlated with democracy” 
Alberto Alesina and David 
Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign 
Aid to Whom and Why?,” 
Journal of Economic Growth 
5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63. 
From 1970 to 1994 Democracy “Of the major donors, France 
is the one that seems to pay 
no attention to the democracy 
of the receiving country” 
“The strongest positive 
response to democratic 
institutions is for the U.S., 
the Dutch, the U.K., the 
Nordics, and Canada” 
Sabine C. Zanger, “Good 
Governance and European 
Aid: The Impact of Political 
Conditionality,” European 
Union Politics 1, no. 3 
(2000): 293–317. 
From 1991 to 1995 Democracy, democratization 
and human rights abuses 
“None of four good 
governance variables (human 
rights violations, human 
rights violations squared, 
democracy and 
democratisation) has any 
effect on foreign aid from 
France” 
“Countries that moved 
towards democracy benefited 
from more aid only from the 
UK between 1991 and 
1995”; yet, “although it gives 
less aid the more human 
rights violations in a country, 
those countries with 
extremely bad human rights 
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records appear to receive 
more British foreign aid” 
Eric Neumayer, “Do Human 
Rights Matter in Bilateral 
Aid Allocation? A 
Quantitative Analysis of 21 
Donor Countries,” Social 
Science Quarterly 84, no. 3 
(2003): 650–66. 
From 1985 to 1997 Personal integrity rights, and 
civil and political rights 
“With respect to personal 
integrity rights, France, the 
United Kingdom … provide 
a higher share of aid to 
countries with a good 
record”; yet, “as concerns 
civil and political rights, … 
the United Kingdom … 
give[s] more aid to countries 
with a good record. The 
opposite is true for France” 
“With respect to personal 
integrity rights, France, the 
United Kingdom … provide 
a higher share of aid to 
countries with a good 
record”; in addition, “as 
concerns civil and political 
rights, the United Kingdom 
… give[s] more aid to 
countries with a good record” 
. 
Jean-Claude Berthélemy and 
Ariane Tichit, “Bilateral 
Donors’ Aid Allocation 
Decisions: A Three-
Dimensional Panel 
Analysis,” International 
Review of Economics & 
Finance 13, no. 3 (2004): 
From 1980 to 1999 Civil and political rights “Comforting results are 
obtained with respect to the 
dummy variables for civil 
liberty and political freedom, 
which have significantly 
positive parameters for most 
of the donors. Two donors - 
France and Belgium – go in 
“Comforting results are 
obtained with respect to the 
dummy variables for civil 
liberty and political freedom, 
which have significantly 
positive parameters for most 
of the donors [including the 
UK]”. 
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253–74. the other direction with 
negative (although most of 
the time nonsignificant) 
parameters for the democracy 
dummies. These two donors 
have consistently given large 
amounts of aid to several 
African nondemocratic 
recipients whom they have 
financially supported for 
most of the period under 
review, although such biases 
have receded in the 1990s” 
. 
David Dollar and Victoria 
Levin, “The Increasing 
Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 
1984-2003,” World 
Development 34, no. 12 
(2006): 2034–46. 
From 1990 to 1994, from 
1995 to 1999, from 2000 to 
2003 
Democracy Significant effect only 
between 2000 to 2003 
 
Always significant 
Sabine C. Carey, “European 
Aid: Human Rights Versus 
From 1978 to 2003 Absolute levels and 
improvements of personal 
“A country that substantially 
improved its respect for 
“The UK is ... twice as likely 
to give aid to a country with 
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Bureaucratic Inertia?,” 
Journal of Peace Research 
44, no. 4 (2007): 447–64. 
integrity rights, democracy 
and democratization 
human rights is 
 … four times more likely to 
receive aid from France. A 
worsening of the human 
rights situation, however, 
goes unpunished at this 
stage”; in addition, France 
“do[es] not reward 
improvement in the amount 
allocation stage”; lastly, “all 
donors are more likely to 
choose more democratic 
countries as recipients, but 
none of the donors 
considered democracy when 
deciding how much aid to 
commit to recipients”. 
widespread repression 
compared with a country 
with no life integrity 
violations”; in addition, “all 
donors, apart from the UK, 
are more likely to choose a 
recipient that has recently 
improved its human rights 
record”; lastly, “all donors 
are more likely to choose 
more democratic countries as 
recipients, but none of the 
donors considered 
democracy when deciding 
how much aid to commit to 
recipients”. 
Javed Younas, “Motivation 
for Bilateral Aid Allocation: 
Altruism or Trade Benefits,” 
European Journal of 
From 1992 to 2003 Civil and political rights Not significant Only country for which the 
variable is significant at 5% 
level 
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Political Economy 24, no. 3 
(2008): 661–74. 
Paul Clist, “25 Years of Aid 
Allocation Practice: Whither 
Selectivity?,” World 
Development 39, no. 10 
(Ottobre 2011): 1724–34. 
From 1982 to 2006 Personal integrity rights, and 
civil and political rights 
“The level of recipient 
governance does not appear 
to be a major determinant for 
any donor, with very little 
evidence for recent changes 
in this” 
“The level of recipient 
governance does not appear 
to be a major determinant for 
any donor, with very little 
evidence for recent changes 
in this” 
Anke Hoeffler and Verity 
Outram, “Need, Merit, or 
Self-Interest—What 
Determines the Allocation of 
Aid?,” Review of 
Development Economics 15, 
no. 2 (2011): 237–50. 
From 1980 to 2004 Personal integrity rights, and 
civil and political rights 
“[M]ost bilateral donors seem 
to place little importance on 
recipient merit. The UK and 
Japans are exceptions” 
“[M]ost bilateral donors 
seem to place little 
importance on recipient 
merit. The UK and Japan are 
exceptions: they allocate 
more aid to countries with 
higher growth, higher 
democracy scores, and fewer 
human rights abuses” 
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As can be seen from the table, there is almost unanimous consensus that France is 
less willing than the UK to allocate aid in order to promote respect for human rights 
and/or avoid being complicit with abuses.  
 
The picture offered by the table is even more remarkable because similar results have 
been obtained notwithstanding the selection of different indicators for human rights 
protection, and the choice of different estimation models for the quantitative analysis 
of aid allocation. On the one hand, researchers have used three different datasets to 
measure respect for human right by recipient countries: the Political Terror Scale for 
personal integrity rights, Freedom House figures for civil and political rights, and 
Polity IV results for democracy in general terms.431 On the other hand, most scholars 
recognised the need to take into account the fact that some recipients do not receive 
foreign aid from specific donors, and thus Ordinary Least Squares may lead to 
problem of selection bias. This compelled the adoption of at least three alternative 
methods, the two-staged analysis (Probit + Ordinary Least Squares), the Standard 
maximum-likelihood Heckman procedure and the Heckman’s two-step estimator. To 
complicate things further, Hoeffler and Outram recently argued that those who have 
used two-stage models or the Heckman estimator “have found little correlation 
between the residuals in the allocation and selection equations. This indicates that the 
allocation equation is independent of the selection equation. Our two-stage results 
also confirm this”. In the end, they “chose to estimate the allocation equation without 
correcting for selection, since it does not seem to result in a significant bias”.432 
 
5.2. The universe of cases of EU aid sanctions and the selection of case studies 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, quantitative analyses of aid allocation may rely upon 
imperfect measures of human rights abuses and aid sanctions. This weakness 
suggests that  
 
                                                 
431 Quite strangely, the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset, which focuses on governments’ 
human rights practices and not on the general human rights situation in the country, has never been 
applied to comparative studies of aid allocation strategies. See David L. Cingranelli and David L. 
Richards, “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2010): 401–24. 
432 Hoeffler and Outram, “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?,” 
240. 
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in an area as complex as aid, it is very possible that considerations can have 
important effects that are not easily captured in aggregate analyses, as most 
analyses of aid tend to be. … [P]erhaps the most direct way of looking at the 
nuanced ways that a consideration such as human rights can have an effect is by 
looking at individual decisions themselves.433  
 
If one follows this recommendation, the rigorousness in the selection process of these 
“individual decisions” takes centre stage. 
 
European aid consists of two separate components. On the one hand, EU Member 
States still administer their own bilateral programmes. On the other hand, EU 
institutions (primarily the European Commission) manage common funds which are 
resourced from either the EU budget or a specific instrument called the European 
Development Fund (EDF). I will hereafter refer to this type of aid as “EU aid” (in 
contrast with “European aid”, which includes both EU aid and the bilateral 
programmes of the Member States). 
 
The starting point of this dissertation was that, given (1) the intergovernmental 
character of EU aid sanctions and (2) the strong coordination mechanisms at the EU 
level, it would be puzzling to discover variation in the internalisation of political 
conditionality by EU Member States. The two elements of inter-governmentalism 
and coordination are particularly important in the case of EU aid sanctions. First, the 
decision to suspend or cut EU aid is generally adopted by unanimity within the 
Council of the EU. When this is not the case, the Commission is reported to consult 
with all relevant Member States before taking any decisive step.434 This means that 
when EU aid is suspended or cut, all Member States have agreed (or at least 
conceded) that the situation on the ground justifies a response affecting development 
cooperation. Second, Member States have signed several documents recommending 
the harmonization of their behaviour with the actions taken at the EU level.435 This 
                                                 
433 Bethany Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid: For Love or Money? (London: Routledge, 2008), 
116. See also Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of 
Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 8. 
434 Interview 21; interview 40. 
435 The most important one is undoubtedly: Council of the European Union, European Commission, 
and European Parliament, European Consensus on Development, 2005. 
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means that, even though this framework is not binding, European aid presents 
unprecedented levels of coordination among participating agencies. 
 
Against this background, it becomes obvious that this chapter should focus on cases 
of EU aid sanctions. It is when all Member States have agreed that suspension or 
reduction of development cooperation is the appropriate instrument to respond to 
human rights abuses, and when all Member States are under the expectation to 
coordinate their own bilateral policies, that variation between France and the UK 
should be most difficult to be found. 
 
The universe of cases of EU aid sanctions is composed of all instances of application 
of political conditionality by the EU between 1991 and 2012. As seen in Chapter 4, 
since 1995 the EU has included a human rights clause in all its development 
agreements. Tacit decision-making rules envisage that the clause can be activated 
only by unanimous decision of the Council. This means that several cases of political 
conditionality are reported in EU official documents. After vetting all decisions of 
the Council of the EU between 1996 and December 2012, it can be concluded that 
human rights clauses have been used to suspend development cooperation with 
recipient governments in the following instances: 
 
 Central African Republic (2003); 
 Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros (1999); 
 Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (2000 and 2001); 
 Republic of the Fiji Islands (2000 and 2007); 
 Republic of Guinea (2004 and 2009); 
 Republic of Guinea-Bissau (1999, 2003, 2011); 
 Republic of Haiti (2000); 
 Republic of Liberia (2001); 
 Republic of Madagascar (2009); 
 Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2005 and 2008); 
 Republic of Niger (1996, 1999, 2009); 
 Republic of Togo (1998 and 2004); 
 Republic of Zimbabwe (2001). 
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Some scholars assume that Council decisions on human rights clauses represent the 
complete universe of cases of EU aid sanctions.436 However, this assumption is 
fallacious. First of all, the above list does not take into account aid sanctions before 
1996, that is, before the advent of the human rights clause policy. From 1991 to 1996 
the suspension of EU aid was usually a de facto measure without any formal decision 
by EU institutions. For instance, in October 1993 the assassination of Melchior 
Ndadaye, the Head of State of Burundi, led the county into an armed conflict lasting 
until 2005. As the Lomé III Convention, which regulated cooperation between the 
EU and Burundi, did not include any human rights clause, the European Commission 
could not but de facto fully suspend cooperation from October 1993.437  
 
In addition, even after 1996, when human rights abuse take place, the first decision to 
suspend EU aid is usually taken by the Commission, in the person of the 
Development Commissioner, and this is not always reflected in Council decisions. 
Thus, for instance, on 22 March 2012 a group of Malian renegade soldiers looted the 
presidential palace and then overthrew the elected government of President Amadou 
Toumani Touré. The day after the coup, European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs 
stated: “Following yesterday’s coup d’état in Mali, I decided to suspend temporarily 
European Commission's development operations in the country until the situation 
clarifies”.438 Commission-led suspensions of foreign aid are usually confirmed, later 
on, by a formal decision of the Council. However, this does not always occur.  
 
Accordingly, the list of 23 cases listed above should be complemented with (a) pre-
1996 cases of EU aid suspension and (b) cases of EU aid suspension decided by the 
Commission but not sanctioned by the Council. From 1991 to 2012, the EU 
suspended development aid without reference to any human rights clause in the 
following countries:  
 
                                                 
436 See, for instance, Johanne Døhlie Saltnes, The EU’s Human Rights Policy: Unpacking the 
Literature on the EU’s Implementation of Aid Conditionality (Brussels: ARENA Working Paper, 
2013), 4. 
437 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform, 160; Hadelwich Hazelzet, “Carrots or Sticks? EU and 
US Reactions to Human Rights Violations (1989-2000)” (PhD Dissertation, European University 
Institute, 2001), 71; Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (London: 
Polity, 2013), 244. 
438 Andris Piebalgs, Press release: Coup d’état in Mali, MEMO/12/214 
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 Belarus (1996); 
 Burma/Myanmar (1991); 
 Burundi (1993, 1996);  
 the Central African Republic (1991 and 1996);  
 Congo (1997);  
 Côte d’Ivoire (2010); 
 Djibouti (1991); 
 DRC (1992); 
 Equatorial Guinea (1992 and 1994);  
 Gambia (1994);  
 Guatemala (1993); 
 Haiti (1991); 
 Honduras (2009);  
 Kenya (1991); 
 Liberia (1990); 
 Malawi (1992); 
 Mali (2012); 
 Mozambique (2010); 
 Nicaragua (2008); 
 Nigeria (1993 and 1995);  
 Peru (1992 and 2000); 
 Rwanda (1994); 
 Russia (1999); 
 Somalia (1991); 
 Syria (2011); 
 Sudan (1990); 
 Tajikistan (1998); 
 Togo (1993); 
 Uzbekistan (2005); 
 Zanzibar (1997).439 
 
                                                 
439 The EU also suspended aid to Kenya in 2004 and Malawi in 2002, but this was related to problems 
of corruption rather than human rights violations or democratic setbacks. 
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The total number of cases of EU aid sanctions from 1991 to 2012 is thus 57 (an 
average of three cases per year).  
 
Selecting a few case studies out of 57 is not a straightforward exercise. This is 
complicated by the fact that it is almost impossible to find recipient countries which 
have a similar donor-recipient relationship with both France and the UK. Most 
developing countries are former colonies of one of the two Member States. Most 
developing countries offer different economic or security opportunities to each of 
them. The result is that most recipient countries enjoy a special relationship with one 
of the two donors, but not with the other. Finding at least one case study in which the 
two donors can be directly compared with each other would be particularly 
important.  
 
According to research design rules, the objective should also be to identify the cases 
where variation among EU Member States is expected to be the most difficult.440 
Observing variation in cases where it is unlikely to occur would offer the strongest 
evidence in support of its existence. The findings from Chapter 4 suggest that the UK 
has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France. 
This means that least-likely cases are represented by those human rights violations 
that occur in recipient countries which have a special relationship with the UK. If the 
UK applies political conditionality in these cases, the adoption of the norm can be 
considered strong. In addition, if France is against the application of political 
conditionality in these cases (where it should not have particular interests to defend), 
the adoption of the norm can be considered to be particularly weak. The opposite is 
true for human rights abuses which occur in recipient countries which have a special 
relationship with France. The expectation here is that France will be against the 
application of political conditionality, but it will be difficult to distinguish low degree 
of norm internalisation from fundamental material interests.  
 
                                                 
440 This strategy follows the general suggestion to select least-likely cases: A. Bennett and C. Elman, 
“Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 
(2007): 173. The least-likely case study relies on what Levy has dubbed the “Sinatra inference”: “If 
the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere”. See Jack S. Levy, “Qualitative Methods in 
International Relations,” in Evaluating Methodology in International Studies, ed. Michael Brecher and 
Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 144. 
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Following this line of reasoning, the chapter will focus on two “fundamental” case 
studies (one in which France and Britain can be compared directly with each other 
and one with a special relationship with Britain) and two “additional” ones 
(including at least one with a special relationship with France). 
 
The first fundamental case study is Mozambique. There are at last four reasons why 
the analysis of European donors’ reaction to human rights abuses in Mozambique is 
important for this chapter. First, Mozambique was not a former colony either of 
France or of the Britain. Second, Mozambique is of little strategic political or 
economic importance for France or the UK. According to Howard, “Mozambique 
was never high on the priority list for any of the major world powers”.441 Indeed, 
France and the UK do not feature among the most important donors in the country, 
such as Portugal, the former colonial power, the Scandinavian countries, which felt 
sympathetic with the left-wing regime since the Cold War, and Italy, which 
maintains a high profile in the country as a result of its key role during the peace 
negotiation process. Yet, France and the UK are often included in the lists of “key” 
donor countries, in a comparable position.442 Third, Mozambique is one of the 
countries with the highest number of donors, all roughly equivalent to each other. 
Major donors include Canada, Denmark, the EU, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the US and the UK. Not only. 
Mozambique is also a donor darling which entertains one of the most elaborate 
budget support partnerships in the world, with direct government-to-government 
flows accounting for almost half its budget.443 Mozambique is often cited as an 
example of the effective use of direct budget support to further the Paris Declaration 
goal of donor coordination and harmonization.444 Since 2004, a group of 19 donors 
(G19) have joined forces and provided budget support to the government for 
                                                 
441 Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
188. 
442 See, for example, Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough, “Bilateral Donors and Aid 
Conditionality in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Mozambique,” Journal of Modern African 
Studies 48, no. 1 (2010): 149. 
443 Isabelle Ramdoo, “Mozambique, Aid and Foreign Investment: Trapped between Scylla and 
Charybdis?,” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 7–8. 
444 Christian Brütsch, “Technocratic Manager, Imperial Agent, or Diplomatic Champion? The IMF in 
the Anarchical Society,” Review of International Studies 40, no. 2 (2014): 219. In general on the 
relationship between donors and Mozambique, see Paolo De Renzio and Joseph Hanlon, “Contested 
Sovereignty in Mozambique: The Dilemmas of Aid Dependence,” in The Politics of Aid: African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors, ed. Lindsay Whitfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
246–70. 
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implementation of the Mozambican Poverty Reduction Strategy.445 The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the basis of the budget support programme 
explicitly includes political conditionality. In addition, “although the G19 have 
reserved the power to cut off funding, individually or collectively, in the event of 
major corruption or where the “underlying principles” of the agreement are violated. 
they have made an important concession to stop donors acting unilaterally. The new 
agreement forces donors to work through the G19, even when there is disagreement 
within the group, before taking any unilateral action”.446 Molenaers, Cepinskas and 
Jacobs even reported that some donors “felt that the level of harmonization in 
Mozambique creates a peer pressure that is in some circumstances unhealthy: it 
restraints a smaller or weaker donor from taking another position. Taking a different 
stand then all of a sudden is seen as if one is deviating from the collectively 
established norm”.447 Lastly, the EU, that is, the Commission and its Member States, 
represents by far the largest donor of aid to Mozambique, providing 80% of total 
assistance.448 This means that coordinated efforts among EU Member States could 
produce significant pressure on the government.449 
 
The second “fundamental” case study is Zimbabwe. The only former British colonies 
which have been subject to EU aid sanctions decided within the Council are Fiji and 
Zimbabwe. As France is a modest donor in Zimbabwe, while it is insignificant in 
Fiji, the decision fell on the African country. Other reasons behind the selection of 
                                                 
445 Budget support donors, known as the G19 or Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), are the African 
Development Bank, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the World Bank (the US is not part of the group because its policy is not to provide 
general budget support). The G19 is governed by what it calls the “troika plus”. Three donors serve 
for three years, with one new member being elected each year and serving as chair in the second year. 
The “plus” are the European Commission and World Bank, who deserve permanent seats because, as 
they are described in the MoU, they are the “two most influential PAP donors”.  
446 Joseph Hanlon, “19 Budget Support Donors Sign New 5-Year Accord,” Mozambique News 
Reports & Clippings, March 25, 2009. For the exact provision, see Government of the Republic of 
Mozambique and Programme Aid Partners, Memorandum of Understanding (Maputo: World Bank, 
March 2009), Section 2. 
447 Nadia Molenaers, Linas Cepinskas, and Bert Jacobs, Budget Support and Policy/political 
Dialogue. Donor Practices in Handling (political) Crises (Antwerp: University of Antwerp, 2010), 
30. 
448 Paul Malin, “EU Support to Mozambique,” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 4–5. 
449 Numerous commentators agree that things are changing. Mozambique is rapidly reducing its 
dependence on Western donors, mainly due to squeezed aid budgets, increasing mining and 
hydrocarbon royalties and new donors (such as China, Brazil and South Africa): Francesca Bruschi, 
“Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid Dependence to Development Effectiveness?,” GREAT 
Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 9–10. 
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Zimbabwe include the following. First, at the end of the 1990s Zimbabwe was 
wealthier than most of the other recipient countries under EU aid sanctions. This 
made it particularly resilient to pressure through aid suspension. The relatively low 
probability of success of external pressure entails that the application of political 
conditionality towards the Zimbabwean government should derive from strong 
adoption of the norm. Even with a high risk of failure, aid sanctions were perceived 
as the appropriate thing to do. Second, numerous EU Member States had missions 
and aid programmes in the country: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. This offers an interesting field to be 
compared with French and British behaviour. Third, Zimbabwe is the first case in 
which EU aid suspension were complemented by “restrictive measures” (that is, 
smart sanctions) under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).450 Since 
restrictive measures are considered tougher than appropriate measures, the adoption 
of CFSP sanctions signals the existence of strong consensus among EU Member 
States. This adds another point to the fact that Zimbabwe represents a least-likely 
case for variation of policy responses. Lastly, Zimbabwe is the only example in 
which Article 96 consultations were started even though the level of freedom of 
participation was better than in an average ACP country, and had even improved 
from the previous year.451 This makes it a good complement to other case studies 
which are mainly centred on electoral politics.452 
 
The first “additional” case study is Madagascar. Among the numerous cases of 
former French colonies under EU aid sanctions decided within the Council, this 
chapter will concentrate on Madagascar. The 2009 coup is one of the most recent 
cases of appropriate measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and this 
leads to higher expectations of convergence with other Member States (almost 15 
                                                 
450 Portela explains that previous cases of development aid suspension combined with visa bans or 
arms embargoes (Nigeria 1993 or Sudan 1990) were handled outside the EU-ACP framework, given 
the unavailability of the consultations procedure before 1995: Clara Portela, “Aid Suspensions as 
Coercive Tools? The European Union’s Experience in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Context,” 
Review of European and Russian Affairs 3, no. 2 (2007): 48. 
451 Liisa Laakso, Timo Kivimäki, and Maaria Seppänen, Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence 
in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (Aksant Academic Publishers, 
2007), 50. 
452 It is also interesting to note that the unsound economic policies of the Zimbabwean government 
triggered a humanitarian crisis that compelled the EU to hugely increase the amount of humanitarian 
aid. Even though EU bilateral cooperation declined after the adoption of aid sanctions in 2002, the 
surge in humanitarian assistance meant that the total aid disbursement has augmented since the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
144 
 
years had passed since the EU started to adopt common positions on political 
conditionality). The fact that the events are recent also makes it easier to identify and 
interview relevant people since most of them are still in the same professional 
position or have moved only once (staff tend to stay 3 to 4 years in a country and 
then move on to another country or headquarters). Importantly, the case also offers 
the opportunity to compare French behaviour with a varied set of Western donors, 
including an EU Member State (Germany), a European country which is not an EU 
Member State (Norway) and the US.453  
 
Lastly, the chapter analyses the case of Nicaragua in order to expand the scope of the 
dissertation outside of the African boundaries. Among the cases of EU aid sanctions 
decided within the Council, Haiti was too far away in time (2000), and Fiji would be 
problematic given the minimal aid contribution by both France and the UK. Among 
the cases of EU aid sanctions decided by the Commission, Honduras represented a 
credible alternative. However, preliminary interviews with diplomats in both 
countries suggested the existence of larger variation among European donors in 
Nicaragua. This made it a more interesting case for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 
A final point concerns the methodology of comparison. As mentioned above, it is 
almost impossible to meaningfully compare France and the UK in any specific 
recipient country (with the possible exception of Mozambique). The strategy adopted 
by this chapter is thus to compare the behaviour of France and the UK with other 
relevant donors in the country. Does the UK usually take the side of the hardliners? 
Does France often try to encourage engagement? This method also allows me to 
solve the problems related to the feasibility of aid sanctions. It would be unfair to 
judge France and Britain for not adopting aid sanctions when no other country 
adopted them. Instead, it is interesting to discover whether, in those cases when 
sanctions are possible (as demonstrated by the behaviour of other donors), the two 
country apply them or not. 
 
  
                                                 
453 In this respect, the selection of Madagascar is equivalent to the potential selection of Guinea-
Conakry, Mauritania, Niger and Togo. 
145 
 
5.3. The case studies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
 
5.3.1. Mozambique 
 
Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975. After only two years of 
independence, the country descended into an intense and protracted civil war 
between the Marxist ruling party, Front of Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 
and the opposition forces of the anti-Communist Mozambique Resistance Movement 
(RENAMO), lasting from 1977 to 1992.454 In 1994, Mozambique held its first 
multiparty elections and, since then, has remained relatively stable, with an annual 
average GDP growth which is among the world’s highest.455 Since 1994 
Mozambican elections have always been won by the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Mozambican Presidents (Joaquim Chissano from 
1994 to 2004 and Armando Guebuza from 2004 onwards) have both come from the 
same party.456 
 
Despite its economic successes, in recent times Mozambique’s democratic 
credentials have been tarnished by FRELIMO’s growing monopoly on power at all 
levels and by serious problems in the administration of local and national 
elections.457 Political researchers have categorized Mozambique as a ‘managed 
                                                 
454 For a comprehensive history of Mozambique, see Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
455 “A Faltering Phoenix,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16542671. 
In general on the transition period, see Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, Mozambique, the 
Troubled Transition: From Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism (London: Zed Books, 
1995); Carrie Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-
2000 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002). On the country’s development problems notwithstanding the 
impressive growth of the economy, see John S. Saul, “Mozambique - Not Then but Now,” Review of 
African Political Economy 38, no. 127 (2011): 93–101; Benedito Cunguara, “An Exposition of 
Development Failures in Mozambique,” Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 131 (2012): 
161–70; Benedito Cunguara and Joseph Hanlon, “Whose Wealth Is It Anyway? Mozambique’s 
Outstanding Economic Growth with Worsening Rural Poverty,” Development and Change 43, no. 3 
(2012): 623–47. Hanlon even argued that “donors need to believe in the Mozambique success story, 
so they do not look at anything which would challenge their comfortable picture and would force them 
to rethink their consensus development policy. But inequalities are growing and are now the major 
area of conflict in Mozambique”: Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique: ‘the War Ended 17 Years Ago, but 
We Are Still Poor,’” Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 1 (2010): 98. 
456 An interesting contribution on the stabilization of the two-party system is offered by Giovanni M. 
Carbone, “Continuidade Na Renovação? Ten Years of Multiparty Politics in Mozambique: Roots, 
Evolution and Stabilisation of the Frelimo-Renamo Party System,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 43, no. 3 (2005): 417–42. 
457 Chris Alden, “A Separate Peace: Mozambique, State Reconstruction and the Search for Sustainable 
Democracy,” in Ending Africa’s Wars: Progressing to Peace, eds. Oliver Furley and Roy May 
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democracy’, comparing it to the authoritarian regimes in Indonesia under Suharto, 
the South Korean developmental state, and South Africa under the African National 
Congress.458 Apparently, democratization reinforced FRELIMO’s territorial control, 
and the replacement of Joaquim Alberto Chissano by Armando Guebuza lead to a 
return to party precedence over the state.459 
 
The 2009 presidential, legislative and first ever provincial assembly elections 
triggered a crisis between donors and the government. Two events prompted the 
reaction by international actors. First, a new political party, the Democratic 
Movement of Mozambique (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, MDM), was 
barred from running in nine of the 13 parliamentary regions because of an alleged 
failure to comply with administrative regulations. The move was considered 
politically motivated, as both FRELIMO and RENAMO had a vested interest in 
ensuring that MDM did not emerge strongly in the elections.460 Second, independent 
observers documented widespread irregularities on the day of the elections, including 
ballot stuffing and tabulation fraud at some polling stations.461 Hanlon argued that 
the ballot “was tainted by misconduct, unfairness, and secrecy”.462 Manning 
commented that FRELIMO’s victory came “in the wake of an election in which the 
ruling party manipulated the legal institutions of election administration and used its 
                                                                                                                                          
(London: Ashgate, 2006), 163. For a critical perspective on the “good governance” discourse in 
Mozambique, see Joseph Hanlon, “Governance as ‘Kicking Away the Ladder’” New Political 
Economy 17, no. 5 (2012): 691–98. 
458 Madalitso Zililo Phiri, “The Political Economy of Mozambique Twenty Years on: A Post-Conflict 
Success Story?,” South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2012): 238. 
459 Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert, “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and Political 
Liberalization in Africa,” African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2012): 367. Some interesting research has 
been produced on the role of the “party” within the Mozambican State: Jason Sumich, “The Party and 
the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post-Socialist Mozambique,” Development and Change 
41, no. 4 (2010): 679–98; Adriano Nuvunga and M.A. Mohamed Salih, “Party Dominance and 
Electoral Institutions: Framing Frelimo’s Dominance in the Context of an Electoral Governance 
Deficit,” Africa Review 5, no. 1 (2013): 23–42; Adriano Nuvunga and Sitoe Eduardo, “Party 
Institutionalisation in Mozambique: ‘The Party of the State’ vs the Opposition,” Journal of African 
Elections 12, no. 1 (2013): 109–42. For an overview of the role and potential of the opposition party, 
RENAMO, see Baxter Tavuyanago, “RENAMO: From Military Confrontation to Peaceful 
Democratic Engagement, 1976-2009,” African Journal of Political Science and International 
Relations 5, no. 1 (2011): 42–51; Alex Vines, “Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of 
Reintegration in Mozambique,” International Peacekeeping 20, no. 3 (2013): 375–93. 
460 Jeremy Astill-Brown and Markus Weimer, Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and 
Security (London: Chatham House, August 2010), 8. 
461 Robert Lloyd, “Mozambique,” in Countries at the Crossroads 2011: An Analysis of Democratic 
Governance, ed. Freedom House (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 2–5. 
462 Joseph Hanlon, “Frelimo Landslide in Tainted Election in Mozambique,” Review of African 
Political Economy 37, no. 123 (2010): 92. 
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extensive influence over access to economic resources to tilt the playing field 
dramatically against the opposition”.463 
 
In response to this event, the EU suspended general budget support to Mozambique 
in 2010.464 EU action was part of the so-called “donor strike”, a concerted move by 
al budget support donors (G19) which included the freeze of budget support for 2010 
and the exclusion of any form of increase in budget support for 2011.465 In December 
2009 Kari Alanko, Finnish Ambassador and Chair of the G19, sent a letter to the 
Mozambican government, demanding rapid moves on electoral law reforms, 
corruption, conflict of interest, and the overlap between FRELIMO and the state. 
Relevant parts of the letters read as follows: 
 
I wish to formally advise the Government of Mozambique of the G19’s serious 
concerns on governance and electoral issues. … They relate to serious 
governance shortcomings, essentially those identified in the previous political 
dialogues, and also in the reports of the EU Elections Observation Mission and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism. … Based on this, there is a view, for 
many, that a breach may have occurred of the Underlying Principles of the 
MoU. To address these concerns, we wish to initiate an early dialogue with the 
Government of Mozambique. … There is a strong desire on the part of the 
partners we represent to sustain the heretofore excellent relationship with the 
Government of Mozambique and to ensure that disbursements for 2010 are 
influenced by a positive outcome to these deliberations. We have calculated that 
an outcome reached no later than mid-March might facilitate this. We look 
forward to your response and to beginning our discussions as quickly as 
possible.466 
                                                 
463 Carrie Manning, “Mozambique’s Slide into One-Party Rule,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 
(2010): 151–65. See also the coverage from Barry Bearak, “Party’s Power in Mozambique Is 
Criticized as a Barrier to Democracy,” The New York Times, October 27, 2009. 
464 This is the interpretation of most commentators and official assessment reports. For instance, the 
assessment report of Irish aid refers to the “donor strike” as the case “when donors reacted strongly to 
the exclusion of an opposition party from many constituencies”: Stephen Lister et al., Evaluation of 
the Irish Aid Mozambique Country Strategy 2007-2010 (Oxford: Mokoro Ltd, August 28, 2011), 10. 
According to Molenaers, Cepinskas and Jacobs, “the occurrence of seemingly one event 
(Mozambique elections ...) served as a vehicle to address a large number of concerns which were both 
technocratic and democratic in nature”: Molenaers, Cepinskas, and Jacobs, Budget Support and 
Policy/political Dialogue. Donor Practices in Handling (political) Crises, 25. 
465 “Aid Strike in Maputo,” Africa Confidential, March 19, 2010, http://www.africa-
confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/3463/Aid_strike_in_Maputo. 
466 Wikileaks, Goverment of Mozambique Responds Harshly to Donor Concerns on Governance 
(Maputo: Embassy of the United States, January 13, 2010), §9. 
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The letter was accompanied by the news that budget support was suspended. As the 
funds normally start flowing in January, the donors informed the government that 
new disbursements were made contingent on the successful conclusion of political 
dialogue.467 After a month and a half of “crispação” (“political tension”), on 5 
February 2010 Aiuba Cuereneia, Minister for Planning and Development and the 
main government negotiator with the donors, sent a reply to the G19, offering a few 
concessions.468 Negotiations in early March led to an agreement announced 24 
March and to the resumption of the flow of money.469 The Governance Action Plan 
that was set up to guide future donor disbursement decisions confirmed the relevance 
of political issues for the donors. In addition to aspects related to economic 
governance, corruption and land redistribution, the points of agreement included 
reforms in the country’s electoral legislation and changes in the parliamentary rules 
(in order to allow MDM to create an official parliamentary group).470 
 
Even though all G19 countries signed the December letter, heated discussions took 
place on whether the MoU was violated.471 Lawson concluded a multi-donor joint 
                                                 
467 “A Faltering Phoenix”; “Aid Row Escalates,” Africa Confidential, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.africa-confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/5670/Aid_row_escalates; Fernando 
Mbanze, “Braço de Ferro a Caminho Do Fim,” Mediafax, March 17, 2010, 
http://debatesedevaneios.blogspot.it/2010/03/braco-de-ferro-caminho-do-fim.html; “Donor Strike 
May Be Nearing Its End,” Club of Mozambique, March 18, 2010, 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=mozambique&id=17792&tip
o=one. 
468 The aid strike started to produce effects on public finances only in February because big donors 
such as the World Bank and European Union had made substantial disbursements before the strike 
started in December: “If Donor Strike Continues, Government May Alter Budget,” Club of 
Mozambique, March 8, 2010, 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=mozambique&id=17682&tip
o=one. 
469 Joseph Hanlon, “Donor Strike Ends,” Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, March 18, 2010. 
470 According to Hanlon, “it was widely seen that the donors had lost the strike. The government 
March proposal, below, offered only one concession -- that the government would submit a proposed 
electoral law to parliament quickly (by May 2010) and would not go through the detailed and lengthy 
public consultation demanded by civil society and the Constitutional Council”. In particular, the 
request to ban Frelimo party cells in government was blatantly rejected: Joseph Hanlon, “News 
Reports 2009/11,” Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, March 2010. Lawson offers a more 
positive assessment: Andrew Lawson, Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique: 
Final Report - Volume I (Maputo: G19, 2014), 87, http://www.oecd.org/derec/ec/Mz-BS-Eval-Final-
Report-Vol-1.pdf. For a general overview of the news on the end of the strike, see Manuel De Araújo, 
“MOZAMBIQUE 160: News Reports & Clippings,” March 25, 2010, 
http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.it/2010/03/mozambique-160-news-reports-clippings.html. 
471 The MoU sets out the principles underlying the partnership between donors and government, and 
stipulates that a breach of any of these principles constitutes a legitimate ground for suspension of 
budget support. The underlying principles were: (1) safeguarding peace and promoting free, credible 
and democratic political processes, independence of the judiciary, rule of law, respect for human 
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assessment of development cooperation with Mozambique by saying that “the 
shortfalls in disbursements in the first two quarters of 2010 … were the results of 
deliberate delays in disbursements by some bilateral Budget Support providers, due 
to concerns over the ‘underlying principles’ for Budget Support having been 
potentially breached, through electoral irregularities in the national elections of 
October 2009”.472 According to Rasmussen, “a majority of the G19 froze their 
pledges for 2010 due to disappointment with the ruling FRELIMO party’s poor 
performance on transparent governance, anti-corruption, mixing party and state, 
fighting conflict of interest and the exclusion of parties at last year’s elections”.473 
Who where these “some” donors, this majority? 
 
According to a cable from the US Ambassador in Maputo, the G19 Heads of Mission 
reviewed three options: 1) do nothing but request a deeper dialogue with the 
government on democracy and governance issues; 2) suspend but not cancel budget 
support payments pending government commitments on governance issues; and 3) 
declare an immediate breach of the underlying principles and reduce direct budget 
support, and launch a negotiation with the government on next steps to restore 
budget support. The US Ambassador reported that 
 
The United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden were all prepared to 
declare an immediate breach of the democratic principles and reduce budget 
support. The UK High Commissioner, along with the DFID representative, were 
firm in supporting the immediate declaration of a breach, an announcement of a 
reallocation of some amount of budget support to other projects, and the 
commencement of negotiations with the government of Mozambique to reach 
an agreement on steps which must be taken to restore the totality of budget 
support. The DFID representative said “we (the donors) have lost our credibility 
because we've been too patient for too long”. The Nordic, the Irish, the German, 
and the Dutch Ambassadors also are considering reductions, but preferred first 
                                                                                                                                          
rights, good governance and probity in public life, including the fight against corruption; (2) 
prioritising fighting poverty through its policies and plans and in its patterns of public expenditure; 
and (3) pursuing sound macro-economic policies and public financial management systems. 
Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Programme Aid Partners, Memorandum of 
Understanding, Section 2. 
472 Lawson, Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique: Final Report - Volume I, 54, 
emphasis added. 
473 Henrik Lomholt Rasmussen, “Donors Put Brakes on Mozambique Aid,” Mail & Guardian, July 1, 
2010, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-07-01-donors-put-brakes-on-mozambique-aid/, emphasis added. 
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to suspend temporarily budget support to provide a “shock effect” to the 
government of Mozambique in anticipation of negotiations.474  
 
The Southern Europeans (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) resisted any tough message and 
argued for the status quo.475 On December 4, the G19 Heads of Mission met again to 
debate the issues. The EC Representative reiterated his opposition to a strong course 
of action, noting that political dialogue should take place within the Cotonou 
Agreement framework.476 The UK High Commissioner responded that the EC has to 
respect its Cotonou commitments, but “the rest of us, as independent sovereign 
nations, have every right and intention to determine how best to administer our 
assistance to Mozambique”.477 Frustrated by the procedural manoeuvrings of the EC 
and Portugal, the “like-minded” countries (Nordics, Dutch, Germans, Swiss, British, 
Canadians and the United States) said that they were prepared to raise concerns 
jointly with the Mozambican government should the G19 mechanism fail to produce 
any real pressure.478 
 
Political commentators confirm the narrative from the US Ambassador. According to 
Joseph Hanlon, “Ireland led the strike. It received more support initially from 
Northern countries, including the UK, which was supportive at the beginning of the 
strike”.479 Marc de Tollenaere argued that “the most progressive group was 
composed by the like-minded: Nordics, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Switzerland, 
Canada. On the other end of the spectrum were Spain, Italy and certainly Portugal. In 
the middle is a group that goes with the flow (Germany, Belgium, France, 
Austria)”.480 The most important news agency in Maputo reported that  
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475 Ibid., §5. 
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478 Ibid., §9. 
479 Interview with Joseph Hanlon, Senior Lecturer in Development Policy and Practice at the Open 
University, 6 May 2013. 
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the donor strike … was far from complete. One of the largest contributors to the 
state budget is the World Bank and, according to Finance Minister Manuel 
Chang, the World Bank budget contribution (110 million US dollars for this 
year) has come through as promised. Some of the smaller budget support 
contributors (such as Portugal, Italy and France) have made it clear that they are 
not in favour of withholding funds.481 
 
The French position was later confirmed by a trip of the French Secretary of State for 
Foreign Trade, Anne-Marie Idrac, at the beginning of March 2010. Local 
commentators interpreted the visit as “an indication that France, like Portugal and 
Italy, does not regard the donor strike as a useful tactic”.482 
 
The strike not only meant the temporary suspension of disbursements.483 At the 
ceremony delivering the aid commitments, the G19 Chair, Irish Ambassador Frank 
Sheridan, announced that several donors could have increased their budget support 
but chose not to do so because of poor performance by the Mozambican government. 
Newspaper singled out Britain and the Netherlands.484 During the negotiations for 
the donor strike, the UK already noted its willingness to reduce direct budget support 
assistance by at least 10 percent in 2010.485 In addition, the donors which were more 
in favour of the strike (including Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
UK) decided to attach a variable tranche mechanism to their decisions on GBS 
disbursements.486  
 
                                                 
481 “Government and Donors Claim Consensus,” Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, March 24, 
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482 “No Indication That Donors Will End Support,” Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, March 
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483 The figures for real disbursements show that the total contributions grew pretty steadily until 2009, 
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4 consecutive years of falling disbursements: Alberto Musatti, “General Budget Support to 
Mozambique: Alive Again?,” Belgian Development Agency, April 3, 2013, 
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More recent events confirm the differences among donors. In September 2013 a new 
private (but effectively state-owned) company, the Empresa Moçambicana de Atum 
(Ematum), signed a $200 million contract with Constructions Mecaniques de 
Normandie (CMN), a French shipbuilder, to refurbish the tiny Mozambican Navy, 
whose ships were all donated by other countries, and buy 24 trawlers, three 
interceptors and three patrol vessels. The contract was financed through a $850 
million bond yielding 8.5% and maturing in 2020.487 There was no public discussion 
that the government was about to establish a major fishing fleet and a navy 
overnight. Mozambique officials eventually confirmed it, and commented that the 
ships will help fight illegal trafficking and piracy, and protect fishery operations as 
well as offshore oil and gas drilling platforms. As the patrol ships will need naval 
guns and other military equipment, there are also negotiations under way about 
buying the needed weaponry from France.488 
 
By the time the revelations of the $850 million Eurobond came, the issue was 
immediately inserted at the top of the agenda of the G19.489 Divergences soon 
appeared. Diplomats report a similar pattern to the donor strike. The World Bank, the 
EU and smaller donors, including Italy, France and Portugal, were content to 
continue providing the funds. In contrast, Britain, Sweden and Denmark were “the 
most in favour of withholding payment”490 and eventually (together with Germany) 
did not disburse the money as planned.491 These donors were also disappointed when 
the IMF produced a report in January effectively recommending that donors make 
                                                 
487 The remaining $500 million will probably be used to fund the tuna fleet operations as well as 
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Cherbourg,” Le Monde, September 6, 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/09/06/une-
commande-historique-pour-les-chantiers-navals-de-normandie_3472200_3234.html; “Le 
Mozambique Commande 200 Millions D’euros de Bateaux «made in Cherbourg»,” Libération, 
September 5, 2013, http://www.liberation.fr/economie/2013/09/05/le-mozambique-commande-200-
millions-d-euros-de-bateaux-made-in-cherbourg_929732; “Construction Navale: Les Présidents 
Français et Mozambicain À Cherbourg,” Radio France Internationale, September 30, 2013, 
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130930-president-france-mozambique-cherbourg-construction-navale-
cnm/; “Mozambique: Hollande, Guebuza See Work Start On Big Mozambique Ship Order,” Radio 
France Internationale, September 30, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201309301405.html. 
488 Sylvie Corbet and Angela Charlton, “France-Mozambique Ship Deal Raises Questions,” Contra 
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Bloomberg, November 15, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/mozambique-donors-
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their disbursements as planned. One senior diplomatic source in Maputo said: “The 
IMF now want us to disburse. But that is not going to happen … if they get away 
with Ematum, then there is no hope for accountability in general”.492 The Nordics, 
the UK and the US also lobbied the World Bank and the EU to delay their final 
disbursement of 2013.493 
 
Importantly, the main rationale for suspensions after the Ematum scandal were 
transparency and public financial management.494 However, numerous interviewees 
suggested that the motives are more complex, and includes anxieties on the 
democratic direction of the country. Some of them compared the situation to the 
donor strike: “Some donors are tired of fighting for small bits of the big problem. 
The problem is a problem of trust and accountability. It involves corruption, 
transparency and democracy”. Another diplomat commented that “the lack of 
progress in the democratic environment certainly played a role in the decision to 
suspend aid. It was not the only concern. It might not have been the primary concern. 
But it influenced the donors. And the message was made clear to the government”.495 
Other sources confirm that “donors were worried that the extensive electoral frauds 
which FRELIMO activists committed during the previous local elections might be 
repeated on a grander scale in the 2014 October general elections. Corruption, 
secretive arms purchases and a rise in poverty indices under President Armando 
Guebuza are other worries”.496 In addition, there are also specific suspicions that “the 
contract may help finance the presidential election campaign of the governing 
Frelimo in 2014”.497 Roberto Vellano, the Italian Ambassador and G19 Chair, 
confirmed the identity of two countries which had delayed pledges, Britain and 
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Germany, and suggested that they did so “partly because of preoccupations relating 
to Ematum”.498 
 
The consequences of the events covered above seem to be long-lasting. According to 
Vellano, “concerns over fiscal transparency, fighting corruption and other 
outstanding issues” had led “some partners to think they could no longer confirm 
their participation in this kind of support”.499 Four donors have already ceased their 
budget support programmes: Norway and the Netherlands over concerns about 
transparency and democracy, Belgium and Spain because of the fiscal crisis.500 On 
13 June 2014 Britain announced that DfID will not disburse general budget support 
to Mozambique any more. The new British High Commissioner, Joanna Kuenssberg, 
said financing “will be clearly linked to the delivery of the policies and actions 
necessary for inclusive economic growth: for example, strengthening public financial 
management, the fight against corruption and improving the investment climate”.501 
Koenssberg also said that the decision to end budget support did not mean that 
Britain is “abandoning Mozambique”. There would instead be new forms of aid, tied 
to indicators on good governance.502 Interviews with DfID and FCO representatives 
highlighted that one of the main reasons behind the new programme is the aspiration 
to conduct independent assessments of progress in good governance, including 
democratic advancements.503 In this respect, prolonged discussions among donors on 
what to include and what not to include in the new MoU with the government 
influenced the British decision.  
 
The previous MoU was supposed to end at the beginning of 2014. However, it was 
prolonged for one year in order to wait for the October elections. Debates among 
donors revolved around numerous issues, including the role of political dialogue and 
the potential consequences of breaches of the essential elements. Allegedly, the 
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inability to obtain a strengthened performance framework have prompted the UK to 
leave the budget support group and conduct its own assessment process. 
 
5.3.2. Zimbabwe 
 
The current Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, has held office since 
Zimbabwe’s internationally recognised independence in 1980.504 Widely renowned 
across the African continent as a champion of the anti-colonial cause, Mugabe was 
initially praised by Western donors for the achievement of good results in poverty 
reduction.505 Yet, since the end of the 1990s, a grave political and economic crisis 
affected the country.506 As a brief and general introduction, suffice it here to mention 
that the crisis had historical roots centred on intricate interactions between land 
grievances, the constructions of nationhood and state formation. In a post-colonial 
context where the great majority of fertile land was owned by a small minority of 
white people, Mugabe’s position shifted from prosecuting illegal farm settlers to 
actively encouraging the violent seizure of white-owned commercial farms.507 The 
key turning point in this transition occurred in 1997, when the state agreed to meet 
long-neglected demands for financial compensation and land allocation from war 
veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.508 This created a strong alliance between 
the State, peasants and war veterans, an alliance which repeatedly mobilized every 
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time that Mugabe was at risk of losing the handles of power.509 The diffusion of a 
narrative called ‘patriotic history’ was simultaneously used to marginalize opposition 
supporters.510 
 
In this context, two series of events triggered the adoption of EU aid sanctions.511 
First of all, Zimbabwe intervened in the Congo War in 1998.512 Second, in 2000 
Mugabe proposed a referendum to change the constitution. The proposed 
amendments would have granted Mugabe the chance to stand as President for 
another two terms, and would have permitted the confiscation of white-owned land 
without compensation. The failure in the constitutional referendum was a watershed 
moment for future human rights abuses and electoral irregularities. Since then, 
Mugabe fastened the process of land acquisition and worsened human rights abuses 
against his opponents.513 Some commentators even wrote about the beginning of a 
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“fascist cycle”.514 In addition, Mugabe blatantly rigged the subsequent parliamentary 
and presidential elections, in 2000 and 2002 respectively.515 Bush and Sfetzel 
summarized the situation in the following terms: 
 
About the general nature of the events that occurred during the last two 
or more years, there can be little dispute. Although information is patchy 
and not always reliable, and there has been much exaggeration and 
hysteria on both sides, the sheer volume of reports of widespread, 
calculated and brutal electoral corruption and thuggery – overwhelmingly 
perpetrated by the government and its supporters – is such that there can 
be no question but that the election campaign was a stain on the country's 
political history and that it has added substantially to Africa’s disgraceful 
record of abuses of human and political rights.516 
 
Responses by international donors started at the end of the 1990s, when numerous 
agencies shifted their programmes from government collaboration to NGO channels. 
Mainly due to debt mismanagement and the failure to service debt obligations, the 
World Bank stopped funding in October 2000 and the IMF suspended cooperation at 
the end of 2001.517 An unfavourable report on the 2002 elections by the 
Commonwealth Observer Group led to the decision to suspend Zimbabwe from 
participation in Commonwealth affairs for a year. At the end of the 2003, the 
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Commonwealth confirmed the suspension, and Zimbabwe withdrew from the 
organisation.518 
 
As far as the EU is concerned, the Council of the EU called for consultations under 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement in February 2001 and the parties began a 
political dialogue one month later. Lack of significant cooperation by the 
Zimbabwean government prompted the Commission to increase the pressure by 
invoking Zimbabwe’s breach of the essential elements of the Agreement and 
recommending both the beginning of consultations under Article 96 and the scaling 
down of development cooperation. Consultations started in January 2002, on the eve 
of the 2002 Presidential elections. The increase in political violence, the continuation 
of the fast-track land reform programme and, perhaps as important, the obstacles to 
the deployment of the EU election observation team were considered sufficient proof 
of the unwillingness of Mugabe to improve the situation.519 On 18 February, 
consultations were brought to a halt and the Council announced the adoption of 
“appropriate measures”, including the suspension of budgetary support under 
Zimbabwe’s 7th and 8th European Development Fund National Indicative 
Programmes, the suspension of the signature of the whole Zimbabwe’s 9th EDF NIP, 
and the suspension of all projects except those in direct support of the population, 
particularly in the social sectors, democratization, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law.520 On the same day, the Council also adopted “restrictive measures” 
(including an arms embargo, visa bans and the freezing of assets).521 
 
The whole EU decision-making process leading to the adoption of sanctions 
presented a surprising situation. The UK, the former colonial power with vested 
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interests in the country, lobbied in favour of both appropriate and restrictive 
measures. On the contrary, France (which has never been a large donor in 
Zimbabwe) adopted a welcoming approach. Taylor and Williams recall that Britain 
played an important role in the EU’s decision to put increasing pressure against the 
government of Zimbabwe.522 According to Youde, “within the Council, and its 
preparatory meetings, the UK, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany 
took a ‘hard line’. France, Belgium, Italy and Spain were more moderate. France, in 
particular, opposed invoking Article 96”.523 Compagnon agrees and adds that “the 
differences between member states were both ideological (France, Spain and Italy 
were more reluctant to apply political conditionality) and tactical (originally they 
argued that this political pressure on Mugabe would fail to mollify him and provide 
him with a powerful propaganda asset)”.524 The International Crisis Group confirms 
that “the UK was the first and, for a while, only champion among EU member states 
for tough action against Mugabe in the first half of 2001”.525 Even later in the year, 
the EU “has had difficulty speaking with one voice on Zimbabwe”: some Member 
States (the Scandinavians, the Dutch, and the UK) wanted to act quickly and increase 
pressure on Mugabe; others, like France and Belgium, insisted that time for action 
was not yet ripe.526  
 
The position of the Labour Government was expressly confronted with the soft 
approach adopted by the Thatcher government during the 1980s. Robin Cook 
reminded that, at the time of the ‘Matabeleband massacres’, 
 
there was not a word of criticism from any Minister. There was no cut in 
overseas aid – on the contrary, Lady Thatcher increased aid by £10 million at 
the time of the massacres. No attempt was made to use the Commonwealth 
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against Zimbabwe at the time. It is no wonder that President Mugabe let it be 
known that he was grateful for the British Government’s restraint.527 
 
In contrast with the British attitude, Cilliers recalls that at the beginning of 2001, “to 
the dismay of the British, who were at the forefront of condemning Harare for its 
derogation of the rule of law, President Robert Mugabe … was given a warm Gallic 
reception by President Jacques Chirac in Paris”.528 In the end, however, France left 
the EU-Zimbabwe policy largely to the British. This was in line with its agreement 
with the UK in Saint Malo in 1998, which stipulated that both countries should 
respect each other’s Africa policy.529 
 
Variation between France and the UK is blatant not only at the multilateral level, but 
also if one looks at bilateral relationships. According to Addison and Laakso, the UK 
“has been most active in applying diplomatic pressure” against Mugabe.530 In May 
2000, the UK had already halted the provision of 450 Land Rovers to the Zimbabwe 
police force, withdrew the British Military Advisory Training Team, and cut aid to 
Zimbabwe by one-third.531 Since 2001, DfID stopped all operations with the 
government and channelled all aid through multilateral organisations or NGOs.532 
Together with the UK, hardliners included Sweden, Denmark and the US. Sweden 
suspended aid at the end of 2001.533 In December 2001, President George W. Bush 
signed into law the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 
(ZDERA). Among other things, the law instructed American officials in international 
financial institutions to “oppose and vote against any extension by the respective 
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institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe”, and to 
vote against any reduction or cancellation of “indebtedness owed by the government 
of Zimbabwe”.534 In January 2002, Thor Pedersen, the then Danish Finance Minister, 
announced that “the government will pursue an assistance policy with a higher 
degree of consistency. Systematic, constant violations of human rights and 
democratic rules will no longer be accepted. Therefore, development cooperation 
with Zimbabwe … [and its] status as programme countr[y] will cease”.535 Hansen 
commented that, “even though the initial response may have not been as strict and 
consequent as the British and Danish ones”, other Western donors acted “on the 
same premises. In 2001 most donors … made cuts in aid and loans and strongly 
criticized the deterioration of law and order and the violations of human rights in 
Zimbabwe”.536 France represents an exception. 
 
According to Masiya, “while the UK restricted development support both at bilateral 
and EU levels, France maintained bilateral support. ... Countries like France were 
torn between following EU collective principles and seizing the opportunity created 
by UK’s retreat for it (France) to make new political and economic gains in 
Zimbabwe”.537 Grebe confirms that in 2001 France “extended bilateral development 
cooperation with Zimbabwe at the same time most of the other EU countries were 
drastically reducing cooperation”.538 Given the situation, the European Parliament 
found it justified to take the uncommon step to single out a single Member State. In 
its resolution of 6 September 2001, it criticized the French government, stating that 
“whereas most [EU] Member States have substantially cut or suspended their 
financial support and development aid to Zimbabwe, …France had significantly 
increased its engagement”, and called on Paris “to adhere to the line taken by the 
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other Member States”.539 The soft stance adopted by France is confirmed by other 
researchers: 
 
EU Member States and the EC delegation have coordinated their positions 
through Heads of Missions (HOMs) meetings. The UK, for example, organized 
regular meetings during its Presidency. A group of like-minded countries 
regularly communicates to form a common view. Direct informal contacts are 
important and extend to non-EU states as well, including the United States, 
Canada and Australia. Such cooperation excludes some Member States: most 
importantly France, which today is one of the largest creditors to Zimbabwe.540 
 
The different position at the bilateral level is also showed by the repeated attempts 
from France (as well as Italy and Belgium) to find exemptions to Mugabe’s travel 
bans. After the adoption of the restrictive measures, the different attitude of the two 
countries was evident from a few contrasting episodes. If one looks at the French 
side, in May 2002, just three months after the travel ban took effect, Robert Mugabe 
travelled via Paris to the United Nations in New York. In August of the same year, 
police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, who was on the sanction list, was granted a 
visa to attend an Interpol conference in Lyon.541 If one looks at the British side, in 
July 2002, Deputy Secretary for the Disabled and Disadvantaged Joshua Malinga 
was prevented from continuing his trip to New York by British authorities in 
London.542 Under British pressure, a planned meeting of EU and Southern African 
ministers in Copenhagen was switched to Maputo, in Mozambique.543  
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In one of the most blatant representations of the different attitude between the two 
countries, French President Jacques Chirac granted Mugabe a travel permit in 
February 2003 to attend a Franco-African summit meeting. The UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden immediately protested against the exemption.544 However, 
they “were concerned that if they formally opposed [it], France and Portugal 
(perhaps joined by Italy and Greece) would refuse to extend the sanctions regime 
when it came up for renewal” the day before the event.545 Indeed, France allegedly 
threatened to veto the renewal of the sanctions if it was not allowed to host Mugabe 
in Paris.546 Townsend and Copson commented that France 
 
is generally seen as favouring more engagement with the Mugabe regime than 
Britain or other EU members … Chirac justified the move by arguing that the 
inclusion of Mugabe rather than isolation would provide a quicker path to 
easing the Zimbabwe crisis … Chirac is reportedly sympathetic to the quiet 
diplomacy initiative of President Mbeki.547 
 
At the Summit, France also supported President Mbeki’s pursuit of a government of 
national unity, against the firm refusal of any compromise with Mugabe by other 
European donors.548 
 
This situation apparently changed in 2004, “when London and Paris effectively 
struck a deal whereby France backs UK efforts on Zimbabwe, particularly within the 
EU, while the British support France on Cote d’Ivoire”.549 However, if the deal 
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closed the gap between the two donors at the bilateral level, France continued to 
press to re-engage with Mugabe and relax the appropriate and restrictive measures at 
the EU level. Even though the situation on the ground had not improved – the 
government of Zimbabwe continued to pass repressive bills (such as the NGO bill)550 
and conduct repressive actions (such as Operation Murambatsvina)551 – at the end of 
2006 France’s new ambassador to Harare, Gabriel Jugnet, said, “of course we want 
dialogue between France and Zimbabwe. We want to help facilitate an improved 
dialogue between Zimbabwe and the EU”.552 At the beginning of 2007, the French 
did not invite Mugabe to the Franco-African summit in Cannes, but the trade-off 
was, allegedly, that Tony Blair agreed not to block the Zimbabwean leader’s 
attendance at the May 2007 Africa-EU summit in Lisbon.553 Indeed, Portugal invited 
Mugabe to attend the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon.554 Britain did not oppose but 
decided to be represented by Baroness Amos, a life peer with no ministerial 
portfolio.555 The Portuguese president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel 
Barroso, criticized the UK for its solitary boycott.556 Gegout commented that “this 
event shows continuing disagreements within the EU over how to deal with African 
states that contravene democracy and human rights values”.557 British newspapers 
reported that France and Portugal were even against the renewal of the sanctions 
regime.558 
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According to Grebe, “it is important to consider that any violation of the travel ban is 
undermining the legitimacy, and hence the credibility, of the sanction regime … 
Even though these visits fall in the category of exemptions, one can assume that 
Mugabe used these meetings to react to the increasing isolation of his country”.559 
Indeed, Mugabe often claimed victory over the British isolation strategy when he 
was allowed to participate in international meetings. After receiving the invitation to 
the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, he commented that “the sinister campaign led 
by Britain to isolate us … continues to disintegrate. I wish to thank the European 
Union and African countries for their support and the Portuguese government who 
are hosting the European Union-Africa summit for their correct reading of the 
situation”.560 
 
The situation has not changed with the political evolutions of 2008. In March 2008, 
the opposition won the parliamentary elections. However, the spark of hope was 
short-lived. A few months later, during the presidential elections, violent 
intimidations and voting irregularities allegedly prevented the opposition’s candidate, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, from being credited with the necessary 50 percent of the vote to 
be directly nominated President of the country. The period until the runoff was 
plagued by so much violence and persecution that Tsvangirai pulled out shortly 
before the poll, which took place with only one candidate, Robert Mugabe. External 
pressure convinced Mugabe and Tsvangirai to close a power-sharing agreement at 
the end of 2008. A Government of National Unity (with Mugabe as President and 
Tsvangirai as Prime Minister) was formed in February 2009.  
 
Donors’ reactions to the Government of National Unity (GNU) were coordinated. 
Yet, the different positions of the UK and France were still evident – and the British 
stance is more surprising than before, given the conciliatory attitude eventually 
adopted by Nordic countries.561 The dilemma faced by the donors was whether to 
engage with the GNU or abide by the Hague Principles, a 2005 policy statement 
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which expressly requested a significant amelioration of the political situation on the 
ground before even considering the move from humanitarian to development 
assistance.562 Erratic statements suggest the presence of disagreements among 
donors. High-ranking officials from leading Western donors maintained the 
principled position in a meeting in Washington in March 2009: “provided positive 
developments in regards to … political and economic reforms, the donor community 
is ready to support Zimbabwe’s rebuilding with development assistance”.563 
However, during a meeting in Berlin in October 2009, almost the same group of 
donors issued a statement that seemed to revise their position. The group renamed 
itself “the Friends of Zimbabwe” and endorsed the idea of “gradually shifting from 
measures aimed at purely humanitarian relief to substantial longer term assistance in 
a number of sectors which are crucial for the rapid improvement of living conditions 
for the people”.564 
 
What is interesting is that the debate between hard-liners and soft-liners once again 
saw the UK and France on opposite sides. According to cables leaked from the US 
Embassy in Paris,  
 
at a April 21 meeting, French Deputy National Security Advisor Bruno Joubert, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Eric Chevallier, and Foreign Minister 
Kouchner’s African Affairs Advisor Charlotte Montel all “pressed hard” on UK 
Foreign Office Minister for Africa Lord Malloch-Brown to support lifting EU 
sanctions on Zimbabwe … According to French, Montel said that the EU will 
begin considering lifting sanctions “with or without the UK”, but would prefer 
the UK to lead the process. Malloch-Brown replied by saying, “Yes, it was time 
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to begin looking at Zimbabwe as a glass half-full”, but that the Zimbabwe GNU 
had not done enough yet to merit lifting sanctions … Indicating that many 
senior UK Government figures remain hard-line on Zimbabwe, French said UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown had recently told Italian Prime Minister Prodi 
that the UK “will not support the (Government of Zimbabwe) until Mugabe is 
gone”.565 
 
In a later cable, the Ambassador qualified, but did not change, its perspective on the 
French position: “speaking carefully, Montel said that the French did not press the 
UK to ease sanctions on April 21 but rather hoped that the UK would acknowledge 
potentially positive changes that could make a less aggressive EU sanctions policy 
warranted at some point”.566 
 
In sum, Laakso, Kivimäki, Seppänen summarizes the situation in the following 
terms: 
 
The EU is divided into three groups over the case of Zimbabwe. There is a 
group that is deeply involved, a group that has adopted a softer stance and a 
third group that is indifferent. … The Northern Member States are close to the 
UK position, although at least some of them show a tendency towards softer 
viewpoints at the level of the missions in Harare than in their capitals. France is 
openly pursuing very different bilateral relations, but does not oppose the UK 
view as far as the common EU policy is concerned, viewing the dominant role 
of the UK as legitimate. There are Southern Member States, like Greece, which 
at the mission level are known to be critical of the EU policy.567  
 
Importantly, these differences have significantly contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
international pressure against Mugabe. Professor Youde commented that “the 
efficacy of the EU stance was questionable because certain Member States (I’m 
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thinking in particular of France) have shown a willingness to circumvent 
sanctions”.568 
 
5.4. The case studies of Madagascar and Nicaragua 
 
5.4.1. Madagascar 
 
The 2009 Malagasy crisis started at the end of 2008.569 Notwithstanding the adoption 
of sound economic and political policies in previous years,570 three affaires strained 
the relationship between President Marc Ravalomanana and both the local population 
and the international community. First, Ravalomanana bought a very expensive new 
presidential jet.571 Second, he promised South-Korean Daewoo Logistics to lease a 
huge amount of Malagasy land in order to produce corn and palm oil for the South 
Korean market.572 Third, he granted an import duty moratorium, thus favouring his 
personal dairy conglomerate, Tiko, but also reducing State revenues.573 These events 
provoked the suspension of budget support from the IMF in December 2008,574 and 
gave the opportunity to the major of Antananarivo (the capital of Madagascar), 
Andry Rajoelina, to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent president.575  
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At the end of January, after the forced closure of Rajoelina’s television and radio 
channels, tension escalated. Harsh suppression of demonstrations outside the 
presidential palace caused more than 100 deaths.576 At a big rally on 31 January 
Rajoelina announced the creation of the High Authority of the Transition (Haute 
Autorité de la Transition, HAT) and declared himself Head of State. After the failure 
of mediation attempts by local churches and the UN, on 17 March 2009 
Ravalomanana handed power to the highest-ranking officers in the armed forces, 
with the hope to take power back after a short military parenthesis.577 A few days 
later, as Rajoelina managed to garner the support of key figures in the military 
establishment, the officers handed power to him as the leader of the HAT. The coup 
was finalized.578  
 
The reaction of Western donors to these events was divided.579 As a foreign diplomat 
in Madagascar summarized the responses, “there were two sides: France and all other 
donors”.580 Norway was the first country to adopt aid sanctions. On 16 March 2009, 
even before the coup was actually completed, it froze its development aid.581 
Germany, the only EU Member State in addition to France with a significant 
presence in Madagascar, suspended all project and programme activities at 
ministerial level immediately after the coup, on 19 March 2009.582 The US 
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suspended all development assistance on 20 March 2009, when the State Department 
named the events unfolding in Antananarivo a “coup”. Under Section 7008 of the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 
the US government is legally required to suspend non-humanitarian assistance to 
countries where a democratically elected government is toppled by unconstitutional 
means.583 On the same day, the US MCC put a hold on its five-year, $110 million 
poverty reduction grant programme with Madagascar as well. The programme was 
then officially terminated in August 2009.584 
 
Even though France formally joined the chorus of censure against Rajoelina, it 
decided not to suspend development cooperation and continued aid disbursement.585 
On the day after the coup, France expressly pledged that “it will keep aid flows 
going”.586 The spokesman of French Foreign Ministry, Eric Chevallier, commented 
that “there is no question” of suspending bilateral aid.587 A French representative 
added that aid projects were maintained “because we think that the guilt is 
shared”.588 The website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the 
official “France’s Position Regarding the Malagasy Political Crisis”. The relevant 
parts of the document read as follows: 
 
The country’s number one partner, France has favoured a realistic and 
pragmatic approach and has sought to convince Madagascar’s other partners 
(AU/SADC, US, EU) of the need to reconcile principles and take into account 
the realities in the field … Also keen to minimize the impact of the political 
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crisis on the Malagasy population, and in response to an alarming deterioration 
of the economic situation, France did not wish to interrupt its efforts towards 
the poorest populations.589 
 
French decision-makers also tried to justify the continuation of development 
assistance using the argument of ineffectiveness. At a meeting with the US political 
officer in Paris, Beatrice Lederle, Desk Officer for Zimbabwe at the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and Remi Marechaux, African Advisor to the French President, 
said that  “France was considering what carrots and sticks were available, but 
admitted that options were limited … According to both Marechaux and Lederle, 
France did not have a very robust assistance program in place (and no budget 
support) and had already diminished its military assistance, due to budget cuts”.590 
The limits of this argument are evident if one realizes that the Norwegian and the US 
programmes were, by far, smaller than the French ones. Other donors took a 
principled decision, which France was reluctant to follow. 
 
The French position is surprising not only because of the differences with other 
donors, but also given the strong reaction by regional organisations. The AU Peace 
and Security Council suspended Madagascar’s membership of the organisation on 20 
March 2009. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) followed suit 
on 30 March.591 Some SADC members even talked of taking military action to 
restore democracy in Madagascar (although this never became a serious option).592  
 
France not only avoided bilateral aid sanctions, but also “strongly encouraged the 
international community to take account of realities on the ground” and “called for 
the continuation of some development aid to address the declining socio-economic 
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conditions”.593 In particular, France tried to mitigate the position of the EU. First of 
all, French officials resisted to name the change of government a “coup d’état”. This 
was evident not only at the ministerial level, when the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs avoided condemning the events in Madagascar during a Brussels event when 
the Czech EU presidency expressly denounced the unconstitutional deposition,594 but 
also at the local level. Many diplomats reported difficulties talking with French 
officials given their resistance to use the word “coup”. The explanation is that “using 
the word ‘coup’ would have inevitably led to the adoption of appropriate measures 
(that is, aid sanctions) under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and France was 
against this option”.595 
 
The International Crisis Group also reported that the EU “experienced serious 
difficulties in adopting a common position, divided between the legalistic views of 
some countries and those of France”.596 The result was a belated and soft response to 
the coup. On 31 March (much later than any other donor), the European Union 
representative to Madagascar, Jean Claude Boidin, said that no suspension of aid to 
the Indian Ocean island State had been taken by the European bloc because of its 
recent political development. However, he added that the EU had no plan for new aid 
contract with the country.597  
 
The situation changed with the opening of consultation under Article 96 of the 
Cotonou Agreement in May 2009. Cooperation activities were limited to 
humanitarian measures. The EU officially suspended budgetary aid, existing 
programmes involving the government and its agencies, and all new contracts.598 The 
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principled position by other EU Member States played a fundamental role in the 
adoption of appropriate measures. For instance, the UK is known to have “adopted a 
robust stance, with Lord Malloch-Brown the only European minister publicly to 
condemn the coup from the outset”.599 
 
Diplomatic cables from the US embassy in Antananarivo shine further light on the 
negotiations among EU Member States before the start of EU political dialogue. A 
few weeks after the coup, US Ambassador Marquandt reported that the new French 
Ambassador Jean-Marc Châtaigner “made clear that the French have no intention to 
suspend any aid or other program here; he implied privately that they will seek to 
delay and/or mitigate any EU actions in this regard … In this regard, the French are 
outliers, as most of the resident diplomatic community sees this crisis, as we do, as 
far from over”.600 The US Ambassador showed significant preoccupation regarding 
the consequences for the EU political dialogue: “with France leading the upcoming 
EU ‘political dialogue’ launching April 16 with the Rajoelina regime, the EU will 
likely be under pressure to follow the French lead. We understand the French are 
trying to include the Swiss and Norwegians in the EU ‘political dialogue’ but the 
Norwegians have some real hesitation about being dragged along by the French”.601  
 
The beginning of the EU’s political dialogue was eventually pushed back to May 
2009. One of the reasons behind the postponement was that the UK had serious 
questions about the terms of reference that France had proposed. According to US 
cables,  
 
Foreign Office Southern Africa Team leader Sarah Riley said the UK is 
uncomfortable with how quickly the French are moving to legitimize the 
Rajoelina regime and supports Cotonou Agreement Article 96 consultations 
rather than enhanced Article 8 consultations, which would “essentially mean 
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business as usual”, as opposed to the Article 96 consultations that could result 
in the suspension of all EU assistance programs. According to Riley, the UK 
sees France's push for the enhanced Article 8 consultations as a delaying tactic 
and an excuse to avoid Article 96 consultations. Riley said the UK is “pushing 
back hard” and is doing a lot of “heavy lifting in the EU” to change the terms of 
reference for the political dialogue.602 
 
The conclusion offered by the US Ambassador just a few days before the 
consultations was the following: “the EU clearly is divided on how to approach 
Madagascar, with the French opposed by most members who favour strengthening 
the EU backbone vis-à-vis the HAT”.603  
 
Variation between France and other donors is confirmed also by the different 
responses to the failure of the Maputo power-sharing deal at the end of 2009.604 The 
United States and the European Union used again the threat of sanctions against 
Malagasy leaders if they did not share power before the organisation of the polls. A 
US diplomat explicitly commented that “if the carrot does not work, we need to use 
the stick. We must send the signal that things may get worse”.605 In contrast with this 
idea, France considered that the Maputo process was deadlocked, and supported the 
unilateral organisation of elections by Rajoelina as soon as possible, provided that 
the vote was free and fair. The US Ambassador in Antananarivo commented that the 
French  
 
continue to support the idea of early elections, even if imperfect, as the French 
are extremely pessimistic about the ability of sanctions, the Maputo/Addis 
Accords, and/or further negotiations led by Chissano to solve the political crisis. 
The French government has reduced its military aid to Madagascar, but does not 
plan to make further cuts to bilateral aid programs, even if EU funds are cut 
                                                 
602 Wikileaks, Madagascar: UK Strongly Supports Usg Position (London: Embassy of the United 
States, April 14, 2009). 
603 Wikileaks, Madagascar International Contact Group: Preparing for the First Meeting 
(Antananarivo: Embassy of the United States, April 27, 2009). 
604 Lauren Ploch and Nicolas Cook, Madagascar’s Political Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, June 18, 2012), 14. In early August 2009, Madagascar’s feuding leaders agreed on a 
power-sharing deal that would have ceded control of the Indian Ocean island to an interim 
government, with elections then coming within 15 months. See Barry Bearak, “Madagascar Political 
Rivals Agree to Power-Sharing Deal,” The New York Times, August 10, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/africa/10madagascar.html. 
605 International Crisis Group, Madagascar, 26 [translationa by the author]. 
175 
 
following the closure of discussions under the Cotonou Accord, now expected 
in March 606. 
 
Incidentally, it is important to note that the continuation of French government-to-
government aid to Madagascar was directly blamed as one of the main reasons 
behind the inability of the international community to solve the Malagasy crisis. If 
support from the SADC meant that Ravalomanana was not willing to compromise (in 
the hope of coming back to Madagascar as powerful as before the coup),607 Rajoelina 
seemed to count on French assistance (including development cooperation) when he 
decided to avoid consensual solutions to the crisis.608 
 
Before concluding, it is worth addressing the point, suggested by some 
commentators, that the conciliatory French attitude in Madagascar can be explained 
by reference to fundamental strategic goals, and thus is not particularly relevant in 
terms of application of political conditionality (even other donors would have 
behaved in the same way if they had the same interests).609 In economic terms, 
“France has traditionally had the largest foreign interests in Madagascar, with nearly 
25,000 citizens and 700 companies in the country”.610 Cawthra suggested that, in 
order to protect the economic interests of the French and the Franco-Malagasy 
community, the French “are interested above all in maintaining stability in 
Madagascar and preventing any slide towards civil conflict”.611  
 
In addition, the relationship between France and Ravalomanana (the ousted 
President) was not cordial. Lanz and Gasser reports that “Paris’ position was 
‘ambiguous’ given that it had had strained relations with Ravalomanana, who was 
described as a ‘Francophobe’”.612 Indeed, Ravalomanana proposed English as the 
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third official language of the country,613 expelled the French Ambassador in 
Antananarivo and three key figure of the French expat community in Madagascar 
(Olivier Peguy, foreign correspondent for Radio France Internationale, Chirstian 
Chadefaux, foreign correspondent for Libération and editor-in-chief of the 
newspaper Les Nouvelles, and Sylvain Urfer, a Jesuit priest),614 and joined the 
SADC, “which some took as indication of an intention by Ravalomanana to move 
away from the traditional French post-colonial influence”.615 In the eyes of the 
French, a quick resolution of the crisis in favour of Rajoelina was the best of the 
possible outcomes. 
 
However, this narration of the facts offers a partial picture of the French response to 
the Malagasy crisis. First, French interests in Madagascar are often exaggerated. On 
14 January 2010, French Ambassador Jean-Marc Châtaigner spoke to the American 
Chamber of Commerce regarding French commercial and political relations with 
Madagascar. Châtaigner noted that “there are 650 French companies in Madagascar 
with more than 50 employees each, … and that France was the primary importer of 
Malagasy products in 2009”. However, he also pointed out that “Madagascar is not 
of strategic interest for France in general trade terms, as commerce with the island 
only accounts for less than 0.1 percent of overall French trade”.616  
 
Second, it is not self-evident that government-to-government interaction was 
desperately needed to avoid an economic crisis in the country, or at least that the 
balance should have been totally skewed in favour of stability at the expenses of 
human rights. The US, for instance, adopted a different approach: “from our 
perspective, it is important to maintain as much as possible of our assistance, in order 
not to contribute to instability, while sending a clear message to the High 
Transitional Authority that we can have no direct involvement with or through them 
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on the programs we will continue until there are free and fair presidential elections, 
as soon as possible”.617 Last but not least, it is not true that the relationship with 
Ravalomanana was so unfriendly to dictate uncompromising preference for 
Rajoelina. Ravalomanana had always demonstrated to maintain strong links with the 
OIF, as confirmed by hard (and successful) lobbying to host the 2010 Francophonie 
Summit in Antananarivo,618 and Total signed a large contract for investing in 
Madagascar’s oil sector way before the political crisis in 2009.619  
 
The lack of application of sanctions in this circumstance suggests that, in Paris, 
human rights concerns lose against strategic interests which are not fundamental. As 
commented by one interviewee, “Madagascar is not Côte d’Ivoire or Cameroon, two 
of the former colonies with the strongest links to Paris, and is not Niger or Gabon 
(where France sources almost all its uranium)”.620 Whenever there is something to be 
gained, the human rights component is lost during aid decision-making. 
 
5.4.2. Nicaragua 
 
Nicaragua, the largest of the Central American countries, is a former Spanish colony. 
In the years leading to 2008, the largest Western bilateral donors in Managua were, 
by far, the European Commission, Spain and the US. Apart from yearly fluctuations, 
other important donors included Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.621  
 
In 2005, seven bilateral donors (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and UK) and two multilateral donors (EU, WB) entered into a 
long-term general and sectoral budget support programme with the Nicaraguan 
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government.622 The Joint Financing Agreement included some ‘fundamental 
principles’ that both donors and government had to abide by. These principles were 
formulated as follows: 
 
commitments to international law and conflict prevention, respect for human 
rights, democratic principles including free and fair elections, the rule of law, 
independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes, 
accountability and the fight against corruption, sound macroeconomic policies 
and commitment to poverty reduction.623  
 
Up to the mid-2000s, Nicaragua was considered a model of international 
cooperation. Good relations prevailed between the government and the donor 
community, and the country was used as a pilot for the application of the Paris 
Declaration principles of ownership and harmonization.624 The situation changed in 
2006 when Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came 
back to power after 16 years of conservative rule.625 While the new government 
maintained macroeconomic performance in line with the expectations of 
international financial institutions and did not antagonize the private sector, it 
adopted several policies that alienated the sympathy of the donors. For instance, it 
endorsed a strict law banning all abortions in Nicaragua, started harassing NGOs that 
it perceived as opponents, adopted an assertive attitude focused on restoring a 
Sandinist social programme, and built a new alliance with Venezuela and the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).626  
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Donors, in particular those contributing to the budget of the government, began to 
worry about human rights issues. Their initial response was coordinated. The 2007 
Joint Assessment of Budget Support to Nicaragua concluded, inter alia, that there 
had been no progress in political independence and judiciary independence, and that 
there had been a set-back with respect to human rights (in particular, regarding the 
penalization of abortion).627 The consequence was the explicit inclusion of an area on 
governance focusing on justice, human rights and citizen participation in the 
Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).628  
 
The crisis of the relationship between Ortega and the donor community reached its 
climax with the 2008 local election. In June 2008, a few months before the vote, the 
Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council disqualified two opposition parties from 
participation. Then, for the first time since 1990, the Council decided not to allow 
national or international observers to witness the election. Finally, opposition 
political party members and NGO representatives claimed numerous instances of 
intimidation, violence, and harassment. Amidst international criticism, the Supreme 
Electoral Council agreed to review results for Managua only, while the opposition 
demanded a nationwide review.629 
 
The firm position of the Nicaraguan government, the low level of violence, and the 
slow pace of repressive practices led to significant variation in the behaviour of 
Western donors. According to foreign diplomats, two groups could be distinguished: 
the hardliners, which included Finland, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US, 
versus those adopting a softer stance, such as Spain, and to a lesser extent Norway 
and Switzerland.630 The division among EU Member States is confirmed by the 
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cables of the US Embassy in Managua. After the local elections, “Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Deputy Chief for Central American Affairs Laetitia van Asch Pieters 
… reported that the EU agrees the Nicaraguan elections were flawed … but the EU 
representatives in Managua are divided on whether to take a more confrontational 
approach with the GON”.631 The evaluation report of Norwegian development 
cooperation also corroborates the fact that, after the first round of suspensions, 
donors did not agree on the demands to be forwarded to government nor on what 
exactly the government of Nicaragua would have to do to unfreeze disbursements.632 
  
Sweden announced that the end of its foreign assistance programmes Nicaragua in 
August 2007. The position of Sweden is interesting not only because of the timing of 
the response, but also because it is often equated to the British one.633 Officially, the 
decision was justified as a result of a general policy to shift focus on countries in 
Africa and Eastern Europe.634 However, subsequent actions suggest that the Swedish 
behaviour was at least partially linked to the human rights practices of the 
Nicaraguan government. In addition to phasing out its programmes, in fact, Sweden 
decided to discontinue its general budget support programme, maintaining only its 
budget support contribution to the health sector. The official Outcome Assessment of 
Swedish development cooperation in Nicaragua acknowledges that this decision 
“was motivated by non-fulfilment by Nicaragua of several fundamental principles for 
general budget support included in the agreement. These principles include respect 
for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and independence of the 
judiciary, macroeconomic stability, and commitment to combating poverty and 
corruption”.635 A former Swedish diplomat analyzed the decision-making process in 
the following terms: 
 
I am very critical about the way in which the Swedish government operated. 
The phasing out started with a clear purpose: to limit the number of countries of 
operation. This was the message we were supposed to deliver. … The problem 
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is that the Nicaraguan government never believed us. And the fact that, a few 
months later, the government decided to diminish budget support on the basis of 
political considerations made our job almost impossible. To the Nicaraguan 
government, it was clear that both decision were politically based.636  
 
Other diplomats confirm that the Swedish decision to continue only budget support 
to the health sector was, not only but at least significantly, based on concerns about 
electoral and human rights issues.637 
 
The second donor to leave the country was the UK. In December 2007, DFID 
announced that it would close its offices in April 2009. According to DFID officials, 
this decision was made independently from the political developments in the country. 
The reason was that “Nicaragua moved into the ‘middle income country’ bracket and 
so no longer benefited from our bilateral assistance”.638 The strategy was to invest in 
more economically vulnerable regions such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. 
However, the problems created by the 2008 local elections entailed that DfID could 
not comply with the planned phase-out strategy, which included the disbursement of 
the last tranches of budget support to the Nicaraguan government.639 Thus, in 
September 2008, the British government sent a letter to the Nicaraguan Ministry of 
Finance, informing it that budget support was discontinued and that DFID will only 
continue its other projects in the country.640 The result is that, when the DFID 
Nicaragua closed its office in May 2009 and DFID Latin America assumed 
responsibility for the country programme, there was no Budget Support Programme 
for Nicaragua.641  
 
According to an insider of the General Budget Support Group, the decision by the 
UK should be understood in a similar fashion to the Swedish one: “the context is 
important. It is true that the donor justified it through the realignment of their aid 
programmes. However, there was already mistrust. All donors were worried about 
the elections. Before, during and after the actual voting. And the UK was very clear 
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about the lack of confidence”.642 This view is confirmed by a joint evaluation of 
donor programmes which reported that “the UK stopped budget support 
disbursement in 2008 but still spoke critically in the budget support group meetings 
(allegedly to the resentment of others)”.643 A foreign diplomat recalls that “at the 
time the UK diplomats were very happy that they were closing their programmes 
because this meant that they did not have to take inevitable political decisions”.644 
 
After Sweden and the UK, other donors followed suit. Germany announced the 
suspension of budget support and the closure of its offices in April 2008.645 Finland 
withdrew its commitment to the general budget of Nicaragua in October 2008.646 The 
European Commission suspended budget support in December 2008.647 Marc 
Litvine, EuropeAid’s head of operations for Central America, stated that “there is a 
political problem between the European Union and Nicaragua. Last November 2008, 
there was proof of widespread fraud. So the European Union suspended money for 
budget support for the free disposal [of the Nicaraguan government]”.648 The 
Netherlands did not discontinue budget support, but reduced it from 12 million Euros 
to 6 million Euros for 2008, and froze it for 2009.649 On December 18, Minister for 
Development Cooperation Koenders justified the decision in the following terms: “I 
find it irresponsible to give direct help to the Sandinista government, which has 
thwarted free and fair elections in all possible manners”.650 Denmark announced their 
intended departure from Nicaragua in April 2010.651  
 
The two exceptions within the Budget Support Group were Norway and Switzerland. 
As far as Norway is concerned, a US cable from the US embassy in Managua 
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reported that “Kjersti Rodsmoen, head of the Latin America section of the MFA … 
expressed official concern over developments in Nicaragua but little interest in 
actually reducing Norway’s budget support. At the same time, Rodsmoen said that 
Norway would limit its 2009 budget support to 2008’s figure of 20 million kroner 
(approx $3.2 million) rather than the 25 million kroner it had pledged for 2009 at a 
budget support group meeting this fall”.652 In October 2010 Norway eventually 
joined the group of donors which announced a plan to close their diplomatic mission 
to Nicaragua to free resources for missions elsewhere.653 According to Dijkstra, 
“Norway was willing to continue but did not want to be the sole remaining bilateral 
donor”.654 Regarding Switzerland, it actually stepped in when other donors decided 
to leave the country. In 2007, it announced that it would have tripled its annual 
foreign aid to Nicaragua, from about $5 million to over $17 million annually for the 
next five years. This partially offset the $21 million annual loss from Sweden’s 
pullout.655 Moreover, at the time of the local elections, Nora Kronig, Regional 
Coordinator for Central and South America at the Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs turned down the US request to suspend aid “noting that the Swiss 
government prefers to address such problems through direct dialogue with the 
recipient country”.656 Switzerland eventually ended budget support in late 2009.657 
 
The last two big donors to be considered are Spain and the US. Their comparison is 
particularly interesting because neither of the two countries was providing budget 
support to the Nicaraguan government. The difference between the two donors 
shows that there can be variation of behaviour also between countries who channel 
assistance mainly through discrete projects (like France). Spain resisted cutting aid. 
In November 2008, Spanish MFA Sub-Direct General for Mexican, Caribbean, and 
Central American Affairs Jorge Romeu Gonzalez-Barros informed the US Embassy 
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in Managua that, “though Spain had been considering reducing its support to the 
Nicaraguan police, … the government had decided to maintain said contributions 
because the police project was well run and not overly politicized”. He also said that 
he would have tried “to moderate the EU position toward Nicaragua. At this point, he 
explained, there was no longer much daylight between the Spanish and broader 
European positions”.658 On the contrary, the U.S. not only suspended its Millennium 
Development Cooperation programme in November 2008 (the programme was 
eventually cancelled in 2009).659 Washington also took the leadership with other 
Western donors, and encouraged them to suspend their contributions. According to 
the US Ambassador in Nicaragua: 
 
the international community should send a clear message to the government of 
Nicaragua that violations of democratic norms have a cost. Actions by multiple 
countries will be more effective in making this point than unilateral actions by a 
single country. We believe suspension of assistance programs, except for 
humanitarian help channelled through non-governmental sources, is an 
appropriate response to the government’s actions. Since external assistance 
accounts for approximately 25 percent of the Nicaraguan budgetary inflows, the 
government of Nicaragua will feel the impact quickly.660  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter confirmed that policies, legal documents and behaviour go hand in 
hand. France is often the most opposed to the application of political conditionality, 
while the UK frequently takes the lead in the imposition of aid sanctions, together 
with like-minded Nordic donors. 
 
The chapter thoroughly examined four cases of aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, 
Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. In line with the results of 
past statistical studies, the UK was usually more willing than France to apply aid 
sanctions. After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France was the only Western donor 
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(in contrast with the EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to continue some bilateral 
government-to-government programmes. During the 2009 donor strike in 
Mozambique, France adopted a soft stance and avoided a confrontational position 
against the Mozambican government. The UK was among the leaders of the strike 
and one of the most vocal critics of the political situation. After the contested 2008 
local elections in Nicaragua, the UK was the second donor (after Sweden) to 
announce the suspension of its budget support programme. When the Zimbabwean 
government resorted to widespread human rights abuses in connection with its fast-
track land reform at the beginning of the 2000s, the UK pushed for the adoption of 
aid sanctions. France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VARIATION IN THE INTERNALISATION OF POLITICAL 
CONDITIONALITY: FOUR HYPOTHESES 
 
The previous two chapters have shown that France and the UK present significant 
variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality. The remaining 
part of the dissertation explains why the two donors have not been affected by this 
norm in the same way. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to justify the decision 
to adopt an “analytic eclectic” framework, and to introduce four hypotheses that can 
explain variation across the Channel. The validity of these hypotheses will be tested 
in the next chapter. 
 
6.1. Analytic eclecticism 
 
Variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality defies simple 
explanations. Interviewees who were asked to agree or disagree with a set of pre-
determined hypotheses derived from the main theories of International Relations and 
Foreign Policy Analysis offered responses as revealing as “the situation is much way 
too complex to point you in the direction of one or another hypothesis”, “it is not as 
black and white as you describe; interests, instruments, cultures, they all play a role, 
they concur in the result”, and “it is difficult to say, I do believe that it is an 
interaction of all these factors”.661  
 
This finding is not surprising for scholars working on foreign policy, development 
aid and human rights. Already in 1962, Morgenthau argued that, “of the seeming and 
real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign 
policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign 
aid”.662 In one of the most acclaimed overviews of contemporary aid, Lancaster 
denied the possibility of creating an overarching framework to explain development 
assistance, explicitly because “there are too many interacting variables to justify a 
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model that would be both parsimonious and insightful”.663 Brysk asks: “Why does a 
particular state construct a particular identity, in this case, as a global good citizen? 
The answer lies partly in history, partly in structure, partly in the agency of meaning 
and myth makers, and partly in relations to Others”.664  
 
French and British decision-making processes in foreign policy and development aid 
are no exceptions to the complexities suggested above. Paul Williams described UK 
foreign policy making in the following terms: 
 
Foreign policy is not made in a political vacuum but is shaped by domestic 
factors (such as public opinion), globalizing pressures (such as communication 
technologies), integrative tendencies (especially within the European Union) 
and transnational forces (such as lobbying from NGOs) ... First, while the same 
goals and commitments can persist for long periods, foreign policy-making is 
best conceptualized as a dynamic process that exists in a dialectical relationship 
with the outside world. Second, at times, the process is wide-ranging, involving 
officials from all areas of government and a (growing) number of outsiders 
from both foreign governments and NGOs.665 
 
Chafer and Cumming argued that British and French “bilateral cooperation cannot be 
understood without disaggregating the state[s] and including strong focus on the 
perceptions, interest and ideas of elite policy-makers, not to mention institutional 
constraints and other domestic variables”.666 
 
The intricacy of foreign policy and development assistance decision-making has 
pushed me to go beyond paradigmatic boundaries and endorse “analytic 
eclecticism”.667 As a problem-driven (not theory-driven) methodology, analytic 
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eclecticism acknowledges the messiness of everyday politics and “explores how 
diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theories might interact 
with each other, and how, under certain conditions, they can combine to affect 
outcomes”.668 Importantly, analytic eclecticism “neither suggests that ‘anything 
goes’, nor seeks to create endless laundry lists of potentially relevant factors”.669 As 
any other scholarly enterprise, eclectic work is assessed against available evidence 
and alternative arguments. However, analytic eclecticism avoids the risk that the lack 
of integration among multiple paradigms becomes a “hindrance to understanding”.670  
 
The adoption of an (at least partially) “eclectic” stance is, nowadays, rather common 
in IR studies. Neorealist scholars have acknowledged that the influence of 
international material constraints is significantly filtered by “transmission belts” such 
as different domestic structures and political groups.671 Some constructivist 
academics have explicitly recommended the use of rationalism and constructivism as 
complements rather than competitors;672 others have recognised that the diffusion of 
international norms is extensively conditioned by domestic culture, institutions and 
actors.673 Liberal researchers have emphasised that foreign policy decisions are the 
result of a two-level game in which the government should manage pressures not 
only from the domestic arena but also from the international environment.674 
Europeanization scholars have derived the mechanisms through which European 
policies produce impact at the national level (including micro-processes as different 
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as coercion and imitation) from both rationalistic and sociological 
institutionalisms.675  
 
In the end, this is not a surprising evolution if one thinks that IR theories 
“intentionally oversimplify” the world in order to highlight those forces that are 
considered to be “typically”, but not constantly, central to explain state behaviour.676 
To offer one example, hard-headed realists recognise that domestic politics exists. 
Yet, they argue that material pressures at the international level are generally so 
strong that domestic politics is unimportant to determine the foreign policy of a 
country. The starting point of this dissertation is that variation in internalisation of 
political conditionality is one of those aspects of European donors’ foreign policies 
that remains too complex to be explained by reference to one theory alone. Theories 
are meant to create opportunities for, not constraints on, empirical research. 
 
6.2. Realism 
 
A plausible hypothesis to explain variation in the internalisation of political 
conditionality by France and the UK can be derived from a rational-material theory 
such as realism. Realism starts with three assumptions. First, states behave as rational 
and unitary actors. Second, even if survival is not the only goal for states, it is 
certainly the paramount one (if a state no longer exists, the pursuit of any other 
objective is evidently impossible). Third, self-help is the only way for States to 
protect themselves in an anarchical international system (at the international level 
there is no world-state that can enforce rights and duties as states do in the domestic 
sphere). From these assumptions, realists conclude that it is sensible for States to 
share a uniform, constant and overriding quest for military and economic power 
before the pursuit of any other interest and against the loyalty to any existing alliance 
(today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy and nobody will defend misguided states). 
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As those countries that do not follow these rational prescriptions are doomed to 
disappear, natural selection explains the persistence of realist “laws” over history.677 
 
Realism has been frequently used to explain the foreign policy of great powers.678 In 
addition, even though neo-realism (that is, the most rationalist and structural version 
of realism) was initially crafted to explain not specific foreign policy decisions but 
international political outcomes (such as the balance of power),679 Elman has made a 
strong case for the possibility of a “neorealist theory of foreign policy”. In brief, this 
maintains that foreign policy is dictated by international material constraints and that 
ethical considerations are almost always overridden by strategic considerations.680  
 
Foreign aid, as one of the multiple representations of a country’s foreign policy, is no 
exception to the rational and material expectations depicted by realists. Several Cold 
War scholars argued that aid policies were primarily driven by strategic concerns, 
and any attention to normative values was simply a cloak for geopolitical and 
economic considerations.681 George Liska is one of the early realists who argued that 
aid was a tool for enhancing national security. He articulated the view that foreign 
aid “is today and will remain for some time an instrument of political power”.682 
Morgenthau famously stated that it was  
 
pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a 
policy of foreign aid – as much so as to ask whether the United States ought to 
have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests 
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abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which 
the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid 
is not available they will not be supported at all.683  
 
Gilpin supported this view and argued that even though humanitarian concerns 
played an important role in foreign assistance the “primary motives for official aid by 
governments have been political, military and commercial”.684 In 1995, Hook 
compared the aid policies of four donors (France, Japan, U.S. and Sweden). He 
concluded that, despite the differences, the common thread is that decisions on 
development assistance reflect the national interest of the different countries, and, 
importantly, this national interest is primarily determined by the international 
context.685 
 
The validity of these impressionistic statements from several fathers of the realist 
tradition has been confirmed by outspoken politicians, more liberal scholars and 
subsequent empirical tests. Sir William Ryrie, the former Permanent Secretary of the 
British Overseas Development Agency – the precursor of DfID – characterized the 
political objectives of the British aid programme as “making friends, buying and 
keeping influence”.686 Olav Stokke, one of the most renowned experts on political 
conditionality and European aid, concedes that “most government, particularly those 
aspiring to a hegemonic position globally or regionally, will rank security interests 
high, along with predominant economic interests”.687 Most empirical models of aid 
allocation have highlighted the significance of variables representing strategic and 
economic motives, such as levels of militarization, alliance ties and level of trade, 
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thus confirming that donors frequently use their economic assistance in return for 
support on critical UN votes, trade issues, security links, etc. 688 
 
What, then, is the role of norms in a realist account of foreign aid? Norms are only 
“epiphenomenal” occurrences, ex post rationalizations of strategic interests such as 
security and/or wealth.689 Following this line of reasoning, a country’s approach to 
political conditionality would be the consequence of predetermined priorities in 
terms of (1) favourite recipients and/or (2) sanction decisions. The first leg of the 
hypothesis says that donors whose material interests happen to suggest the allocation 
of development assistance to repressive regimes will avoid human rights language, 
while donors whose material interests happen to suggest the allocation of 
development assistance to respectful government will pay lip service to political 
conditionality. In other words, a donor would appear to internalize political 
conditionality (realists resist the terminology of norms and internalisation) if the 
recipient countries which are dictated by its material concerns are in the majority 
good human rights performers. A donor would oppose political conditionality if the 
recipient countries dictated by its security concerns are in the majority repressive 
regimes. The second leg of the hypothesis says that donors whose material interests 
happen to suggest the application of aid sanctions to repressive regimes will be more 
likely to pay lip service to political conditionality. In other words, a donor would 
appear to internalize political conditionality if sanction decisions which are in reality 
dictated by its material interests can be masked under normative language. In both 
cases, political conditionality merely represents window-dressing.  
 
Europeanization scholars have already suggested the plausibility of this hypothesis 
for other aspects of EU Member States’ aid policies. For instance, Bretherton has 
showed that one of the reasons behind the shallow harmonization of European 
development cooperation in terms of policy coherence and horizontal coordination is 
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that EU Member States policies “have continued to be formulated according to 
national priorities and principles and, hence, to reflect traditional ties or particular 
interests”.690 
 
The hypotheses deriving from realism are the following: the UK has internalized 
human rights to a larger extent than France (1) because traditional recipients of 
British aid are better human rights performers than traditional recipients of French 
aid, and/or (2) because the application of political conditionality could be used by 
British decision-makers to mask the pursuit of strategic interests in specific 
countries. 
 
6.3. International constructivism 
 
In contrast with the realist focus on materiality and rationality, international 
constructivism argues that states’ behaviour is heavily influenced by the (active as 
well as involuntary) ideational and social pressures exercised by other international 
actors (mainly states, international organisations and transnational movements).691 
The behaviour of states is norm-driven (not goal-oriented), and norms are 
constructed (as well as deconstructed) through social interaction at the international 
level.692 As highlighted by Brysk, foreign policy can be “constructed outward. The 
identities that shape interests are constructed in relation to others”.693  
                                                 
690 Charlotte Bretherton, “Development Policy,” in The Europeanization of European Politics, ed. 
Charlotte Bretherton and Michael L. Mannin (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 172. 
691 I call this approach “international” constructivism in order to distinguish it from “unit-level” 
constructivism, whose focus lies on the relationship between local/domestic norms and the identities, 
interests and actions of states. The distinction was first proposed by C. Reus–Smit, “Imagining 
Society: Constructivism and the English School,” The British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations 4, no. 3 (2002): 487–509. For an example, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996). 
692 See, in general, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325–47; John G. Ruggie, 
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (Routledge, 1998); 
Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
693 Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 33. In a similar fashion, but talking about human rights and 
domestic politics, Adler argues that “it would be very difficult for a European state to consistently 
abuse human rights and still be deemed to belong to contemporary ‘Europe’”: E. Adler, “ʻSeizing the 
Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politicsʼ,” European Journal of International Relations 3, 
no. 3 (1997): 345. 
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Finnemore and Sikkink best exemplified this approach through a model of norms’ 
cascade. Once a critical mass of states adopt an international norm, other states begin 
to adopt this norm “more rapidly, even without domestic pressure for such change”. 
At this stage of the life cycle, “the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades 
is an active process of international socialisation intended to induce norm breakers to 
become norm followers ... In the context of international politics [this process] 
involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is 
reinforced by material sanctions and incentives”. In fact, “states and state élites 
fashion a political self or identity in relation to the international community”, and 
seek “legitimation, conformity and esteem”.694  
 
On the basis of these insights, international constructivist scholars explain 
similarities and differences between foreign policies through social processes at the 
international level: foreign policies are similar when states construct their identities 
(and therefore adopt the norms dictated by these identities) together with each other; 
foreign policies are dissimilar when states construct their identities without, or even 
against, each other.695 For example, Rittberger suggests that norms “emerge in, and 
are restricted in their validity to, particular regional contexts, producing cross-
regional variation in state behaviour”.696  
 
Importantly, even though international constructivism stresses the influence of social 
pressures at the international level, a distinctive characteristic of this approach is its 
agnosticism over which social pressures matter most in influencing a specific state’s 
                                                 
694 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 897–8, 902–3. 
695 For examples of similarity in Europe, see Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National 
Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 84–114; Frank 
Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The 
Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 495–518. For examples at the global level, see Martha Finnemore, 
“International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–97; 
Richard M. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” 
International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613–44. 
696 V. Rittberger, Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations 
Theories (Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung: University of 
Tübingen, 2004), 25. 
195 
 
identities, norms and actions. This is a question for empirical research.697 A plausible 
explanation for variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality by 
France and the UK can therefore be that the two donors belong to different groups of 
states, inside or outside the EU.  
 
France and the UK equally belong to numerous international groups and 
organisations, including ‘Western liberal democracies’, nuclear powers, permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, NATO, G7, OECD, Council of Europe, etc. 
Common participation excludes these groups and organizations from the set of 
potential explanatory variables behind varied internalisation of political 
conditionality. Two options are relevant for this dissertation: the like-minded donors 
or Nordic plus group (which includes the UK but not France), and the distinction 
between the Commonwealth (UK) and the International Organization of La 
Francophonie (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF).698 The 
importance of these two groupings has already been recognized by past research on 
sanctions and human rights. For instance, Klotz explained British application of 
sanctions against South Africa during the 1980s in the following terms: “in the face 
of Commonwealth and European Community (especially Nordic) pressures for 
sanctions, Thatcher tried to forestall escalating international demands by making 
incremental compromises”.699 
 
A constructivist explanation has strong plausibility in the field on foreign aid and 
human rights promotion. Several scholars have already explained the diffusion of 
development cooperation programmes by the force of ideational and social 
processes.700 In the most comprehensive survey of European donors, Hoebink and 
                                                 
697 H. Boekle, V. Rittberger, and W. Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,” in German 
Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, ed. V. Rittberger (Manchester: 
Manchester Univ Press, 2001), 110. 
698 At the beginning of the 2000s, the four Nordic donors (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway) 
plus Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom formally joined forces under the heading of the 
“Nordic Plus Group”. Since then, the groups has gained in importance. In 2006, Selbervik and 
Nygaard argued that “the Nordic Plus group appears as a more important point of reference than the 
Nordic countries per se”: Selbervik and Nygaard, Nordic Exceptionalism in Development Assistance? 
Aid Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic Countries, 51. 
699 Audie Klotz, “Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South Africa,” Review of 
International Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 181. 
700 David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-
1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Roger C. Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered 
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
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Stokke reported the existence of a “strong mutual influence among donors”, which 
may be explained “with reference to the existence of a transnational aid policy 
community that has many of the same characteristics as national policy 
communities”.701 Van der Veen documented the role that reputation and mimicry 
play in the specific features of aid departments. His suggestion to aid activists is to 
exploit this opportunity:  
 
If obligation or reputation are prominent frames, it may make sense to try to 
change the set of States that are considered peer States. For Belgium, for 
example, whether France or the Netherlands is seen as the more logical referent 
makes a considerable difference. Or, to offer a more extreme example, imagine 
if Italy felt obliged to do as least as much as the Nordic countries!702  
 
Even specifically on political conditionality, researchers reported the emergence on 
“common features” in the methodology of country-level human rights assessments 
evaluation.703 Del Biondo and Orbie reported that, in the case of Ethiopia, 
coordination after the 2005 human rights violations was driven by “peer pressure and 
the hope of having some effect through coordinated action”.704 
 
These socialization processes take place both within the capitals and on the ground. 
On the one hand, Lancaster recalls that, after the adoption of the first development 
programme by Norway, “given the close contacts among the publics, organisations, 
and officials of the Nordic countries, Norway’s action was observed and soon 
imitated by Sweden and Denmark”.705 On the other hand, Baylies reminds us that, 
“while some bilaterals set general conditions of a political nature in their individual 
agreements with recipient countries, the exercise of political conditionality is 
                                                 
701 Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke, “Introduction: European Development Co-Operation at the 
Beginning of a New Millennium,” in Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: Policy 
and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU, ed. Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 18. 
702 A. Maurits van der Veen, Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 221. 
703 David D’Hollander, Axel Marx, and Jan Wouters, Integrating Human Rights in EU Development 
Cooperation Policy: A Comparative Assessment of Strategies and Practices of Donors (Leuven, 
Belgium: Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, April 2014), 236. 
704 Karen Del Biondo and Jan Orbie, “The European Commission’s Implementation of Budget 
Support and the Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia: Democracy Promoter or Developmental 
Donor?,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2014): 422. 
705 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 30. 
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particularly dramatically enacted at consultative group meetings. The outcome of 
these meetings ostensibly represents collectively imposed conditions”.706  
 
In terms of the specific mechanisms through which international socialization takes 
place, the academic literature has suggested three micro-processes: instrumental 
adaptation, normative persuasion and emulation.707 While instrumental adaptation is 
not relevant for this specific hypothesis (neither France nor the UK has any material 
incentive at the international level to apply conditionality),708 the other two micro-
processes are worth exploring.  
 
Under the name of “normative persuasion”, donors’ norms are changed through 
communicative argumentation. If rationalism views language as a tool to exchange 
information or signal intentions, constructivism envisages a “thicker” role for it, as 
constitutive of actors and their interests. According to the “logic of arguing”, actors 
communicate to convince each other: they present arguments and are open to 
redefining their preferences.709 Checkel exemplifies the process in the following 
terms: “If asked about the source of compliance, agents – after conscious thought – 
might answer, ‘Well, this is the right thing to do even though I didn’t used to think 
so’”.710 The socializing agents are often assumed to be transnational advocacy 
networks.711 However, they can also be other states or international organisations. In 
a study on the diffusion of international science norms, Martha Finnemore found that 
“states were socialized by international organizations and an international 
community of experts – in this case scientists – to accept the promotion and direction 
of science as a necessary and appropriate role”.712  
 
                                                 
706 Carolyn Baylies, “‘Political Conditionality’ and Democratisation,” Review of African Political 
Economy 22, no. 65 (1995): 328. 
707 See, for instance, Alastair Iain Johnston, “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range 
Theorizing and Beyond Europe,” International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 1021. 
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Framework,” International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 812. 
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As far as emulation is concerned, Waltz conceded that, along with praise (for 
conformation) and ridicule (for deviation), socialization – of strategies, not norms 
(Waltz is a realist, after all) – may occur through emulation.713 In this case, which 
can also be referred to as mimesis, or imitation, actors adopt certain norms because 
“good” actors have adopted them. Later on, these norms may become taken-for-
granted habits.714 Imitation is a recurrent theme in the constructivist literature on 
norms. Florini has argued that “prominent” norms, which are norms held by states 
widely viewed as successful and desirable models, are likely to become 
widespread.715 Finnemore and Sikkink consider imitation one of the most important 
mechanism of socialization during the norm cascade.716  
 
The hypotheses deriving from international constructivism are the following: the UK 
has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object 
of social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus 
Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations, which both value political 
conditionality more than the groups of states whom France belongs to (such as the 
OIF). 
 
6.4. Liberalism 
 
Unlike realism and international constructivism (and against long-lasting 
assumptions dismissing the influence of political accountability on foreign policy 
decisions),717 liberalism proposes that states are ‘autistic’ (that is, they badly relate 
with the material and social international environment), and their foreign policies are 
therefore mainly determined by the interests of dominant domestic actors.718 For 
                                                 
713 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 75–76. 
714 For some examples, see Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, “World Politics and Organizational 
Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance,” European Journal of International 
Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 728. 
715 Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3 
(1996): 363–89. 
716 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
717 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: MacMillan, 1922); Gabriel Almond, The American 
People and Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1950). 
718 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 04 (1997): 513–53. The version of liberalism proposed by 
Moravcsik is different from the strand of research which goes under the name of “neo-liberalism”. 
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liberals, foreign policy decision-makers are not outward-looking: they are neither 
concerned about what other foreign actors can do against them (as realists assert) nor 
preoccupied about what other foreign actors think of them (as international 
constructivists suggest). Rather, they are inward-looking: they are worried about 
their own survival as incumbent politicians.719 As a consequence, their foreign policy 
decisions are mainly influenced by powerful domestic political constituencies.720  
 
Dismissing the assumption that sees states as unitary actors, liberal researchers 
explain foreign policy decisions by assessing the preferences of domestic political 
actors, such as voters, interest groups, businesses, political parties, bureaucrats, etc., 
and exploring which actors are likely to dominate the decision-making process. The 
interests of these actors will be reflected in the state’s foreign policy.721 In the case of 
human rights, for instance, a special role has been recognised for domestic civil 
society organizations. Independent activists with prominent transnational 
connections act as “nodes for an increasingly transnational process of normative 
transformation that is reshaping notions of political legitimacy and national identity – 
and, through these, national foreign policies”.722  
 
In recent years, domestic politics have been recognised to play an important role in 
aid decision-making as well.723 The academic literature on development assistance 
                                                                                                                                          
For an example of neo-liberal work, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). Since 
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Press, 2005), 7. 
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723 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “A Political Economy of Aid,” International 
Organization 63, no. 2 (2009): 309–40; Erik Lundsgaarde, The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid 
(London: Routledge, 2013). See also the literature review contained in Dustin Tingley, “Donors and 
Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid Effort,” The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance 50, no. 1 (2010): 40–49. 
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has shown that aid allocation can be influenced by national media,724 political 
parties,725 government leaders,726 civil society organizations,727 business actors,728 
parliamentary committees,729 Diaspora groups,730 the quality of domestic 
institutions731 and the strength of welfare policies.732 Ruttan provided what is 
considered to be the most comprehensive and authoritative study of the domestic 
sources of foreign aid. His detailed analysis of the actors, issues, and processes 
involved in the evolution of U.S. aid policies is based upon the premise that 
“domestic sources have been more important in determining the size and direction of 
assistance than has the international economic and political environment”.733 
Europeanization researchers confirm the potential validity of a “domestic politics” 
hypothesis. According to Bretherton, recent shifts in attitudes towards closer or 
looser European coordination “indicate the importance of internal changes within the 
Member states, which can promote or impede progress toward Europeanization”. 
 
The specific issue of aid sanctions is no exception to the influence of domestic-level 
factors. According to Vanheukelom, “domestic considerations in donor countries (the 
pressures from public opinion, or special interest groups, etc.) influence decisions 
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and assessments”.734 Several scholars have emphasized the fact that bilateral donors 
are more willing to apply conditionality because of domestic constraints from which 
multilateral donors are exempted.735 The core of the argument seems to be the 
following: higher domestic accountability means higher internalisation of political 
conditionality. The case of Rwanda is informative in this respect. Hayman reported 
that one donor representative said that “political concerns only came into the 
equation when they affected the bigger picture of donor attention, such as the MDGs, 
or if they triggered domestic pressure in the donor country”.736 Zorbas confirmed that 
the diplomats and aid officials whom she interviewed insisted that their support to 
Rwanda was not unconditional, for one simple reason: “We are accountable to our 
Parliament and to our public. Our assistance is based on a shared set of principles: 
democracy, respect for human rights, aid being channelled to the poorest”.737 
 
The recognition of the validity of these insights has led researchers to focus on the 
role of specific actors. Barratt concentrates on the media industry: “states will 
become especially sensitive to their obligation to protect these rights elsewhere when 
violations are widely publicized”.738 Faust, Leiderer and Schmitt focused on political 
parties: “when more conservative governments came to power in countries including 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010, 
these newly elected governments soon began to assign more importance to political 
conditionality and the democracy objectives of the instrument”.739 The idea that 
right-wing governments are more willing to apply conditionality is confirmed by 
quantitative studies as well.740 A potential explanation is that conservative 
governments tend to be more active in foreign policy and less willing to disburse aid 
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to autocratic regimes that implement pro-poor policies.741 The influence of powerful 
parliamentary commissions was also explored.742  
 
Human rights NGOs played the role of the usual suspects. Spence argued that 
“NGOs often publicly criticize or shame policymakers for supplying aid to 
governments that commit human rights abuses. This criticism matters for 
policymakers because it can strengthen domestic opponents of the foreign aid 
programme and may even jeopardise the political survival of elected officials”.743 
Baehr offers the specific example of the relationship between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia. The Dutch government faced considerable pressure from domestic human 
rights organisations prior to its decision to impose sanctions on Indonesia. Groups 
such as the non-governmental Indonesia Committee published up-to-date reports of 
the regime’s human rights violations and lobbied policymakers in favour of 
sanctions.744 Similarly, Apodaca suggests that the Carter administration’s decision to 
link aid policy to human rights was due in part to the lobbying efforts of NGOs. 
These groups encouraged the administration to use sanctions to punish human rights 
abusers and were supported in their efforts by a broad coalition in Congress which 
included legislators who sought to promote human rights abroad as well those who 
were more interested in reducing overall levels of foreign aid spending.745 
 
In sum, the hypothesis offered by the liberal tradition is that the more aid policy-
makers are accountable to the Parliament, to human rights NGOs and to the general 
public for their decisions, the more they can be expected to adopt and internalize the 
norm of political conditionality. Western politicians are well aware that aid sanctions 
represent not only an instrument to press for political reform in recipient countries, 
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but also a device to avoid complicity with human rights abuses and dissipation of 
taxpayers’ money into the hands of repressive regimes.746 
 
In terms of the specific mechanisms through which norm internalisation can take 
place, the previous section showed that international constructivism focuses on 
persuasion and/or imitation. The liberal hypothesis is based on the third micro-
process: instrumental adaptation. Under the logic of consequences, political actors 
with fixed goals and interests purposefully adapt to incentives and constraints. When 
this logic operates alone, there can be no normative change or strengthening: actors 
know what they want and interaction does not influence their preferences.747 
However, decision-makers “may end up ‘buying into’ their own rhetoric”.748 Checkel 
offers the following example:  
 
[C]onsider individuals who, for purely strategic, incentive-based reasons, begin 
to act in a certain manner; at some point, they will likely need to justify these 
acts to themselves and others. As a result, a cognitive dissonance may arise 
between what is justified and argued for, and what is – secretly, privately – 
believed. Laboratory and experimental work suggests that human beings have a 
tendency to resolve such dissonance by adapting their preferences to the 
behaviour; that is, they internalize the justification.749  
 
Snyder named this process “blowback”;750 Risse called it “self-entrapment” in 
instrumental adaptation.751  
 
Incentives and constraints can be international, such as conditional trade agreements 
and punitive sanctions.752 Incentives and constraints can also be domestic. McElroy 
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suggests that “it is possible for domestic groups to mobilize around an international 
moral norm and thereby put pressure on a president or Congress to change American 
foreign policy.... The desire of presidents and congressional representatives for re-
election and popularity creates a ‘pathway’ from international moral norms to norm-
observant state behaviour”.753  
 
The hypothesis deriving from liberalism is the following: the UK has internalized 
human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are 
under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts.  
 
6.5. Sociological institutionalism 
 
At the end of the 1970s a group of researchers at Stanford University began to argue 
that, in contrast with the Weberian view of bureaucracies as the epitome of 
rationality and technicality, many of the institutional forms and procedures used by 
contemporary organizations have not been adopted because they are most functional 
and efficient for the performance of the assigned task, but because they are 
transmitted from the West to the rest of the world as culturally-bound practices (akin 
to rituals and ceremonies of pre-modern societies). The main piece of evidence in 
support of this argument was that bureaucratic organizations had spread even more 
quickly than the markets and technology that were supposed to have triggered the 
need for them.754 This powerful insight generated a strand of research, known as new 
institutionalism or sociological institutionalism, which emphasized the role of culture 
in explaining the behaviour of large organizations.755  
 
While sociological institutionalism was initially interested in explaining 
isomorphism (the similar features of large organizations in different parts of the 
                                                 
753 Robert W McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International 
Affairs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 45–46. 
754 The first outputs of the research group gravitating around John W. Meyer were the following: John 
W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–63; John W. Meyer and W. Richard 
Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE, 1985). 
755 For a good discussion of the foundations of this research tradition, see Paul J. DiMaggio and 
Walter W. Powell, “Introduction,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Paul J. 
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1–41. 
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world),756 those working on international relations exploited this research tradition to 
explore the puzzling differences between similar organizations in similar 
countries.757 The first studies focused on the armed forces. The conventional view of 
militaries, as found in Allison’s and Posen’s works, is that similar units within the 
context of similar structure should exhibit similar behaviour.758 Numerous scholars 
have challenged this view by using cultural variation as the most important 
explanatory variable.  
 
Jeffrey W. Legro, for example, has shown that “organizational cultures” usually 
mediate between international norms and state policy preferences.759 During World 
War II, warring factions ignored the submarine warfare restrictions almost 
immediately, respected strategic bombing rules for months and then violated them, 
but upheld limitations on chemical weapons, despite expectations and preparations, 
throughout the war. Why were some norms apparently influential and not others? 
According to Legro, “the dominant beliefs in military organizations about the 
appropriate ways to right wars shaped how soldiers thought about and prepared for 
war, which in turn shaped the varying impact of norms on state aims”.760 Applied to 
military bureaucracies, 
 
an organizational culture perspective highlights how government agencies 
tasked with vague formal purposes (“provide security”) concentrate on modes 
of warfare that subsequently condition organizational thinking and behaviour. 
                                                 
756 See, for instance, J. Boli, F. O Ramirez, and J. W Meyer, “Explaining the Origins and Expansion of 
Mass Education,” Comparative Education Review 29, no. 2 (1985): 145–70. New institutionalists 
have produced studies of isomorphism in a wide range of sectors, from social welfare and organised 
violence: George M. Thomas and Pat Lauderdale, “World Polity Sources of National Welfare and 
Land Reform,” in Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual, ed. George 
M. Thomas et al. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987); Daniel P. Eyre and Malcolm M. Suchman, 
“Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” 
in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 79–113. 
757 For a general introduction to the first works in this strand of research, see Peter A. Hall and 
Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms*,” Political Studies 
44, no. 5 (1996): 936–57; Theo Farrell, “Figuring out Fighting Organisations: The New 
Organisational Analysis in Strategic Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 1 (1996): 122–35. 
758 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
2nd ed. (Longman, 1999); Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
759 Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Cornell 
University Press, 1995). 
760 Jeffrey Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the‘ Failure’ of Internationalism,” International 
Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 32. 
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Their dominant way of war tends to become such a locus of activity that, in 
effect, means become ends. Culture shapes how organizations understand their 
environment.761 
 
Numerous researchers have followed Legro’s footstep.762 Elizabeth Kier, for 
instance, examined the doctrinal developments in the two countries analyzed in this 
dissertation, France and the UK, and used a cultural approach to take issue with the 
conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive 
doctrines.763 Barnett and Finnemore concentrated on the role of international 
organizations, such as the IMF (but with arguments that can be transposed to the 
EU), in diffusing ideologies, norms and appropriate standards of behaviour.764 
 
The IR tradition of sociological institutionalism recently received new lifeblood as a 
number of scholars have called for greater use of ethnographic methods.765 While 
feminist scholars have been at the forefront of this trend,766 social constructivists 
have quickly adopted the new methodology. Iver Neumann, for example, focused on 
the experience of being a diplomat.767  
 
The adoption of an ethnographic methodology has also been used to study the human 
rights and development field. Mertus surveyed around eighty mid-level soldiers from 
all of the U.S. armed forces in order to gauge their attitude toward the protection of 
                                                 
761 Ibid., 36. 
762 See, for instance, Terry Terriff, “‘Innovate or Die’: Organizational Culture and the Origins of 
Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (2006): 
475–503. 
763 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
764 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in 
Global Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
765 A lively debate is taking place on the challenges and opportunities of a potential “ethnographic 
turn” in IR: Wanda Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 279–301; Lisa Wedeen, “Reflections 
on Ethnographic Work in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2010): 
255–72; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Can Ethnographic Techniques Tell Us Distinctive Things About 
World Politics?,” International Political Sociology 2, no. 1 (2008): 91–93; Jason P. Rancatore, “It Is 
Strange: A Reply to Vrasti,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 65–77. 
766 Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Signs 12, no. 4 
(1987): 687–718; Cynthia H. Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s 
Lives (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000). 
767 Iver B. Neumann, “To Be a Diplomat,” International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 1 (2005): 72–93; 
Iver B. Neumann, “‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,’ or: Why Diplomats Never 
Produce Anything New,” International Political Sociology 1, no. 2 (2007): 183–200. 
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human rights.768 Van Gastel and Nuijten analyzed the workings of the Dutch 
Ministry of Development Cooperation to reconstruct the processes of policy 
formulation around the idea of “good governance”.769 The most interesting piece of 
research for this dissertation is Galit Sarfaty’s ethnography of the World Bank and 
the resistance against the adoption of a human rights policy.770 
 
Sarfaty showed that organizational culture represents one of the main obstacles to the 
integration of human rights into the World Bank. Extensive ethnographic research 
brought to surface a dominant subculture of economists, normatively and practically 
reluctant to integrate political and/or legal conceptions into the Bank’s operations. 
The general conclusion is that “the ways norms become adopted and ultimately 
internalized in an institution largely depend on their fit with the organizational 
culture”.771 
 
The hypothesis deriving from sociological institutionalism is the following: the UK 
has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France 
because the organizational culture of DfID presents a better fit than the 
organizations cultures of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French 
Development Agency. 
 
  
                                                 
768 Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
769 Jilles van Gastel and Monique Nuijten, “The Genealogy of the ‘Good Governance’ and 
‘Ownership’ Agenda at the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation,” in The Aid Effect: Giving 
and Governing in International Development, ed. David Mosse and David Lewis (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), 85–105. See also David Mosse, “Global Governance and the Ethnography of 
International Aid,” in The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development, ed. David 
Mosse and David Lewis (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 1–36; Gerhard Anders, “Good Governance as 
Technology: Towards an Ethnography of the Bretton Woods Institutions,” in The Aid Effect: Giving 
and Governing in International Development, ed. David Mosse and David Lewis (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), 37–60. 
770 Galit Sarfaty, Values in Translation: Human Rights and the Culture of the World Bank (Stanford 
University Press, 2012). Another interesting work on the organizational culture of the World Bank is 
Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, and Catherine E. Weaver, “Bridging the Rationalist-
Constructivist Divide: Re-Engineering the Culture of the World Bank,” Journal of International 
Relations and Development 9, no. 2 (2006): 107–39. Specifically on international financial 
institutions, culture and conditionality, see Bessma Momani, “Limits on Streamlining Fund 
Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund’s Organizational Culture,” Journal of International 
Relations and Development 8, no. 2 (2005): 142–63. 
771 Galit A. Sarfaty, “Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human 
Rights at the World Bank,” The American Journal of International Law 103, no. 4 (2009): 649. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
 
The first section of this chapter justified the decision to adopt an “analytic eclectic” 
framework in answering the following question: which hypotheses can explain 
variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the 
UK? Analytic eclecticism is best positioned to address complex issues like aid 
decision-making and human rights internalisation. In addition, it has already been 
applied by researchers working on both Europeanization and comparative foreign 
policy. 
 
The remaining part of the chapter presented four different hypotheses that can 
explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France 
and the UK. A realist perspective leads to expect that the UK has internalized human 
rights to a larger extent than France (1) because traditional recipients of British aid 
are better human rights performers than traditional recipients of French aid, and/or 
(2) because the application of political conditionality could be used by British 
decision-makers to mask the pursuit of strategic interests in specific countries. 
International constructivist scholars would suggest that the UK has internalized 
human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of social pressure 
(through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the 
Commonwealth of Nations, which both value political conditionality more than the 
groups of states which France belongs to (such as the OIF). According to the version 
of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have internalized human rights 
to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are under stricter 
domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. If one follows the most recent 
research in sociological institutionalism, the expectation is that the UK has 
internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France 
because the organizational culture of DfID presents a better fit than the 
organizational culture of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French 
Development Agency. 
 
It is the purpose of the next chapter to test the validity of these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FRANCE AND BRITAIN: EXPLAINING VARIATION 
 
The previous chapter introduced four different hypotheses to explain variation in the 
degree of internalisation of political conditionality between France and the UK. In 
brief, a realist would expect variation to be the consequence of different military and 
economic interests. The British façade of deeper internalisation is just an ex-post 
rationalisation of the fact that aid recipients suggested by its strategic concerns are 
better human rights performers, and/or of the fact that aid sanctions actually further 
material objectives. According to international constructivism, variation exists 
because France and the UK belong to groups of states which attach different 
importance to political conditionality. Paris and London are therefore objects of 
different social pressures at the international level. The groups considered to be 
relevant are the Nordic Plus Group, to which only the UK belongs, and/or the 
Commonwealth of Nations, in comparison with the OIF. A liberal à la Moravcsik 
would explain variation between France and the UK by reference to different levels 
of accountability at the domestic level. British policy-makers have internalized 
political conditionality to a larger degree than their French counterparts because their 
aid decisions are subject to higher domestic scrutiny. From the perspective of 
sociological institutionalism, variation exists because, notwithstanding performing 
similar functions, DfID, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AFD present 
different organisational cultures. In particular, DfID’s organisational culture is 
expected to offer a better fit to political conditionality than that in French institutions.  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to test these hypotheses. Each section, from section 1 
to section 4, assesses whether supporting evidence is strong enough not to falsify 
them. Section 5 suggests the inclusion of an additional explanatory factor. The 
sections are based on semi-structured interviews with more than 100 individuals who 
are working or have worked for French and British institutions, and who are working 
or have worked for other donors or for development/human rights NGOs.772 The 
validity of most of the information suggested by the interviewees has been 
corroborated through the examination of publicly available documents from French 
                                                 
772 When potential interviewees were not available in person or by phone, a standard questionnaire 
was sent by email. 
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and British institutions, and the analysis of secondary literature on the activities of 
DfID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and AFD.  
 
Importantly, given the interest of the dissertation in exploring internalisation of 
political conditionality at the general level (that is, not only on the ground but also in 
the capitals), the chapter mainly but not only refers to the four case studies analyzed 
in chapter 4. The analysis also builds on interviews with diplomats and officials in 
Paris and London, as well as with a few individuals working in other recipient 
countries and/or for other donors. 
 
7.1. Realism 
 
The realist hypothesis is unambiguous and parsimonious. However, it is not 
convincing to explain variation between France and the UK. It is the UK, not France, 
that delivers the larger part of its assistance within countries with repressive regimes, 
and should therefore be expected to be more reluctant to embrace political 
conditionality. Norm internalisation cannot be an ex-post rationalization of material 
interests. 
 
Table 3 displays the country ratings of the top 15 and top 30 recipients of British and 
French aid from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World surveys between 2000 and 
2011. Freedom in the World is an annual report on political rights and civil liberties 
that includes numerical ratings for each country in the world. A country is assigned 
two ratings (1 to 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the 
smallest degree of freedom), one for political rights and one for civil liberties. The 
ratings are based on 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. The 
political rights indicators are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process; 
Political Pluralism and Participation; and Functioning of Government. The civil 
liberties indicators are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and 
Belief; Associational and Organisational Rights; Rule of Law; and Personal 
Autonomy and Individual Rights.773 
                                                 
773 For a general introduction, see Raymond D. Gastil, “The Comparative Survey of Freedom: 
Experiences and Suggestions,” Studies In Comparative International Development 25, no. 1 (1990): 
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One of the main criticism of the Freedom House ratings is that the scores are based 
on strong Western assumptions: the starting point of the analysis is that freedom for 
all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies.774 However, country 
rankings from the Freedom in the World report have regularly been used in the 
academic literature on aid and human rights.775 The main justification is that this 
interpretation of freedom resonates well with the human rights norms promoted by 
donor countries. As such, it can safely be assumed that the scores of the report 
adequately reflect the understanding of the situation on the ground by Western 
diplomats and aid officials. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation, one of the 
most authoritative performance-based Western aid organisations, has even formally 
included Freedom House’s indicators among those measures that are used to assess 
the human rights and democracy record of potential recipient countries.776  
 
Table 3. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid  
on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom in the World Survey) 2000-2011 
 
United Kingdom France 
Recipient Average score 
2000-2011 
Recipient Average score 
2000-2011 
Nigeria 4,17 Morocco 4,63 
India 2,5 Cote d'Ivoire 5,79 
Iraq 6,08 Nigeria 4,17 
Tanzania 3,5 Cameroon 6,04 
Bangladesh 3,83 Congo, Rep. 5,13 
Afghanistan 5,83 DRC 5,96 
Ethiopia 5,17 Tunisia 5,5 
                                                                                                                                          
25–50. The up-to-date methodology can be found at the following website: “Freedom in the World 
2014: Methodology,” Freedom House, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2014/methodology. 
774 Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy,” 
Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 1 (2000): 77. For a more elaborate discussion, see Diego 
Giannone, “Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of Democracy: The Freedom House 
Case,” Democratization 17, no. 1 (2010): 68–97. 
775 See, for instance, Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” Economics & Politics 11, no. 3 
(1999): 280; Eric Neumayer, “Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral 
and Multilateral Aid Flows,” Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2003): 651. 
776 “Selection Indicators,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2011, 
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicators. 
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Pakistan 5,17 Senegal 2,83 
Ghana 1,83 China 6,5 
Uganda 4,71 Iraq 6,08 
DRC 5,96 Egypt 5,63 
Sudan 7 Vietnam 6,21 
China 6,5 Algeria 5,5 
Malawi 3,67 Madagascar 3,67 
Zambia 3,79 Indonesia 2,92 
South Africa 1,75 Lebanon 4,83 
Kenya 3,75 Turkey 3,33 
Mozambique 3,42 Kenya 3,75 
Rwanda 5,71 Mali 2,33 
Sierra Leone 3,5 Burkina Faso 4,04 
Serbia 2,25 Gabon 4,92 
Nepal 4,25 Niger 3,71 
Zimbabwe 6,17 Mexico 2,42 
Vietnam 6,21 Pakistan 5,17 
Indonesia 2,92 South Africa 1,75 
Somalia 6,75 Mozambique 3,42 
Cameroon 6,04 Guinea 5,54 
Yemen 5,33 Mauritius 1,42 
Myanmar 6,96 Brazil 2,29 
Cambodia 5,54 Ghana 1,83 
Average Top15 4,65 Average Top15 5,10 
Average Top30 4,68 Average Top30 4,24 
 
Source: Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data  
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world) 
 
Table 4 displays the Political Terror Scale (PTS) scores of the top 15 and top 30 
recipients of British and French aid between 2001 and 2011. If Freedom House’s 
report concentrates on civil and political rights, the PTS focuses on measuring 
physical integrity rights violations. The PTS measures the levels of political violence 
and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror 
scale” (1 being the best score – low levels of political violence – and 5 being the 
worst score – high levels of political violence). The data used in compiling the PTS 
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comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty 
International and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices.777 
 
The PTS is an appropriate measure to assess donors’ perceptions of political violence 
in recipient countries because coders are expressly instructed that, even thought they 
should not turn a blind eye towards violence by non-state actors, their primary goal is 
to measure levels of violence by the State. As explained by Wood and Gibney (the 
managers of the PTS), the index “focuses on state behaviour. As such, domestic 
(family) or societal (mob, clan) violence, which are of epidemic proportions in many 
countries, are not included in a country’s annual score”.778 For example, female 
genital mutilation remains an enormous problem in a number of countries in the 
world. Although this is “violence”, it is not the kind of violence that is captured by 
the PTS.  
 
Table 4. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid  
on personal integrity rights (Political Terror Scale) 2000-2011 
 
United Kingdom France 
Recipient Average score 
2000-2011 
Recipient Average score 
2000-2011 
Nigeria 3,88 Morocco 2,71 
India 3,88 Cote d'Ivoire 3,79 
Iraq 4,75 Nigeria 3,88 
Tanzania 2,63 Cameroon 3,25 
Bangladesh 3,75 Congo, Rep. 2,87 
Afghanistan 4,79 DRC 4,83 
Ethiopia 3,71 Tunisia 2,83 
Pakistan 4,13 Senegal 2,48 
Ghana 2,52 China 4,00 
Uganda 3,79 Iraq 4,75 
DRC 4,83 Egypt 3,58 
                                                 
777 For a general introduction, see Mark Gibney and Matthew Dalton, “The Political Terror Scale,” 
Policy Studies and Developing Nations 4, no. 1 (1996): 73–84. 
778 Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a 
Comparison to CIRI,” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2010): 370. 
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Sudan 4,96 Vietnam 2,67 
China 4,00 Algeria 3,71 
Malawi 2,54 Madagascar 2,50 
Zambia 2,95 Indonesia 3,54 
South Africa 3,08 Lebanon 2,92 
Kenya 3,42 Turkey 3,42 
Mozambique 2,96 Kenya 3,42 
Rwanda 3,13 Mali 1,79 
Sierra Leone 2,79 Burkina Faso 2,33 
Serbia 2,00 Gabon 2,42 
Nepal 4,13 Niger 2,54 
Zimbabwe 3,75 Mexico 3,33 
Vietnam 2,67 Pakistan 4,13 
Indonesia 3,54 South Africa 3,08 
Somalia 4,33 Mozambique 2,96 
Cameroon 3,25 Guinea 3,17 
Yemen 3,73 Mauritius 1,79 
Myanmar 4,29 Brazil 3,92 
Cambodia 2,96 Ghana 2,52 
Average Top15 3,81 Average Top15 3,43 
Average Top30 3,57 Average Top30 3,17 
 
Source: Political Terror Scale Ratings  
(http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/download.php) 
 
As can be seen from Table 3 and Table 4, recipients of British aid generally present 
higher scores than recipients of French aid, according to both the Freedom in the 
World surveys and the Political Terror Scale. This means that recipients of British 
aid are worse human rights performers than recipients of French aid.779 The realist 
hypothesis is seriously hampered: there is no material justification for British 
decision-makers to pay lip service to political conditionality and pretend consistent 
application of aid sanctions. 
                                                 
779 This statement may seem in contradiction with the general argument of the thesis. However, it has 
to be remembered that the list of top recipients does not take into account the way in which aid is 
disbursed (for instance, through NGO channels when the recipient country has a repressive 
government). The list is used only to give a rough indication of favourite recipients.  
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The results of this simple test are also in line with the findings of almost all past 
statistical studies.780 Past quantitative analysis shows that France has applied political 
conditionality to a smaller extent than the UK, even if one controls for economic, 
strategic and post-colonial interests. In other words, France has applied political 
conditionality to a smaller extent than the UK even if one eliminates the confounding 
effects of the (independent) human rights performance of those recipients which 
would be suggested by their economic, military or neo-colonial interests. As Alesina 
and Dollar clarify regarding colonial past (with a reasoning which is valid for all 
other variables, including strategic and economic ones) 
 
Democracy is an area in which there are clear differences among major donors. 
The strongest positive response to democratic institutions is for the U.S., the 
Dutch, the U.K., the Nordics, and Canada. Of the major donors, France is the 
one that seems to pay no attention to the democracy of the receiving country, 
while Germany and Japan put a small weight on this factor. Once again, these 
results are obtained holding “colonial past” constant. Therefore they cannot be 
explained by the fact that different colonizers have more or less democratic 
regimes in former colonies.781  
 
A close analysis of the case studies described in Chapter 5 confirms the weaknesses 
of the realist hypothesis. To being with, the UK was among the most assertive 
supporters of aid sanctions in Zimbabwe. Can this attitude be explained by reference 
to strategic interests? President Mugabe has claimed time and again that the hidden 
objective of British sanctions is to protect the interests of the minority of white 
farmers present in Zimbabwe. For instance, after the adoption of EU sanctions in 
2002, the government-controlled Herald newspaper published a lengthy ‘opinion’ 
piece arguing that Britain wanted “to maintain [its] stranglehold on Harare”. The 
newspaper continued as follows: 
 
The imperial intentions began to manifest themselves when the Government [of 
Zimbabwe] decided to embark on a fast track land resettlement programme. … 
                                                 
780 See the first section of Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of these findings. 
781 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000): 49. 
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In order to safeguard the interests of their kith and kin in the country, the British 
and Scandinavian countries rallied behind the formation of the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change. Their intention was to install a puppet 
government willing to bend to their colonial designs and adventures ... It is not 
surprising to note that Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Nigeria and 
South Africa have all refused to succumb to bullying tactics by Britain because 
they are all aware of its hidden agenda to topple the present Zimbabwean 
government.782 
 
Interviewees recognized that the UK had material interests in the country. However, 
they also emphasized two aspects that show that a realist explanation of British 
actions in Zimbabwe offers, at best, a partial interpretation of the events, and that 
principles and norms played a role in British decision-making.783 First, there was 
general consensus among international NGOs and Western donors that violations of 
human rights and democratic principles warranted international reaction. Amnesty 
International, for example, explicitly stated that it was “concerned at the widespread 
human rights violations carried out against dozens of commercial farmers and 
thousands of farm labourers in the context of redistribution of land in Zimbabwe”, 
and that “government trucks donated by foreign donors were used to transport the 
abducted victims”.784 As shown in Chapter 5, all “like-minded” donors (including 
Sweden and Denmark) applied sanctions in coordination with Britain.  
 
In addition, British behaviour has to be interpreted within the broader orientation of 
New Labour’s foreign policy. For instance, Taylor and Williams acknowledge that 
“since Zimbabwe’s independence, Britain has traditionally been protective of white 
farming interests and insisted on a land reform policy based on market mechanisms 
and the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle”. However, “from 1997 Britain’s 
involvement in Zimbabwe’s crisis needs to be understood within the context of New 
Labour’s efforts to promote its version of the ‘third way’ in Africa”, which meant 
that “it has encouraged adherence to the accepted tenets of contemporary 
development discourse, namely good governance, human rights and sound … 
                                                 
782 Quoted in Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, “Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-
Imperialism,” Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 101 (2004): 387. 
783 Interview 84; interview 85; interview 92. 
784 Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: The Toll of Impunity, June 2002, Chapter 2. 
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economic policies”.785 Julia Gallagher clarified that for Blair, Africa was a “noble 
cause” and “the commitment of his country had a moral purpose”. For most British 
decision-makers, “Mugabe is only a crazy dictator. They do not conceive Zimbabwe 
– and Africa in general – as a place where political logics clash one against the 
other”. In other words, Zimbabwe is a place where norms apply, not interests.786 
Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppänen confirm, in the clearest possible formulation, that 
“while the UK had a larger concentration of interests in Zimbabwe than any other 
EU Member State, its approach did not stem from those interests but rather from 
principles and values of the Cotonou Agreement. The British business in the country, 
for instance, has not benefited from the ‘smart sanction’”.787  
 
Anyway, the most important piece of evidence against a realist explanation of the 
different behaviour by Paris and London in Zimbabwe revolves around French 
actions. As already highlighted in Chapter 5, the EU found it difficult to express a 
common position against Mugabe because some countries, including France and 
Belgium, resisted the quick imposition of sanctions. Some researchers were puzzled 
by the actions of France, which became one of the largest creditors to Zimbabwe: 
“Zimbabwe, however, is not a priority for France, which does not have important 
economic interests there. Yet, France wants to have better bilateral relations with 
Zimbabwe than the EU has. This is not well understood by the other Member States 
and appears as poor coordination”.788 The International Crisis Group reports that the 
official reason given for the French position “was that the EU should tread softly 
while there was still a decent chance of negotiating deployment of its election 
observers. A more sceptical interpretation was that the French and Belgians, with 
their particular interests in the Congo, did not wish to antagonize Mugabe because 
his support was important for the Kabila government in Kinshasa”.789 Some critics 
also suggested that France’s significant new commercial deals with Zimbabwe, such 
                                                 
785 Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, “The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in 
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as the lease of aircraft to Air Zimbabwe, were not unrelated to the soft stance 
adopted by French institutions.790 
 
In sum, the modest interests of “better relations with” and “not antagonizing” 
Mugabe were sufficient for France to resist the application of sanctions. On the 
opposite, the strong interests of protecting white farmers and avoiding the economic 
collapse of one of its most successful former colonies were not sufficient for the UK 
to avoid pushing for the application of sanctions. There is evidently something that a 
realist explanation is missing. 
 
A strong case against the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis is offered by 
Mozambique too. In 2010, the Economist wrote that,  
 
At the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique was arguably the world’s 
poorest country. Its transport, education and health systems were in ruins. Many 
Mozambicans with marketable skills had fled. But now its economy is one of 
the fastest-growing in the world. In the past 15 years it has swelled by an 
average of 8% a year, … with nearly 7% expected this year, well above the 4% 
the World Bank forecast for southern Africa as a whole.791  
 
New discoveries in natural resources, in particular coal and gas, are driving the boom 
of the Mozambican economy.792  
 
Donors are well aware of the economic potential of Mozambique. Political 
commentators argue that “the natural gas bounty, coupled with the country’s massive 
coal deposits, are set to transform the previously impoverished nation, and the 
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region, in ways few can predict”.793 However, it is certain that “the reduction of aid 
dependence and the geopolitical changes associated to the mining boom pose new 
challenges to the Government, as much as to Mozambique’s development and 
commercial partners”.794 
 
If Mozambique has become an interesting market for its commercial partners, this is 
equally true for France and the UK. France, for example, was directly involved in the 
EMATUM case. One of the arrangers of EMATUM’s seven-year, $500 million 
Eurobond was French bank BNP Paribas.795 The money raised with the bond was 
used to finance a €200 million deal with Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie 
(CMN), a French shipbuilder.796 The contract has provided two years of work for 
around 400 French employees.797 Moreover, the patrol ships built by CMN need 
naval guns and other military equipment, and so there have been also negotiations 
about buying the needed weaponry from France.798  
 
In addition to direct economic advantages, the EMATUM deal was viewed “as 
revealing French interest in Mozambican natural resources and in consolidating its 
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influence in Africa”.799 That the boats deal came during Guebuza’s state visit to 
France has prompted political commentators to speculate that 
 
higher-level strategic concerns are involved, possibly regarding the long-term 
protection of Mozambique’s gigantic offshore hydrocarbon assets in the 
Rovuma field. France has a number of overseas territories in the Indian Ocean, 
including Réunion and Mayotte, and some in the Mozambique channel in the 
vicinity of the Rovuma basin. … Analysts have said that the area could hold 
huge, untapped potential for oil and gas. It would be a logical step for France to 
offer to extend to Mozambique the protection it gives its own strategic assets in 
the region, especially if it involves lucrative deals for French shipbuilders and 
secures dockside jobs at home.800 
 
In September 2013 South Africa, Mozambique and France conducted a joint anti-
piracy in the Mozambique Channel, based out of the Port of Maputo.801 
 
If France has showed growing interest in Mozambican economy, the UK did not 
stand idly by. Exactly during the months of the donor strike, British-Australian Rio 
Tinto “ha[d] been buying up a lot of assets in Mozambique, and they stand to be one 
of the significant beneficiaries there”.802 In July 2011 Rio Tinto completed the 
takeover of Sydney-based Riversdale Mining for an impressive $3.4 billion and 
added 25 million tons of Mozambican coal to its annual output.803 The result was that 
in 2013, at the time of the EMATUM case, Rio Tinto was the second-biggest mining 
company operating in the Tete region after the Brazilian Vale de Rio Doce (Vale). 
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Rio Tinto held “mining concessions of 290 000 hectares for the Benga and Zambezi 
projects. These two sites are estimated to hold 4 billion and 9 billion tonnes of coal 
reserves respectively, and might oblige Rio Tinto to relocate the current provincial 
airport”.804  
 
The UK has commercial and investment interests not only in the coal industry. Just 
to offer another example, in 2010 British multinational British Petroleum (BP) 
decided to pull out of five countries in Southern Africa (namely, Namibia, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana) but still invested to grow its market share in 
Mozambique and South Africa. BP Africa’s Chief Executive Sipho Maseko said that 
BP had significant operations Mozambique and that the country “offered better 
synergies with its supply portfolio”.805 
 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that neither France nor the UK is a former 
colonial power in Mozambique, and notwithstanding the fact that both countries have 
similar interests in exploiting the ongoing boom of the Mozambican economy, 
France adopted a soft stance during the donor strike, while the UK took the 
leadership of it. A realist hypothesis is of little help in explaining this situation. 
 
7.2. International constructivism 
 
Variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the 
UK is puzzling because of significant coordination and support in favour of the norm 
at the EU level, and related expectations of Europeanisation processes. However, 
France and the UK are subject to social pressures not only at the European level. A 
first hypothesis that can explain variation across the Channel is that the UK (and not 
France) has been “socialized” to give higher attention to human rights problems by 
Nordic countries. A second hypothesis revolves around the different social pressures 
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deriving from participation in the Commonwealth of Nations and the International 
Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) respectively. 
 
7.2.1. Nordic countries  
 
The credibility of an hypothesis of British “socialization” from Nordic countries is 
based on two elements. Nordic countries should have internalized political 
conditionality to a larger extent than other EU Member States. Moreover, the UK 
should have been more amenable than France to social pressure from the Nordic 
group. 
 
Regarding the first point, there is little doubt that the group of Nordic donors which 
includes Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden has always set the highest 
standards in terms of value-based development policies, including the integration of 
human rights into development programmes and the adoption of aid sanctions against 
repressive regimes.806 According to Selbervik, the Nordic countries “were among the 
pioneers in linking development aid and human rights”.807 Sweden made human 
rights one of the objectives of its development cooperation back in the 1970s.808 
Norway added respect for human rights to the list of criteria used to select 
development partners in 1976.809 Employing a dataset covering the period 1980 to 
1999 and as many as 91 recipient countries, Gates and Hoeffler found that “unlike 
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the average donor, Nordic donors allocate aid according to democracy and human 
rights records but not to political allies”.810  
 
Interviewees corroborate the fact that “in the case of the Nordic countries, respect for 
human rights is a paramount value. There is lower tolerance for any kind of abuse in 
comparison with other EU Member States”.811 The four case studies confirm that 
Nordic countries are very often among the hardliners against repressive regimes. 
Sweden was the first country to suspend budget support in Nicaragua and strongly 
argued in favour of aid sanctions against Mugabe at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Norway immediately suspended development cooperation after Rajoelina toppled 
Ravalomanana in Madagascar. Other cases offer additional evidence. Just to give two 
more examples, Denmark and the Netherlands have always been among the strongest 
supporters of sanctions against the Burmese regime.812 Sweden was among the 
hardliners after the 2005 elections in Ethiopia.813 
 
Regarding the second point, almost all interviewees validated the hypothesis that 
Nordic countries put lower social pressure on France than Britain. Regarding France, 
a former diplomat in numerous African countries highlighted the general 
unwillingness of France to coordinate and, above all, to “be coordinated” (which can 
be equated to “be persuaded”).814 A foreign diplomat in Antananarivo shared his 
surprise when the new French Ambassador in Madagascar, who arrived in the middle 
of the political crisis, showed no interest in knowing what other local diplomats 
thought about the crisis and how they would have reacted to the unilateral French 
decision to continue development assistance to Rajoelina.815 When asked about 
French development cooperation in their countries of competence, almost all 
development officers from Nordic countries confessed that they knew very little 
about the programmes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AFD.816 An aid 
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official emphasized that “it is very difficult to coordinate with the French. They are 
not too transparent about their activities, and when we discuss about political issues 
it seem that they come to listen rather than to talk”.817  
 
Loose cooperation between France and Nordic countries is confirmed by the 2006 
Donor Atlas published by the European Commission and the OECD. At that time, 
nine donors (including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and 
Sweden) claimed that their coordination with other EU Member States was “strong”. 
Italy, Portugal and Greece reported weak coordination, while France and Spain failed 
to respond to the question altogether.818 When these results were pointed at a Nordic 
diplomat commented: “You can see by yourself who coordinates more and who 
coordinates less among Member States”.819 
 
Lack of persuasion through close coordination is accompanied by limited chances for 
imitation. The French diplomats who have been interviewed have never 
demonstrated any deference to the Nordic approach. They talked about the Nordic 
Plus donors as “a group of donors who believe they are the best in class”.820 Even 
when they acknowledge that Nordic donors score better than anybody else in most 
rankings of aid quality,821 they differentiate France on the basis of the argument that 
“we are a much greater power, with larger interests. In the end, the only interest of 
Nordic countries is to be at the top of these rankings. It is not a fair comparison”.822 
In addition, AFD representatives often argued that “AFD is not a development 
agency like Sida and Norad”.823 Institutional differences therefore seem to further 
limit the possibility of imitation.824 According to Naudet, this attitude may also 
derive from scepticism regarding international norms. The priorities of French aid 
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“have been somewhat removed from the constantly changing international priorities 
... there is a widespread feeling of mistrust within the French system with regard to 
the new priorities ... these are sometimes considered as “fashions” which are likely to 
falter or disappear as new ideas emerge”.825  
 
Regarding the UK, almost all interviewees emphasized a good level of 
harmonization with Nordic countries. To start with, there is high resonance in terms 
of values and principles. A UK diplomat highlighted that, “even though the UK and 
the Nordics might disagree on the appropriate response to specific abuses, I always 
trust them to share our own values and objectives. This is why I pay attention to what 
they say”.826 A Nordic diplomat confessed that “sometimes we are worried by the 
way in which a large organisation like DfID works, and I can give you examples of 
situations when we thought that it operated too close with the government. However, 
I have never questioned their values. In that respect, we are very similar”.827  
 
According to a DfID official, similar values are not the only feature that makes UK-
Nordic harmonization easy. 
 
Between UK and Nordics, not only is there agreement on the principles of 
development programmes, there are also frequent high level meetings between 
the heads of the development aid departments from the countries involved. 
There are joint visits to countries receiving aid from Britain and the Nordics as 
well as joint programming in these countries.828 
 
In terms of joint programming and coordination, the Nordic Plus Group takes centre 
stage. The Group, which promotes the “Joint Action Plan of Effective Aid Delivery 
through Harmonisation and Alignment of Donor Practices”, has mainly concentrated 
on aid coordination and delegated cooperation.829 For instance, in Zambia the Nordic 
Plus countries developed a joint plan of action in 2003. The plan included joint 
programming and evaluation as well as the pooling of technical assistance. In 
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addition, it sets very specific targets to promote donor co-ordination at all levels, 
including in international fora.830 However, the Group has also covered human rights 
and conditionality. Human rights were perceived as a natural element for cooperation 
among the countries. In 2006, the seven countries carried out a joint assessment of 
policies and administrative practices in order to identify possible barriers for 
delegated cooperation among the Nordic Plus partners. One of the main findings was 
that “certain cross-cutting issues and themes are common to all the donors. These 
include Governance (Human Rights and Democratisation)”.831 The Nordic Plus 
Group also actively worked to harmonize (and thus reduce) the conditions in the 
programmes they supported.832  
 
Close coordination within the Nordic Plus group offers ample opportunities for both 
persuasion and imitation. As far as persuasion is concerned, Ingebritsen has already 
suggested that Scandinavian countries deliberately act as “norm entrepreneurs” in 
foreign aid: they have “consistently and actively sought to influence more powerful 
states in establishing and strengthening global norms of cooperation”.833 Herman 
spoke of the Netherlands as a gidsland, a “mentor state”.834 Dahl interpreted 
categorized Sweden as a “moral superpower”, a country that sees “itself as a natural 
role model in the international community” and takes “it upon itself to act as a guide 
to other actors in the system”.835 When introduced to these concepts, a diplomat from 
a Nordic country commented that “it is normal that we try to influence the behaviour 
of larger donors, especially those with which we often coordinate, such as DfID. We 
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are not large players in many countries, and combined action is necessary if we want 
to have an impact”.836  
 
The attempts of Nordic countries to persuade the UK to adopt joint sanctions make 
perfect sense from the perspective of small states.837 Small states do not possess 
numerous sources of influence over large organisations like the EU. However, 
sometimes they are able to punch above their weight. As recognized by Panke, 
“small states are neither per se political dwarfs nor power-brokers”.838 Two common 
mechanisms of influence help explain their behaviour in cases of political 
conditionality. First, small states often try to influence larger players by putting 
forward arguments that appeal to shared ideas, a strategy which Björkdahl referred to 
as “normative framing”.839 Jakobsen agrees that, in order to be successful, small 
States’ initiatives “should appeal to fundamental norms and values shared by EU 
Member States in order to maximize its appeal and make it difficult to reject”.840 
Second, small states need to cultivate “network capital”.841 According to 
Thorhallsson and Wivel, “when small states have succeeded in influencing EU 
policy, coalition-building has been decisive”.842 The UK is the ideal candidate for 
coalition-building with powerful actors on the basis of norms and values. 
 
As far as imitation is concerned, Lumsdaine already argued that “some countries, 
such as the Dutch and the Swedes, … consciously see their role in the aid process as 
one of seeking to set higher standards, to reform and correct the aid process by 
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example”.843 A UK diplomat confirmed that “if human rights violations take place, if 
a coup is staged, it is very likely that the first diplomat I would contact would be a 
Nordic diplomat”.844 A DfID representative commented that contacts with officials 
from Nordic development agencies are more “constructive” and “productive”, 
partnership with Nordic officials is “natural” and “obvious”.845  
 
British adoption of advanced policy documents on political conditionality is linked to 
emulation of Nordic countries as well.846 Interviews suggested that Nordic-UK 
synchronization goes back to the end of the 1990s, when the Ministers for 
Development Cooperation in the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the UK 
(Eveline Herfkens, Ms Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Clare Short and Hilde Johnson 
respectively) were all women.847 Named the ‘Utstein Group’, and later enlarged to 
Canada and Sweden, this forum assumed a coordinating function and a proactive role 
in the international donor community (in particular on poverty reduction, anti-
corruption and donor coherence).848 A former Nordic diplomat commented that, at 
the time of the creation of DfID, the affinity between Clare Short and the other 
Development Minister meant that the new-born British Department, eager to position 
itself as a leader in the development sector, recurrently looked at the policies of the 
Nordic countries to draw inspiration.849 
 
Even at the level of international arrangements, the UK found itself under pressure to 
mainstream the inclusion of human rights provisions. The Joint Financing 
Arrangement promoted by the Nordic Plus Group explicitly includes a human rights 
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cooperation”: Norad, Strengthening Nordic Development Cooperation in and with Afghanistan, Norad 
Report Discussion (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009), 5. 
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clause.850 The Nordic Plus Group also drafted a template for arrangements on 
delegated cooperation. This document reveals the important role played by other 
countries (in this case the Netherlands) in pressing for the inclusion of human rights 
clause: “The Programme Arrangement will be based on the principle of national 
ownership, and will cover at least the following issues: … if the Netherlands is Co-
Donor: A provision on respect for human rights and adherence to democratic 
principles, rule of law and good governance”.851 
 
Pressure from Nordic donors on British decisions was detected in several case 
studies. In Nicaragua, all donors were included in a general coordination group 
called Mesa de Cooperantes.852 In addition, budget support donors participated in a 
specific Budget Support Group.853 However, interviewees reported the existence of 
an informal group of Nordic Plus donors, where closer interaction took place.854 The 
evaluation report of Finnish development assistance confirms that the embassy “has 
its own coordination mechanisms for bilateral negotiations and implementation of 
specific projects and programmes, and participates in meetings of heads of 
cooperation of EU Member States and the ‘Nordic Plus’ group”.855 A former aid 
official suggested that local coordination created limited but existing peer pressure 
within the Nordic Plus Group.856  
 
Sweden was the first country to suspend aid to Nicaragua in August 2007. Britain 
was the second one, just a few months later. Apparently, there was no direct attempt 
to persuade the UK to follow the Swedish decision. Actually, Sweden was criticized 
for the absence of any coordination with other EU Member States (as recommended 
by the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour). However, 
a Nordic official supports the idea that the Swedish behaviour paved the way for 
DfID decisions, both in terms of closure of the office and suspension of budget 
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support: “I am pretty sure that DfID looked at Sweden and followed suit. Indeed, 
several other donors (including the Netherlands and Finland) took inspiration from 
the Swedish decision. Once the door was opened, many donors lined up to exit the 
country”.857 This pattern was also anticipated by Schultz immediately after the 
Swedish decision in 2007: “the Swedish withdrawal has relevance for the future 
dynamics of the harmonisation and alignment agenda, especially at a time of alarm 
over the meaning and ramifications of the ownership agenda pursued by the 
Nicaraguan government”.858 
 
The case of Mozambique confirms the findings of the Nicaraguan crisis, and offers 
additional evidence through direct comparison with French actions. In Maputo, the 
main donor group for coordination was the G19. However, smaller informal groups 
“are not a secret to anyone in Mozambique”. The EU is one of these groups, even 
though “EU coordination is weak”. The reason is that “it reproduces the European 
North/South distinction which is already present within the G19”.859  
 
The more cohesive group is, again, the informal coordination among Nordic Plus (or 
“like-minded”) countries. The four Scandinavian countries share the same building, 
and their coordination is therefore “logistically” easy. However, they often reach out 
“similar agencies, like DfID”. This is perceived to be “spontaneous” because “we 
share the same value”. The diplomat continued: 
 
It is true. The donors which participate in the Nordic Plus Group adopted a 
similar stance both during the donor strike and in response to the EMATUM 
                                                 
857 Interview 112. Sweden was always considered a lead donor in Nicaragua. For instance, it also 
“took the initiative for setting up the Budget Support Group” in 2003: Geske Dijkstra, “Governance or 
Poverty Reduction? Assessing Budget Support in Nicaragua,” Journal of Development Studies 49, no. 
1 (2012): 115. 
858 Nils-Sjard Schulz, Nicaragua: A Rude Awakening for the Paris Declaration (Madrid: FRIDE, 
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deal. This is not surprising if you think that we consider ourselves to be obvious 
collaborators in numerous circumstances.860  
 
Anyway, influence is a two-way street: “DfID is influenced, but also heavily 
influences what others do”.861  
 
Evidence of Nordic Plus coordination on good governance and human rights issues 
can be found in other programmes as well. Shortly before 2011, the Nordic Plus 
donors launched an initiative to strengthen partnerships between donors and civil 
society organisations. The objective was “to establish a set of principles for donors to 
follow to increase civil society capacity at the local level, as well as to improve 
donor effectiveness and co-ordination between civil society organisations and Nordic 
Plus donors”.862 A foreign diplomat reported that, in a rather unusual step for a 
highly coordinated environment like the Mozambican one, in March 2013 Nordic 
Plus donors unilaterally (that is, without consultation with other Western donors) 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister asking for explanation about governance in the 
forestry sector. 
 
The absence of any “natural partnership” between France and Nordic countries in the 
application of political conditionality is confirmed by researchers who have analyzed 
other cases. In the 2009 political crisis in Niger, France made it clear that it was very 
interested in maintaining Danish involvement in the country. However, Denmark 
decided to postpone a new phase of its cooperation in the water sector and to 
consider adjustments in the overall country programme.863 According to Olsen,  
 
The Swedish experience from holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 
2009 confirms the existence of the North–South divide within the Union when 
it comes to other policy issues linked to Africa. During the Swedish Presidency, 
a number of Francophone countries were on the agenda. France considered 
Mauritius, Guinea Conakry, Niger and Madagascar as its genuine interests; 
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therefore, it was very difficult for the Presidency to find common ground among 
the member states for policy initiatives directed towards these four countries. 
Based on the experiences during the Presidency and other examples, Swedish 
decision-makers in general consider France as a difficult partner to work with in 
an African context.864 
 
In sum, today British representatives feel much closer to their like-minded 
counterparts than French officials do,865 and both journalists and researchers have 
already suggested that, because of participation in the Nordic Plus Group, UK 
policies are therefore becoming “increasingly” similar to those of Denmark, Sweden, 
the Netherlands and Norway.866 Importantly, close coordination between Nordic Plus 
donors sometimes takes place at the expenses of European coordination. As reported 
by Delputte and Orbie,  
 
Some Nordic Plus interviewees … suggested that more intense EU coordination 
conflicts with their identity, which corresponds more with ‘supporting the 
principle of multilateralism’ than ‘being an EU donor’. This opinion also rests 
on a perception that through EU coordination, the EU Delegations aim to 
strengthen a common European identity rather than making EU aid more 
effective.867  
 
Delputte and Söderbaum reported that in Zambia and Tanzania the Commission 
suffers from administrative delays and a burdensome hierarchy. Hence, it is the 
complete opposite of some Nordic Plus donors, who are considered as more flexible 
                                                 
864 Olsen, “The European Union’s Africa Policy,” 416. 
865 Past research already suggested the existence of “a natural partnership between the UK and the 
Nordics … and a less fruitful alliance between France and the Scandinavian States”: Tony Chafer and 
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866 “Leaders: Missing the Point; Foreign Aid,” The Economist, March 16, 2002; Stephen Knack, “Aid 
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agencies: “by the time the Commission gives the green light, its ideas are already 
superseded by what we have already agreed in the sectors”.868  
 
Others suggested that, in this interplay of identities, “Nordicization” of the UK might 
have also meant “Europeanisation”: “in the case of the UK, there have been 
considerable shifts in stance toward coordination of EU development policy, from 
the extreme negativity expressed by Secretary of State Clare Short, who declared that 
the Commission was ‘the worst development agency in the world’, through a period 
of adaptation to EU norms and practices in the context of the Nordic Plus group”.869 
Fraser confirms that in Zambia “the way towards coordination was paved by the 
Nordic Plus countries before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council 
Conclusions were adopted”.870 
 
In any case, there is strong evidence that, through persuasion and/or emulation, 
British decision-makers have been more willing than their French counterparts to 
follow the leadership of Nordic donors on political conditionality. 
 
7.2.2. The International Organisation of La Francophonie versus the Commonwealth 
 
France and the UK manage their relationship with former colonies (and a few 
additional recipient countries) through separate international organisations: the 
Organisation international de la Francophonie (OIF) and the Commonwealth of 
Nations respectively. The OIF is an international organisation representing countries 
and regions that share a notable affiliation with French culture. The organisation 
comprises 57 member States and governments, three associate members and twenty 
observers. The Commonwealth consists of 53 member States that were mostly 
territories of the former British Empire. 
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The two organisations are interesting because, in case of gross human rights abuses 
and grave violations of democratic principles, both have the power to apply aid 
sanctions and, more generally, suspend repressive regimes from membership. In 
2000, OIF Member States adopted the Bamako Declaration, where they declared 
their adherence to the following fundamental principles: 
 
1. Democracy is a system of universal values based on recognition of the 
inalienable dignity and the equal value of all human beings; everyone has the 
right to play an active role in social, professional and political life and to enjoy 
the right to development; 
2. The essential elements of any democratic regime must include the 
constitutional rule of law, which implies submission of all institutions to the 
law, the separation of powers, the free exercise of human rights and 
fundamental liberties, and equality before the law for all citizens, men and 
women.871 
 
Chapter 5 of the Bamako Declaration describes the potential actions that the 
Permanent Council of La Francophonie (Conseil Permanent de la Francophonie, 
CFP) can take “in the case of a breakdown of democracy, or massive human rights 
violations”. Among other things, the CFP is allowed to “suspend multilateral 
cooperation of the Francophonie, with the exception of programs of direct benefit to 
the civilian population and those that might support a return to democracy”. In 
addition, it “may propose suspension of the country concerned from the 
Francophonie. In the case of a military coup against a democratically elected 
government, such suspension is decided”.872 
 
In 1991, the Commonwealth adopted the Harare Declaration, in which its Member 
States committed to numerous principles, including “democracy, democratic 
processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and 
the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” and “fundamental 
human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of 
                                                 
871 Organisation Internationale de La Francophonie, Bamako Declaration, November 3, 2000, Chapter 
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race, colour, creed or political belief”.873 In 1995, Commonwealth Heads of 
Government agreed the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Plan on the Harare 
Declaration. The Action Plan established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action 
Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG), comprising the Foreign Ministers of 
eight countries, to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare principles. 
The task of the CMAG is “to assess the nature of the infringement and recommend 
measures for collective Commonwealth action”. Among these measures, the CMAG 
can decide for the “suspension of participation at all Commonwealth meetings and of 
Commonwealth technical assistance if acceptable progress is not recorded by the 
government concerned after a period of two years”.874 
 
While the provisions of the two organisations appear strikingly similar, three 
different factors make socialization in favour of political conditionality more likely 
for the UK within the Commonwealth than for France within the OIF. To begin with, 
while both organisations officially support human rights and democratic institutions 
among their members, there is no doubt that the Commonwealth has a much stricter 
policy in this respect. According to Srinivasan, the Commonwealth’s principles “are, 
by and large, unexceptionable and its references to democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law can be considered a powerful point of advocacy for Commonwealth 
members”.875 In contrast, the Bamako Declaration expressly allowed for individual 
exceptions. For instance, Vietnam and Laos attached a reservation against 
multipartism, arguing that each population should be able to chose another path in 
function of its own “cultural, historic, economic and social specificities”.876 In 
addition, OIF sanctions can affect only multilateral aid. On the contrary, in certain 
circumstances (namely, “to reinforce the need for change in the event that the 
government concerned chooses to leave the Commonwealth and/or persists in 
violating the principles of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration even after two 
years”), the CMAG can considerate “appropriate further bilateral and multilateral 
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measures by all member states (e.g. limitation of government-to-government 
contacts; people-to-people measures; trade restrictions; and, in exceptional cases, 
suspension from the association)”.877  
 
The different degree of importance given to democracy and human rights issues is 
confirmed by the way in which the two organisations reacted when Cameroon 
applied for membership in both of them in 1989. The country’s democratic transition 
was monitored far more closely and critically by the Commonwealth than by the 
Francophonie. Membership of La Francophonie was granted in 1991, even before the 
multiparty presidential elections took place; membership of the Commonwealth was 
granted four years later, and a number of political and civil society actors still 
protested that stronger constitutional guarantees should have been required.878  
 
The second difference is that the Commonwealth offers a specific institution, the 
CMAG, where socialization over aid sanctions can take place. Even though limited 
only to eight members, in practice the most powerful states (including the UK) 
always participate (at least by proxy).879 Many researchers have highlighted the 
unique opportunities offered by this body in terms of information sharing and 
consensus building.880 
 
Finally, the OIF is a France-centred organisation (Paris is, by large, the largest 
contributor to the budget). The Commonwealth is more balanced: the budget is 
evenly distributed, and the organisation includes other relevant players (including 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand).881 In addition, as highlighted above, “there are 
no ‘permanent members’ in the Commonwealth of Nations leadership. In the 
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CMAG, created to be a kind of executive for the Commonwealth, no nation is 
assured of a place, not even the United Kingdom”.882 
 
The behaviour of Canada offers an interesting example of variation between the 
organisations because of its dual membership. Potter reports that Canada has been 
able to take a much more proactive role in the Commonwealth than in the OIF.883 
David Kilgour, a former Canadian Secretary of State, characterized CMAG as a 
“flexible instrument” of Canadian foreign policy to help promote change in non-
democratic countries.884 On the contrary, the Canadian proposal for an OIF Charter 
that would have allowed the French-based organisations to sanction member states 
that are known to have poor human rights records was proposed at least twice, but 
never approved.885 
 
In sum, according to Bourne, “the Commonwealth is making a contribution in human 
rights. This is not an area of significant activity for la Francophonie, the post-
colonial French body which is now numerically larger but less coherent than the 
Commonwealth”.886 This situation can offer a significant factor to explain varied 
degrees of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK.  
 
The expectations regarding the limited influence of the OIF on France are met. In the 
case of Madagascar – the only OIF Member State among the four cases analyzed in 
Chapter 5 (Mozambique is an Observer State) – the CFP suspended the country on 2 
April 2009. The CFP expressly implemented all measures described in paragraph 3 
of Chapter 5 of the Bamako Declaration, “including suspension of the multilateral 
Francophone cooperation, with the exception of those programs that benefit the 
civilian population and that can contribute to the restoration of democracy”.887 
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Notwithstanding this decision, France continued some government-to-government 
development programmes in Madagascar.888 The US Ambassador hinted at the 
almost non-existence influence from the OIF, when he called it a “French proxy 
organisation”.889 Indeed, after a few months the OIF policy became strikingly similar 
to the French one. The OIF “called for prompt presidential and legislative elections 
as a solution to the political impasse” and “offered material assistance to facilitate 
such polls”. At one stage it also “envisaged a rapid timetable although the UN 
considered that updating the electoral roll, the essential prerequisite for fair polls, 
would take a minimum of 10 months”.890  
 
The problem with the “OIF versus Commonwealth” hypothesis is that the 
Commonwealth does not seem to play a significant influence over British aid 
policies and decisions. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, the Commonwealth 
suspended the country from the organisation in 2002. However, it was Britain who 
pushed for the imposition of sanctions against Mugabe, not vice versa.891 
 
In September 2001, the CMAG met a Zimbabwean delegation in Abuja. Mugabe’s 
government promised to halt the violence, but repression continued unabated. As a 
consequence, the UK, together with Australia and New Zealand, pushed for the 
suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth before the 2002 elections. Other 
countries, mostly African ones, resisted any action until the elections were 
completed. A compromise inspired by Canada created a troika of the previous, 
current and next Chairpersons-in-Office (Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) with 
the task of deciding any suitable action after the issuance of the election report by the 
Commonwealth Observer Group.892 
 
The UK continued to press. Prime Minister Tony Blair said that “if the observers’ 
report does indeed find widespread evidence of intimidation and violence then the 
fudging will have to stop … The credibility of the Commonwealth itself is at stake. 
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The procedures laid down … are clear and action must follow, up to and including 
suspension”.893 In the end, the observers’ report was highly critical, and South 
Africa, Australia and Nigeria decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the 
organisations.894 
 
Taylor reports that British policy “was hugely frustrated by the persistent reluctance 
of African elites to criticize Mugabe’s behaviour”.895 Porteous confirms that UK 
leverage within the Commonwealth was reduced by the “reluctance of African elites 
to take a hard line against a veteran of the struggle for independence”.896 For 
instance, Mbeki claimed that attempts to ostracize Mugabe in the British 
Commonwealth were “inspired by notions of white supremacy”.897 In addition, he 
“fought for Zimbabwe’s suspension to be ended, only to be defeated on that by a 
similar margin, with only the countries of southern Africa (and not all of them) lined 
up against the rest”.898 
 
Even other cases that seem to support the Commonwealth hypothesis in reality do 
not offer substantial evidence in favour of it. In 2006, Commodore Bainimarama 
staged the third coup in the recent history of Fiji. The Fijian coup is interesting 
because the only two European donors with high-level diplomats/officers in Suva are 
France and the UK (together with a Representative of the European Commission). In 
addition, Fiji is a former British colony, raising the expectation of a softer approach 
by Britain than by France. 
 
The reality was different. The positions of France and the UK within the Council 
were similar. French and British officials agreed on a new round of EU consultations 
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and all aid, except from humanitarian support, was suspended.899 Gradual resumption 
was, and still is, conditioned on holding free and fair elections.900 However, at the 
bilateral level, the UK acted much more quickly than France. On the day of the coup, 
a spokesman of the British government told reporters: “We are suspending 
immediately bilateral and military assistance to Fiji and considering further measures 
with our international and Commonwealth partners. We will urge all parties to 
recognise the sovereign authority of the elected government”.901 Just three days after 
the coup, the CMAG (which included Britain) decided the suspension of Fiji’s 
membership on the Councils of the Commonwealth (full suspension was decided on 
1 September 2009). As a result, all Commonwealth’s technical assistance 
programmes were suspended.902 Several interviewees suggested that the quick and 
firm reaction by the UK was due to the urgency of the matter within the 
Commonwealth.903 
 
The approach taken by France was different. As reported by Graham Davis, an 
Australian journalist,  
 
in stark contrast with Australia and New Zealand – which have shunned Fiji 
since Bainimarama’s coup in 2006 – France has continued to engage with the 
regime ... the French attitude to the repeated coups in Fiji over the years has 
been vastly at odds with the tough stance of Australia and New Zealand … The 
French ambassador in Suva is a regular visitor to the Prime Minister’s office, in 
stark contrast to the Aussies. France has also enhanced its aid and cultural 
programs in Fiji.904 
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The continuation of development aid is acknowledged by the French Development 
Agency as well. According to its website, in 2006 “France condemned the December 
5th coup and immediately suspended military cooperation and training of senior 
officials, including diplomats. Nevertheless, its cooperation has been maintained in 
culture, science, and technology (especially for public health and humanitarian aid). 
Fijian projects are still eligible for the French Fund for Cooperation in the Pacific, in 
conjunction with the three French Pacific collectivities”.905 
 
At a first glance, the Fijian case seems to support the idea that, at least occasionally, 
the Commonwealth can influence the position of the UK on aid sanctions. However, 
most interviewees pointed to the fact that it was mainly due to the willingness to 
follow Australia, rather than to follow the Commonwealth, that Britain acted so 
quickly.906 According to a foreign diplomat in the country, “Britain followed 
Australia, which in turn was leading the Commonwealth. There was no 
‘Commonwealth’ effect on British aid. There was an ‘Australia’ effect”.907 Another 
diplomat confirmed that “the UK leaves the leadership on Pacific matters to 
Australia and New Zealand. The British reaction to the coup was driven by 
Australian foreign policy, and only indirectly by pressure within the 
Commonwealth”.908 
 
The weaknesses of the Commonwealth hypothesis are exposed not only by the 
Zimbabwean and Fijian cases. It is often Britain which leads the human rights 
activities of the organisation. It is true that there are a few circumstances in which the 
UK has followed the guidance of Australia, as in the case of Fiji, and the guidance of 
Canada, as in the recent case of Sri Lanka and the absence of accountability for 
alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian standards by 
government forces during the repression of separatist Tamil Tiger rebels.909 Yet, it 
was the UK that lobbied for the expansion of the CMAG remit to address human 
                                                 
905 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Fiji Islands: Political Relations,” France-Diplomatie, 
February 22, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/fiji-islands/. 
906 Interview 55. 
907 Interview 67. 
908 Interview 81. 
909 Stuart Mole, “Editorial: Canada, the Commonwealth and Human Rights,” The Round Table 103, 
no. 3 (2014): 262. 
242 
 
rights abuses beyond the unconstitutional overthrow of governments.910 And it was 
the UK that put the issue of gay rights on the agenda of the organisation in 2011.911 
 
In sum, even though the potential for differentiated socialization is evident, the 
analysis of the case studies and the interviews with their protagonists do not warrant 
the conclusion that France and the UK differ in the internalisation of political 
conditionality because the former belongs to OIF and the latter to the 
Commonwealth. 
 
7.3. Liberalism 
 
When interviewees were asked their opinion regarding the main factor behind the 
different attitude to political conditionality by France and the UK, there was almost 
unanimous consensus (from both capitals and local offices) in favour of domestic 
politics. Interviewees pointed to several reasons why British aid policy-makers are 
subject to stricter scrutiny for their decisions and, consequently, they are more 
accountable to their domestic constituencies than their French counterparts.  
 
To begin with, at least since 1997, British aid responsibilities squarely fall on one 
single individual, the Secretary of State for International Development, and a few 
senior officials within one single department, the Department for International 
Development.912 Fisher describes the consequences of this situation in the following 
terms: 
 
Being held personally responsible, by superiors, journalists or voters, for 
continuing to provide aid to a corrupt or dictatorial regime is potentially 
devastating to an individual’s career prospects in the era of austerity and intense 
scrutiny of public spending and it is therefore logical that donor officials might 
be inclined to recommend the swift suspension of aid programmes to such 
                                                 
910 Paul Williams, “Blair’s Britain and the Commonwealth,” The Round Table 94, no. 380 (2005): 
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regimes when governance crises hit, with little clear idea of how such cuts may 
or may not help to resolve the crisis.913  
 
It is perhaps recognition of this “blame risk” that led former UK International 
Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell to wait until his last day in office to restore 
£16m of aid to Rwanda in September 2012.914  
 
In France, the absence of a high-level political figure as Minister of Development 
Cooperation, joint management of the aid budget by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and AFD, and the significant (but often hidden 
role) played by the President make it extremely difficult to assign clear-cut political 
responsibilities.915 Naudet argues that “French aid lacks transparency, partly as a 
result of the dispersal of the administrative structures involved”. Assessment of 
French aid strategy in general is difficult “because the interventions are spread 
between agencies according to their own specific objectives and there are insufficient 
overviews available to the public which attempt to place overall activities within a 
coherent framework.916 
 
A second factor that affects aid accountability is the form of government. The UK is 
a parliamentary democracy where decision-makers are directly accountable to the 
Parliament. Institutional accountability adds up to political accountability. Even 
though Barratt argues that “Parliament’s role falls short of what might be 
expected”,917 DfID decisions are examined by the House of Common’s International 
Development Committee, a serious discussion over the aid budget takes place every 
year, and Members of the Parliament (MPs) often conducted in-depth review of 
specific aid programs.918 For instance, in 2012 Andrew Mitchell was “grilled” by 
                                                 
913 Jonathan Fisher, “From ‘Mission Conditionality’ to ‘PR Conditionality’: The Changing Political 
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MPs over his decision to restore British aid to Rwanda notwithstanding fears about 
the human rights record of the country’s government.919 
 
In contrast with British parliamentary form of government, France is a semi-
presidential system where those in charge of foreign policy and high-level aid 
decisions respond to the President, not to the Parliament. According to Médard,  
 
The Parliament has never played any important role in African policy. 
Moreover, there has never been a real public debate in Parliament on French 
policy. The budget of the Ministry of cooperation was voted on without any 
serious discussion. This notorious absence of parliamentary involvement 
reflected in part its diminished position within the Fifth Republic institutions.920  
 
The absence of formal accountability channels is exacerbated by the low level of 
interest shown by MPs, as confirmed by the absence of a specific committee 
dedicated to aid issues (development assistance is discussed within the more general 
foreign policy committee).921 To date there have been no examples of parliamentary 
initiatives having a significant influence on French aid policy.922 
 
Third, as highlighted by Hoebink and Stokke, “in some countries development co-
operation is a high-profiled issue, while in others this policy attracts little attention 
from policy-makers and the general public alike”.923 This difference is stark in the 
case of the UK and France. National media dedicate much more attention to aid in 
the UK than in France.924 British newspapers (including popular tabloids) frequently 
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cover scandals of money disbursed to repressive regimes,925 and recurrently call for 
aid cuts at times of austerity or national disasters.926 According to Coles, “the 
potential for a strong domestic reaction to an overseas development is always there 
and policymakers must factor that potential into their thinking”.927 This is also the 
consequence of a different culture of watchdog journalism: 
 
Beyond shared norms of media freedom and mutually accepted standards for 
the gathering information, media outlets in both Britain and the United States 
share business imperatives and norms that motivate them to leap upon the story 
of a bureaucrat shown to be significantly out of step with the desires or 
demands of the public or its elected leaders. … Of all democratic bureaucracies, 
it is easiest to believe that British civil servants would wish to avoid public 
scrutiny in the media.928 
 
The British government’s attempts to sell its foreign policies (both at home and 
abroad) have also opened the policy process up to new levels of scrutiny.929 The 
greater significance afforded to human rights by policy announcements at the 
beginning of the first Labour government meant that this issue attracted far more 
publicity, and therefore expectation. Human rights did become a more openly 
discussed issue.930  
 
This is not the case on the other side of the Channel. Aid is rarely mentioned in 
newspapers’ headlines and the general public “is largely ignorant about who does 
                                                 
925 Peter Oborne Politics Last updated: October Oborne, “Overseas Aid Is Funding Human Rights 
Abuses,” The Daily Telegraph, October 28, 2010, 
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and who takes what”.931 The opacity of the system is widely recognized by 
commentators.932 Renou laments “a lack of transparency and democratic control” in 
the aid decision-making process: “the French parliament and most of the ministers 
have been kept out of the game, as has public opinion, the media and NGOs”.933 
Bovcon reports that “most decisions concerning these events have been taken in an 
old-fashioned way: namely, in a non-transparent manner at the highest level of the 
French State, bypassing the French parliament and public debate”.934 
 
Lastly, French development and human rights NGOs are significantly less influential 
than their British counterparts. According to Lundsgaarde, this is the result of a 
combination of different factors: smaller size, tighter budgets and larger focus on 
service-delivery than on advocacy.935 Lancaster defines French development NGOs 
as “weak” and “lacking in access”.936 In the UK, most development NGOs have a 
close relationship with DfID, and regularly interact with the International 
Development Secretary of State and DfID senior officials on the steps to take in case 
of democratic setbacks or human rights problems.937 According to Porteous, “the 
‘growing clout’ within the Labour Party establishment of a variety of development 
and humanitarian NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid, and media and public 
opinion concerns that something needed to be done to alleviate Africa’s appalling 
predicament” are among the “chief” reasons behind Blair’s foreign policy in 
Africa.938 
 
All case studies explored in Chapter 5 provide evidence in support of the liberal 
hypothesis. In Nicaragua, foreign diplomats reported that the main preoccupation 
within the Budget Support Group (but not outside) was how to justify direct 
assistance to a Sandinista government which rigged elections, banned therapeutic 
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abortion and harassed local NGOs. An interviewee from the Nordic Plus Group 
commented that “we were all worried about the future of the Nicaraguan aid 
programmes. We knew that it became increasingly difficult to defend assistance 
before our domestic public”.939  
 
As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, Vines argued that, from a purely strategic point of 
view, what happens in Zimbabwe is of limited interest to the UK, yet domestic 
pressures forced the government to take action proactively against the regime of 
President Mugabe.940 Taylor and Williams commented that “few events in Africa in 
recent years have so excited British opinion on foreign affairs as the downward spiral 
of Zimbabwe under President Mugabe”.941 Williams confirms that “compared with 
most African States, Zimbabwe’s crisis has consistently generated a significant 
degree of coverage in the UK press, despite the fact that most journalists working for 
British organisations have been expelled from the country since 2001. Zimbabwe’s 
crisis has also been a regular feature of parliamentary debate in both the Lords and 
Commons, with the Conservative party consistently criticizing Labour for not taking 
decisive action”.942 
 
The relevance of the “domestic accountability” hypothesis is confirmed also by those 
cases where the UK took a softer stance in terms of aid sanctions. In Rwanda, the 
Netherlands cut budget support twice – during the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2003 and after the publication of a UN report detailing Rwandan support 
for a Congolese rebel group in 2008. According to Zorbas, “both times, the 
suspension of aid was not so much a reaction to developments on the ground in 
Rwanda as it was a response to political pressure from the Dutch Parliament resulting 
from vocal media and civil society groups”.943 The explanation of the soft position 
from the UK, which did not cut aid in these circumstances (but which did cut aid in 
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2012), is suggested by a Western diplomat: “Rwanda has support across the UK 
Parliament. This is not the case with the Dutch or Belgians. Also, the UK doesn’t 
have a large Rwandan Diaspora community which itself exerts pressures on 
Parliaments and is often quite critical of the government in Kigali”.944 
 
The conclusions of two overviews of French and British aid respectively aptly 
summarize the differences we have highlighted in this section. Sue Wheat wraps up 
her analysis of British aid by saying that it “has taken a much higher and often 
controversial profile and government is far more open to consulting with and 
listening to advocates in the development sector”.945 Lancaster describes a different 
situation in Paris: “Much of the answer has to do with widely shared ideas about 
France’s rightful role in world politics, together with a highly centralised and not 
very transparent government (the National Assembly had little involvement in or 
even knowledge of the details of French aid, and development-oriented NGOs had 
little access to government decision-making)”.946 
 
Before moving to sociological institutionalism, a last comment is warranted on 
obstruction points and personal relationships. The second factor mentioned above 
(dispersal of authority over aid decisions) not only affects French transparency and 
accountability, but also produces several “veto points” before any decision on aid 
sanctions can be made and executed. The concept of “veto points” (or “veto 
players”) – that is, the number of actors necessary to take and implement decisions947 
– has been recurrently used to explain differentiated impacts of EU policies over EU 
Member States in the Europeanisation literature.948 According to Börzel and Risse 
“multiple veto points in a country’s institutional structure can effectively empower 
actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational pressures emanating from 
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Europeanisation”.949 Bursens and Deforche clarify that “when the political power in 
the political system is shared among many actors, it will be more difficult to mobilize 
enough actors to pull through changes. The less institutional or de facto veto players 
are involved in a policy case, the easier it is to foster the domestic ‘winning 
coalition’, which is a necessary condition for smooth shaping and taking of EU 
policy, i.e. for adaptation”.950 
 
Importantly, the high number of French veto players is not only due to the 
complexity of the formal administration of aid. Several interviewees suggested that it 
is also a detrimental consequence of la Françafrique, that is, the informal network of 
dubious connections between French and African politicians and businessmen which 
has lasted since decolonization.951 La Françafrique has often been used to explain 
French reluctance to apply political conditionality.952 In 2001 Gordon Cumming 
published an extremely detailed comparison of how France and the United Kingdom 
responded to the “new development nostrum” that required tying assistance to 
political reforms in developing countries. According to the author, who focused on 
the period from the end of the Cold War to 1997, there was “a radical shift with the 
introduction of political conditionality, but this has gradually been watered down by 
France, and, to a lesser extent, the UK”.953 Variation between the two donors was 
mainly explained through the existence of strong personal and affective ties between 
French decision-makers and African leaders, compared to the strong emphasis that 
Britain placed on the formal institutions involved in the formulation of development 
policy.954  
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The main argument here is that, as suggested by several interviewees and recent 
research, the “emotional” factor emphasized by Cumming has possessed weaker 
explanatory power since the beginning of the 2000s.955 According to Gounin, 
 
whether the critics of Françafrique like it or not, France’s Africa policy is not 
permanently frozen in “Foccartism” [Jacques Foccart was Chief of Staff for 
African Affairs under President Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidous, and 
is since then considered the epitome of the Françafrique] … France’s policies 
toward Africa today are led by a new generation of officials whose ethos is that 
of IMF and EU technocracy, not that of “l’Afrique de Papa” and who have had 
increasing success in normalizing the France-Africa relationship.956 
 
Bovcon lists numerous factors that have undermined the Françafrique: budgetary 
constraints; public criticism of corruption, supported by numerous legal 
investigations into the affairs of some leading figures of African networks; the 
increasing fragmentation of these networks into various individual business lobbies; 
the death of some pivotal figures, such as Foccart, Mitterrand and Houphouët-Boigny 
(former President of Côte d’Ivoire); and France’s implication in the Rwanda 
genocide in 1994.957 
 
Notwithstanding the decline of the Françafrique regime, its consequences in terms of 
veto players are still significant.958 The case of Madagascar is interesting in this 
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respect. After the March 2009 coup by Rajoelina against Ravalomanana, French 
policy-makers were divided. The official diplomatic service of the Presidency and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have opted for a more principled decision.959 
Yet, the Africa Cell of the French Presidency (that is, the personal advisor to 
President Sarkozy, Claude Guéant) and the Secretary of State for Cooperation, Alain 
Joyandet, were in favour of quick elections to legitimize Rajoelina. According to 
Laurent d’Ersu, private interests enmeshed with public diplomacy: 
 
Following a scenario that has become a classic since the accession to power of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the leading missi dominici of the President in Africa, 
business lawyer Robert Bourgi, intervened on behalf of private interests, 
namely those of a giant food exporter to Africa. He orchestrated then – 
especially with the Secretary General of the Elysée Claude Guéant and the 
Secretary of State for Cooperation Alain Joyandet, who both have secretly 
received Andry Rajoelina – French support to the candidature of the young 
acting president, an option vigorously opposed by the Quai d'Orsay and the 
diplomatic team of the Elysée.960 
 
This narrative, which is confirmed by the cables from the US Embassy in 
Antananarivo and is in line with new research produced by Cumming,961 has already 
been generalized to other countries and human rights crises. According to Dewar, 
Massey and Baker, the French position in many situations was “confused by the 
management of foreign policy under President Nicolas Sarkozy, in which political 
dealings with some African countries were largely entrusted to the president’s own 
Africa team at the Elysée palace, marginalizing the foreign ministry (which was 
more closely aligned with mainstream EU policy)”.962  
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In sum, if la Françafrique has lost its emotional character and its significant 
explanatory power, it has left behind numerous veto points obstructing the principled 
application of political conditionality. This adds up to a decision-making system 
which is far less accountable than the British one. 
 
7.4. Sociological institutionalism 
 
Exploring the organisational culture of bureaucracies like DfID, the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs or the French Development Agency would require the adoption of 
an ethnographic methodology in order to make sense of how officials at the three 
institutions make sense of the world. The problem is that ethnographic research is 
challenging in foreign policy and foreign aid settings. To start with, if all 
bureaucracies are designed to guard information, foreign policy institutions do so 
more than others, with little allowance made to transparency or public engagement. 
Roy’s book on microfinance, based in part on interviews at the United States Agency 
for International Development, expressly mentions the author’s substantial 
difficulties with access to information and engagement with officials.963 In addition, 
participant observation is almost impossible. The traditional ethnographic practice of 
“deep hanging out” – to recall James Clifford’s iconic phrase – is evidently 
precluded when studying foreign policy decision-makers. How can one imagine a 
researcher shadowing the head of cabinet of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs at work? 
Neumann frankly acknowledges the importance of his personal contacts at the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.964  
 
The consequence of these difficulties is that, in the field of international politics and 
foreign policy, even “the best accounts of elite policy bureaucracies draw by and 
large on textual material or interviews, sometimes complemented by a small 
participant observation component”.965 This dissertation is no exception in this 
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respect. Research was mainly based on the analysis of policy documents and 
personal interviews. Even though a definite answer cannot be reach through these 
means, the aim is to explore whether a preliminary case can be made in favour of a 
cultural explanation of variation in the adoption of political conditionality.  
 
Notwithstanding the similar functions, the institutions managing British and French 
development assistance are starkly different from each other. French development 
assistance is dominated by economists and diplomats. The “pivot” actor of the 
French aid system is the French Development Agency (Agence Française de 
Développement, AFD). The staff of AFD is mainly composed of economists who 
eagerly repeat that “AFD is a bank and operates as a bank”.966 When asked for which 
other institutions AFD look like, the unanimous response was the World Bank. If a 
few officials also signalled the German Federal Enterprise for International 
Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), 
nobody ever mentioned DfID or the development agency of a Nordic country.967 
Meimon explains that, notwithstanding its prominent role, AFD “is not a political 
organ”. Rather, it almost always takes a “banking approach” to development 
issues.968 Raffinot confirms that, for AFD staff, “development is a technical process, 
depending heavily on the creation of a solid infrastructure, not on protection the 
poor”.969 In addition to the predominance of a banking culture, one of the two “co-
tutors” of AFD is the Ministry of Economics and Finance, which is also directly in 
charge of the most significant size of French aid budget. To describe the inner 
working of the Ministry, Gabas explicitly refer to a “culture based on 
macroeconomic balancing and the extension of commerce”.970  
 
As the French government lacks a dedicated Ministry for Development Cooperation, 
the remaining part of French bilateral aid is managed by diplomats within the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 1998 reform of French development cooperation 
assigned a stronger role to the local ambassador in comparison with embedded 
development officers.971 This change has had important repercussions. Before the 
reform,  
 
the two functions of ambassador and chief of French development cooperation 
mission were carried out by the two different people. The ambassador had the 
diplomacy function and the chief of the French cooperation mission had the 
responsibility for development cooperation. Now, it is the ambassador with his 
primary diplomatic function who will implement the projects and programmes 
financed by France; development will be introduced as a second priority. 972  
 
In theory, this situation might have elevated the importance of human rights in aid 
decision-making: diplomats might be more inclined than economists to give due 
consideration to political issues, such as respect for human rights and democratic 
norms. Yet, several interviewees suggested that this is not the case. French diplomats 
value “continuity over disruption, partnership over imposition”.973 Diplomats 
themselves acknowledged that “French diplomacy is based on supporting change 
rather than punishing mistakes”.974 As clarified by Alain Joyandet, France speaks “to 
regimes that are not perfect democracies, because our diplomacy is intended to be 
universal. This is a diplomacy of “positive influence”: we want to talk with everyone 
to bring them to our values. The more we talk with these countries, the greater the 
possibilities of advancing these values”.975 A diplomat referred to a policy named 
“reconciliation diplomacy”, whereby rather than promoting human rights and 
democracy, France will promote diversity, cited as a common value for all that will 
not block communication efforts.976  
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In addition to a “conciliatory” and not “divisive” culture, French understanding of 
good government and democracy support has been known to “take a very state-
centric approach. Most projects continue to require State support from local 
governments since technical assistants are delegated to consult and assist in the 
reform, reorganisation and modernisation of judicial systems, police, parliaments and 
civil services”.977 This almost inevitably excluded any political dimension from 
French development cooperation. As highlighted by Rahimi, the idea that “all that is 
politics belongs with the State” has had a significant influence, meaning that any 
attempts to engender political change would not be the work of the development 
departments. This again plays a role in France’s opposition to American style 
democratisation, which has been more political and short-term”.978  
 
Other researchers have even suggested that French model of development actually is 
“stable authoritarianism”. According to Moncrieff, “France offered only tepid 
support to democratization movements, and was sometimes downright hostile. 
Whether because of a sincere belief in stability before democracy or through self-
interest … many Francophone African leaders successfully exerted a stability 
blackmail (if I go it will be chaos) to retain French support as they used and abused 
incumbency to hang onto power”.979 Melly and Darracq argue that this situation 
created unexpected synergies between French and Chinese policies in Africa:  
 
France and China share a common concern for stability in Africa, and China has 
at times partnered with France in this regard. The most striking example has 
been in Sudan where, thanks to its privileged relations with the regime of Omar 
al-Bashir, China was instrumental in persuading it to accept the deployment of 
the UN mission in Darfur. … France discovered that in this instance its position 
on Sudan is closer to China’s than to its usual partner, the United States, which 
is more critical.980 
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Lastly, Bourmaud recalls that diplomats are educated under a “Gaullist consensus”, 
which supports the ideas of French grandeur and exceptionalism. In this worldview, 
Africa acts as the guarantor of French standing in world politics (together with the 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council and the force de frappe of the nuclear 
weapons). Rupture of any significant relationship with African countries is almost 
not contemplated.981 
 
As far as the UK is concerned, two factors might make DfID a more favourable 
terrain for the integration of human rights concerns. First, the existence of a 
dedicated Department in charge of development assistance insulates it from political 
pressures to downplay human rights in favour of strategic and economic interests.982 
It is true that the dilemma between long-term development objectives and short-term 
human rights protection has blatantly manifested in the ‘soft’ stance of donors, 
including DfID, towards pro-poor but semi-authoritarian government in Ethiopia and 
Rwanda.983 Yet, former DfID officials argue that things have changed since when 
“the Department tented to the view that the Foreign Office were better at 
understanding short-term political event”. DfID joined with the Overseas 
Development Institute to develop a methodology for understanding the ‘drivers of 
change’ and today “has a substantial cadre of governance professionals and stronger 
capacity for political analysis”.984  
 
Second, DfID is increasingly staffed with individuals sharing a strong ethical 
purpose at the roots of their job decisions (as confirmed by the popularity of the 
Department in voluntary application for entries to the Civil Service, and the large 
number of recruitments of people with previous work experience in NGOs).985 One 
immediate effect of this shift in ‘institutional orientation’ was an increase in the 
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number of young professionals employed in DFID, especially but not exclusively 
economists. In addition, DFID engaged with academics and NGOs. This took time to 
implement, but finally became a defining feature of the Department.986 The close 
relationship with NGOs and value-based external organisations is important because 
“independent aid agencies create bureaucratic incentives for higher aid budgets” and 
“are less conducive to principled conditionality and often more entangled with 
domestic clients of tied aid and recipient governments than integrated aid programs. 
Domestic NGO circulation into the aid bureaucracy … can be correctives to these 
tendencies”:987 
 
While France and the UK show two different organisational cultures, and this might 
well represent a decisive factor in explaining stronger internalisation of political 
conditionality, a cultural explanation faces two main weaknesses. First, decisions 
over aid sanctions are taken at ministerial level, not by DfID staff. Dodd therefore 
suggests that, while aid suspensions and cuts are inevitably informed by the 
interpretation given by bureaucrats within DfID and the FCO, “culture can be a 
factor to explain a strict approach to political conditionality. Yet, it is not the most 
important”.988 Simon Maxwell partially confirms this interpretation by distinguishing 
“between fundamentalists and gradualists”. Politicians are immediately tempted to 
cut aid when faced with serious human rights abuses. DfID staff usually takes a 
“more nuanced” approach, trying to understand the “direction of travel” of the 
recipient country.989  
 
Second, historical accounts of decision-making over aid sanctions indicate that the 
department which often takes the hardest stance on human rights is the FCO, not 
DfID. For example, “the FCO (with its new injection of human rights advisers from 
the NGO world) came to feel that Short was not paying enough attention to human 
rights and democratization in countries like Rwanda and Uganda”. In addition, 
according to Bronwen Manby, former deputy Africa director of Human Rights 
Watch, the organisation had increasing difficulty in getting its views heard on Africa 
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in DFID, particularly on Rwanda”.990 Rwanda fomented strife also several years 
later. When Mitchell reinstated aid to the country, “most people in the Foreign Office 
[thought] the time [had] come to take a really tough stand”.991 
 
The result is that most interviewees agree that a cultural explanation is more useful to 
explain which are the “hard cases” for aid sanctions (that is, those recipient countries 
to which a donor find more difficult to apply political conditionality) rather than the 
general attitude towards the norm itself. An interviewee suggested: “Look at the 
countries where France has not applied sanctions: Madagascar, Niger, etc. Then, look 
at the countries where the UK has been reluctant to apply sanctions: Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, etc. In the case of France, strategic interests overcome human rights; in the 
case of the UK, development successes overcome human rights”.992 
 
7.5. A neglected but important detail: aid modalities 
 
One of the advantages of semi-structured interviews is that they leave open the 
possibility for respondents to raise issues not contemplated in the initial 
questionnaire. All interviews with aid decision-makers included a question about 
potential missing variables, and a few interviewees raised an interesting point about 
the facilitating role played by the fact of delivering aid through different modalities. 
 
For instance, according to some aid officials, legal, economic and psychological 
reasons make loans more difficult to suspend or cancel than grants.993 First, a loan is 
often based on a contract with a third party. As human rights clauses are rarely 
included in project-level agreements, aid sanctions would lead to controversial 
breaches of contractual obligations. Second, discontinuing a loan inevitably entails 
an unforeseen loss for the development agency. Third, as repayment plans are often 
longer than 10 or even 20 years, loans nurture the idea of a long-term partnership 
between donor and recipient. This makes it thornier to break the relationship apart 
for short-term objectives. 
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In France, the degree of concessionality has steadily decreased since the 1970s.994 
Grants, which represented 80% of French ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in 1975, only 
accounted for 65% in 1985.995 The creation of the AFD exacerbated this trend. The 
Agency has a predominant “banking culture and a strong emphasis on loans”.996 
Today, loans account for 40% of French bilateral aid.997 On the contrary, the vast 
majority of UK bilateral aid is provided in grant form.998  
 
A strong preference for loans or grants is not the only difference between French and 
British development institutions. Since the late 1990s, DfID has been among the 
leading advocates of programme modalities (such as direct budget support, but also 
sector-wide programmes), as against projects.999 In 2000, Claire Short sanctioned this 
change of perspective: “Too much of development in the past has been about isolated 
development projects. The new agenda is increasingly about sector-wide approaches, 
helping governments to provide key services, such as health and education”.1000 The 
most recent DAC peer review openly recognizes “UK’s willingness to lead in the use 
of direct budget support”.1001 
 
In contrast with the UK, France has always experienced a strong predominance of 
technical assistance, and showed particular resistance to embrace the new 
instrument.1002 Even though the size of their bilateral development programme is 
comparable, in 2008/2009 DfID provided USD 1.1 billion in budget support,1003 
France only USD 259 million.1004 The last few years have been particularly 
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innovative in this respect.1005 Yet, the Hollande administration “still takes a cautious 
approach to general budget aid; only a few countries receive such support from 
France – generally in the form of highly concessional loans, on terms similar to 
World Bank IDA credits. Recipients in 2013 include Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire 
(€300million), Senegal (€140 million), Niger (€50 million) and Mauritania. The 
government sees France’s tradition of funding long-term infrastructure as a 
strength”.1006 
 
General budget support and political conditionality are intimately linked for two 
main reasons. First, the instrument is easy to suspend. In contrast with project aid, it 
does not entail the presence of workers on the ground or contractual obligations with 
third parties.1007 In addition, the fact that money is disbursed directly in the hands of 
the recipient government calls for stricter fiduciary safeguards. In case of human 
rights abuses, project aid can still be justified on the basis of its direct benefits to 
vulnerable individuals (who risk to be punished twice in case of aid suspensions). 
General budget support cannot but be seen as a sign of support and/or complicity 
with the repressive regime.1008  
 
The British approach hold some support to the hypothesis that the adoption of some 
sort of conditionality is seen as a price to pay for an “enhanced” version of aid 
programmes. Partnership became a guiding theme in the second DfID annual report. 
Where governments were prepared to commit themselves to sustainable pro-poor 
development programmes, the department was prepared “in principle to embark on a 
deeper, long-term partnership, involving all forms of assistance”. While stressing the 
avoidance of “crude conditionality”, the department could nonetheless warn that 
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partnership might “involve intense dialogue and hard choices”1009. The advantages 
for recipient governments are aptly described by the Economist:  
 
DFID is quite choosy about which poor governments it lends to. But when it has 
picked what it sees as a winner, it stands back, letting the government govern, 
without too many intrusive conditions or requests for thank-you notes 
(otherwise known as progress reports). In some countries, such as Uganda, 
Tanzania and Mozambique, as much as half of the money DFID provides is not 
earmarked for any particular scheme or project at all. It is simply added to the 
nation's budget.1010 
 
Notwithstanding their plausibility, it is difficult to draw general conclusions from the 
arguments presented above. First, there does not seem to be a perfect correlation 
between the provision of grants or loans and the application of aid sanctions. France, 
for instance, adopted sanctions in cases where it was mainly operating through loans. 
The UK still provides a large part of its bilateral aid budget in specific projects. For 
instance, Joseph Croft, Executive Director at Stakeholder Democracy Network, 
argued that “even if it was more proactive on conditionality, the UK would have 
problems to adopt aid sanctions against Nigeria because of the way in which aid is 
disbursed. DFID outsources its programs to consultancies. This means that it is in a 
contractual relationship to deliver the project”.1011 Second, it is true that general 
budget support is easy to suspend. Yet, it usually takes years to prepare a budget 
support agreements, and there is often resistance to blow up such a long-term 
investment.1012 Third, the all idea of budget support is to offer predictability to aid 
flows. Suspensions and cancellations because of political problems obviously run 
against this idea. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
Avoiding paradigmatic boundaries, this chapter tested four different hypotheses to 
explain variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality across the 
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Channel. The realist hypothesis was rejected because top recipients of British aid are 
not better human rights performers than recipients of French aid.1013 As such, deeper 
internalisation of political conditionality by British policy-makers cannot be 
considered an ex post rationalization of strategically-induced aid allocation. In 
addition, the cases of Zimbabwe and Mozambique showed that aid sanctions have 
not been used by British decision-makers to conceal the pursuit of material interests. 
 
An hypothesis derived from international constructivism suggested that the UK has 
internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of 
social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus 
Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations. The first leg of the hypothesis has 
found significant supporting evidence. Nordic countries apply aid conditionality 
more than other EU Member States, and put pressure on British decision-makers to 
follow their leadership. Closer coordination within the Nordic Plus Group was found 
both in Nicaragua and Mozambique. The second leg of the hypothesis showed strong 
potential at the policy level, but was not convincing after the analysis of the case 
studies. In Zimbabwe, it was the UK to press for the application of sanctions. In Fiji, 
the UK followed the leadership of Australia and New Zealand, and found itself under 
pressure from the Commonwealth only indirectly.  
 
According to the version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have 
internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-
makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. 
Interviewees almost unanimously endorsed this hypothesis, pointing to numerous 
factors that explain higher accountability in London than in Paris. The most 
important ones include: clear allocation of responsibility for aid management, 
stronger role for the Parliament, and more stringent investigations by newspapers and 
NGOs. The higher number of domestic veto players caused by the remnants of la 
Françafrique also plays a role in obstructing normative change within French policy 
circles.  
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The hypothesis which was drawn from sociological institutionalism suggested that 
the UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than 
France because the organisational culture of DfID offered a better fit than the 
organisations cultures of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French 
Development Agency. The analysis confirmed that the “diplomatic” culture of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “banking” culture of the AFD do not 
offer fertile ground for political conditionality to diffuse. DfID seems to be better 
positioned, in particular because of the type of “professions” working for the 
Department and because of the close relationship with human rights and 
development NGOs. However, most decisions on aid sanctions are not taken within 
the organisation, but by top-level bureaucrats or even politicians. In addition, 
historical accounts of sanction decisions show that it was more often the FCO than 
DfID to be in favour of suspending cooperation. Interviewees proposed that the DfID 
organisation culture is less helpful for explaining the degree of internalisation of 
political conditionality than for understanding the “hard cases” for the application of 
aid sanctions. If France finds it difficult to balance human rights with strategic 
interests, DfID finds it complicated to balance human rights with development 
objectives. The cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda exemplify this situation at best. 
 
The last section of the chapter took advantage of the opportunities offered by semi-
structured interviews and explored an additional factor that can influence the level of 
internalisation of political conditionality: aid modalities. While France prefers loans 
and project aid, the UK mainly uses grants and budget support. Theoretically, the 
hypothesis makes sense. Loans create legal, financial, and psychological obstacles to 
prompt suspensions and cuts. When human rights problems arise, budget support is 
easier to stop and more difficult to justify. However, it seems that the realities on the 
ground (such as the still high number of projects and the long time needed to prepare 
budget support programmes) preclude aid modalities from playing a decisive role in 
decisions over aid sanctions.  
 
In conclusion, the higher accountability of aid decision-makers and social pressure 
by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) have been found to play the 
major role in explaining deeper internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. 
In contrast, evidence was not sufficient to support the plausibility of explanations 
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based on material interests, Commonwealth influence and aid modalities. Different 
organisational cultures, if not capable of explaining the extent of internalisation of 
political conditionality, can help understand those cases when political conditionality 
is not applied. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation addressed a puzzling question: why do France and the UK differ in 
their attitude towards political conditionality (that is, the norm by which aid donors 
should make the allocation of development assistance dependent on respect for 
human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments)? The question is 
puzzling because there are numerous reasons to expect convergence rather than 
variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by EU Member States, at 
least since the beginning of the 1990s. These reasons include, but are not limited to, 
the window of opportunity created by the end of Cold War rivalry, the causal belief 
that respect for human rights is a precondition for effective poverty reduction, the 
financial problems in donors’ economies, the automatic coordination that should 
derive from the reiterated application of any type of conditionality, and strong 
support for the norm by EU institutions. 
 
This final chapter summarises the main findings of the dissertation, discusses its 
most important contributions to the academic literature on foreign aid, human rights 
and Europeanisation, and offers a few suggestions in terms of potential avenues for 
future research. 
 
8.1. Main findings 
 
This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
assessed the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the 
UK. The second part (Chapters 6 and 7) tested several hypotheses to explain 
variation between the two donors.  
 
In order to assess internalisation of political conditionality, the first part adopted a 
three-fold measurement framework, and examined French and British policies, legal 
documents and behaviour. Chapter 4 concentrated on policies and legal documents. 
France and the UK differ significantly. France does not support the idea that 
allocation and disbursement of development assistance should depend on respect for 
human rights by recipient governments. Notwithstanding initial endorsement of the 
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norm, France has reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct 
support to rule of law programmes) to conditionality. The laws that regulate French 
development cooperation do not include any reference to human rights. French 
development agreements with recipient governments generally do not contain human 
rights clauses. The UK presents a firmer stance in favour of political conditionality. 
Even though human rights promotion is not an objective of British development 
assistance under the International Development Act 2002, the UK has adopted a 
fully-fledged policy requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic 
democratic principles, and consistently include human rights clauses in development 
agreements with recipient countries. 
 
Serious weaknesses in data availability prevented from conducting a quantitative 
analysis of aid allocation patterns. As a consequence, Chapter 5 thoroughly examined 
four cases of aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 
and Zimbabwe 2002. The selection of cases followed a “least-likely case” or “hard 
case” research design. To begin with, the EU suspended aid in all four 
circumstances. This makes the four cases a difficult scenario for variation among EU 
Member States. In addition, given the preliminary results from the analysis of 
policies and legal documents, the cases included political crises where France was 
least likely not to apply aid sanctions (because of high levels of coordination within 
the donor community or because of little strategic interests in comparison with other 
former colonies) and where the UK was least likely to apply political conditionality 
(because of strong post-colonial links). The case of the suspension of EU aid to 
Nicaragua was included to extend the reach of the dissertation outside of the African 
continent. 
 
In line with the results of past statistical studies, the UK was usually more willing 
than France to apply aid sanctions. After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France was 
the only Western donor (in contrast with the EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to 
continue some bilateral government-to-government programmes. During the 2009 
donor strike in Mozambique, France avoided a confrontational position against the 
Mozambican government. The UK was among the leaders of the strike and one of 
the most vocal critics of the political situation. After the contested 2008 local 
elections in Nicaragua, the UK was the second donor (after Sweden) to announce the 
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suspension of its budget support programme. When the Zimbabwean government 
resorted to widespread human rights abuses in connection with its fast-track land 
reform at the beginning of the 2000s, the UK pushed for the adoption of aid 
sanctions. France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors. 
 
How to explain these differences? Given the complexities of aid decision-making, 
Chapter 6 justified the adoption of “analytic eclecticism”, a problem-driven approach 
which explores how diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound 
theories can interact with each other. The chapter introduced four hypotheses to 
explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by EU 
Member States. The hypotheses reflected four of the most traditional theories in the 
study of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis: realism, international 
constructivism, liberalism and sociological institutionalism. Chapter 7 tested these 
hypotheses not only against the behaviour of the two donors in the four case studies, 
but also against the responses of more than 100 interviewees who are working or 
have worked for French and British institutions, and who are working or have 
worked for other donors or for development/human rights NGOs.  
 
The realist hypothesis posited that what appears as deeper internalisation of political 
conditionality by British policy-makers is only the ex post rationalization of 
strategically-induced aid decisions. The realist hypothesis was rejected because the 
top recipients of British aid are not better human rights performers than the top 
recipients of French aid (it should be France to pay lip service to political 
conditionality in order to maintain its favourite relationships). In addition, the cases 
of Mozambique and Zimbabwe showed that British decision-makers did not use aid 
sanctions to conceal the pursuit of economic and post-colonial interests. 
 
An international constructivist scholar would suggest that the UK has internalized 
political conditionality to a larger extent than France because of social pressure 
(through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the 
Commonwealth of Nations (in comparison with its French counterpart, the 
International Organisation of La Francophonie). The first leg of this hypothesis was 
supported by significant evidence. Nordic countries are the strongest supporters of 
political conditionality, and often put pressure on British decision-makers to follow 
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their leadership. Closer coordination within the Nordic Plus Group was found both in 
Mozambique and Nicaragua. The second leg of the hypothesis was not equally 
convincing. Even though the Commonwealth takes political conditionality more 
seriously than the OIF, it was the UK to press for the application of aid sanctions 
against Zimbabwe. In the additional case of the 2006 Fiji coup, the UK followed the 
leadership of Australia and New Zealand. The Commonwealth exerted only indirect 
pressure.  
 
According to the version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have 
internalized human rights to a larger degree than France because British aid decision-
makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. 
Interviewees almost unanimously endorsed this hypotheses, pointing at numerous 
factors that explain higher accountability in London than in Paris. The most 
important ones include: clear allocation of responsibility for aid management, 
stronger role for the Parliament, and more stringent investigations by newspapers and 
NGOs. The presence of strong domestic veto players caused by the remnants of la 
Françafrique was also found to play a role in obstructing normative change within 
French policy circles.  
 
Sociological institutionalism hinted at the potential role played by a better fit 
between the norm of political conditionality and DfID organisational culture, in 
comparison with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French 
Development Agency. While the analysis confirmed that the “cooperative” culture of 
French diplomats and the “banking” culture of the AFD do not offer fertile ground 
for a norm that encourages disengagement because of political concerns, the 
hypothesis did not survive the British test. Aid sanctions are not bureaucratic but 
political decisions, and it was more often the FCO than DfID to support the 
suspension of cooperation. Nevertheless, interviewees suggested that DfID 
organisational culture can help understand which are the “hard cases” for the 
application of British aid sanctions. If France finds it difficult to balance human 
rights with strategic interests, DfID find it complicated to balance human rights with 
development objectives. 
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As a synthesis of these findings, and knowingly running the risk of over-
simplification, one can conclude that while in France foreign aid is framed as 
development cooperation (as the Minister in charge of development assistance was 
called until a few years ago), in the UK it is perceived as development assistance. In 
the former case, the relationship with developing countries cannot be jeopardized by 
idiosyncratic problems (such as human rights abuses) that are best addressed through 
long-term engagement. In the latter case, disbursement of taxpayers’ money must be 
suspended or withdrawn to respond significant misbehaviour by recipient 
governments.  
 
In addition, while both countries undeniably use aid also as an instrument to foster 
their national interests (in addition to the flagship goal of reducing poverty), their 
objectives are different: local/bilateral influence for Paris, global/multilateral 
influence for London. While France aims at becoming a trusted partner to politicians 
and businessmen in recipient countries in order to play a significant role in local, 
regional and international fora, the British objective is to be perceived as a principled 
actor that follows value-based standards in order to assume a leadership role in 
global debates. A strict application of human rights conditionality obviously 
endangers the goal of the former and supports the ambition of the latter. 
 
8.2. Most important contributions to the academic literature on foreign aid, 
human rights and Europeanisation 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the academic literature of International Relations (IR) has 
addressed three important questions with respect to political conditionality. From a 
normative point of view, is it an appropriate tool of foreign policy? From a policy 
perspective, is it efficacious in bringing change within recipient countries? From an 
empirical standpoint, do states actually practice political conditionality as they 
claim? The most important contribution of this dissertation is to the research strand 
which addressed the last question.  
 
To begin with, this dissertation improved the way in which past researchers have 
assessed internalisation of political conditionality by Western donors. Quantitative 
analyses are based on limited datasets, and only focuses on behaviour. Qualitative 
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studies, like Crawford’s Foreign Aid and Political Reform and Barratt’s Human 
Rights and Foreign Aid: For Love or Money?, added the policy component. 
However, to the knowledge of the author, this dissertation is the first ever study to 
offer a fully-fledged analysis of behaviour, policies and legal documents, including 
international agreements with developing countries. Since most researchers 
recognize the importance of the human rights clause included in all EU development 
agreements, it is surprising that nobody has studied this aspect at the level of bilateral 
donors yet. 
 
The dissertation also represents the second comparative work ever to explain 
variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality between two 
Western donors. Cumming’s Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the 
Cold War to the New Millennium was published in 2001. The volume concentrated 
on the same two donors of this thesis, France and the UK, and asked whether the 
development programmes of these former colonial powers had undergone radical 
changes since the appearance of the new norm of political conditionality after the end 
of the Cold War. This dissertation advanced Cumming’s book in at least three ways. 
First, it tested new hypotheses, in line with the latest developments in Foreign Policy 
Analysis and Europeanisation research. For instance, Cumming almost overlooked 
the potential influence of international social pressures from like-minded donors and 
international organisations, including the Commonwealth and the OIF. Second, it 
expanded the time frame until 2012. In addition to the obvious advantages of an 
updated analysis, this move was  instrumental to show the decreasing importance of 
one the most important explanatory factors highlighted by Cumming, namely the 
personal and emotional Françafrique network, and to test the importance of the 
“organisational culture” hypothesis. DfID was created in 1997, when Cumming 
ended his analysis. Lastly, Cumming focused only on two former colonies, Togo and 
Kenya. This limits the external validity of his findings. This dissertation built on the 
results of past statistical studies and corroborated them through the rigorous 
examination of four cases, including two countries which are no former colonies of 
either France or UK.  
 
Besides the literature on political conditionality, this thesis contributes to 
comparative research on human rights foreign policies. It is surprising how little 
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comparative work has been produced to explain different levels of integration of 
human rights into the foreign policy of Western states. The most important books so 
far, Forsythe’s Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy and Brysk’s Global 
Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy, offered a fascinating snapshot 
of the place of human rights in world politics. However, both of them analyze a very 
wide range of states’ foreign policies (from Sweden to Costa Rica, from Russia to 
Japan). The result is that their findings are not sufficiently fine-grained to help 
understand differences between European countries (the variables highlighted in the 
two books include level of democracy, degree of trade openness and stage of 
development). This dissertation scrupulously applied the Most Similar Systems 
Design (or Mill’s Method of Difference). This offered the opportunity to delve into 
the details of British and French foreign policy decision-making and explore the 
relevance of specific factors such as organisational cultures and aid modalities.   
 
As far as Europeanisation is concerned, the dissertation built on the most recent 
works on EU Member State’s foreign policies and development programmes, and 
tested the significance of two factors widely recognized as mediating between EU 
pressure and national implementation: existence of veto points and resonance with 
domestic cultures. Both factors helped explain variation in the degree of 
internalisation of political conditionality between France and the UK. The 
Françafrique has lost its emotional appeal to French decision-makers. Yet, it has 
produced a legacy of individuals and informal networks that block any change when 
their interests are threatened, such as when Bockel announced the introduction of 
political conditionality in 2007 or when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in favour 
of suspending government-to-government development cooperation in Madagascar 
in 2009. 
 
Cultural resonance has also played an important role, specifically at the level of aid-
managing institutions. The diplomats working at the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs prefer engagement and support than disengagement and conditionality. The 
economists working at AFD do not see themselves as political actors, and reject the 
idea of introducing political considerations into the operation of an institution which 
is perceived more like a bank than like a development agency. In the British case, 
cultural resonance did not explain the level of internalisation of political 
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conditionality, but was found to be the most important factor behind the reluctance to 
apply aid sanctions to developmental state like Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
 
The most important contribution to the Europeanisation literature, however, comes 
from the findings related to the Nordic Plus Group. In their attempt to explain why 
European pressures – which on the face of it are the same for all Member States – 
result in different impacts at the national level, Europeanisation researchers have 
concentrated on domestic mediating factors, overlooking the potential role of 
international mediating factors. EU Member States participate in different 
international organisations and informal networks. The social pressures exerted 
within these groupings can significantly affect their willingness to comply with 
European “ways of doing things”. As shown in the cases of Mozambique and 
Nicaragua, Nordic donors took the leadership in the application of aid sanction, thus 
encouraging other donors to follow their example and weakening the coordinating 
role of the EU Delegation. 
 
8.3. Potential avenues for future research 
 
The most straightforward way to advance the research presented in this dissertation 
is to update its findings in a few years time. The potential of this strategy lies in 
significant recent developments, both in Brussels and in Paris. On the one hand, the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 has significantly 
strengthened the EU’s external action, raising the profile of the principles of 
democracy and human rights and reinforcing the coordinating role of the newborn 
European External Action Service. On the other hand, the Presidency of François 
Holland has shaken the foundations of French development assistance. From 
November 2012 to March 2013, Pascal Canfin, then Minister of State for 
Development (not any more “for Cooperation”!), organized an extensive consultation 
process – the French Consultations on Development Aid (les Assises du 
Développement et de la Solidarité Internationale) – with all development actors, 
including recipient government and French civil society. Moreover, in February 2014 
the National Assembly adopted a historic bill which has made French aid more 
transparent and has created significant opportunities to publicly debate aid decisions 
within the Parliament. Evidently, these evolutions offer the first important test to 
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explore the reliability of the findings of this dissertation. France is expected to 
deepen its internalisation of political conditionality in the coming years. 
 
IR researchers could also look at additional factors that can explain variation in the 
degree of internalisation of political conditionality between EU Member States. One 
suggestion is the selection of aid modalities. As seen in Chapter 7, several 
interviewees commented that loans (and not grants) create legal, financial and 
psychological obstacles to the prompt suspension of development assistance. While 
this hypothesis makes theoretical sense, it was not confirmed in the four cases studies 
analysed in this dissertation. It would be interesting to explore whether other cases 
shed further light on this issue.  
 
The level of decentralization of foreign policy decision-making can also play a 
significant role in donors’ willingness to apply aid sanctions. Almost all interviewees 
in Mozambique and Zimbabwe emphasized that the capitals usually take a stricter 
positions than the embassies. Politicians at home are afraid of being accused of 
throwing taxpayers’ money into the hand of repressive governments in far away 
countries. On the opposite, donor officials on the ground have a strong vested interest 
in keeping the money flowing. In addition, they often have a better understanding of 
the potential ineffectiveness of aid sanctions in producing change, as well as a closer 
perceptions of the needs of the poorest people, which are the first to suffer in case of 
changes in the ways in which aid is disbursed. Do similar donors with different levels 
of decentralization of their foreign policy structure usually take different positions 
when political crises arise in developing countries?  
 
A last comment is dedicated to the recent literature on the Europeanisation of EU 
Member States’ development policies. Numerous researchers have suggested that, 
given the absence of any material power of the Commission to coerce or incentivize 
European coordination of aid programmes, development cooperation is a policy area 
amenable only to socialization processes à la constructivism. This is not true. There 
are at least two reasons why rational EU Member States may decide to coordinate 
their decisions on aid sanctions. First, a common foreign policy is an instrument that 
allows EU Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively. The EU 
offers all Member States, even the largest ones, a means to increase their voice at the 
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global level. This “politics of scale effect” provides a discernible incentive for EU 
Member States to strategically harmonise their policies at the EU level. Secondly, 
Member States can use the “shield” offered by the joint EU decision-making process 
to avoid the bilateral costs of suspending or withdrawing cooperation to important 
partners. 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation explored the factors that assist or obstruct the influence of human 
rights norms on the foreign policies of EU Member States. Focusing on the specific 
case of political conditionality, it suggested that the adoption of principled foreign 
policy decisions is facilitated by strong accountability to domestic constituencies and 
social pressure from leading states. One can interpret this finding as evidence in 
favour of the rationalist insights that politicians want to maintain their job and that 
states strategically learn how to perform their functions in the most efficient way, 
and/or as a confirmation of the constructivist claims that political leaders and 
officials are enmeshed in their national culture and that states are subject to strong 
social pressures at the international level. In either case, the dissertation confirms that 
aid decision-makers are not blind to external pressure, and can be encouraged and/or 
persuaded to take human rights more seriously when considering aid sanctions.  
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
No. Role Organization Date Type 
1 Former diplomat in Mozambique  Finish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 05/09/2014 Interview 
2 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 18/03/2014 Interview 
3 Senior managemenet position Eau Vive 26/03/2014 Email 
exchange 
4 Former diplomat in Madagascar French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19/09/2014 Interview 
5 Former senior official in Nicaragua Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation 
02/09/2014 Interview 
6 Senior management position French Ministry of the Economy, 
Finances and Industry 
18/03/2014 Interview 
7 Senior management position Overseas Development Institute 31/03/2014 Interview 
8 Senior management position Survie 25/03/2014 Interview 
9 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 19/03/2014 Interview 
10 Senior management position Maplecroft 22/05/2013 Email 
exchange 
11 Former diplomat in Fiji Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
27/08/2014 Interview 
12 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 18/03/2014 Interview 
13 Diplomat in Zimbabwe Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 08/09/2014 Interview 
14 Member of Parliament House of Commons 24/03/2014 Interview 
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15 Senior management position 36th Parallel  21/08/2014 Interview 
16 Diplomat in Nicaragua British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 
29/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
17 Researcher Overseas Development Institute 22/04/2013 Email 
exchange 
18 Senior official in Nicaragua   British Department for International 
Development 
09/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
19 Former Minister Fijian Government  20/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
20 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21/03/2014 Interview 
21 Former diplomat in Zimbabwe European Commission 26/04/2013 Interview 
22 Senior management position Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute/Australian Department of 
Defence 
25/07/2014 Interview 
23 Economist French Development Agency (AFD) 17/03/2014 Interview 
24 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 19/03/2014 Interview 
25 Former official in Mozambique Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation 
25/04/2013 Email 
exchange 
26 Diplomat in Mozambique European External Action Service 26/08/2014 Interview 
27 Senior management position UK Aid Network 19/06/2014 Interview 
28 External Consultant  British Department for International 
Development 
12/09/2014 Interview 
29 Senior management position Human Rights Watch France 20/03/2014 Interview 
30 Senior management position Agencia de Informacao de 26/08/2014 Interview 
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Mozambique  
31 Former Consultant  AusAID and the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute 
21/08/2014 Interview 
32 Resaercher  British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 
21/10/2013 Interview 
33 Former diplomat in Zimbabwe  Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
30/03/2013 Email 
exchange 
34 Senior management position Overseas Development Institute 22/05/2012 Interview 
35 Senior researcher European Centre for Development 
Policy Management 
21/02/2014 Email 
exchange 
36 Senior management position British Department for International 
Development 
28/03/2014 Interview 
37 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 06/09/2014 Interview 
38 Senior management position Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance 28/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
39 Senior management position Government-Donor Budget 
Support Group in Nicaragua 
03/09/2014 Interview 
40 Senior management position Development and Cooperation -
 EuropeAid Directorate-General 
26/03/2014 Interview 
41 Researcher Mozambique Political Process 
Bulletin 
24/04/2013 Interview 
42 Senior management position Lowy Institute 31/03/2013 Email 
exchange 
43 Senior management position Coordination Sud 26/03/2014 Interview 
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44 Former Strategic Consultant Fijian government 31/03/2013 Email 
exchange 
45 Former diplomat in Burma British Foreing and Commonwealth 
Office 
10/09/2014 Interview 
46 Diplomati in Mozambique Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 26/08/2014 Interview 
47 Diplomat in Zimbabwe European External Action Service 15/09/2014 Interview 
48 Senior management position Caribbean Council 27/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
49 Former official in Nicaragua British Department for International 
Development 
10/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
50 Director of research German Development Institute 16/03/2013 Interview 
51 Diplomat in Ethiopia Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10/09/2014 Interview 
52 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17/03/2014 Interview 
53 Diplomat in Mozambique British Foreing and Commonwealth 
Office 
01/09/2014 Interview 
54 Africa Advisor  French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24/03/2014 Email 
exchange 
55 Editor Fijileaks 24/03/2013 Interview 
56 Diplomat in Madagascar European External Action Service 01/09/2014 Interview 
57 Senior management position Fiscus Limited 25/08/2014 Interview 
58 Personal Advisor to President François Hollande French Presidency of the Republic 19/03/2014 Interview 
59 Senior management position CARE France 25/03/2014 Interview 
60 Former diplomat in Nicaragua European External Action Service 28/08/2014 Interview 
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61 Former senior official in Mozambique  British Department for International 
Development 
28/03/2014 Email 
exchange 
62 Former diplomat in Mozambique European External Action Service 05/09/2014 Interview 
63 Former diplomat in Madagascar US Department of State 16/09/2014 Interview 
64 Senior management position United Nations Offices in 
Mozambique 
25/08/2014 Interview 
65 Diplomat in Mozambique Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
04/09/2014 Interview 
66 Senior management position Overseas Development Institute 17/06/2014 Email 
exchange 
67 Former diplomat in Fiji US Department of State 25/08/2014 Interview 
68 Project Director International Crisis Group 02/06/2013 Email 
exchange 
69 Policy Advisor Oxfam UK 25/06/2014 Interview 
70 Senior management position Commonwealth 13/06/2014 Interview 
71 Associate Fellow  Chatam House 27/03/2014 Interview 
72 Senior management position United Nations Offices in 
Madagascar 
12/09/2014 Interview 
73 Former Secretary of State British Department for International 
Development 
13/06/2014 Interview 
74 Analyst  British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
14/03/2014 Interview 
75 Advisor  Belgian Development Agency 24/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
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76 Senior management position Mozambican Centro de Integridade 
Publica 
26/08/2014 Interview 
77 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 24/03/2014 Interview 
78 Senior management position CCFD - Terre Solidaire 20/03/2014 Interview 
79 Senior management position Human Rights Watch UK 22/07/2014 Interview 
80 Diplomat in Cote d'Ivoire European External Action Service 08/09/2014 Interview 
81 Diplomat in Fiji New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
18/08/2014 Email 
exchange 
82 Senior Research Fellow  International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
06/03/2013 Email 
exchange 
83 Former diplomat in Fiji European External Action Service 17/08/2014 Interview 
84 Diplomat in Zimbabwe Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 09/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
85 Diplomat in Zimbabwe European External Action Service 12/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
86 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 19/03/2014 Interview 
87 Former Senior Advisor World Bank 27/05/2014 Interview 
88 Senior Advisor French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 20/03/2014 Interview 
89 Senior official in Ethiopia Irish Aid 12/09/2014 Interview 
90 Senior management position British Department for International 
Development 
19/06/2014 Interview 
91 Senior management position New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
22/08/2014 Interview 
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92 Diplomat in Zimbabwe Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 09/09/2014 Interview 
93 Diplomat in Burma/Myanmar Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15/09/2014 Interview 
94 Diplomat in Guinea British Foreing and Commonwealth 
Office 
11/09/2013 Interview 
95 Research Fellow  Overseas Development Institute 22/05/2012 Interview 
96 Senior official in Nicaragua Swedish International Development 
Agency 
12/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
97 Diplomat in Mozambique German Federal Foreign Office 28/08/2014 Interview 
98 Senior management position Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 21/08/2014 Interview 
99 Senior management position International Law and Policy 
Institute 
11/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
100 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21/03/2014 Interview 
101 Senior official in Burma/Myanmar Action Aid 22/06/2014 Email 
exchange 
102 Diplomat in Madagascar European External Action Service 01/09/2014 Interview 
103 Senior Advisor  European Centre for Development 
Policy Management 
29/07/2014 Interview 
104 Former diplomat in Fiji European External Action Service 05/09/2014 Interview 
105 Diplomat in Mozambique Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 22/08/2014 Interview 
106 Senior management position French Development Agency (AFD) 25/03/2014 Email 
exchange 
107 Diplomat in Nicaragua Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 03/09/2014 Email 
exchange 
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108 Senior management position European External Action Service 05/09/2014 Interview 
109 Senior management position OECD-DCD 17/06/2014 Email 
exchange 
110 Former diplomat in Myanmar Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 
21/06/2014 Email 
exchange 
111 Former Ambassador in Nicaragua Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15/09/2014 Interview 
112 Diplomat in Nicaragua Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10/09/2014 Interview 
113 Senior management position French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 24/03/2014 Interview 
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APPENDIX 2 
SAMPLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY 
 
My dissertation focuses on political conditionality in foreign aid, that is, the norm by 
which the allocation and disbursement of government-to-government development 
assistance should depend on respect for human rights and democratic principles by 
recipient governments.  
 
Political conditionality is not only a punitive measure of aid suspension. It is a multi-
faceted instrument. Examples of positive conditionality include, among others:  
 suspension, postponement or even cancellation of government-to-government 
assistance;  
 threats of suspension, postponement or even cancellation of government-to-
government assistance; 
 redirection of assistance from un-earmarked government-to-government 
contributions to specific social sectors (such as health and education) or NGO 
channels;  
 promises of new or increased government-to-government assistance if 
specific conditions are met (positive conditionality).  
 
The dissertation does not take any side in the normative debate between supporters 
and critics of political conditionality. Its purpose is to measure and explain – 
empirically – potential variation in the degree of internalization of the norm by the 
European Union (EU) and its Member States (in particular, France and the United 
Kingdom). The research questions are the following:  
 Do EU Member States differ in the internalization of political conditionality?  
 If so, why?  
The dissertation focuses on the period between 1997 and 2012. 
 
The thesis measures internalization of political conditionality by looking at different 
indicators, including the application (or non-application) of aid sanctions 
(suspension, redirection, threats, promises, etc.) in specific cases of human rights 
abuses and/or democratic setbacks.  
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This questionnaire focuses on the application of political conditionality by bilateral 
donors against Zimbabwe.  
 
Questionnaire 
 
1. Are there big differences among bilateral donors in their willingness to apply 
political conditionality (suspending aid, threatening suspension, redirecting aid 
through NGOs, promising increased cooperation if certain conditions are met, etc.)? 
How would you rank bilateral donors in terms of willingness to apply political 
conditionality (as well as advocating its application from other donors)? Do you have 
specific examples? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
2. Is there any group of donors which usually behave in the same way? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
3. In February 2002, the EU suspended and partially redirected its development 
assistance. Which EU Member State were more in favour of/against this decision? 
Are you aware of the positions of France and/or the UK? According to Laakso et al., 
Member States’ views on political conditionality diverged, with Nordic countries, the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK taking a hard line. France, Belgium and Spain 
were more moderate (Laakso, Liisa, Timo Kivimäki, and Maaria Seppänen. 2007. 
Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Aksant Academic Publishers). Would you agree 
with this statement? 
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*** 
 
4. The decision by the EU is not binding on Member States’ bilateral development 
assistance. Have all EU Member States suspended/redirected their bilateral 
government-to-government aid? Who was first? Who was reluctant? Is there any 
outlier (any donor which disburses government-to-government aid)? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
5. In August 2012 the EU decided to suspend the application of the appropriate 
measures adopted under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement for a period of 12 
months. Was there any EU Member State more in favour of/against this decision? 
Are you aware of the positions of France and/or the UK?  
 
 
 
*** 
 
6. Denmark is set to become the first country to once again give aid to Zimbabwe. 
Will Denmark give government-to-government aid? Is there any other bilateral donor 
which is willing to lift aid sanctions? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
7. How would you explain differences among European donors in the application of 
political conditionality? Why are some European donors more willing to apply 
political conditionality than others? 
286 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
8. Do bilateral donors formally or informally coordinate among themselves? Do 
some bilateral donors coordinate more than others (for instance, European countries, 
Nordic countries, Commonwealth countries, etc.)? Do some bilateral donors actually 
constitute a separate couple/group (they coordinate more than other, they take 
collective decisions, etc.)? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
9. The purpose of my thesis is to explain variation in the adoption (and application) 
of political conditionality by European donors. Are you aware of any additional 
information which I would profit from for this objective? Do you think that 
Zimbabwe is as a good case to show that European donors apply political 
conditionality with different consistency and strength? 
 
 
 
*** 
 
10. I know that your specific expertise focuses on Zimbabwe. However, are you 
aware of any other aid recipient which I can use a good case to show that European 
donors apply political conditionality with different consistency and strength? 
 
 
 
  
287 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abraham, Garth. “The Commonwealth, Human Rights and Zimbabwe: Trouble in 
the Family?” South African Journal of International Affairs 11, no. 1 (2004): 
147–72. 
Abrahamsson, Hans, and Anders Nilsson. Mozambique, the Troubled Transition: 
From Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism. London: Zed Books, 
1995. 
Abrams, Burton A., and Kenneth A. Lewis. “Human Rights and the Distribution of 
US Foreign Aid.” Public Choice 77, no. 4 (1993): 815–21. 
Addison, Tony, and Liisa Laakso. “The Political Economy of Zimbabwe’s Descent 
into Conflict.” Journal of International Development 15, no. 4 (2003): 457–
70. 
Adler, E. “ʻSeizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politicsʼ.” 
European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63. 
Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. “International Practices.” International Theory 
3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. 
AECID. “Spanish Response,” 2011. Public consultation on the future of EU budget 
support to third countries. 
“A Faltering Phoenix.” The Economist, July 8, 2010. 
http://www.economist.com/node/16542671. 
Agence France-Presse. “Denmark Suspends Aid to Egypt.” Global Post, August 15, 
2013. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130815/denmark-
suspends-aid-egypt. 
Aggestam, Lisbeth. “Role-Identity and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: A 
Political-Cultural Approach.” In Rethinking European Foreign Policy, edited 
by B. Tonra and T. Christiansen, 81–98. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2004. 
“Aid Row Escalates.” Africa Confidential, June 27, 2014. http://www.africa-
confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/5670/Aid_row_escalates. 
“Aid Strike in Maputo.” Africa Confidential, March 19, 2010. http://www.africa-
confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/3463/Aid_strike_in_Maputo. 
Alden, Chris. “A Separate Peace: Mozambique, State Reconstruction and the Search 
for Sustainable Democracy.” In Ending Africa’s Wars: Progressing to Peace, 
edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May, 155–78. London: Ashgate, 2006. 
———. “China in Africa.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 147–64. 
Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” 
Journal of Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63. 
Alexander, Jocelyn. Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in 
Zimbabwe 1893-2003. James Currey, 2006. 
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. Longman, 1999. 
288 
 
Almeida, Henrique. “Mugabe to Attend EU–Africa Summit, Brown to Boycot.” 
Reuters, November 27, 2007. http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/worldNews/idUSL2747890420071127? 
pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0. 
Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1950. 
Alonso, José Antonio. “Spanish Foreign Aid: Flaws of an Emerging Framework.” In 
Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: Policy and 
Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU, edited by Paul 
Hoebink and Olav Stokke, 493–513. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Alvarez, Gustavo. “Grupo de Apoyo Presupuestario Dará Importante Cooperación.” 
El Nuevo Diario, July 25, 2007. 
http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2007/07/25/economia/54578. 
Amato, Theresa A. “Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation 
and the International Trade Order.” New York University Law Review 65 
(1990): 79–91. 
Amnesty International. Zimbabwe: The Toll of Impunity, June 2002. 
Anckar, Carsten. “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the 
Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research.” International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, no. 5 (2008): 389–401. 
Anders, Gerhard. “Good Governance as Technology: Towards an Ethnography of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.” In The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in 
International Development, edited by David Mosse and David Lewis, 37–60. 
London: Pluto Press, 2005. 
Anderson, Leslie, and Lawrence Dodd. “Taking the Study of Nicaragua Politics 
Seriously: A Response to Greene on the 2008 Municipal Elections.” Journal 
of Democracy, 2009. 
http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/letters/AndersonDodd.Response.
pdf. 
Anderson, Leslie E., and Lawrence C. Dodd. “Nicaragua: Progress amid Regress?” 
Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 153–67. 
Anonymous. “Yemen: A Discomforting Neighbour.” The Economist, June 26, 1993. 
“A Painful Dilemma; Rwanda.” The Economist, August 4, 2012. 
Aphatie, Jean-Michel. “Robert Bourgi : ‘La France N’avait Pas de Candidat Au 
Gabon.’” RTL, July 9, 2009. http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/article/robert-bourgi-
la-france-n-avait-pas-de-candidat-au-gabon-video-5928146159. 
Apodaca, Clair. “US Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short 
History.” Ritsumeikan International Affairs 3 (2005): 63–80. 
Apodaca, Clair, and Michael Stohl. “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign 
Assistance.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 185–98. 
Arase, David. “Japanese Policy Towards Democracy and Human Rights in Asia.” 
Asian Survey 33 (1993): 939–52. 
289 
 
Archer, Robert. Markets and Good Government: The Way Forward for Economic 
and Social Development?. Geneva: United Nations Non-Governmental 
Liaison Service, 1994. 
Arts, Karin. Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of 
the Lomé Convention. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000. 
“A Scramble in Africa: The Future of Aid.” The Economist, September 6, 2008. 
Associated Press. “Germany Suspends Egypt Aid As World Continues To React To 
Crisis.” Huffington Post, August 16, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/16/germany-egypt-
aid_n_3767552.html. 
———. “Sweden Cuts Aid to South Africa, Nicaragua, Vietnam.” Devex, August 28, 
2007. https://www.devex.com/news/sweden-cuts-aid-to-south-africa-
nicaragua-vietnam-51573. 
Astill-Brown, Jeremy, and Markus Weimer. Mozambique: Balancing Development, 
Politics and Security. London: Chatham House, August 2010. 
Atangana Amougou, Jean-Louis. “Conditionnalité Juridique Des Aides et Respect 
Des Droits Fondamentaux.” Afrilex 2 (2001): 1–12. 
Bach, Daniel, and Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene. États et Sociétés En 
Afrique Francophone. Paris: Economica, 1993. 
Bache, Ian. “The Europeanization of Higher Education: Markets, Politics or 
Learning?” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 231–48. 
Baehr, Peter R. “Problems of Aid Conditionality: The Netherlands and Indonesia.” 
Third World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 363–76. 
Baehr, Peter R., and Monique Castermans-Holleman. The Role of Human Rights in 
Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
Bailey, Ian. “National Adaptation to European Integration: Institutional Vetoes and 
Goodness-of-Fit.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 5 (2002): 791–
811. 
Balladour, Edouard. “Une Solidarité Exigeante.” Le Monde, September 23, 1993. 
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Howard J. Wall. “Chapter 19 The Determinants of 
Aid in the Post-Cold War Era.” In Theory and Practice of Foreign Aid, edited 
by Hamid Beladi and E. Kwan Choi, 387–402. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, 2006. 
Bangura, Yusuf, and Peter Gibbon. “Adjustment, Authoritarianism and Democracy 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. An Introduction to Some Conceptual and Empirical 
Issues.” In Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of 
Economic Reform in Africa, edited by Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and 
Arve Ofstad, 7–38. Uppsala: Scandinavian Instiute for African Studies, 1992. 
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2004. 
Barratt, Bethany. “Aiding or Abetting: British Foreign Aid Decisions and Recipient 
Country Human Rights.” In Understanding Human Rights Violations, edited 
290 
 
by Sabine C. Carey and Steven C. Poe, Ashgate., 112–34. Aldershot: Ashgate 
Pub Ltd, 2004. 
———. Human Rights and Foreign Aid: For Love or Money?. London: Routledge, 
2008. 
Barsh, Russel Lawrence. “Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and 
Purpose.” Human Rights Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1993): 87–121. 
Bartels, Lorand. The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s 
Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third 
Countries. European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, 2008. 
Barya, John Jean B. “The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent 
View from Africa.” IDS Bulletin 24, no. 1 (1993): 16–23. 
Bayart, Jean-François. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. London: 
Longman, 1993. 
Baylies, Carolyn. “‘Political Conditionality’ and Democratisation.” Review of 
African Political Economy 22, no. 65 (1995): 321–37. 
Bearak, Barry. “Madagascar Political Rivals Agree to Power-Sharing Deal.” The 
New York Times, August 10, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/africa/10madagascar.html. 
———. “Party’s Power in Mozambique Is Criticized as a Barrier to Democracy.” 
The New York Times, October 27, 2009. 
Beisharati, Neissan Alessandro. Raising Mozambique: Development Through Coal. 
Policy Briefing. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International 
Affairs, September 2012. 
Bennett, A., and C. Elman. “Case Study Methods in the International Relations 
Subfield.” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 170–95. 
Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. “Aid Strategies of Bilateral Donors,” 2008. 
Bernard, Philippe. “Le départ de M. Bockel souligne les incohérences de l’Elysée.” 
Le Monde, March 21, 2008. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2008/03/21/le-depart-de-m-bockel-
souligne-les-incoherences-de-l-elysee_1025975_823448.html. 
Berthélemy, Jean-Claude. “Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development 
Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?” Review of 
Development Economics 10, no. 2 (2006): 179–94. 
Berthélemy, Jean-Claude, and Ariane Tichit. “Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation 
Decisions: A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis.” International Review of 
Economics & Finance 13, no. 3 (2004): 253–74. 
Besada, Hany, ed. Zimbabwe: Picking Up the Pieces. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010. 
Betts, Alexander, and Phil Orchard, eds. Implementation and World Politics: How 
International Norms Change Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
Biagiotti, Isabelle. “Discours Allemands et Conditionnalité Démocratique.” Politique 
Africaine, no. 60 (1995): 19–33. 
291 
 
Björkdahl, Annika. “Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 1 (2007): 135–54. 
Black, Lloyd D. The Strategy of Foreign Aid. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1968. 
Bockel, Jean-Marie. “Bourgi M’a Tué.” Le Nouvel Observateur, September 13, 
2011. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20110912.OBS0190/jean-
marie-bockel-bourgi-m-a-tuer.html. 
———. Déclaration Sur La Relation Entre La France et l’Afrique. Paris: Message 
de voeux du Secrétaire d’Etat, January 15, 2008. http://www.ambafrance-
uk.org/Declaration-de-M-Jean-Marie-Bockel. 
“Bockel Victime de Ses Positions Sur La Françafrique ?” Le Figaro, March 20, 
2008. http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2008/03/20/01002-
20080320ARTFIG00371-bockel-victime-de-ses-positions-sur-la-
francafrique-.php. 
Boekle, H., V. Rittberger, and W. Wagner. “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory.” 
In German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, 
edited by V. Rittberger, 105–37. Manchester: Manchester Univ Press, 2001. 
Boli, J., F. O Ramirez, and J. W Meyer. “Explaining the Origins and Expansion of 
Mass Education.” Comparative Education Review 29, no. 2 (1985): 145–70. 
Bollen, Kenneth A., and Pamela Paxton. “Subjective Measures of Liberal 
Democracy.” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 1 (2000): 58–86. 
Bolle, Stéphane. “La Conditionnalité Démocratique Dans La Politique Africaine de 
La France.” Afrilex, no. 2 (2001): 1–23. 
Börzel, Tanja A. “Europeanization: How the EU Interacts with Its Member States.” 
In The Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon Bulmer and 
Christian Lequesne, 32–65. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of 
Europe.” In The Politics of Europeanization, edited by Kevin Featherstone 
and Claudio Maria Radaelli, 57–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
———. “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction.” West European Politics 
35, no. 1 (Dicembre 2011): 1–19. 
———. “When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory.” West 
European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 192–207. 
Bourmaud, Daniel. “French Political Culture and African Policy: From Consensus to 
Dissensus” 50 (2000). 
http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No50/Chap5.html. 
———. “La Politique Africaine de Jacques Chirac: Les Anciens Contre Les 
Modernes.” Modern & Contemporary France 4, no. 4 (1996): 431–42. 
Bourne, Richard. Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe?. Zed Books, 2011. 
———. “The Commonwealth of Nations: Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental 
Strategies for the Protection of Human Rights in a Post-Colonial 
Association.” Sur: International Journal on Human Rights 12 (2010): 37–55. 
Bovcon, Maja. “Françafrique and Regime Theory.” European Journal of 
International Relations 19, no. 1 (2013): 5–26. 
292 
 
Bratton, Michael, and Eldred Masunungure. “Popular Reactions to State Repression: 
Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe.” African Affairs 106, no. 422 
(2007): 21–45. 
Bräutigam, Deborah. Aid Dependence and Governance. Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, 2000. 
Brech, Viktor, and Niklas Potrafke. “Donor Ideology and Types of Foreign Aid.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 42, no. 1 (2014): 61–75. 
Bretherton, Charlotte. “Development Policy.” In The Europeanization of European 
Politics, edited by Charlotte Bretherton and Michael L. Mannin, 170–97. 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
Breuning, M. “Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior 
in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.” International Studies 
Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 235–54. 
“Britain: Changed by Short, Not Shortchanged.” The Economist, July 17, 2004. 
Brodin, Anna. “Getting Politics Right: Democracy Promotion as a New Conflict 
Issue in Foreign Aid Policy.” Göteborgs Universitet, 2000. 
Brommesson, Douglas. “Normative Europeanization: The Case of Swedish Foreign 
Policy Reorientation.” Cooperation and Conflict 45, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 
224–44. 
Browne, Stephen. The Rise and Fall of Development Aid. Working Paper. Helsinki: 
UNU/WIDER, 1997. 
Browning, Christopher S. “Branding Nordicity Models, Identity and the Decline of 
Exceptionalism.” Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 1 (2007): 27–51. 
Brown, Stephen. “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa.” 
The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 2 (2005): 179–98. 
Brown, Stephen, and Rosalind Raddatz. “Dire Consequences or Empty Threats? 
Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya.” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 43–62. 
Brummer, Klaus. “Imposing Sanctions: The Not So ‘Normative Power Europe.’” 
European Foreign Affairs Review 14, no. 2 (2009): 191–207. 
Bruschi, Francesca. “Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid Dependence to 
Development Effectiveness?” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 9–
10. 
Brütsch, Christian. “Technocratic Manager, Imperial Agent, or Diplomatic 
Champion? The IMF in the Anarchical Society.” Review of International 
Studies 40, no. 02 (2014): 207–26. 
Brysk, Alison. “Making Values Make Sense: The Social Construction of Human 
Rights Foreign Policy.” Journal for Human Rights [Zeitschrift Fur 
Menschenrechte] 2 (2007): 69–80. 
Brysk, Allison. Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
293 
 
Bucuane, Aurélio, and Peter Mulder. Exploring Natural Resources in Mozambique, 
Will It Be a Blessing or a Curse?. Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e 
Economicos, September 2007. 
Bulmer, Simon J., and Claudio M. Radaelli. The Europeanisation of National 
Policy?. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation. Belfast: Queens University, 
2004. http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/queens/p0042.html. 
Burgerman, Susan. “Mobilizing Principles: The Role of Transnational Activists in 
Promoting Human Rights Principles.” Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 4 
(1998): 905–23. 
Burkhardt, Paul. “Mozambique Donors May Delay Aid Pending Tuna Bond 
Clarification.” Bloomberg, November 15, 2013. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/mozambique-donors-may-
delay-aid-pending-tuna-bond-clarification.html. 
Burnell, Peter J. Foreign Aid in a Changing World. Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1997. 
———. “Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and 
Political Conditionality.” Democratization 1, no. 2 (1994): 485–503. 
Bursens, Peter, and Jana Deforche. “Europeanization of Subnational Polities: The 
Impact of Domestic Factors on Regional Adaptation to European 
Integration.” Regional & Federal Studies 18, no. 1 (2008): 1–18. 
Bush, Ray, and Morris Szeftel. “Editorial: Sovereignty, Democracy & Zimbabwe’s 
Tragedy.” Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 91 (2002): 5–20. 
Caldecott, Julian, Fred van Sluijs, Benicia Aguilar, and Anu Lounela. Evaluation 
Report: Country Programme between Finland and Nicaragua. Helsinki: 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012. 
“Cameron Threat to Dock Some UK Aid to Anti-Gay Nations.” BBC News, October 
30, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15511081. 
Campbell, Duncan. “Commonwealth Suspends Fiji after Coup.” The Guardian, 
December 9, 2006. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/09/politics.fiji. 
Canning, Paul. “International Pressure on Anti-Gay Laws in Africa Must Not Stop.” 
The Guardian, April 20, 2011. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/20/anti-gay-
laws-africa-uganda-ssempa. 
Carayol, Rémi. “Tiko, L’empire Démantelé de Ravalomanana.” Jeune Afrique, 
November 24, 2009. 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2550p084-085.xml1/. 
Carbone, Giovanni M. “Continuidade Na Renovação? Ten Years of Multiparty 
Politics in Mozambique: Roots, Evolution and Stabilisation of the Frelimo-
Renamo Party System.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 03 
(2005): 417–42. 
Carbone, Maurizio. The European Union and International Development: The 
Politics of Foreign Aid. Psychology Press, 2007. 
294 
 
———. “The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-Ordination.” Third 
World Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2010): 13–29. 
Carbone, Maurizio, and Jan Orbie. “The Europeanization of Development Policy.” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, forthcoming. 
Carey, Sabine C. “European Aid: Human Rights Versus Bureaucratic Inertia?” 
Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 4 (2007): 447–64. 
Carleton, David, and Michael Stohl. “The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric 
and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan.” Human Rights Quarterly 
7, no. 2 (1985): 205–29. 
———. “The Role of Human Rights in US Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique 
and Reappraisal.” American Journal of Political Science 31, no. 4 (1987): 
1002–18. 
Carlsson, Gunilla. Supporting Democracy: Highlighting the Political Dimension of 
International Development Cooperation. Opening address by the Swedish 
Minister for Development Cooperation. Challenges to Democracy Building. 
Stockholm: International IDEA, May 28, 2007. 
Carothers, Thomas. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1999. 
———. “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” Journal of 
Democracy 20, no. 1 (2009): 5–19. 
Castle, Stephen. “Anger over Visa for Zimbabwe Minister.” The Independent, 
September 26, 2002. 
Cawthra, Gavin. The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict. 
Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Mozambique, 2010. 
Chafer, Tony. “Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?” African 
Affairs 101, no. 404 (2002): 343–63. 
Chafer, Tony, and Gordon Cumming. “Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security 
Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo.” International Affairs 86, no. 5 
(2010): 1129–47. 
———. “Cinquante ans de politique africaine de la France.” Afrique contemporaine 
235, no. 3 (2010): 53–62. 
Chafer, Tony, and Gordon D. Cumming. “Introduction.” In From Rivalry to 
Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa, edited by Tony 
Chafer and Gordon Cumming, 3–12. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. 
Chan, Stephen. Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2003. 
Chan, Stephen, and Okoth F. Mudhai. “Commonwealth Residualism and the 
Machinations of Power in a Turbulent Zimbabwe.” Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics 39, no. 3 (2001): 51–74. 
Chapman, James. “Britain’s Foreign Aid Madness: Cuts at Home, but We Still Hand 
out More than Every Other G8 Country.” The Daily Mail, June 18, 2013. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2343683/Britains-foreign-aid-
madness-Cuts-home-STILL-hand-G8-country.html. 
295 
 
Chase, Simon. “France Must Not Ignore the Repression in Zimbabwe.” The 
Guardian, January 22, 2007. 
Checkel, Jeffrey. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework.” International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 801–26. 
———. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.” 
International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 84–114. 
———. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” 
International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 553–88. 
Chikwanha, Annie Barbara. The Trajectory of Human Rights Violations in 
Zimbabwe. ISS Paper 202. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 
2009. 
Choi, Wooseon. “Structural Realism and Dulles’s China Policy.” Review of 
International Studies 38, no. 01 (2012): 119–40. 
CICID. Doctrine D’emploi Des Aides Budgétaires Globales Dans Les États 
Étrangères. Paris: French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2007. 
Cilliers, Jakkie. “Still...France versus the Rest in Africa?” African Security Review 
10, no. 3 (2001): 123–26. 
Cingranelli, David L., and Thomas E. Pasquarello. “Human Rights Practices and the 
Distribution of US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries.” American 
Journal of Political Science 29, no. 3 (1985): 539–63. 
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Data Project.” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2010): 401–
24. 
Clark, Ann Marie. “Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on 
International Society.” Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 507–
25. 
Clark, Ian. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
Clark, Ross. “Britain Leads the Way in Foreign Aid - Unfortunately.” The Daily 
Express, June 19, 2013. 
http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/408548/Britain-leads-
the-way-in-foreign-aid-unfortunately. 
Claude, Richard P., and Thomas B. Jabine. “Exploring Human Rights Issues with 
Statistics.” In Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, 
edited by Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude, 5–34. University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992. 
Clinton, William J. “Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” March 24, 
1999. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57305#axzz1IY5zXl7P. 
Clist, Paul. “25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?” World 
Development 39, no. 10 (Ottobre 2011): 1724–34. 
Clover, Jenny. “Rwanda’s Kagame Defiant over Accusations of Backing Congo 
Rebels.” Reuters. October 4, 2012. 
296 
 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/us-rwanda-congo-democratic-
idUSBRE89315020121004. 
Cohn, Carol. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs 
12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718. 
Coles, John. Making Foreign Policy: A Certain Idea of Britain. London: John 
Murray, 2000. 
Coltart, David. A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic Collapse and 
Political Repression under Robert Mugabe. Development Policy Analysis. 
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, March 24, 2008. 
http://www.cato.org/publications/development-policy-analysis/decade-
suffering-zimbabwe-economic-collapse-political-repression-under-robert-
mugabe. 
“Commonwealth ‘Fudging Must End.’” BBC News, March 6, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1858290.stm. 
Commonwealth of Nations. Harare Commonwealth Declaration, October 20, 1991. 
———. Millbrook Commonwealth Action Plan on the Harare Declaration, 
November 12, 1995. 
“Communiqué Du Secrétaire Général: Le Conseil Permanent de La Francophonie 
Suspend Madagascar.” OIF, April 2, 2009. http://www.francophonie.org/Le-
Conseil-permanent-de-la-28269.html. 
Compagnon, Daniel. A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of 
Zimbabwe. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 
Connolly, Lesley. The Troubled Road to Peace: Reflections on the Complexities of 
Resolving the Political Impasse in Madagascar. Policy & Practice Brief. 
Durban: South Africa: ACCORD, February 2013. 
http://www.accord.org.za/publications/policy-practice-briefs/1058-the-
troubled-road-to-peace. 
“Construction Navale: Les Présidents Français et Mozambicain À Cherbourg.” Radio 
France Internationale, September 30, 2013. 
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130930-president-france-mozambique-cherbourg-
construction-navale-cnm/. 
Corbet, Sylvie, and Angela Charlton. “France-Mozambique Ship Deal Raises 
Questions.” Contra Costa Times, September 30, 2013. 
http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_24204798/french-ship-deal-
mozambique-raises-questions. 
Corrales, Javier, and Richard Feinberg. “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western 
Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions.” International 
Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 1–36. 
Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis. “How Do International Institutions Matter? 
The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms.” International 
Studies Quarterly, no. 40 (1996): 451–78. 
———. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research 
Agenda.” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 65–87. 
297 
 
———. “When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s 
Internalisation of the GATT/WTO.” Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 
(2005): 3–25. 
Council of Ministers of Development Cooperation. Resolution on Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development. Brussels, November 28, 1991. 
Council of the European Union. Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: 
An Agenda  for Change. Brussels: 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
May 14, 2012. 
———. The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries. Brussels, 
May 14, 2012. 
Council of the European Union, European Commission, and European Parliament. 
European Consensus on Development, 2005. 
COWI. Barriers to Delegated  Cooperation: Joint Assessment of Policies and 
Administrative Pratcises of the Nordic Plus Donors. Oslo: Norad, September 
2006. 
———. Nordic Plus: Practical Guide to Delegated Cooperation. Oslo: Norad, 
January 2007. 
Cowles, Maria Green, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Syracuse, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
Crawford, Gordon. “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness 
and Consistency.” Democratization 4, no. 3 (1997): 69–108. 
———. Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy 
Assistance and Political Conditionality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001. 
———. Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through 
Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern 
Donors. Leeds: Centre for Democratization Studies, University of Leeds, 
1996. 
Cullinan Hoffman, Matthew. “Sweden Cuts Aid to Countries That Oppose Its Pro-
Abortion Stance.” LifeSiteNews, August 31, 2007. 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/sweden-cuts-aid-to-countries-that-oppose-
its-pro-abortion-stance. 
Cumming, Gordon. Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to 
the New Millennium. Ashgate, 2001. 
———. “Britain and France in Africa since Saint-Malo: Towards an Uneasy 
Partnership.” In From Rivalry to Partnership: New Approaches to the 
Challenges of Africa, edited by Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, 55–72. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. 
———. “Nicolas Sarkozy’s Africa Policy: Change, Continuity or Confusion?” 
French Politics 11, no. 1 (2013): 24–47. 
———. “UK African Policy in the Post Cold War Era: From Realpolitik to 
Moralpolitik?” Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Politics 42, no. 1 
(2004): 106–28. 
298 
 
Cumming, Gordon, and Tony Chafer. “From Rivalry to Partnership? Critical 
Reflections on Anglo-French Cooperation in Africa.” Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 5 (2011): 2439–63. 
Cunguara, Benedito. “An Exposition of Development Failures in Mozambique.” 
Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 131 (2012): 161–70. 
Cunguara, Benedito, and Joseph Hanlon. “Whose Wealth Is It Anyway? 
Mozambique’s Outstanding Economic Growth with Worsening Rural 
Poverty.” Development and Change 43, no. 3 (2012): 623–47. 
Cuvilas, Carlos A., Roel Jirjis, and Carlos Lucas. “Energy Situation in Mozambique: 
A Review.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14, no. 7 (2010): 
2139–46. 
DAC Secretariat. “Technical Guide to Terms and Data in the Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) Aid Activities Database.” OECD, 2013. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.htm. 
Dahl, Ann-Sofie. “Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral 
Superpower?” International Journal 61, no. 4 (2006): 895–908. 
Davidson, Lorna, and Raj Purohit. “Zimbabwean Human Rights Crisis: A 
Collaborative Approach to International Advocacy, The.” Yale Human Rights 
& Development Law Journal 7 (2004): 108–29. 
Davis, Graham. “French Aid in Fiji Floods Shows Way to Pacific Neighbours.” 
Www.pacific.scoop.co.nz, February 12, 2012. 
http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2012/02/french-aid-in-fiji-flooding-shows-way-to-
pacific-neighbours/. 
De Araújo, Manuel. “MOZAMBIQUE 160: News Reports & Clippings,” March 25, 
2010. http://manueldearaujo.blogspot.it/2010/03/mozambique-160-news-
reports-clippings.html. 
“Death to Françafrique?” The Economist, January 21, 2008. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2008/01/death_to_fra
ncafrique. 
Del Biondo, Karen, and Jan Orbie. “The European Commission’s Implementation of 
Budget Support and the Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia: 
Democracy Promoter or Developmental Donor?” Third World Quarterly 35, 
no. 3 (2014): 411–27. 
Dellepiane, Sebastian, Jörg Faust, and Nadia Molenaers. “Political Conditionality 
and Development Cooperation: A Third Wave of Academic Research?” 
World Development, forthcoming. 
Delputte, Sarah, and Jan Orbie. “The EU and Donor Coordination on the Ground: 
Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia.” European Journal of Development 
Research, 2014, online. 
Delputte, Sarah, and Fredrik Söderbaum. “European Aid Coordination in Africa: Is 
the Commission Calling the Tune?” In The European Union and Global 
Development: An “Enlightened Superpower” in the Making?, edited by 
Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm, and Davina Makhan, 37–56. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
299 
 
Deltombe, Thomas. “La France, Acteur-Clé de La Crise Malgache.” Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 2012. http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/2012/03/DELTOMBE/47470. 
De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Randolph M. Siverson, James D. Morrow, and Alastair 
Smith. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
2005. 
De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. “A Political Economy of Aid.” 
International Organization 63, no. 2 (2009): 309–40. 
De Renzio, Paolo, and Joseph Hanlon. “Contested Sovereignty in Mozambique: The 
Dilemmas of Aid Dependence.” In The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for 
Dealing with Donors, edited by Lindsay Whitfield, 246–70. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
http://transparentsea.co/images/c/cd/Derenzio_and_Hanlon_Mozambique_pa
per_rev_120107.pdf. 
D’ Ersu, Laurent. “Changement d’homme providentiel à Madagascar.” Études 411, 
no. 11 (2009): 451–61. 
Development Finance International. Sweden: Profile, September 18, 2009. 
Development Strategies. EU Donor Atlas 2006: Mapping Official Development 
Assistance. Brussels: European Commission and OECD, February 2006. 
De Villepin, Xavier. “La politique française en Afrique à l’aube du nouveau siècle.” 
Revue internationale et stratégique 46, no. 2 (2002): 143–48. 
Dewar, Bob, Simon Massey, and Bruce Baker. Madagascar: Time to Make a Fresh 
Start. AFP 2013/01. London: Chatham House, January 2013. 
DfID. Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century. London, 1997. 
———. Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. 
London, 2000. 
———. Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor. 
London, 2006. 
———. Guidance Note: The Partnership Principles. London, March 2014. 
———. How to Note: Implementing the UK’s Conditionality Policy. London, 2009. 
———. Implementing DFID’s Strengthened Approach to Budget Support: Technical 
Note. London, 2011. 
———. Partnership for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality. London, 
2005. 
———. Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID Policy Paper. London, 2008. 
D’Hollander, David, Axel Marx, and Jan Wouters. Integrating Human Rights in EU 
Development Cooperation Policy: Achievements and Challenges. Leuven, 
Belgium: Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, April 2014. 
———. Integrating Human Rights in EU Development Cooperation Policy: A 
Comparative Assessment of Strategies and Practices of Donors. Leuven, 
Belgium: Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, April 2014. 
300 
 
Dietrich, Simone. “Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign 
Aid Allocation.” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2012): 698–712. 
Dijkstra, Geske. “Governance or Poverty Reduction? Assessing Budget Support in 
Nicaragua.” Journal of Development Studies 49, no. 1 (2012): 110–24. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “Introduction.” In The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by Paul J. DiMaggio and 
Walter W. Powell, 1–41. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Dingwerth, Klaus, and Philipp Pattberg. “World Politics and Organizational Fields: 
The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance.” European Journal of 
International Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 707–43. 
Directorate-General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships. Development 
Cooperation: A French Vision. Paris: French Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs, 2011. 
Dollar, David, and Victoria Levin. “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-
2003.” World Development 34, no. 12 (2006): 2034–46. 
Donnelly, Jack. “An Overview.” In Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, 
edited by David P. Forsythe, 310–34. Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 2000. 
———. “Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing 
Concerns?” World Politics 36, no. 2 (1984): 255–83. 
———. “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis.” International 
Organization 40, no. 3 (1986): 599–642. 
———. “Realism.” In Theories of International Relations, edited by Scott Burchill, 
Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, 
Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True, 29–54. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005. 
———. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003. 
“Donors Cut Maputo Aid over Graft.” Agence France-Presse, June 15, 2014. 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-16268-
Donors+cut+Maputo+aid+over+graft/news.aspx. 
“Donor Strike May Be Nearing Its End.” Club of Mozambique, March 18, 2010. 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=moza
mbique&id=17792&tipo=one. 
“Donors up in Arms.” Africa Confidential, February 7, 2014. http://www.africa-
confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/5200/Donors_up_in_arms. 
Doornbos, Martin. “‘Good Governance’: The Rise and Decline of a Policy 
Metaphor?.” Journal of Development Studies 37, no. 6 (2001): 93–108. 
Dorman, Sara Rich. “‘Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time’: The Politics of 
Elections and Election Observing in Zimbabwe.” Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics 43, no. 2 (2005): 155–77. 
“Down with War.” The Economist, November 5, 1998. 
301 
 
Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. “Does US Aid Buy UN 
General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis.” Public Choice 136, 
no. 1–2 (2008): 139–64. 
Dudley, Leonard, and Claude Montmarquette. “A Model of the Supply of Bilateral 
Foreign Aid.” The American Economic Review 66, no. 1 (1976): 132–42. 
Dunér, Bertil. “Swedish  Development  Policy and  Human  Rights.” In Human 
Rights in Developing Countries: 1990 Yearbook, edited by Bard-Anders 
Andreassen and Theresa Swinehart, 19–25. Strasbourg: Kehl, 1990. 
“Dutch Call on Aid Recipients to Improve Gay Rights.” Reuters, November 7, 2007. 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/11/07/us-dutch-gayrights-
idINL0772993720071107. 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Budget Support: Conditional Results. IOB 
Evaluation. The Hague: Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, 2012. 
Dyson, Kenneth. “EMU as Europeanisation: Convergence, Diversity and 
Contingency.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 4 (2000): 645–66. 
Eberstadt, Nick. Foreign Aid and American Purpose. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 
1989. 
Ebolo, Martin Dieudonné. “L’implication Des Puissances Occidentales Dans Les 
Processus de Démocratisation En Afrique: Analyse Des Actions Américaine 
et Française Au Cameroun (1989–1997).” Polis/R.C.S.P./C.P.S.R. 6, no. 2 
(1998): 21–48. 
EEAS. “EU Relations with Fiji.” European External Action Service, July 18, 2014. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/fiji/index_en.htm. 
Egeland, Jan. “Ethiopia: Letter Regarding UK Development Assistance.” Human 
Rights Watch, September 29, 2011. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/29/ethiopia-letter-regarding-uk-
development-assistance. 
———. “Human Rights. Ineffective Big States, Potent Small States.” Journal of 
Peace Research 21, no. 3 (1984): 207–13. 
Egreteau, Renaud. “Intra-European Bargaining and the ‘Tower of Babel’ EU 
Approach to the Burmese Conundrum.” East Asia 27, no. 1 (2010): 15–33. 
Elman, C. “Horses for Courses: Why No Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” 
Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–53. 
Emmanuel, Nikolas. “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of 
Political Conditionality.” Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 856–77. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s 
Lives. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000. 
Eriksson, Mikael. Targeting the Leadership of Zimbabwe: A Path to Democracy and 
Normalization?. Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2007. 
Ero, Comfort. “A Critical Assessment of Britain’s Africa Policy.” Conflict, Security 
& Development 1, no. 2 (2001): 51–71. 
302 
 
Escribano, Gonzalo, and Alejandro Lorca. “The Ups and Downs of Europeanisation 
in External Relations: Insights from the Spanish Experience.” Perceptions, 
Winter 2004, 131–59. 
Eurobarometer. Making a Difference in the World: Europeans and the Future of 
Development Aid, November 2011. 
“Euro-MPs Attack Belgium over Zimbabwean Ministers.” Reuters, November 21, 
2002. http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/nov23_2002.html#link17. 
European Commission. “Communication on the European Union and the External 
Dimension of Human Rights Polict: From Rome to Maastricht and beyond.” 
COM(95) 567 final, November 22, 1995. 
———. European Development Days Proceedings. Warsaw, December 15, 2011. 
———. Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change. 
COM(2011) 637 final, 2011. 
———. The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries. 
COM(2011) 638 final, October 13, 2011. 
———. The Future of EU Budget Support to Third Countries, October 13, 2011. 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/budget-
support/documents/future_eu_budget_support_en.pdf. 
European Council. Declaration on Human Rights. Luxembourg, June 29, 1991. 
European Parliament. Report on the Communication from the Commission on the 
Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in 
Agreements between the Community and Third Countries. Brussels, June 26, 
1996. 
———. Resolution on the Situation in Zimbabwe. B5-0592/2001. Brussels, 
September 6, 2001. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P5-RC-2001-0549+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
“Europe Reconsiders Uganda Aid Following Anti-Gay Law.” EurActiv, February 28, 
2014. http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-development-aid-
uganda-hangs-news-533810. 
“EU Suspends Development Operations in Mali.” Reuters, March 23, 2012. 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSBRE82M0HS20120323. 
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. Double-Edged 
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of 
California Press, 1993. 
Exadaktylos, Theofanis. “Europeanization of Foreign Policy beyond the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.” In Research Design in European Studies: 
Establishing Causality in Europeanization, edited by Theofanis Exadaktylos 
and Claudio M. Radaelli, 195–220. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
“Exclusión Política Alerta a Cooperantes.” La Prensa, June 21, 2008. 
http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/667619-97/exclusi%C3%B3n-
pol%C3%ADtica-alerta-a-cooperantes. 
303 
 
Eyre, Daniel P., and Malcolm M. Suchman. “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of 
Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach.” In The Culture 
of National Security, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 79–113. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
Falk, Richard. “Human Rights.” Foreign Policy, no. 141 (April 2004): 18–28. 
Farrell, Theo. “Figuring out Fighting Organisations: The New Organisational 
Analysis in Strategic Studies.” Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 1 (1996): 
122–35. 
———. “Transnational Norms and Military Development.” European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 63–102. 
Farrell, Theo, and Terry Terriff. The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, 
Technology. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 
Faust, J., S. Leiderer, and J. Schmitt. “Financing Poverty Alleviation vs. Promoting 
Democracy? Multi-Donor Budget Support in Zambia.” Democratization 19, 
no. 3 (2012): 438–64. 
Faust, Jörg. “Are More Democratic Donor Countries More Development Oriented? 
Domestic Institutions and External Development Promotion in OECD 
Countries.” World Development 36, no. 3 (2008): 383–98. 
Faust, Jörg, Stefan Leiderer, and Johannes Schmitt. “Financing Poverty Alleviation 
vs. Promoting Democracy? Multi-Donor Budget Support in Zambia.” 
Democratization 19, no. 3 (2012): 438–64. 
Favell, Adrian. “The Europeanisation of Immigration Politics.” European Integration 
Online Papers 2, no. 10 (1998). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302731. 
Fearon, James D. “What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word).” manuscript, 
Stanford University, 1999. 
Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 52–72. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2002. 
Featherstone, Kevin, and Claudio M. Radaelli, eds. The Politics of Europeanization. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Ferguson, J. A. “The Third World.” In Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and 
Responses, edited by R. J. Vincent, 203–26. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. 
Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu. “A Panel Data Analysis of the 
Fungibility of Foreign Aid.” The World Bank Economic Review 12, no. 1 
(1998): 29–58. 
Fierro, Elena. The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003. 
“Fiji Suspended from Commonwealth.” The Fiji Times, December 9, 2006. 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/december/12-11-fj01.htm. 
304 
 
Finnemore, Martha. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science 
Policy.” International Organization 47, no. 04 (1993): 565–97. 
———. “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s 
Institutionalism.” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325–47. 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. 
Fisher, Jonathan. “From ‘Mission Conditionality’ to ‘PR Conditionality’: The 
Changing Political Economy of Political Conditionality.” World 
Development, forthcoming. 
Fleck, Robert K., and Christopher Kilby. “How Do Political Changes Influence US 
Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data.” Review of 
Development Economics 10, no. 2 (2006): 210–23. 
Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 3 (1996): 363–89. 
Fontanella-Khan, James, Abeer Allam, and James Politi. “EU Considers Suspension 
of €5bn in Aid to Egypt.” Financial Times, August 18, 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d7381334-07f8-11e3-badc-00144feabdc0.html. 
Foresti, Marta. “Human Rights as Conditions for Aid: How Long Is a Piece of 
String?” Left Foot Forward, January 5, 2012. 
http://www.leftfootforward.org/2012/01/debate-on-human-rights-as-
conditions-for-aid/. 
Foresti, Marta, David Booth, and Tammie O’Neil. Aid Effectiveness and Human 
Rights: Strengthening the Implementation of the Paris Declaration. London: 
ODI, 2006. 
http://www.redenderechos.org/webdav/publico/Aid%20effectiveness%20and
%20human%20rights.pdf. 
Forsythe, David P. “Congress and Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: The Fate of 
General Legislation.” Human Rights Quarterly 9 (1987): 382–401. 
———. , ed. Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy. Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2000. 
———. Human Rights in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
———. “Introduction.” In Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, edited 
by David P. Forsythe, 1–24. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000. 
———. The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward. 
Lincoln: Univ of Nebraska Press, 2000. 
Fraser, Alastair. “Zambia: Back to the Future?” In The Politics of Aid: African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors, edited by Lindsay Whitfield, 299–328. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
“Freedom in the World 2014: Methodology.” Freedom House, 2014. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology. 
305 
 
French Embassy in South Africa. “Exercise Oxide,” March 31, 2014. 
http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Exercise-Oxide. 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Fiji Islands: Political Relations.” France-
Diplomatie, February 22, 2012. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
files/fiji-islands/. 
———. “Political Relations with Madagascar.” France Diplomatie, May 19, 2012. 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/madagascar-273/france-and-
madagascar/political-relations-6077/. 
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. Governance Strategy for French 
Development Assistance. Paris, 2006. 
———. Réponse de La France Au Livre Vert de La Commission Européenne: 
L’appui Budgétaire de l’UE En Faveur Des Pays Tiers, January 2011. 
http://www.sgae.gouv.fr/webdav/site/sgae/shared/04_Consultations_publique
s/201104/20110202_ReponseFR_Livre_vert_aide_budgetaire_pays_tiers.pdf. 
French Parliament. Politique Française En Faveur Du Développement. Document de 
politique transversale. Paris, 2008. 
Frey, Bruno F., and Friedrich Schneider. “Competing Models of International 
Lending Activity.” Journal of Development Economics 20, no. 2 (1986): 
225–45. 
Frieden, Jeffrey. “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.” In Strategic 
Choice and International Relations, edited by David A. Lake and Robert 
Powell, 39–76. Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Friends of Zimbabwe. Communiqué. London: UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, 
March 26, 2013. 
———. The Brussels Statement. Brussels: EEAS, June 28, 2011. 
Frindéthié, K. Martial. Globalization and the Seduction of Africa’s Ruling Class: An 
Argument for a New Philosophy of Development. McFarland, 2010. 
Furuoka, Fumitaka. “Human Rights Conditionality and Aid Allocation: Case Study 
of Japanese Foreign Aid Policy.” Perspectives on Global Development and 
Technology 4, no. 2 (2005): 125–46. 
Gabas, Jean-Jacques. “French Development Co-Operation Policy.” In Perspectives 
on European Development Co-Operation: Policy and Performance of 
Individual Donor Countries and the EU, edited by Paul Hoebink and Olav 
Stokke, 242–66. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Galibert, Didier. “Mobilisation populaire et répression à Madagascar.” Politique 
africaine 113, no. 1 (2009): 139–51. 
Gallagher, Julia. “Britain and Africa: Time to Put the Politics Back in.” African 
Arguments, July 10, 2013. http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/10/britain-
and-africa-putting-the-politics-back-in-%E2%80%93-by-julia-gallagher/. 
———. Britain and Africa Under Blair: In Pursuit of the Good State. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2011. 
———. “Britain’s Idealisation of Africa: Is ‘Doing Good’ Good Enough?.” 
Development Viewpoint 38 (2009): 1. 
306 
 
———. “Can Melanie Klein Help Us Understand Morality in IR? Suggestions for a 
Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Why and How States Do Good.” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2009): 295–316. 
———. “Royaume-Uni/Zimbabwe: repenser les plaies de la colonisation ?” 
Alternatives Internationales 51, no. 6 (2011): 54–54. 
———. “Ruthless Player or Development Partner? Britain’s Ambiguous Reaction to 
China in Africa.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 05 (2011): 2293–
2310. 
Gallagher, Katherine. “Civil Litigation and Transnational Business An Alien Tort 
Statute Primer.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, no. 3 (July 1, 
2010): 745–67. 
Gang, Ira N., and James A. Lehman. “New Directions or Not: USAID in Latin 
America.” World Development 18, no. 5 (1990): 723–32. 
Garcia, Antonio. “Ravalomanana Renforce Ses Pouvoirs et Adopte L’anglais.” Radio 
France Internationale, April 5, 2007. 
http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/088/article_50842.asp. 
Gary, Thomas. “Afghan Prisoner Abuse Could Trigger Some Aid Suspension.” 
Voice of America, October 10, 2011. 
http://www.voanews.com/content/article/168105.html. 
Gaskarth, Jamie. “Ethical Policies or Empty Promises? New Labour and Human 
Rights in British Foreign Policymaking.” The International Journal of 
Human Rights 10, no. 1 (2006): 45–60. 
Gastil, Raymond D. “The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and 
Suggestions.” Studies In Comparative International Development 25, no. 1 
(1990): 25–50. 
Gates, Scott, and Anke Hoeffler. Global Aid Allocation: Are Nordic Donors 
Different?. CSAE WPS/2004-34, December 2004. 
Gattegno, Hervé. “L’homme Qui a Tué Bockel.” Le Point, March 27, 2008. 
http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-politique/2008-03-27/l-homme-qui-a-tue-
bockel/917/0/232476. 
Gegout, Catherine. “EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an 
International Actor.” Ethnopolitics 8, no. 3–4 (2009): 403–15. 
German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation. “Madagascar.” GIZ, 
February 12, 2014. http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/322.html. 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Madagascar.” Auswärtiges Amt, February 12, 
2014. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-
Nodes/Madagascar_node.html. 
Germany. “German Response,” 2011. Public consultation on the future of EU budget 
support to third countries. 
Giannone, Diego. “Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of 
Democracy: The Freedom House Case.” Democratization 17, no. 1 (2010): 
68–97. 
307 
 
Gibbon, Peter. “The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid.” The European 
Journal of Development Research 5, no. 1 (1993): 35–62. 
Gibert, Marie V. Monitoring a Region in Crisis: The European Union in West Africa. 
Chaillot Paper. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, January 2007. 
Gibney, Mark, and Matthew Dalton. “The Political Terror Scale.” Policy Studies and 
Developing Nations 4, no. 1 (1996): 73–84. 
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987. 
Glennie, Jonathan. “Should Donors Give Money to Countries with Poor Human 
Rights?” The Guardian, November 11, 2011, sec. Global development. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/nov/11/donor-money-tied-to-human-rights. 
Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some 
Conceptual and Measurement Issues.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 
4 (1992): 634–64. 
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework.” In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political 
Change, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 3–30. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Goldstein, Markus P., and Todd J. Moss. “Compassionate Conservatives or 
Conservative Compassionates? US Political Parties and Bilateral Foreign 
Assistance to Africa.” Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 7 (2005): 
1288–1302. 
Goldstein, Robert Justin. “The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying 
Human Rights Abuses.” Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 607–27. 
Gomes Porto, Jomes. “Multipronged Strategies for a Multifaceted Crisis? A Critical 
Reflection on EU Policy towards Zimbabwe.” In The European Union and 
Global Development: An “Enlightened Superpower” in the Making?, edited 
by Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm, and Davina Makhan, 190–210. Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Gosparini, Paola, Rebecca Carter, Mike Hubbard, Andrew Nickson, and Lola Ocón 
Núñez. Evaluation of General Budget Support: Nicaragua Country Report. 
University of Birmingham: International Development Department, May 
2006. 
Gounin, Yves. “Not Your Father’s Françafrique.” Foreign Policy, July 13, 2010. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/13/not_your_father_s_francaf
rique?wp_login_redirect=0. 
“Government and Donors Claim Consensus.” Agencia de Informacao de 
Mocambique, March 24, 2010. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003241054.html. 
Government of Denmark. Guidelines for Agreements on Development Cooperation. 
Copenhagen, June 2010. 
Government of the Republic of Mozambique, and Programme Aid Partners. 
Memorandum of Understanding. Maputo: World Bank, March 2009. 
308 
 
Graham, R. “Chirac Seeks to Widen French Role in Africa.” Financial Times, 
February 20, 2003. 
Grebe, Jan. “And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted 
Sanctions against Zimbabwe/Und Sie Sanktionieren Weiter: Zur Wirksamkeit 
Zielgerichteter Sanktionen Gegen Simbabwe.” Africa Spectrum 45, no. 1 
(2010): 3–29. 
Greene, Samuel R. “Learning the Wrong Lessons about Nicaraguan Democracy: A 
Response to Anderson and Dodd.” Journal of Democracy, 2009. 
http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/letters/Greene.Comments.pdf. 
Griffin, Keith. “Foreign Aid after the Cold War.” Development and Change 22, no. 4 
(1991): 645–85. 
Grilli, Enzo R. The European Community and the Developing Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Grosh, Barbara, and Stephen Orvis. “Democracy, Confusion, or Chaos: Political 
Conditionality in Kenya.” Studies In Comparative International Development 
31, no. 4 (1996): 46–65. 
Groves, Jason. “Britain’s Aid Millions Help the Most Corrupt Regimes in the 
World.” The Daily Mail, January 1, 2014. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532009/Britains-aid-millions-help-
corrupt-regimes-world-revealed-Camerons-target-finally-hit.html. 
———. “Mitchell Insisted on Handout to Dictator: £16m Aid ‘a Parting Favour’ for 
His Friend in Rwanda.” The Daily Mail, October 3, 2012. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2212027/Mitchell-insisted-handout-
dictator--16m-aid-parting-favour-friend-Rwanda.html. 
Gurowitz, A. “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and 
the Japanese State.” World Politics 51, no. 3 (1999): 413–45. 
Hale, Mike. “Why Did Andrew Mitchell Reinstate Aid to Rwanda on His Last Day 
at DfID?” New Statesman, September 27, 2012. 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/09/why-did-andrew-
mitchell-reinstate-aid-rwanda-his-last-day-dfid. 
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms*.” Political Studies 44, no. 5 (1996): 936–57. 
Hamilton Spence, Douglas. “Foreign Aid and Human Rights Treaty Ratification: 
Moving beyond the Rewards Thesis.” The International Journal of Human 
Rights 18, no. 4–5 (2014): 414–32. 
Hammar, Amanda, Brian Raftopoulos, and Stig Jensen. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished 
Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Weaver 
Press, 2003. 
Hanlon, Joseph. “$850 Million Bond Issue Threat to Budget Support.” Mozambique 
News Reports & Clippings, November 11, 2013. 
———. “19 Budget Support Donors Sign New 5-Year Accord.” Mozambique News 
Reports & Clippings, March 25, 2009. 
———. “Budget Support Falls from $400 Mn to $275 Mn as Ematum Takes Its 
Toll.” Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, June 13, 2014. 
309 
 
———. “Donor Strike Ends.” Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, March 18, 
2010. 
———. “Frelimo Landslide in Tainted Election in Mozambique.” Review of African 
Political Economy 37, no. 123 (2010): 92–95. 
———. “Governance as ‘Kicking Away the Ladder’;.” New Political Economy 17, 
no. 5 (2012): 691–98. 
———. “Mozambique: ‘the War Ended 17 Years Ago, but We Are Still Poor.’” 
Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 1 (2010): 77–102. 
———. “News Reports 2009/11.” Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, March 
2010. 
Hansen, Holger Bernt. “Donors and the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Experiences and 
Lessons Learned.” In Zimbabwe: Picking Up the Pieces, edited by Hany 
Besada, 247–68. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Harnay, Serge, and Bernard Louis. “Madagascar : les enjeux d’une diplomatie en 
plein essor.” Outre-Terre 30, no. 4 (2012): 261–69. 
Hatton, William, and Anna Fardell. “New Discoveries of Coal in Mozambique — 
Development of the Coal Resource Estimation Methodology for International 
Resource Reporting Standards.” International Journal of Coal Geology 89 
(2012): 2–12. 
Haverland, Markus. “National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance 
of Institutional Veto Points.” Journal of Public Policy 20, no. 01 (2000): 83–
103. 
Hayman, Rachel. “Budget Support and Democracy: A Twist in the Conditionality 
Tale.” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2011): 673–88. 
———. “Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda.” In Remaking 
Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, edited by 
Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, 118–34. Madison, Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 
Hazelzet, Hadelwich. “Carrots or Sticks? EU and US Reactions to Human Rights 
Violations (1989-2000).” PhD Dissertation, European University Institute, 
2001. 
Hazelzet, Hadelwych. Suspension of Development Cooperation: An Instrument to 
Promote Human Rights and Democracy?. Discussion Paper. Maastricht: 
ECDPM, 2005. http://ecdpm.org/publications/development-cooperation-
instrument-promote-human-rights-democracy/. 
Heginbotham, Eric, and Richard J. Samuels. “Mercantile Realism and Japanese 
Foreign Policy.” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 171–203. 
Hellum, Anne, and Bill Derman. “Land Reform and Human Rights in Contemporary 
Zimbabwe: Balancing Individual and Social Justice Through an Integrated 
Human Rights Framework.” World Development 32, no. 10 (2004): 1785–
1805. 
“Helping the Third World: How to Make Aid Work.” The Economist, June 26, 1999. 
310 
 
Heppell, Timothy, and Simon Lightfoot. “‘We Will Not Balance the Books on the 
Backs of the Poorest People in the World’: Understanding Conservative Party 
Strategy on International Aid.” The Political Quarterly 83, no. 1 (2012): 130–
38. 
Herman, Joost. “The Dutch Drive for Humanitarianism: Inner Origins and 
Development of the Gidsland Tradition and Its External Effects.” 
International Journal 61, no. 4 (2006): 859–74. 
Hill, Christopher. “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 
305–28. 
Hineidi, Mo. “Mozambique Secures a Deal with a French Naval Manufacturer, 
Significantly Increasing Its Naval Capacity.” Future Directions International, 
September 25, 2013. http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-
ocean/29-indian-ocean-swa/1343-mozambique-secures-a-deal-with-a-french-
naval-manufacturer-significantly-increasing-its-naval-capacity.html. 
Hinthorne, Lauren Leigh. “Democratic Crisis or Crisis of Confidence? What Local 
Perceptual Lenses Tell Us about Madagascar’s 2009 Political Crisis.” 
Democratization 18, no. 2 (2011): 535–61. 
Hirschman, Albert O. “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding.” 
World Politics 22, no. 3 (1970): 329–43. 
Hoebink, Paul, and Olav Stokke. “Introduction: European Development Co-
Operation at the Beginning of a New Millennium.” In Perspectives on 
European Development Co-Operation: Policy and Performance of Individual 
Donor Countries and the EU, edited by Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke, 1–31. 
New York: Routledge, 2005. 
———. , eds. Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: Policy and 
Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. New York: 
Routledge, 2005. 
Hoeffler, Anke, and Verity Outram. “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What 
Determines the Allocation of Aid?” Review of Development Economics 15, 
no. 2 (2011): 237–50. 
Hofnung, Thomas, and Christophe Boltanski. “Mugabe Divise Paris et Londres.” 
Libération, January 24, 2003. 
http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2003/01/24/mugabe-divise-paris-et-
londres_428854. 
Holland, Heidi. Dinner With Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who 
Became a Tyrant. London: Penguin, 2011. 
Holslag, Jonathan. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in 
Africa.” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 367–86. 
Hook, Steven W. “‘Building Democracy’ through Foreign Aid: The Limitations of 
United States Political Conditionalities, 1992–96.” Democratization 5, no. 3 
(1998): 156–80. 
———. National Interest and Foreign Aid. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995. 
311 
 
Horký, Ondřej. The Europeanisation of Development Policy: Acceptance, 
Accommodation and Resistance of the Czech Republic. Bonn: German 
Development Institute, 2010. 
———. “The Impact of the Shallow Europeanisation of the ‘New’ Member States on 
the EU’s Actorness: What Coherence between Foreign and Development 
Policy?.” In The European Union and Global Development: An “Enlightened 
Superpower” in the Making?, edited by Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm, and 
Davina Makhan, 57–73. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Horng, Der-Chin. “The Human Rights Clause in the European Union’s External 
Trade and Development Agreements.” European Law Journal 9, no. 5 
(2003): 677–701. 
House of Commons. Sessional Returns. London, September 13, 2013. 
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. “Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive Human 
Rights Violations and the Failure to Protect.” Human Rights Quarterly 32, 
no. 4 (2010): 898–920. 
Howard, Lise Morjé. UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. 1st ed. Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
Human Rights Watch. Development without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites 
Repression in Ethiopia, October 2010. 
“If Donor Strike Continues, Government May Alter Budget.” Club of Mozambique, 
March 8, 2010. 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=moza
mbique&id=17682&tipo=one. 
Ingebritsen, Christine. “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.” 
Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 1 (2002): 11–23. 
Ingram, Derek. “The Struggle for a Commonwealth of Democracy.” The Round 
Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 483–88. 
Intermón Oxfam. La realidad de la ayuda 2009: Una evaluación independiente de la 
ayuda y las politicas de desarrollo en tiempos de crisis. Madrid: Intermón 
Oxfam Editorial, 2010. 
“International: Bye-Bye Bob; Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth.” The Economist, 
December 13, 2003. 
International Crisis Group. All Bark and No Bite The International Response to 
Zimbabwe’s Crisis. Africa Report. Harare/Brussels, January 25, 2002. 
———. Madagascar: Sortir Du Cycle de Crises. Africa Report, March 18, 2010. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-
africa/madagascar/156-madagascar-ending-the-crisis.aspx. 
———. Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate. Africa Report. Harare/Brussels, March 
5, 2007. 
———. Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity. Africa Report. Harare/Brussels, March 
10, 2003. 
———. Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government. Africa Briefing, April 20, 
2009. 
312 
 
———. Zimbabwe: What Next?. Africa Report, June 14, 2002. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/047-
zimbabwe-what-next.aspx. 
International Development Committee. DFID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe. Eighth 
Report of Session 2009-10. London: House, March 16, 2010. 
———. The Future of UK Development Co-Operation: Phase 1: Development 
Finance. Eighth Report of Session 2013–14. London: House of Commons, 
February 12, 2014. 
Ireland. “Irish Response.” The future of EU budget support to third countries, 2011. 
Ireton, Barrie. Britain’s International Development Policies: A History of DFID and 
Overseas Aid. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
IRIN. “Denmark Cuts Aid, Targets Rights Violators.” IRINnews, January 31, 2002. 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/30038/SOUTHERN-AFRICA-Denmark-
cuts-aid-targets-rights-violators. 
ITAD. Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts: Nicaragua Country 
Report. Oslo: Norad, June 2011. 
Italy. “Italian Response,” 2011. Public consultation on the future of EU budget 
support to third countries. 
Jablonski, Ryan S. “How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on 
Foreign Aid Distribution.” World Politics 66, no. 2 (2014): 293–330. 
Jackson, Jinty. “With Discoveries in Mozambique, Come New Threats.” Business 
Day, June 17, 2014. 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/06/17/with-discoveries-
in-mozambique-come-new-threats. 
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. “Can Ethnographic Techniques Tell Us Distinctive 
Things About World Politics?” International Political Sociology 2, no. 1 
(2008): 91–93. 
Jacquemot, Pierre. “Cinquante ans de coopération française avec l’Afrique 
subsaharienne.” Afrique contemporaine 238, no. 2 (2012): 43–57. 
———. “Cinquante ans de coopération française avec l’Afrique subsaharienne.” 
Afrique contemporaine 239, no. 3 (2012): 23–34. 
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic 
Influence on the Civilian ESDP.” Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 
1 (2009): 81–102. 
“Jean-Marie Bockel : "Je Veux Signer L’acte de Décès de La ‘Françafrique".’” Le 
Monde, January 16, 2008. http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-
bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J
&objet_id=1020337&clef=ARC-TRK-NC_01. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range 
Theorizing and Beyond Europe.” International Organization 59, no. 4 
(2005): 1013–44. 
Johnston, Alastair Ian. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” 
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 487–515. 
313 
 
Jones-Parry, Emyr. “First Preface: A UK Perspective.” In From Rivalry to 
Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa, edited by Tony 
Chafer and Gordon Cumming, ix – xi. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. 
Joyandet, Alain. “On Jugera La France En Afrique En Termes de Présence 
Économique.” Le Nouvel Observateur, May 31, 2010. 
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/opinions/20100527.OBS4587/interview-on-
jugera-la-france-en-afrique-en-termes-de-presence-economique.html. 
Julia, Marion. “La Démocratie Dans Le Projet Politique de l’Organisation 
Internationale de La Francophonie.” The Round Table 97, no. 399 (2008): 
825–38. 
Kamminga, Menno. “Human Rights and the Lomé Conventions.” Netherlands 
Quarterly for Human Rights, 1989, 28–35. 
Karimi, Faith. “U.S. Restores $350 Million Aid Package to Malawi.” CNN, June 23, 
2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/23/world/africa/malawi-us-
aid/index.html. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States.” International 
Organization 30, no. 1 (1976): 1–45. 
———. , ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
Kelly, Annie, and Liz Ford. “DfID under Fire for Poor Response to Human Rights 
Concerns in Ethiopia.” The Guardian, December 21, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/dec/21/dfid-human-
rights-ethiopia. 
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
———. “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics.” 
International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 291–310. 
Kevlihan, Rob. “Becoming a ‘player’: Ireland and Aid Conditionality with Reference 
to Sudan.” The European Journal of Development Research 13, no. 1 (2001): 
70–86. 
Kier, Elizabeth. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the 
Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Killick, Tony. “Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa.” 
Development Policy Review 23, no. 6 (2005): 665–81. 
King, Tobu. “Human Rights in the Development Policy of the European Community: 
Towards a European World Order?” Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law 28 (1997): 51–99. 
Kirby, Michael. “The Commonwealth of Nations Today: Historical Anachronism or 
Focus for Universal Values?” Commonwealth Law Bulletin 37, no. 1 (2011): 
39–59. 
314 
 
Klotz, Audie. “Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South 
Africa.” Review of International Studies 22, no. 02 (1996): 173–90. 
———. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Knack, Stephen. “Aid and Donor Trust in Recipient Country Systems.” Journal of 
Development Economics 101 (2013): 316–29. 
———. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quarterly 
48, no. 1 (2004): 251–66. 
Knack, Stephen, F. Halsey Rogers, and Nicholas Eubank. “Aid Quality and Donor 
Rankings.” World Development, Expanding Our Understanding of Aid with a 
New Generation in Development Finance Information, 39, no. 11 (2011): 
1907–17. 
Knill, Christoph, and Andrea Lenschow. “Compliance, Competition and 
Communication: Different Approaches of European Governance and Their 
Impact on National Institutions.” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 
3 (2005): 583–606. 
Koeberle, Stefan, Zoran Stavreski, and Jan Walliser. Budget Support as More 
Effective Aid?: Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2006. 
Koh, Harold Hongju. “Review: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale 
Law Journal 106, no. 8 (1997): 2599–2659. 
———. “United States Human Rights Policy for the Twenty-First Century.” St. 
Louis University Law Journal 46 (2002): 293–332. 
Korby, Boris, Paul Burkhardt, and Lyubov Pronina. “Mozambique Tuna Bonds Fund 
Anti-Pirate Fleet in Surprise.” Bloomberg, November 13, 2013. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/mozambique-tuna-bonds-fund-
anti-pirate-fleet-in-surprise.html. 
Korey, William. NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious 
Grapevine. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. 
Körner, Harry. Les Relations Postcoloniales Entre La France et l’Afrique: Le Rôle 
de La Francophonie “Politique.” Paris: GRIN, 2011. 
Kountouros, Haris. “Human Rights Conditionality in Development Policy: An 
Orientation to Debate.” European Parliament, Interparliamentary Committee 
Meetings, DV\877516EN, 2011. 
Kowert, Paul, and Jeffrey Legro. “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical 
Reprise.” In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 451–97. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996. 
Krasner, Stephen D. “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights.” In Regime Theory 
and International Relations, edited by V. Rittberger, 139–67. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993. 
———. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1986): 185–205. 
315 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical 
and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich, and J. G Ruggie. “International Organization: A State of the 
Art on an Art of the State.” International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 753–
75. 
Kriger, Norma. “Foreign Aid Dilemmas under Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government.” 
Solidarity Peace Trust, August 7, 2011. 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1092/foreign-aid-dilemmas/. 
———. “From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990 – 
2005.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 1151–69. 
———. “ZANU(PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and 
Coercion.” African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005): 1–34. 
———. “Zimbabwe’s War Veterans and the Ruling Party: Continuities in Political 
Dynamics.” In Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe, edited by Staffan 
Darnolf and Liisa Laakso, 115–32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Kroslak, Daniela, and Charlotte Larbuisson. “Madagascar’s Crisis, One Year on - 
International Crisis Group.” Mail & Guardian, March 31, 2010. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/madagascar/op-
eds/kroslak-larbuisson-madagascars-crisis-one-year-on.aspx. 
Kuus, Merje. “Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical Intervention.” 
Geopolitics 18, no. 1 (2013): 115–31. 
Laakso, Liisa. “The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of 
Zimbabwe in 2000.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 
437–64. 
Laakso, Liisa, Timo Kivimäki, and Maaria Seppänen. Evaluation of Coordination 
and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement. Aksant Academic Publishers, 2007. 
———. Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 
of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Appendix (Case Studies). Aksant 
Academic Publishers, 2007. 
Ladrech, Robert. Europeanization and National Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010. 
Lahiri, Sajal, and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. “Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid 
Allocation.” The Economic Journal 110, no. 462 (2000): 62–79. 
Lake, David A. “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects 
as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” International Studies 
Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 465–80. 
Lancaster, Carol. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
———. “Governance and Development: The Views from Washington.” IDS Bulletin 
24, no. 1 (1993): 9–15. 
316 
 
Lanz, David, and Rachel Gasser. A Crowded Field: Competition and Coordination in 
International Peace Mediation. Mediation Argument. Pretoria, South Africa: 
Centre for Mediation in Africa, February 2013. 
Larsen, Henrik. “Danish Foreign Policy and the Balance between the EU and the US: 
The Choice between Brussels and Washington after 2001.” Cooperation and 
Conflict 44, no. 2 (2009): 209–30. 
Lavenex, S. The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and 
Internal Security. London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2001. 
Lavin, Franklin L. “Asphyxiation vs. Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma.” Foreign 
Policy 104 (1996): 138–53. 
Lawler, Peter. “Janus-Faced Solidarity Danish Internationalism Reconsidered.” 
Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 1 (2007): 101–26. 
Lawry-White, Simon. Review of the UK Government Approach to Peacebuilding. 
London: DfID, August 2003. 
Lawson, Andrew. Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique: Final 
Report - Volume I. Maputo: G-19, 2014. http://www.oecd.org/derec/ec/Mz-
BS-Eval-Final-Report-Vol-1.pdf. 
Lawson, Andrew, David Booth, Meleki Msuya, Samuel Wangwe, and Tim 
Williamson. Does General Budget Support Work? Evidence from Tanzania. 
London: ODI, 2005. 
http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC19273.pdf. 
Leaders. “Efficiency versus Freedom; Rwanda and Other Aid Darlings.” The 
Economist, August 7, 2010. 
“Leaders: Missing the Point; Foreign Aid.” The Economist, March 16, 2002. 
Legro, Jeffrey. Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World 
War II. Cornell University Press, 1995. 
———. “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the‘ Failure’ of Internationalism.” 
International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 31–63. 
“Le Mozambique Commande 200 Millions D’euros de Bateaux «made in 
Cherbourg».” Libération, September 5, 2013. 
http://www.liberation.fr/economie/2013/09/05/le-mozambique-commande-
200-millions-d-euros-de-bateaux-made-in-cherbourg_929732. 
Levy, Jack S. “Qualitative Methods in International Relations.” In Evaluating 
Methodology in International Studies, edited by Michael Brecher and Frank 
P. Harvey, 131–60. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 
Leymarie, Philippe. “France Vanishes from Africa.” Le Monde Diplomatique - 
English Edition, July 2008. 
http://mondediplo.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/2007/09/15sarkozy. 
Licht, Amanda A. “Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader 
Survival.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 1 (2010): 58–87. 
Lie, Jon Harald Sande. “Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on 
the Ethnographic Turn in International Relations.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 41, no. 2 (2013): 201–20. 
317 
 
Lightfoot, Simon. “The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The 
Case of Central and Eastern European States.” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 2 
(2010): 329–50. 
Lightfoot, Simon, and Balázs Szent-Iványi. “Reluctant Donors? The Europeanization 
of International Development Policies in the New Member States.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 2014, forthcoming. 
Lilley, Ray. “Fiji’s Military Takes Control of Nation.” Washington Post, December 
5, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/05/AR2006120500182_pf.html. 
Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: MacMillan, 1922. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105. 
Liska, George. The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
Lister, Stephen, Richard Batley, Amelia Cumbi, and Alex Warren-Rodriguez. 
Evaluation of the Irish Aid Mozambique Country Strategy 2007-2010. 
Oxford: Mokoro Ltd, August 28, 2011. 
Lloyd, Robert. “Mozambique.” In Countries at the Crossroads 2011: An Analysis of 
Democratic Governance, edited by Freedom House. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012. 
Lough, Richard. “Norway Says Aid to Madagascar Remains Frozen.” Reuters, 
March 19, 2009. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/03/19/uk-madagascar-
politics-idUKTRE52I2T220090319. 
Luard, Evan. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy.” International Affairs 56, no. 4 
(1980): 579–606. 
———. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy.” In Human Rights in the World 
Community: Issues and Action, edited by Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. 
Weston, 296–306. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992. 
Lumsdaine, David Halloran. Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid 
Regime, 1949-1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
Lundsgaarde, Erik. The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Lynch, Allen C. “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Europe-Asia Studies 53, 
no. 1 (2001): 7–31. 
MacDonald, Dzirutwe. “Mugabe Claims Victory over UK in Lisbon Summit Row.” 
New Zimbabwe, December 11, 2009. 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/sanctions77.17250.html. 
Machet, Luc. Quelle Politique Pour La France En Afrique En 2012?. Paris: Terra 
Nova, 2012. 
Maclean, Sandra J. “Mugabe at War: The Political Economy of Conflict in 
Zimbabwe.” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002): 513–28. 
318 
 
MacNamara, William. “Rio Tinto Grabs the Reins at Riversdale.” Financial Times, 
April 7, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f51bb272-6145-11e0-ab25-
00144feab49a.html. 
“Madagascar: Etats-Unis et France Parlent Désormais de Coup d’Etat.” Agence 
France-Presse, March 20, 2009. http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-
monde/2009-03-20/madagascar-etats-unis-et-france-parlent-desormais-de-
coup-d-etat/924/0/327670. 
“Madagascar: l’Union européenne dénonce un ‘coup d’Etat.’” Le Monde, March 20, 
2009. http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2009/03/20/madagascar-l-union-
europeenne-denonce-un-coup-d-etat_1170316_3212.html. 
“Madagascar Power Grab Denounced as Coup d’Etat by EU.” The Telegraph, March 
19, 2009. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/madagasc
ar/5019402/Madagascar-power-grab-denounced-as-coup-detat-by-EU.html. 
“Madagascar Sentences Ex-President.” BBC News, June 3, 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8080940.stm. 
Maizels, Alfred, and Machiko K. Nissanke. “Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries.” World Development 12, no. 9 (1984): 879–900. 
Makumbe, John M. “Zimbabwe’s Hijacked Election.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 
4 (2002): 87–101. 
Malin, Paul. “EU Support to Mozambique.” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 
2012): 4–5. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Lessons of Zimbabwe.” London Review of Books, December 
4, 2008. 
Mander, Benedict. “Critics Question Flow of Venezuelan Aid.” Financial Times, 
August 28, 2012. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/03ba7206-eab5-11e1-984b-
00144feab49a.html. 
Manning, Carrie. “Mozambique’s Slide into One-Party Rule.” Journal of Democracy 
21, no. 2 (2010): 151–65. 
———. The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-
2000. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002. 
Manning, Carrie, and Monica Malbrough. “Bilateral Donors and Aid Conditionality 
in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Mozambique.” Journal of 
Modern African Studies 48, no. 1 (2010): 143–69. 
———. The Changing Dynamics of Foreign Aid and Democracy in Mozambique. 
UNU-WIDER, February 2012. 
Marais, Jana. “Mozambique Ports Grow With Rio Tinto Appetite for Coal: Freight.” 
Bloomberg, December 13, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-
13/mozambique-ports-grow-with-rio-tinto-appetite-for-coal-freight.html. 
Marantis, Demetrios James. “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development: The 
European Community Model.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 7 (1995): 1–
32. 
319 
 
Marchesin, Philippe. “Le Mystère Des Chiffres Ou L’opacité Du Système Français 
D’aide Au Développement.” In Rapport 1995, edited by Observatoire 
permanent de la coopération française, 19–43. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1995. 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders.” International Organization 52, no. 04 (1998): 943–69. 
Marriage, Zoe. “Defining Morality: DfID and the Great Lakes.” Third World 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2006): 477–90. 
Martí i Puig, Salvador. “The Adaptation of the FSLN: Daniel Ortega’s Leadership 
and Democracy in Nicaragua.” Latin American Politics and Society 52, no. 4 
(2010): 79–106. 
Martin, Guy. “Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations.” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 33, no. 1 (1995): 1–20. 
Mastenbroek, Ellen, and Michael Kaeding. “Europeanization Beyond the Goodness 
of Fit: Domestic Politics in the Forefront1.” Comparative European Politics 
4, no. 4 (2006): 331–54. 
Masunungure, Eldred V., and Simon Badza. “The Internationalization of the 
Zimbabwe Crisis Multiple Actors, Competing Interests.” Journal of 
Developing Societies 26, no. 2 (2010): 207–31. 
Matthews, Robert O., and Cranford Pratt. “Introduction.” In Human Rights in 
Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt. 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988. 
Mavrotas, George, and Peter Nunnenkamp. “Foreign Aid Heterogeneity: Issues and 
Agenda.” Review of World Economics 143, no. 4 (2007): 585–95. 
Mbanze, Fernando. “Braço de Ferro a Caminho Do Fim.” Mediafax, March 17, 2010. 
http://debatesedevaneios.blogspot.it/2010/03/braco-de-ferro-caminho-do-
fim.html. 
McElroy, Robert W. Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in 
International Affairs. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
McFaul, Michael. “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.” The Washington 
Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004): 147–63. 
McGregor, JoAnn. “The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State In 
Zimbabwe.” African Affairs 101, no. 402 (2002): 9–37. 
McKinlay, Robert D. “The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and 
Interpretation of the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960–1970.” 
Comparative Political Studies 11, no. 4 (1979): 411–64. 
McKinlay, Robert D., and Richard Little. “A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral 
Aid Allocation.” World Politics 20, no. 2 (1977): 58–86. 
———. “The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution 
of French Bilateral Aid, 1964–70.” Development and Change 9, no. 3 (1978): 
459–78. 
320 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: WW Norton 
& Company, 2003. 
Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and US Foreign 
Policy. London: Penguin, 2008. 
Médard, Jean-François. “France and Sub-Saharan Africa: A Privileged 
Relationship.” In Africa and the North: Between Globalization and 
Marginalization, edited by Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, 38–54. London: 
Taylor & Francis, 2004. 
Meernik, James, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe. “Testing Models of US Foreign 
Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War.” The Journal of Politics 
60, no. 1 (1998): 63–85. 
Meimon, Julien. “Que reste-t-il de la Coopération française ?” Politique africaine 
105, no. 1 (2007): 27–50. 
Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa 
from Sarkozy to Hollande. Programme Paper. London: Chatham House, May 
2013. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/191453. 
Mertus, Julie A. Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy. New York: 
Routledge, 2008. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 
(1977): 340–63. 
Meyer, John W., and W. Richard Scott. Organizational Environments: Ritual and 
Rationality. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE, 1985. 
Michaelowa, Katharina. “The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative.” 
Public Choice 114, no. 3/4 (2003): 461–87. 
Michalski, Anna. “Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Denmark’s and Sweden’s Relations with China.” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 51, no. 5 (2013): 884–900. 
“Miliband Defends Mugabe Boycot.” BBC News, December 7, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ uk_news/politics/7132874.stm. 
Millennium Challenge Corporation. “Madagascar Compact,” September 30, 2010. 
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/program/madagascar-compact. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Koenders Suspends Budget Support to Nicaragua.” 
Government of the Netherlands, December 19, 2008. 
http://www.government.nl/news/2008/12/19/koenders-suspends-budget-
support-to-nicaragua.html. 
Mitterand, François. “Conférence de Presse, Notamment Sur L’aide Française À 
l’Afrique En Matière Économique, Militaire, Financière et La 
Démocratisation de l’Afrique.” Franco-African Summit, June 21, 1990. 
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/907015600.html. 
———. “Le Discours de La Baule.” Franco-African Summit, June 20, 1990. 
http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/037/article_20103.asp. 
321 
 
Molenaers, Nadia. “The Great Divide? Donor Perceptions of Budget Support, 
Eligibility and Policy Dialogue.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 5 (2012): 
791–806. 
Molenaers, Nadia, Linas Cepinskas, and Bert Jacobs. Budget Support and 
Policy/political Dialogue. Donor Practices in Handling (political) Crises. 
Antwerp: University of Antwerp, 2010. 
Molenaers, Nadia, Anna Gagiano, Lodewijk Smets, and Sebastian Dellepiane. “What 
Determines the Suspension of Budget Support in Sub-Saharan Africa?” 
Mainz, 2013. 
Molenaers, Nadia, and Robrecht Renard. Policy Dialogue under the New Aid 
Approach: Which Role for Medium-Sized Donors? Theoretical Reflections 
and Views from the Field. Antwerp: University of Antwerp, 2008. 
Mole, Stuart. “Editorial: Canada, the Commonwealth and Human Rights.” The 
Round Table 103, no. 3 (2014): 261–64. 
Momani, Bessma. “Limits on Streamlining Fund Conditionality: The International 
Monetary Fund’s Organizational Culture.” Journal of International Relations 
and Development 8, no. 2 (2005): 142–63. 
Moncrieff, Richard. French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President 
Sarkozy. SAIIA Occasional Paper. Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 2012. 
Monkam, Nara F. “International Donor Agencies’ Incentive Structures and Foreign 
Aid Effectiveness.” Journal of Institutional Economics 8, no. 3 (2012): 399–
427. 
Moore, David. “ZANU-PF & the Ghosts of Foreign Funding.” Review of African 
Political Economy 32, no. 103 (2005): 156–62. 
Moore, Mick. “Introduction.” IDS Bulletin 24, no. 1 (1993): 1–6. 
Moosa, Zohra. “African Activists on British Aid & LGBTI People.” The F Word, 
October 27, 2011. http://www.thefword.org.uk/blog/2011/10/african_activis. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 04 (1997): 513–53. 
Morazán, Pedro. The Future of EU Budget Support in Developing Countries. 
Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of 
the Union, Policy Department, 2011. 
Morgenthau, Hans. “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.” The American Political 
Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 301–9. 
———. Politics Among Nations. New York: Knops, 1948. 
Morris, Nigel. “Commonwealth Nations to Have Aid Cut for Gay Rights Abuses.” 
The Independent, October 31, 2011. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/commonwealth-nations-
to-have-aid-cut-for-gay-rights-abuses-6255009.html. 
Morrissey, Oliver. “British Aid Policy in the ‘Short-Blair’ Years.” In Perspectives on 
European Development Co-Operation: Policy and Performance of Individual 
322 
 
Donor Countries and the EU, edited by Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke, 161–
83. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Mosley, Paul. Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural-Adjustment Lending, 
1980-86. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
———. “The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: A Model of the Market for a Public 
Good.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 33, no. 2 (1985): 373–
93. 
Mosse, David. “Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid.” In 
The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development, edited 
by David Mosse and David Lewis, 1–36. London: Pluto Press, 2005. 
Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way 
for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010. 
Moyo, Sam. “The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in 
Zimbabwe, 1990-1999.” Journal of Southern African Studies 26, no. 1 
(2000): 5–28. 
“Mozambique: Budget Support in Decline.” Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 
June 13, 2014. http://allafrica.com/stories/201406140479.html?viewall=1. 
“Mozambique: Hollande, Guebuza See Work Start On Big Mozambique Ship 
Order.” Radio France Internationale, September 30, 2013. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309301405.html. 
“Mozambique: UK Ends Direct Budget Support to Mozambique.” Agencia de 
Informacao de Mocambique (Maputo), June 13, 2014. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201406140484.html. 
Mpofu, Busani. “Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities.” African Affairs 
110, no. 441 (2011): 673–75. 
Mulholl, Hélène. “Andrew Mitchell Faces Grilling over Rwandan Aid Decision.” 
The Guardian, November 1, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/nov/01/andrew-mitchell-grilling-
rwanda-aid. 
Müllerson, Rein. Human Rights Diplomacy. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Murphy, Jim. DFID under Labour – Development and Power- Jim Murphy Speech 
at the ONE Campaign. London: Speech at the ONE Campaign, April 8, 2014. 
http://www.jimmurphymp.com/news-room/Speeches/news.aspx?p=1041548. 
Musatti, Alberto. “General Budget Support to Mozambique: Alive Again?” Belgian 
Development Agency, April 3, 2013. http://www.btcctb.org/en/blog/general-
budget-support-mozambique-alive-again. 
Musisi, Frederic, and Ismail Musa Ladu. “Japan Will Not Suspend Aid to Uganda 
over Anti-Gay Law.” Africa Review, February 27, 2014. 
http://www.africareview.com/News/Japan-will-not-suspend-aid-to-Uganda-
over-anti-gay-law/-/979180/2224306/-/ho4fr0z/-/index.html. 
Nasra, Skander. “Governance in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring Small State 
Influence.” Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 2 (2011): 164–80. 
323 
 
Naudet, David. “French Development Aid.” In How European Aid Works, edited by 
Aidan Cox, 165–78. London: ODI, 1997. 
———. “French Development Aid.” In How European Aid Works: A Comparison of 
Management Systems and Effectiveness, edited by Aidan Cox, John Healey, 
and Antonique Koning, 165–78. London: Overseas Development Institute, 
1997. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. “Making Sense of Mugabeism in Local and Global 
Politics: ‘So Blair, Keep Your England and Let Me Keep My Zimbabwe.’” 
Third World Quarterly 30, no. 6 (2009): 1139–58. 
Nelson, Joan M. “Good Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid.” In 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice 
of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries, edited by Paul Mosley, 297–
315. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992. 
Nelson, Joan M., and Stephanie J. Eglinton. Encouraging Democracy: What Role for 
Conditioned Aid?. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992. 
Neumann, Iver B. “‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,’ or: Why 
Diplomats Never Produce Anything New.” International Political Sociology 
1, no. 2 (2007): 183–200. 
———. At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. 
———. “To Be a Diplomat.” International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 1 (2005): 72–
93. 
Neumayer, Eric. “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A 
Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries.” Social Science Quarterly 84, 
no. 3 (2003): 650–66. 
———. “Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral 
and Multilateral Aid Flows.” Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2003): 510–
27. 
Newitt, Malyn. A History of Mozambique. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995. 
Nielsen, Richard A. “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against 
Repressive States.” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 791–
803. 
Nielson, Daniel L., Michael J. Tierney, and Catherine E. Weaver. “Bridging the 
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide: Re-Engineering the Culture of the World 
Bank.” Journal of International Relations and Development 9, no. 2 (2006): 
107–39. 
“No Budget Support Received So Far This Year.” Agencia de Informacao de 
Mocambique, March 1, 2010. 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=moza
mbique&id=17604&tipo=one. 
Noel, Alain, and Jean-Philippe Therien. “From Domestic to International Justice: 
The Welfare State and Foreign Aid.” International Organization 49, no. 3 
(1995): 523–53. 
324 
 
Nogueras, Diego J. Linan, and Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez. “Human Rights 
Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and 
Legitimacy Problems.” Columbia Journal of European Law 7 (2001): 307. 
“No Indication That Donors Will End Support.” Agencia de Informacao de 
Mocambique, March 16, 2010. http://sap4africa.net/news/no-indication-
donors-will-end-support-chang. 
Norad. Strengthening Nordic Development Cooperation in and with Afghanistan. 
Norad Report Discussion. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
March 2009. 
Nordic Plus. Practical Guide to Joint Financing Arrangements. Oslo: Norad, 
October 2007. 
“Nordic Plus Launches Ambitious Goals for Harmonisation.” Development Today, 
September 12, 2006. http://www.development-
today.com/magazine/2004/DT_4/News/1702. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Endringer I Norges Diplomatiske Nærvær I 
Utlandet,” October 5, 2010. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/ud/Nyheter-og-
pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2010/naervaer_utlandet.html?id=620269. 
Noutcheva, Gergana, and Senem Aydin-Düzgit. “Lost in Europeanisation: The 
Western Balkans and Turkey.” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 59–
78. 
Nuscheler, Franz, and Ben Warkentin. “From ‘International Cooperation’ to 
‘Development Policy’? Reform and Reorientation of Japan’s ODA.” Asia-
Pacific Review 17 (2000): 66–89. 
Nuvunga, Adriano, and Sitoe Eduardo. “Party Institutionalisation in Mozambique: 
‘The Party of the State’ vs the Opposition.” Journal of African Elections 12, 
no. 1 (2013): 109–42. 
Nuvunga, Adriano, and M.A. Mohamed Salih. “Party Dominance and Electoral 
Institutions: Framing Frelimo’s Dominance in the Context of an Electoral 
Governance Deficit.” Africa Review 5, no. 1 (2013): 23–42. 
Nyaira, Sandra. “Zanu PF Women MPs Barred from Sweden.” The Daily News, July 
29, 2002. http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/july30_2002.html. 
Oberlé, Thierry. “Disgrâce Française Dans L’île de Madagascar.” Le Figaro, July 15, 
2008. http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/07/16/01003-
20080716ARTFIG00014-disgrace-francaise-dans-l-ile-de-madagascar-.php. 
Oborne, Peter Oborne Politics Last updated: October. “Overseas Aid Is Funding 
Human Rights Abuses.” The Daily Telegraph, October 28, 2010. 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/peteroborne/100061337/overseas-aid-is-
funding-human-rights-abuses/. 
ODI. Aid and Political Reform. London: Oversseas Development Institute, January 
1992. http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/5468-aid-political-reform-new-
conditionality. 
OECD. France: Development Cooperation Peer Review. Paris: OECD, 2000. 
———. France: Development Cooperation Peer Review. Paris: OECD, 2008. 
325 
 
———. France: Development Cooperation Peer Review. Paris, 2013. 
———. Is It ODA?. Factsheet. Paris: OECD, November 2008. 
———. Norway: Development Cooperation Peer Review. Paris: OECD, 2004. 
———. UK: Development Cooperation Peer Review. Paris, 2010. 
OECD DAC. Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-
Operation. Paris: OECD, 1996. 
OECD, and World Bank. Integrating Human Rights into Development. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2013. 
Okuizumi, Kaoru. “Implementing the ODA Charter: Prospects for Linking Japanese 
Economic Assistance and Human Rights.” New York Journal of International 
Law and Politics 27 (1995): 367–406. 
Olsen, Gorm Rye. “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War 
Africa: How Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?” African Affairs 97, no. 
388 (1998): 343–67. 
———. “How Strong Is Europeanisation, Really? The Danish Defence 
Administration and the Opt-Out from the European Security and Defence 
Policy.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12, no. 1 (2011): 13–
28. 
———. “Scandinavian Africa Policies: Value-Based Foreign Policies between 
British Affinity, French National Interests and EU Norms.” In From Rivalry 
to Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa, edited by Tony 
Chafer and Gordon Cumming, 91–105. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. 
———. “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Result of Nordicization or 
Europeanization?” Journal of European Integration 35, no. 4 (2012): 409–24. 
Olsen, Johan P. “The Many Faces of Europeanization.” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40, no. 5 (2002): 921–52. 
Ombok, Eric. “Uganda Currency Plunges as Anti-Gay Law Prompts U.S. Aid Cuts.” 
Bloomberg, June 23, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-
23/uganda-currency-plunges-as-anti-gay-law-prompts-u-s-aid.html. 
Orbie, Jan. “The EU’s Role in Development: A Full-Fledged Development Actor or 
Eclipsed by Superpower Temptations?” In The European Union and Global 
Development: An “Enlightened Superpower” in the Making?, edited by 
Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm, and Davina Makhan, 17–36. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Orbie, Jan, and Simon Lightfoot. “The Europeanization of Development Policy.” In 
The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States: Continuity and 
Europeanisation, edited by Amelia Hadfield, Ian Manners, and Richard 
Whitman, forthcoming. London: Routledge, 2014. 
Organisation Internationale de La Francophonie. Bamako Declaration, November 3, 
2000. 
———. Réserve Du Vietnam et Du Laos Sur L’article 2(5), November 3, 2000. 
Öström, Nils, and Elisabeth Lewin. Outcome Assessment of Swedish Cooperation 
with Nicaragua 2001-2008. Stockholm: SIDA, December 15, 2009. 
326 
 
Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford Dictionary of English. 3rd edition. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Pack, H., and J. R. Pack. “Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility.” The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 1993, 258–65. 
Panke, Diana. “Small States in EU Negotiations Political Dwarfs or Power-
Brokers?” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 2 (2011): 123–43. 
Peiffer, Caryn, and Pierre Englebert. “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and 
Political Liberalization in Africa.” African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2012): 355–
78. 
Pellerin, Mathieu. Le Nouvel Essor Des Relations Entre La Chine et Madagascar. 
Notes de l’Ifri. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, March 
2011. 
———. “Madagascar : un conflit d’entrepreneurs ?” Politique africaine 113, no. 1 
(March 1, 2009): 152–65. 
Perkins, Richard, and Eric Neumayer. “The Organized Hypocrisy of Ethical Foreign 
Policy: Human Rights, Democracy and Western Arms Sales.” Geoforum, 
Themed Issue: Mobilizing Policy, 41, no. 2 (2010): 247–56. 
Pettenger, Mary E. The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, 
Norms, Discourses. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007. 
Phimister, Ian, and Brian Raftopoulos. “Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-
Imperialism.” Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 101 (2004): 385–
400. 
Phiri, Madalitso Zililo. “The Political Economy of Mozambique Twenty Years on: A 
Post-Conflict Success Story?” South African Journal of International Affairs 
19, no. 2 (2012): 223–45. 
Piebalgs, Andris. “Preface.” In The European Union and Global Development: An 
“Enlightened Superpower” in the Making?, edited by Stefan Gänzle and 
Sven Grimm, xi – xii. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Piron, Laure-Hélène. The Role of Human Rights in Promoting Donor Accountability. 
London: Overseas Development Council, 2006. 
Piron, Laure-Hélène, and Paolo de Renzio. Political Conditionality in Africa: An 
Empirical Study into Its Design, Use and Impact: DFID 1999 - 2004. * 
shared on a confidential basis *. London: DfID, 2005. 
Ploch, Lauren. Zimbabwe: The Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. 
Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 27, 
2011. 
Ploch, Lauren, and Nicolas Cook. Madagascar’s Political Crisis. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2012. 
Poe, Steven C. “Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan 
and Jimmy Carter.” American Journal of Political Science 36, no. 1 (1992): 
147–67. 
Poe, Steven C., and James Meernik. “US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global 
Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995): 399. 
327 
 
Poe, Steven C., S. Pilatovsky, B. Miller, and A. Ogundele. “Human Rights and US 
Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region.” Human Rights 
Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1994): 539–58. 
Poe, Steven C., and Rangsima Sirirangsi. “Human Rights and US Economic Aid 
During the Reagan Years.” Social Science Quarterly 75 (1994): 494–509. 
Portela, Clara. “Aid Suspensions as Coercive Tools? The European Union’s 
Experience in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Context.” Review of 
European and Russian Affairs 3, no. 2 (2007): 38–53. 
———. European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They 
Work?. London: Routledge, 2010. 
Porteous, Tom. Britain in Africa. London: Zed Books, 2008. 
———. “British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa under New Labour.” 
International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 281–97. 
Portugal. “Portuguese Response.” The future of EU budget support to third countries, 
2011. 
Posen, Barry. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
Between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. 
Potter, Evan H. “Canada in the Commonwealth.” The Round Table 96, no. 391 
(2007): 447–63. 
Potts, Deborah. “‘Restoring Order’? Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis 
in Zimbabwe.” Journal of Southern African Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 273–91. 
Pouliot, Vincent. “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security 
Communities.” International Organization 62, no. 2 (2008): 257–88. 
Pratt, Cranford. Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension. 
Montreal: McGill/Queen’s Press, 1990. 
“Press Release: MCC Board Approves Zambia Compact, Suspends Compact with 
Malawi.” Millennium Challenge Corporation, March 23, 2012. 
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-032312-Boardrelease. 
Price, Richard M. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Land Mines.” International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613–44. 
Putnam, R. D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” 
International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. 
Radaelli, Claudio M. “The Europeanization of Public Policy.” In The Politics of 
Europeanization, edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, 27–
55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Raffinot, Marc. “French Official Development Aid : From Colonial Past to European 
Future?” Business & the Contemporary World 10, no. 3 (1998): 465–86. 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Briefing: Zimbabwe’s 2002 Presidential Election.” African 
Affairs 101, no. 404 (2002): 413–26. 
Raftopoulos, Brian, and Alois Mlambo, eds. Becoming Zimbabwe. A History from 
the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press, 2009. 
328 
 
Rahimi, Metsa. Sarkozy’s Clean Slate: A New French Commitment to Democracy 
and Human Rights?. Madrid: FRIDE, February 2008. 
Ramdoo, Isabelle. “Mozambique, Aid and Foreign Investment: Trapped between 
Scylla and Charybdis?” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 7–8. 
Rancatore, Jason P. “It Is Strange: A Reply to Vrasti.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 39, no. 1 (2010): 65–77. 
Randrianja, Solofo. Madagascar, le coup d’État de mars 2009. KARTHALA 
Editions, 2012. 
Ranger, Terence. “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of 
the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe.” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 215–34. 
Rasmussen, Henrik Lomholt. “Donors Put Brakes on Mozambique Aid.” Mail & 
Guardian, July 1, 2010. http://mg.co.za/article/2010-07-01-donors-put-
brakes-on-mozambique-aid/. 
Renou, Xavier. “A New French Policy for Africa?” Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 20, no. 1 (2002): 5–27. 
Reus–Smit, C. “Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School.” The 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations 4, no. 3 (2002): 487–
509. 
Reuters. “British Petroleum (BP) Pulls out of 5 African Countries.” Club of 
Mozambique, March 3, 2010. 
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=inter
national&id=17630&tipo=one. 
Riddell, Roger C. Foreign Aid Reconsidered. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1987. 
Risse-Kappen, T. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in 
Liberal Democracies.” World Politics 43, no. 4 (1991): 479–512. 
Risse, Thomas. “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics.” 
International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. 
Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Persistent Power of 
Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. “The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction.” In The Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by 
Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, 1–38. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Rittberger, V. Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International 
Relations Theories. Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und 
Friedensforschung: University of Tübingen, 2004. 
Rix, Alan. Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership. 
London: Routledge, 1993. 
329 
 
Roberts, Greg. “Rio Tinto Completes Riversdale Mining Takeover.” The Herald Sun, 
June 18, 2011. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/business/rio-tinto-completes-
riversdale-mining-takeover/story-fn7j19iv-1226077386327. 
Robertson, Robert E. “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote 
the ‘Maximum Available Resources’ to Realizing Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 693–714. 
Robinson, Mark. “Aid, Democracy and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” The European Journal of Development Research 5, no. 1 (1993): 
85–99. 
———. “Will Political Conditionality Work?” IDS Bulletin 24, no. 1 (1993): 58–66. 
Rose, G. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, 
no. 1 (1998): 144–72. 
Rosenau, James N. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 
1967. 
Rostow, W. W. “The Stages of Economic Growth.” The Economic History Review 
12, no. 1 (1959): 1–16. 
Roy, Ananya. Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development. New 
York: Routledge, 2010. 
Roy, Sudip. “Mozambique Agency Ematum Hires BNP Paribas and Credit Suisse.” 
Reuters, September 3, 2013. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/mozambique-bonds-
idUSL6N0GZ2DU20130903. 
Ruggie, John G. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization. Routledge, 1998. 
Ruttan, Vernon W. United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic 
Politics of Foreign Economic Aid. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996. 
Ryrie, Sir William. “Managing an Aid Programme.” IDS Bulletin 17, no. 2 (1986): 
7–13. 
Sachikonye, Lloyd M. “Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis & Democratisation.” Review of 
African Political Economy 29, no. 91 (2002): 13–20. 
Sadie, Yolanda. “Aid and Political Conditionalities in Sub-Saharan Africa.” South 
African Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2002): 57–68. 
Saltnes, Johanne Døhlie. The EU’s Human Rights Policy: Unpacking the Literature 
on the EU’s Implementation of Aid Conditionality. Brussels: ARENA 
Working Paper, 2013. 
Sanders, Ronald. “The Commonwealth after Colombo: Can It Become Meaningful 
Again?” The Round Table 103, no. 1 (2014): 23–40. 
Sarfaty, Galit. Values in Translation: Human Rights and the Culture of the World 
Bank. Stanford University Press, 2012. 
Sarfaty, Galit A. “Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality 
of Human Rights at the World Bank.” The American Journal of International 
Law 103, no. 4 (2009): 647–83. 
330 
 
Saul, John S. “Mozambique - Not Then but Now.” Review of African Political 
Economy 38, no. 127 (2011): 93–101. 
Scarnecchia, Timothy. “The ‘Fascist Cycle’ in Zimbabwe, 2000–2005.” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 221–37. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel. “Costs, Commitment and 
Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, 
Slovakia and Turkey.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 
495–518. 
Schmitt, Eric. “Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators Hurts 
Training Mission.” The New York Times, June 20, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/politics/military-says-law-barring-us-
aid-to-rights-violators-hurts-training-mission.html. 
Schmitz, Gerald, and David Gillies. The Challenge of Democratic Development: 
Sustaining Democratization in Developing Societies. The North-South 
Institute, 1992. 
Schmitz, Hans Peter, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Human Rights.” In 
Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse, and Beth Simmons, 517–37. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. 
———. “International Human Rights.” In Handbook of International Relations, 
edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, 2nd Edition., 
826–51. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012. 
Schoeman, Maxi, and Chris Alden. “The Hegemon That Wasn’t: South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe.” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 25, 
no. 1 (2003): 1. 
Schoultz, Lars. “US Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: 
A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions.” Comparative Politics 
13, no. 2 (1981): 149–70. 
Schraeder, Peter J., Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. “Clarifying the Foreign Aid 
Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid 
Flows.” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323. 
Schulz, Nils-Sjard. Nicaragua: A Rude Awakening for the Paris Declaration. 
Madrid: FRIDE, November 2007. 
Selbervik, Hilde. Aid as a Tool for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy: 
What Can Norway Do?. Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997. 
Selbervik, Hilde, and Knut Nygaard. Nordic Exceptionalism in Development 
Assistance? Aid Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic Countries. CMI 
Report. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006. 
“Selection Indicators.” Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2011. 
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicators. 
Servenay, David. “Omar Bongo a Eu La Peau de Jean-Marie Bockel.” Rue89, 
August 20, 2008. http://www.rue89.com/2008/03/20/omar-bongo-a-eu-la-
peau-de-jean-marie-bockel. 
331 
 
Shumba, Precious. “Air Zimbabwe Loses Billions in French Deal.” Daily News, 
March 27, 2003. 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar27b_2003.html#link6. 
———. “Costly Blunder Haunts Air Zimbabwe.” Daily News, April 4, 2003. 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr5_2003.html#link9. 
Sikkink, Kathryn. “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the 
United States and Western Europe.” In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions, and Political Change, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Owen Keohane, 139–72. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein. “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World 
Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research 
Traditions.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 02 (2010): 411–31. 
———. “De-Centering, Not Discarding, the ‘Isms’: Some Friendly Amendments.” 
International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 481–85. 
Sil, Rudra, and Peter Joachim Katzenstein. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism 
in the Study of World Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Smith, David. “Paul Kagame’s Rwanda: African Success Story or Authoritarian 
State?” The Guardian, October 10, 2012, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/10/paul-kagame-rwanda-
success-authoritarian. 
Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State. Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse Univeristy Press, 1997. 
Smith, Karen E. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. London: 
Polity, 2013. 
———. “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality.” In The 
Enlargement of the European Union, edited by Marise Cremona, 105–40. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
———. “The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism: The EU and Burma, Cuba and 
Zimbabwe.” In The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: 
Concepts and Analysis, edited by Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, 155–77. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2006. 
———. “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third 
Countries: How Effective?” European Foreign Affairs Review 3, no. 2 
(1998): 253–74. 
Smith, Stephen, and Antoine Glaser. Ces Messieurs Afrique 2: Des Réseaux Aud 
Lobbies. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1997. 
Smyth, Jamie. “Rio Tinto Closes Dire Chapter with $50m Mozambique Coal Sale.” 
Financial Times, July 30, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9c30482-17c0-
11e4-b842-00144feabdc0.html. 
Snegaroff, Claire. “‘Françafrique’: Les Limites de La ‘Rupture’ Promise Par 
Sarkozy.” Le Point, March 21, 2008. http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-
politique/2008-03-20/francafrique-les-limites-de-la-rupture-promise-par-
sarkozy-papier/917/0/230891. 
332 
 
Snyder, Jack L. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Sorensen, Georg. “Introduction.” European Journal of Development Research 5, no. 
1 (1993): 1. 
Soudan, Francois. “Retour À La Case Foccart?” JeuneAfrique.com, April 21, 2008. 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_LIN20048retoutracco0_retour-a-la-
case-foccart.html. 
“Special Report: For Us or against Us?; The International Criminal Court.” The 
Economist, November 22, 2003. 
Spendzharova, Aneta B., and Milada Anna Vachudova. “Catching Up? 
Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU 
Accession.” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 39–58. 
Srinivasan, K. “A Force for Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law? Do 
Harare and Millbrook Go Too Far or Not Far Enough?” The Round Table 86, 
no. 344 (1997): 513–16. 
Steiner, Henry J. Diverse Partners: Non-Governmental Organizations in the Human 
Rights Movement: The Report of a Retreat of Human Rights Activists. 
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1991. 
Stohl, M., D. Carleton, and S. E Johnson. “Human Rights and US Foreign Assistance 
from Nixon to Carter.” Journal of Peace Research 21, no. 3 (1984): 215. 
Stokke, Olav, ed. Aid and Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 
———. “Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art.” In Aid 
and Political Conditionality, edited by Olav Stokke, 1–87. London: Frank 
Cass, 1995. 
———. “Introduction.” In Aid and Political Conditionality, edited by Olav Stokke, 
vii – xviii. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 
———. “Norweigan Aid Policy: Continuity and Change in the 1990s and Beyond.” 
In Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: Policy and 
Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU, edited by Paul 
Hoebink and Olav Stokke, 448–92. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
———. “The Changing International and Conceptual Environments of Development 
Co-Operation.” In Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: 
Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU, edited by 
Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke, 32–114. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
———. , ed. Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the 
Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 
Oslo: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989. 
Stone, Randall W. Buying Influence: Development Aid between the Cold War and 
the War on Terror. unpublished manuscript, 2010. 
Sumich, Jason. “The Party and the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post-
Socialist Mozambique.” Development and Change 41, no. 4 (2010): 679–98. 
Svensson, Jakob. “Aid, Growth and Democracy.” Economics & Politics 11, no. 3 
(1999): 275–97. 
333 
 
———. “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking.” Journal of International Economics 51, 
no. 2 (2000): 437–61. 
———. “Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and What Can Be Done about It?” 
Journal of Development Economics 70, no. 2 (2003): 381–402. 
Sweden. “Swedish Response,” 2011. Public consultation on the future of EU budget 
support to third countries. 
“Sweden Suspends Uganda Aid over Anti-Gay Law.” Al Jazeera, March 6, 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/sweden-suspends-uganda-aid-
over-anti-gay-law-20143661242394264.html. 
Tarp, Finn. Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions For The 
Future. Routledge, 2003. 
Tavernier, Yves. La coopération française au développement: bilan, analyses, 
perspectives. Rapport au Premier ministre, 1999. 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-
publics/994000623/index.shtml. 
Tavuyanago, Baxter. “RENAMO: From Military Confrontation to Peaceful 
Democratic Engagement, 1976-2009.” African Journal of Political Science 
and International Relations 5, no. 1 (2011): 42–51. 
Taylor, Ian. “Britain and Africa under Blair: In Pursuit of the Good State.” African 
Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013): 320–22. 
———. “Spinderella on Safari: British Policies Toward Africa Under New Labour.” 
Global Governance 18, no. 4 (2012): 449–60. 
———. “‘The Devilish Thing’: The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe’s Dénouement.” 
The Round Table 94, no. 380 (2005): 367–80. 
Taylor, Ian, and Paul Williams. “The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy 
and the Crisis in Zimbabwe.” International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002): 547–65. 
Tendi, Blessing-Miles. Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, 
Intellectuals and the Media. Oxford; New York: Verlag Peter Lang, 2010. 
Terriff, Terry. “‘Innovate or Die’: Organizational Culture and the Origins of 
Maneuver Warfare in the United States Marine Corps.” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29, no. 3 (2006): 475–503. 
“The Mystery Ship Deal.” Africa Confidential, November 1, 2013. 
http://www.africa-
confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/5098/The_mystery_ship_deal. 
The Netherlands. “Dutch Response.” The future of EU budget support to third 
countries, 2011. 
Thérien, Jean-Philippe, and Alain Noel. “Political Parties and Foreign Aid.” The 
American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (2000): 151–62. 
Thiele, Rainer, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Axel Dreher. “Do Donors Target Aid in Line 
with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid 
Allocation.” Review of World Economics 143, no. 4 (2007): 596–630. 
Thomas, George M., and Pat Lauderdale. “World Polity Sources of National Welfare 
and Land Reform.” In Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and 
334 
 
the Individual, edited by George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. 
Ramirez, and John Boli. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987. 
Thorhallsson, Baldur. The Role of Small States in the European Union. London: 
Ashgate, 2000. https://www.ashgate.com/pdf/tis/9780754614234_ROW.pdf. 
Thorhallsson, Baldur, and Anders Wivel. “Small States in the European Union: What 
Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 651–68. 
Tingley, Dustin. “Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid 
Effort.” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50, no. 1 (2010): 
40–49. 
Tomasevski, Katharina. Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited. London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1993. 
Tonra, B. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish 
Foreign Policy in the European Union. London: Ashgate Aldershot, 2001. 
Torrent, Mélanie. “Common Grounds? Strategic Partnerships for Governance in the 
Commonwealth of Nations and the Organisation Internationale de La 
Francophonie.” The Round Table 100, no. 417 (2011): 605–21. 
Townsend, Jeffrey, and Raymond W. Copson. Zimbabwe: Current Issues. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 11, 2005. 
Tran, Mark. “Britain Suspends Aid to Malawi.” The Guardian, July 14, 2011, sec. 
Global development. http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2011/jul/14/britain-suspends-aid-to-malawi. 
———. “EU Denounces Egypt Violence but Will Maintain Aid Programmes.” The 
Guardian, August 21, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/aug/21/eu-egypt-violence-aid-programmes. 
Trumbull, William N., and Howard J. Wall. “Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with 
Panel Data.” The Economic Journal 104, no. 425 (1994): 876–82. 
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Tujan, Antonio, and Wim De Ceukelaire. “‘Conditionnalité’ et ‘Appropriation’ de 
L’aide : Quelles Contradictions?.” Alternatives Sud 15, no. 2 (2008): 93–108. 
“Uganda Fury at UK Gay Aid Threat.” BBC, October 31, 2011, sec. Africa. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15524013. 
“Uganda Hit with Foreign Aid Cuts over Anti-Gay Law.” Al Jazeera, February 27, 
2014. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/uganda-hit-with-
foreignaidcutsoverantigaylaw.html. 
“Une commande historique pour les chantiers navals de Cherbourg.” Le Monde, 
September 6, 2013. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/09/06/une-
commande-historique-pour-les-chantiers-navals-de-
normandie_3472200_3234.html. 
“U.S. Cuts Aid to Uganda, Cancels Military Exercise over Anti-Gay Law.” Reuters. 
June 19, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/19/us-usa-uganda-
gay-announcement-idUSKBN0EU26N20140619. 
335 
 
US Department of State. “Declaration by Friends of Zimbabwe Group.” Office of the 
Spokesman, October 30, 2009. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/131154.htm. 
———. “Statement by Participants in Zimbabwe Like-Minded Meeting.” African 
Press Organization, March 28, 2009. 
http://appablog.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/statement-by-participants-in-
zimbabwe-like-minded-meeting/. 
“U.S. Suspends Aid to Madagascar.” USA TODAY, March 20, 2009. 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-20-madagascar-
aid-freeze_N.htm. 
Uvin, Peter. “Can Human Rights Make Aid Agencies More Accountable?” Overseas 
Development Council, London, 2005. 
———. “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality.” The 
European Journal of Development Research 5, no. 1 (1993): 63–84. 
———. Human Rights and Development. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004. 
Van Belle, Douglas A., and Steven W. Hook. “Greasing the Squeaky Wheel: News 
Media Coverage and Us Development Aid, 1977–1992.” International 
Interactions 26, no. 3 (2000): 321–46. 
Van Belle, Douglas A., Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter. Media, 
Bureaucracies, and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004. 
Van Brabant, Koenraad, and Tony Killick. The Use of Development Incentives and 
Disincentives in Influencing Conflict or Civil Violence. Case Study: 
Afghanistan. Paris: OECD/DAC, 1999. Development Assistance Committee, 
OECD. 
Van der Veen, A. Maurits. Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid. 1st ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Van de Sands, Klemens, and Ralf Mohs. “Making German Aid More Credible.” 
Development and Co-Operation 1 (1992): 4–5. 
Van Gastel, Jilles, and Monique Nuijten. “The Genealogy of the ‘Good Governance’ 
and ‘Ownership’ Agenda at the Dutch Ministry of Development 
Cooperation.” In The Aid Effect: Giving and Governing in International 
Development, edited by David Mosse and David Lewis, 85–105. London: 
Pluto Press, 2005. 
Vanheukelom, Jan. Political Conditionality in the EU’s Development Cooperation – 
Pointers for a Broader Debate. GREAT Insights. Brussels: ECDPM, April 
2012. http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/trade-and-human-rights/political-
conditionality-eus-dev-cooperation-broader-debate/. 
Verdon, Philippe. “Le Maroc, Candidat Pour Le Sommet 2010?” Jeune Afrique, 
August 3, 2008. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARCH-
LIN03088lemartemmos0.xml/. 
Vereker, John. “Blazing the Trail: Eight Years of Change in Handling International 
Development.” Development Policy Review 20, no. 2 (2002): 133–40. 
336 
 
Véron, Jean-Bernard. “L’Afrique post-indépendances: 50 ans de crises? L’exemple 
de Madagascar.” Afrique contemporaine 235, no. 3 (2010): 115–24. 
Vinciguerra, Venusia. “How the Daewoo Attempted Land Acquisition Contributed to 
Madagascar’s Political Crisis in 2009.” In Contest for Land in Madagascar: 
Environment, Ancestors and Development, edited by Sandra Evers, Gwyn 
Campbell, and Michael Lambek, 221–43. London: BRILL, 2013. 
Vines, Alex. “Africa and the United Kingdom: Labour’s Legacy, May 1997-May 
2010.” In From Rivalry to Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of 
Africa, edited by Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, 25–39. Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2011. 
———. “India’s Security in the Western Indian Ocean.” In India in Africa: 
Changing Geographies of Power, edited by Emma Mawdsley and Gerard 
McCann, 187–202. Dakar: Fahamu/Pambazuka, 2011. 
———. “Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in 
Mozambique.” International Peacekeeping 20, no. 3 (2013): 375–93. 
Vittek, Martin, and Simon Lightfoot. “The Europeanisation of Slovak Development 
Cooperation?” Contemporary European Studies 1 (2009): 20–36. 
Vivier, Jean-Loup. Madagascar une île à la dérive: Les années 2007-2010. Paris: 
Editions L’Harmattan, 2010. 
Vrasti, Wanda. “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations.” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 279–301. 
Vreeland, James Raymond. The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
Wainer, Andrew. “Despite Tensions, EuropeAID Continues Nicaragua Programs.” 
Devex, October 16, 2009. https://www.devex.com/en/news/despite-tensions-
europeaid-continues-nicaragua-programs/62348. 
Walker, Thomas W., and Christine J. Wade. Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the 
Eagle. Fifth Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011. 
Walldorf, C. William. Just Politics: Human Rights and the Foreign Policy of Great 
Powers. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008. 
Waller, Peter P. “Aid and Conditionality: The Case of Germany, with Particular 
Reference to Kenya.” In Aid and Political Conditionality, edited by Olav 
Stokke, 110–28. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979. 
Waltz, K. N. “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy.” Security Studies 6, no. 1 
(1996): 54–57. 
Wedeen, Lisa. “Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2010): 255–72. 
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
Wheat, Sue. “UK Development Aid.” Courier, 2000. 
337 
 
White, Howard, and Oliver Morrissey. “Conditionality: When Donor and Recipient 
Preferences Vary.” Journal of International Development 9, no. 4 (1997): 
497–505. 
Wikileaks. Antananarivo Pol/econ Update. Antananarivo: Embassy of the United 
States, January 20, 2010. 
———. Demarche on Assistance to Nicaragua Following Fraudulent Elections. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, December 17, 2008. 
———. Demarche Response: Spain Honoring Existing Aid Commitments to 
Nicaragua. Madrid: Embassy of the United States, December 24, 2008. 
———. Donor Coordination Mechanisms: Increasing Unites States Government 
Influence in Multi-Lateral Political Dialogue. Maputo: Embassy of the 
United States, February 19, 2010. 
———. Europeans and Canadians Consider Response to Mozambique’s Flawed 
Elections. Maputo: Embassy of the United States, December 4, 2009. 
———. French Worried by Madagascar. Paris: Embassy of the United States, April 
29, 2009. 
———. Goverment of Mozambique Responds Harshly to Donor Concerns on 
Governance. Maputo: Embassy of the United States, January 13, 2010. 
———. Local French Views on Malagasy Crisis. Antananarivo: Embassy of the 
United States, February 25, 2010. 
———. Madagascar: Elections within Six Months?. Antananarivo: Embassy of the 
United States, March 24, 2009. 
———. Madagascar/France: The U.S. and France “Share the Same Objectives.” 
Paris: Embassy of the United States, January 22, 2010. 
———. Madagascar International Contact Group: Preparing for the First Meeting. 
Antananarivo: Embassy of the United States, April 27, 2009. 
———. Madagascar: Political Process Moving Haltingly Forward, as Fault Lines 
Emerge among Partners. Antananarivo: Embassy of the United States, April 
8, 2009. 
———. Madagascar: UK Strongly Supports Usg Position. London: Embassy of the 
United States, April 14, 2009. 
———. Netherlands/Nicaragua: EU Divided on next Steps. The Hague: Embassy of 
the United States, November 21, 2008. 
———. Nicaragua: Finland Cuts Budget Support. Managua: Embassy of the United 
States, November 28, 2008. 
———. Norwegians Reluctant to Cut Aid for Nicaragua. Oslo: Embassy of the 
United States, December 23, 2008. 
———. Swiss Reaction to Call for Freezing Non-Humanitarian Assistance to 
Nicaragua Following Fraudulent Elections. Bern: Embassy of the United 
States, December 23, 2008. 
———. Urging Early Return to Constitutional Rule in Madagascar. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. State Department, April 10, 2009. 
338 
 
———. Zimbabwe: French Deny Pushing for Relaxation in Sanctions Regime. Paris: 
Embassy of the United States, May 4, 2009. 
———. Zimbabwe/UK/France: Sanctions and Leading in the EU. London: Embassy 
of the United States, April 24, 2009. 
Williams, Paul. “Blair’s Britain and the Commonwealth.” The Round Table 94, no. 
380 (2005): 381–91. 
———. “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 
909–29. 
Wiseman, John A. “The Rise and Fall and Rise (and Fall?) of Democracy in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” In Democratization, edited by David Potter, 272–93. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. 
Witt, Antonia. “Convergence on Whose Terms? Reacting to Coups d’État in Guinea 
and Madagascar.” African Security 6, no. 3–4 (2013): 257–75. 
Wiznitzer, Louis. “France’s Africa Policies Begin to Look a Lot like Washington’s.” 
Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1983. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0228/022855.html. 
Wong, Reuben, and Christopher Hill. “Many Actors, One Path? The Meaning of 
Europeanization in the Context of Foreign Policy.” In National and European 
Foreign Policy, edited by Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill, 210–80. 
London: Routledge, 2011. 
https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780203816035. 
Wood, Reed M., and Mark Gibney. “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-
Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI.” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 2 
(2010): 367–400. 
Wood, Robert E. From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development 
Choices in the World Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986. 
World Bank. “From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Sub-Saharan Africa: A Long-
Term Perspective Study.” World Bank Publications, 1989. 
World Bank, World. Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why (A World 
Bank. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Wright, Joseph. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian 
Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 (2009): 552–71. 
Wright, Joseph, and Matthew S. Winters. “The Politics of Effective Aid.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 61–80. 
Wright, Katy. “What Would DfID Look like under Labour?” Oxfam Policy & 
Practice, April 9, 2014. http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2014/04/what-would-dfid-look-like-under-labour. 
Yang, Fang. “EU Says No Suspension of Aid to Madagascar.” Xinhua News, March 
31, 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
03/31/content_11109011.htm. 
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Basingstoke, UK: SAGE, 
2009. 
339 
 
Younas, Javed. “Motivation for Bilateral Aid Allocation: Altruism or Trade 
Benefits.” European Journal of Political Economy 24, no. 3 (2008): 661–74. 
Youngs, Richard. “European Approaches to Democracy Assistance: Learning the 
Right Lessons?” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2003): 127–38. 
———. The End of Democratic Conditionality: Good Riddance?. Working Paper. 
Madrid: Spain: FRIDE, September 2010. 
———. “What Has Europe Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 
160–69. 
Zakaria, Fareed. “Africa’s Biggest Success Story.” CNN, July 17, 2009. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/. 
Zanger, Sabine C. “Good Governance and European Aid: The Impact of Political 
Conditionality.” European Union Politics 1, no. 3 (2000): 293–317. 
“Zimbabwe Official ‘Removed’ from UK.” BBC News, July 27, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2156337.stm. 
Zorbas, Eugenia. “Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the 
Rwandan  Paradox.” In Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights 
after Mass Violence, edited by Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, 103–18. 
Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 
Zounmenou, David. “Madagascar’s Political Crisis: What Options for the Mediation 
Process?” African Security Review 18, no. 4 (2009): 71–75. 
 
 
